Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam’s statements with regard to this matter. For seemingly, if the gift has a blemish that the recipient did not notice until later, he has the right to return it, as does the purchaser of an article who discovers a blemish. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam is referring to a blemish that was obvious from the outset.

This is somewhat of an overstatement. As the Rambam proceeds to state, these statements are equivalent to a formal renunciation of ownership. They are of no consequence with regard to the fact that the article is never returned to its original owner (Kessef Mishneh).
The Ra’avad and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 245:10) seek to clarify the Rambam’s statements, explaining that the law the Rambam mentions applies when the statements made by the recipient indicate his lack of desire to accept the gift. If, however, the recipient states that the gift was never properly acquired, his statements are accepted. The rationale is that when he testifies to the detriment of his own position, the statements of a principal involved in a judgment are accepted more than those of 100 witnesses. Therefore, if the recipient claims not ever to have received the gift, his statements are accepted. (See Halachah 13 and notes.)

Through a valid kinyan, as one takes possession of other ownerless property, as described in the previous chapters.

The Ramah (Ibid.) states that if the recipient has a creditor who can support his claim with a loan contract, the creditor acquires the article automatically. for he has a lien on all articles belonging to the recipient.

Through the statements that he made.

For a person cannot be compelled to accept property against his will.

The third party is considered to be a shaliach, “agent,” of the recipient, for we assume that the recipient would have desired that he be appointed in this capacity.

In which instance the property would be ownerless and could be claimed by anyone who takes possession of it, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 245:11) mentions a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether or not this question applies also with regard to a matnat sh’chiv me’ra (the deposition of an oral will). The Ramah, however, rules that such a distinction should not be made between that instance and an ordinary gift.

And hence, he felt no necessity to issue a protest.

In which instance the property would revert to the possession of the original owner, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

I.e., because of our doubt regarding the ownership of the article.

The original owner of the article might desire to reclaim the article as his own, maintaining that the recipient never accepted it, and so it reverts to his ownership, as stated in Halachah 1. His claim is not accepted, because there is no way of resolving the doubt mentioned above.

This ruling is not accepted by all authorities. As mentioned in the notes on Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 1:11, according to the Rambam, since the doubt remains unresolved, whichever of the two parties who have a claim to the article is in possession at the time is allowed to maintain possession. If, however, the other party takes possession by force, he is allowed to retain possession.
Other authorities do not allow the original owners to seize possession of the article by force. Since at the time the question first arose, the article was in the possession of the person who acquired it, he should be allowed to maintain possession.

A zuz is synonymous with a dinar.

Gittin 11 b states that saying “give to” is equivalent to saying “acquire on behalf of.” There is, however, a distinction between the two terms, as explained in Halachah 11 and notes.
As reflected in the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 125:6-7), this concept is not accepted by all authorities, and there are those who distinguish between “give to” and “acquire on behalf of.”

For according to the Rambam, in both instances the wording Reuven uses implies that Levi will serve as an agent and acquire the money on behalf of Shimon. Therefore, as soon as the money is given to Levi, Shimon acquires it.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 243:2) emphasizes that if the recipient is a poor person, the giver is not able to retract even if he uses this wording. Moreover, even if the recipient is wealthy, there are occasions where retracting can cause him to be considered faithless, as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 7:9.

For this choice of wording indicates that Reuven desires Levi to bring the money to Shimon, and for Shimon to acquire it himself. Therefore, Shimon does not acquire the money until it reaches his own domain.
As the Ra’avad emphasizes, these concepts apply only with regard to giving a gift. With regard to repaying a debt or returning a lost object, even if the person uses the expression “bring,” once the article is given to the agent he cannot retract. See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 16:2; Hilchot Sechirut 1:6.

By stating “bring,” Reuven did not transfer ownership of the money to Shimon. Hence, since Levi could not deliver the money, it should be returned to its legal owner.

I.e., in the event that Reuven died after Shimon did, before the money could be returned to Reuven (Maggid Mishneh).
Because of Shimon’s death, Levi can no longer fulfill the mission with which he was originally charged. Therefore, the money should be returned to its original owner or to his heirs.

I.e., in the event that Shimon died after Reuven did. Even though the money was not given to Shimon, the money should be given to Shimon’s heirs, because as soon as Reuven died, the money became Shimon’s, for the reasons the Rambam proceeds to explain. Thus, in the event of Shimon’s death, it should be given to Shimon’s heirs.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 12, with regard to the ruling when similar instructions are given when a person is allocating his property through the deposition of an oral will.

I.e., had the money been returned to Reuven before he died, there would be no obligation to give it to Shimon or his heirs. Nevertheless, since it remained in the hands of Levi, Reuven’s agent, it is a mitzvah to follow the instructions that Reuven gave.
It is only when the money (or article) is entrusted to a third party for this specific purpose, before the principal’s death, that this principle applies [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 252:2)]. Otherwise, it remains part of the principal’s estate and is transferred to the principal’s heirs.

As explained above, a person who acquires property on behalf of a colleague is acting as his agent. To serve as an agent, one must be past majority and mentally competent (Hilchot Shluchin 2:2).
As the Rambam proceeds to explain in the following halachah, even though in certain instances a minor can acquire property for himself, he cannot do so on behalf of others.

I.e., a woman married to anyone else besides the person giving the gift. A woman married to the person giving the gift cannot acquire property on behalf of another person unless she has a right to it herself [Maggid Mishneh; Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 243:14)].
The fact that a married woman does not have an independent financial capacity - but rather whatever she acquires for herself becomes encrusted to her husband - does not prevent her from acquiring property on behalf of another person (Hilchot Shluchin, loc. cit.).

I.e., a servant or maidservant belonging to anyone else besides the person giving the gift. A servant belonging to the giver of the gift cannot receive the property on behalf of another person, because the servant is considered an extension of his master (Maggid Mishneh, based on Eruvin 79b).

For, as stated in Hilchot Shluchin, loc. cit., a servant can serve as an agent. The only exception is an instance involving marriage or divorce.

Note the Siftei Cohen 243:5, who rules that a gentile can acquire property from a Jew on behalf of another gentile.

Hilchot Shluchin 2:1. There are opinions (Bava Metzia 72a) that maintain that a gentile can acquire property on behalf of a Jew, but the Rambam does not accept them.

Ibid..

He has obviously attained a certain degree of maturity.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 243:15) maintain that this applies even according to Scriptural Law. Although the Rambam has stated (Hilchot Gezelah 17:4, 12) that a minor has the right to acquire an ownerless object only according to Rabbinic law, different laws apply to receiving a gift. The rationale is that in these instances the consent of another person (the giver of the gift) endows the child’s act with greater legal power. Even so, with regard to the acquisition of property through a sale, although the consent of another person is also involved, the child’s acquisition is only Rabbinic in origin, as explained in Hilchot Mechirah 29:1.

For as reflected in Hilchot Gezelah 17:4, a greater level of understanding is required to acquire property on behalf of someone else than to acquire it for one’s own self.
A minor may acquire property on behalf of others according to Rabbinic Law. Therefore, a minor may be involved in the making of an eruv (Siftei Cohen 243:7).

According to Scriptural Law. He does, however, acquire it according to Rabbinic Law.

I.e., according to Scriptural Law. According to Rabbinic law, he has this capacity, as reflected in Hilchot Gezelah 17:12 (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 243:28).

For certainly a mentally incompetent person is no worse than the newborn child described in the following halachah (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 243:30). The Ketzat HaChoshen 243:6 takes issue with this point, for the child will eventually mature into a responsible adult, while it is possible that the mentally incompetent person will never attain competency.

But not for others [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 243:17)]. See Hilchot Gezelah 17:4,12, which explains that, although according to Scriptural Law a deaf mute is considered to be mentally incompetent, nevertheless, according to Rabbinic law he is given the right to acquire ownerless property. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 243:31 explains that, just like a child, he has the potential to acquire a gift according to Scriptural Law, because the consent of another person is involved.

It would appear that even according to Scriptural Law, the gift becomes the property of the minor.

I.e., an adult’s or a female minor’s. As the Rambam proceeds to explain, the courtyard functions as an agent, and a male minor cannot employ an agent.

Since, a the Rambam states in the following halachah, the article will be kept safe in the courtyard, it function like an agent. Therefore, it is given the halachic status of one.

When the courtyard is not protected, it cannot serve as an agent.

In his gloss on Hilchot Gezelah 17:8 (where these concepts are first raised), the Maggid Mishneh states that the intent is within his field, at its side. If he is outside the property, he does not acquire the object. See Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 200:1).

From Hilchot Gezelah 17:11, it is obvious that this law applies only to immobile objects.

If however, the per on is not standing there, or he is standing there but does not make such a statement, he does not acquire the object (Hilchot Gezelah 17:8).
The Rambam’s opinion is cited by the Shulchaii Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 243:21). The Tur and the Ramah (commenting on this law and on Choshen Mishpat 200:1) differ and maintain that with regard to a sale or a gift, it is not necessary for the courtyard 10 be safeguarded for the recipient (or purchaser) to be acquire a gift or purchase. As long as the giver (seller) is able to safeguard the object in an unprotected field belonging to the recipient, that is sufficient

This measure was chosen because it represents the height of an ordinary person standing with outstretched arms. This is as far as he can reach to pick up an article without leaving his place.

See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 268:3, which cites an opinion that maintains that a _person can acquire an object by virtue of its entering the four cubits adjacent to him only when he is standing still. If he is walking, this is not an effective means of acquisition.

Our Sages ordained that the area in a person’s immediate reach be considered equivalent to his private, guarded courtyard. In such an instance, he is not required to make a statement of intent regarding the acquisition of an article.

For the convention of four cubits is not effective there, nor on property belonging to another person (Hilchot Gezelah 17:9).

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 243:23, based on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi) writes that this applies only to a female minor who has been orphaned [or one who is married (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 243:39)]. For only in those instances does she have an independent financial capacity.
The Siftei Cohen 243:11, however, notes that there are many Rishonim who differ with Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and maintain that since this privilege is granted to a female minor who does not have a father, it is also granted to all female minors.

In Hilchot Gezelah 17:10, the Rambam writes:
[The rationale for these laws is that] we derive [the concept that] a female minor [may acquire property by virtue of its presence in her] courtyard from [the fact that] she is able to acquire an article that is placed in her hand. For just as she can be divorced by virtue of a bill of divorce being placed in her hand, so too can she be divorced by virtue of a bill of divorce being placed in her courtyard. And just as her courtyard is effective with regard to [the acquisition of] a bill of divorce, so too, it is effective with regard to [the acquisition of] a lost object.
[From this we also conclude that she may acquire an article by virtue of its presence in the area within a radius of] four cubits of her, for this area is considered her courtyard with regard to [the acquisition of] a lost article.

In Hilchot Gezelah, loc. cit., the Rambam explains:
The [potential for] a man [to acquire property by virtue of its presence in his] courtyard is derived, by contrast, from [the fact that] he is able to acquire an article via an agent. Just as an agent can acquire [an article] for him, so too, can he acquire [an article by virtue of its presence in his] courtyard. Since a male minor is incapable of charging an agent to act on his behalf, so too, he cannot acquire [an article by virtue of its presence in his] courtyard or in [the radius of] four cubits around him; it must reach his hand.
As stated in the notes on Hilchot Mechirah 29:10-11, the Ra’avad maintains that the above principles apply only with regard to the acquisition of ownerless property. With regard to a sale or a gift, since the consent of another person is involved, a male minor may acquire property placed in his courtyard. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 243:23) accepts the Rambam’s ruling.

See Hilchot Gerushin 2:6, which explains similar concepts with regard to a bill of divorce. The fundamental principle that applies in both instances is that an agent can be charged with an object to convey or a task to perform, but he cannot be charged merely with instructions to convey.

Even though three people constitute a Rabbinic court, their actions are not acceptable in this instance (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 244:2).

The Ra’avad adds that it is certainly not acceptable if these individuals write the deed themselves, for they were never charged with that responsibility by the giver.

The Ramban and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 244) do not accept this ruling and maintain that if these instructions are conveyed to the agent and followed, the gift is binding. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 244:1) mentions both views without stating which is to be followed.

This is a lesser situation than the previous one, for in the first instance the people received specific instructions to convey to the scribe, while in this instance they chose to entrust the task to the scribe on their own. Nevertheless, one might think that since they were capable of writing the deed on their own, they could also entrust that responsibility to an agent.

This ruling is accepted by the Tur. On this basis, we can appreciate the Tur’s interpretation of the principle: “Words cannot be conveyed by an agent.” When an agent is given instructions to perform a task, but is not given an article in his hand, he cannot convey those instructions to another person. See Tur (Even HaEzer 141).

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 245:1) emphasizes that if a person makes such statements verbally, they are not effective in transferring ownership over property unless he performs a kinyan to that effect. Nevertheless, if a person makes an admission of the fact that has has previously transferred property, his statement is accepted. (See the following halachah.)

All these expressions employ the past tense.

Since his statement employs the future tense, it is interpreted as merely a promise to give a gift; it does not effect a transfer of property. With regard to the use of the present tense, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 243:3) quotes an opinion that states that the document is acceptable. For unlike the future tense, it can be interpreted to mean that the article is being transferred at this time.

The Kessef Mishneh states that in such an instance, the use of the future tense would also be acceptable, for it could be interpreted to mean that the person is telling the witnesses that when they compose the deed (in the future), he will transfer the property to the recipient.

See Halachah 2.

The recipient is not rejecting the gift (see Halachah 1). but rather admitting not ever to have received it (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 245:7).

As stated in Halachah 2, without the knowledge of the recipient. Since it i possible to resolve the statements of the two principals in this manner, the transfer is binding.
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 245:4) tale that this ruling applies only when the giver has other unencumbered property. If, however, that is not so and a creditor of the giver is trying to expropriate this property as payment for a debt, the giver’s statement is not accepted.

I.e., to the recipient himself.

The commentaries raise the question: Why is the recipient’s statement accepted and not the giver’s? Just as the recipient is a principal, so is the giver.
The Rashba (in his commentary on Bava Batra 40b) offers two resolutions:
a) we suppose that the recipient will remember better than the giver, because the giver may have thought that he will give, but then changed his mind;
b) The property is in the possession of the giver, and it is the recipient who must prove that it is his. Since the recipient denies receiving the property, he cannot substantiate such a claim.

I.e., the produce that grew between the time the gift was given and the time the matter was brought to the attention of the court.

The Tur interprets this as referring to an instance when the son of the recipient claims to have been present when his father rejected the gift. Even so, we say that perhaps he was not aware of his father’s dealings and that later his father accepted the gift. If, however, he does not make such a statement, we assume that his father received the gift without his knowing about it. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 245:6) quote this understanding with the preface: “There are those who say that....”

The Maggid Mishneh differentiates between the instance described in this halachah and Halachah 1 as follows: In this halachah, the recipient is denying that he ever received the gift. In such an instance, we follow the maxim: The statements of a principal are considered equivalent to the testimony of 100 witnesses. Therefore, the gift is returned to its original owner. In Halachah 1, by contrast, the recipient admits receiving the gift, but wishes to disavow ownership.

This claim is significant if the recipient is being held liable for a debt, he lacks sufficient funds to pay it, and his creditor seeks lo expropriate the gift. If the recipient’s claim is accepted, the gift is returned to its original owner. Otherwise, it will be expropriated oy the creditor.

The Ra’avad and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 245) protest the Rambam’s· requirement of an oath. For seemingly, there is no reason t require the recipient to take an oath, denying the fact that he received the gift. The Maggid Mishneh admits the force of the Ra’avad’s argument, but rates that perhaps an oath is required if the recipient’s creditors are claiming the property. This interpretation is reflected in the statement of the law by Sefer Me’irat Einayim 245:12.

This law applies to a gift of movable property or of landed property when it has been io the recipient’s possession for more than three years. (See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 8:1, 11:1.)

The person who claims to have received the gift.

As in all cases where a person totally denies a claim lodged against him.

For the plaintiff is required to prove his claim, not the person in possession of the disputed article.

I.e., a person on his death bed. See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.

By giving the gift in a hidden manner.

However, when the purchaser(s) try to take possession of the article, he will discover that the recipient of the gift has the legal right to the property. (The Ra’avad apparently had a different version of the Mishneh Torah, and based on that version, explains the difficulty differently.)

As the Maggid Mishneh emphasizes, a hidden gift of movable property is also not effective. The Rambam mention landed property because movable property is not acquired through the transfer of a legal document unless another kinyan is also performed.

I.e., in public view, so that others will know about the matter.

See also the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 242:4), which clarifies that if the giver had the document written privately, but had it signed or given in a public manner, the gift is not considered to have been given in a hidden manner, and it is acceptable.

At present, registering the exchange of property in the deeds office is considered to be the most effective means of publicizing the transfer of property (Kin’at Eliyahu).

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:5) states that since it has become customary for all legal documents to be written in a conspicuous manner, even when the giver does not state explicitly that the document should be written in this manner, we assume that this was his intention. The Ramah, nevertheless, states that it is preferable that an explicit statement be made.

The Maggid Mishneh, the Tur and the Ramah [(Choshen Mishpat 242:8), based on Bava Batra 40b] state that we do not consider the deed recording the hidden gift as a protest invalidating the gift. (See the following halachot.)

Bava Batra, ibid., explains that there is a difference of opinion whether a hidden gift refers to a legal document that the giver instructs the recipient to hide, or one that does not state that it should be made public. As indicated by the Rambam, the latter view is accepted.

See Hilchot Mechirah 10:3, which states that in contrast to a sale or a compromise, a gift or a waiver of a debt is nullified if the person issues a protest beforehand, even if he is under no compulsion whatsoever.

Since the giver of a gift does not receive anything in return (in contrast to a sale), for the transfer of ownership to be effective he must desire to relinquish his hold on the object.

In contrast to the instance described in the previous halachah, in this instance there are two factors involved: a) his obvious desire not to give the gift, and b) the fact that he had given a hidden gift beforehand. Neither of these factors alone is sufficient to nullify the gift (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 242:14).

See Bava Batra 40b, which records this incident.

For when his father died, he would not receive anything.

The son.

Because the document he was given was hidden.

“As if he had been acting under duress,” because he had the option not to marry her (Maggid Mishneh).

The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 242:10) emphasize that were it not for the first gift, the second gift would be binding. For it to be nullified, it would have to have been accompanied by a protest.

The Rambam is speaking about an instance where the legal documents were transferred to the recipient without the transfer having been observed by witnesses. For had the transfers been observed by witnesses, the recipient who received the document first would acquire the field, as stated in the conclusion of the following halachah.

For we assume that the document that was written earlier was also transferred earlier (Maggid Mishneh).

This is the Rambam’s interpretation of the Talmudic expression (Ketubot 94a), 1m11 ‘l”11. The judges must try to determine who the rightful owner is. Tosafot (Bava Batra 35a) offer a different interpretation of that expression: that the judges arbitrarily decide to whom to award the field.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 240:3) states that this prerogative should be given only to a judge who is a :inou:i, “expert.” On this basis, the Siftei Cohen 240:5 questions what should be done in the present era.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 240:14 states that the statements of the giver or seller are not acceptable and cannot be used to determine the outcome.

For the kinyan affects the transfer of the property. The document is then no more than a legal record.

For we follow the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that the transfer of the property is made final when the witnesses observe the transfer of the legal document.

This presents a problem, because we do not know when the transfer of the property took place. The date of the transfer is significant, because from the date of the transfer the property is no longer on lien to any debts undertaken by the first owner and becomes on lien for debts undertaken by the second owner.

I.e., the giver agrees to reimburse the recipient for the value of the field if a creditor of the giver expropriates the field for a debt of the giver that was undertaken before the transfer of the field.

It is taken for granted that a person selling property will take responsibility for it if expropriated by his creditor for an unpaid debt. If we see a deed of sale that does not mention this factor, we assume that it was inadvertently omitted by the scribe. The seller is held responsible unless the deed states explicitly that he has no responsibility. (See Hilchot Mechirah 19:3.)

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Sh’chenim 12:5, 13:1, when a person sells landed property, his neighbors are given the option of buying it from the purchaser at the price he paid for it. This right is not granted when a field is given as a gift.
By giving the purchaser a document recording the transfer as a gift, the seller thus intended to prevent the neighbors from exercising their right to purchase the property from him. The commentaries debate, however, if he is legally entitled to do this, or if this is merely a technique of deception that would not be effective if brought to the court’s attention (Maggid Mishneh).
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 240:1) state that the purchaser/recipient has the right to nullify the neighbor’s claim only when he shows only the second document in court. If he shows both, it is considered a sale and the neighbor is given the right to purchase the property.

The giver or the seller granted the recipient the right to benefit from the trees in the field (Ketubot 44a).

I.e., the first document was valid. Afterwards because of the additional points mentioned in the second document, the second document was composed, and the matters mentioned in the first document were restated for the sake of specificity.
The Tur and the Maggid Mishneh explain that it is as if two separate contracts were made. The fundamental transfer of property takes effect from the date mentioned in the first document. The ownership of the additional points is transferred at the date of the second contract.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 240:2) adds that it is not necessary to say that this ruling applies when the second document is less inclusive than the first

If the field is expropriated by his creditor.

Ketubor, loc. cit., cites a difference of opinion between two Sages with regard to the rationale for this ruling. Rafram maintains that the second document indicate that the first was a forgery. Rav Acha maintains that the recipient was willing to release the initial owner from responsibility until the date of the second contract

When stating this Jaw, the Tur uses slightly different wording. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 240:8 notes the difference and explains that the Tur requires only that the produce that is in the recipient’s hand at present be returned to the original owner. He does not have to pay him from the produce that he consumed.

For until that date the property belonged to the original owner, and the produce is therefore al o rightfully his.

Ketubot, loc. cit., states that these are the halachic ramifications of Rafram’s position. The Maggid Mishneh explains that it is not that the halachah was decided in favor of Rafram. Instead, the matter remained unresolved. Nevertheless, since the property belonged to the initial owner, it is considered his until it is proven otherwise.

In general, we follow the principle דברים שבלב אינם דברים, “matters [left] in a person’s heart, and not explicitly stated, are of no consequence” (Kiddushin 49b). That said, there are exceptions, such as the case at hand, where the person’s intent is plainly obvious. See also Hilchot Mechirah 11:8.

As explained in Chapter 5, Halachah 1.

In contrast to the following halachah, the Rambam does not mention whether this law applies to a gift given while one is healthy, or only to an apportionment of one’s property before dying (matnar sh’chiv me’ra). The Ramban and the Tur (Choshen Mishpar 246) explain that it applies only to a dying man’ testament. For if it were speaking about gifts given by a healthy man, there is no reason to think that the property would be given to the son. For just as the person is not concerned with keeping the property for himself we assume he would not be concerned with keeping it for his son.
The Ramah however, differs and maintain that this law applies even when the giver is healthy. It is possible that a person will have given up all desire to own property himself, and yet would rather have that property go bis son than to others. The Shulchan. Aruch (Choshen Mishpa. r 246:2) quotes both opinions.

Instead, he would have retained it for his son to inherit.

For the fact that he retained some property, instead of apportioning his entire estate, indicates that he desired to leave an inheritance for his son.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that mentioning the son as the executor in a written document is an honor that compels his brothers to respect him. When, by contrast, the father merely makes these statements verbally, the principle stated above does not apply.
Based on Hilchot Nachalot 6:2, the Kessef Mishneh rejects this hypothesis. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 246:5.

The Tur and the Ramah follow the interpretation of the Rashbam (Bava Batra 130a) and state that if a dying man uses the expression “inherit,” the gift is binding. The Rambam’s understanding is based on the interpretation of the Sephardic teachers who preceded him, Rabbenu Chanan’el and Rabbenu Yitzehak Alfasi, and is perpetuated in the Slmlchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpar 246:4).

Although it is hardly likely that a father would desire that an infant be considered the executor, in order to establish uniformity our Sages maintained the above stated principle in this instance as well. It applies even when the other sons are adults and would not need an executor to control their management of their property.
The Slmlchan Aruch (loc. cit.) states that if the wording of the document indicates that the son is to receive the property mentioned as a gift (e.g., it explicitly states that the intent is that he receive it as a gift and not merely become the executor), it is given to him.

The fact that he kept a portion of the property for his other heirs indicates that he intended for the son he mentioned to actually acquire the remainder of the property. For had he merely intended to appoint him as executor, he could have appointed him as the executor of this portion of the estate as well (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 246:7).

The commentaries question the nature of the situation referred to. For if a person has even one son, his daughters are not considered heirs. Among the explanations given is that the “daughters” refer to granddaughters of the deceased - nieces of the son - who receive their father’s share of their grandfather’s inheritance. Alternatively, the intent is that usually women are given issur nechasim, one tenth of the estate of their father, to use for their dowries. (See Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 20.) By giving his entire inheritance to his son, the father is withholding this gift from his daughters.

I.e., if the estate falls to the deceased’s brothers, and he mentions one as the sole heir.

Although Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi describes this law as “a halachah without a rationale,” some explanation can be given. It is natural for daughters to respect a male heir. It is not necessary to make him executor to engender such respect. Therefore, if the father singled the son out in his will, we can assume that his words should be taken literally and the son should be given the entire inheritance.

The Rashbam (Bava Batra 131b) emphasizes that the husband must use the expression “gives.” If he states that she will inherit his property, she does not receive anything, for she is not a legal heir. See Hilchot Nachalot 6:2-5.

Thus, she does not acquire anything as her own. She does not, however, forfeit her right to the property due her by virtue of her marriage contract [Tur, Ramah (Even HaEzer 107:1)].
Note the comments of the Chelkat Mechokek 107:2, who questions whether the woman is granted the right to function as the executor if the heirs are past the age of majority.

Even though there is no necessity to confirm the appointment of an executor with a kinyan, we nevertheless assume this to be the husband’s intent. With regard to a kinyan and an oral deposition of property, see Chapter 8, Halachah 10.

This follows the logic explained in Halachah 2.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Ishut, according to Jewish law there are two phases in marriage, kiddushin or erusin, at which time a man consecrates a woman as his wife and causes her to be prohibited to all other men, and nisu’in., when he marries her, the couple consummate their relationship and live together as man and wife.

For in these instances, it i very unlikely that he would have appointed her as an executor.

I.e., and not only to the son who was mentioned explicitly. The rationale is that once the portion is given to the other person, the half of the estate that remains is the father’s entire estate. Thus, the law mentioned in Halachah 2 applies.

A woman who was merely consecrated or one who was divorced, or who was assigned her husband’s entire estate in a manner that clearly indicates that she was not only appointed an executor. If, however, she was only appointed an executor, she does not forfeit the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Maggid Mishneh).

When a woman marries, all her husband’s property becomes on lien to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Ordinarily, this lien takes precedence over all debts undertaken afterwards. Nevertheless, in this situation, the woman forfeits this lien for the reason the Rambam proceeds to explain.

So that she cannot use it to collect the sum mentioned in it in a court of law. The Chelkat Mechokek 107:8 suggests that the ketubah is not torn, for at times it may be used, as explained in the following note.

If, however, the gift predates the debt, any property owned by the husband at the time of the gift is not under lien to the debt. (See Beit Shmuel 107:7.) Moreover, if the husband acquired other property after giving his wife this gift, the woman may acquire the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from it [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 107:3)]

She may, however, collect her nedunyah - i.e., the payment for the property that she brought to the marriage (Beit Shmuel 107:8).

The fact that her husband assigned her his entire estate demonstrates his respect for her. This is a great source of satisfaction.

This halachah is based on the statements of the Mishnah (Pe’ah 3:8). In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam writes that this halachah applies only when the husband makes these statements while on his deathbed. If he makes such statements while he is healthy, the woman is allowed to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, unless the heirs can bring proof that she forfeited her claim.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 106:1) quotes the Rambam’s ruling in this halachah. The ShulchanAruch (loc. cit. 108:1) also states that when a husband on his death bed uses different wording and says: ‘May my wife take a share like my children,” she acquires that share, but does not forfeit her right to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

To forfeit her claim to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, the woman does not have to state her acceptance of her husband’s statements. All that is necessary is that she not protest. [Maggid Mishneh; Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.)].

In the Talmudic era, movable property was not considered as valuable as landed property. We assume that a woman would not forfeit her right to her ketubah merely for the right to receive movable property,

The rationale is the same given by the Rambam at the conclusion of the halachah. Since the woman may collect her due from a portion of the estate - the portion retained by her husband - she is given the right to collect it from the entire estate.

As the Rambam explains (Hilchot Ishut 16:7), in the era of the Geonim the socio-economic conditions of the Jewish people changed, and movable property became more valuable. Hence, the Geonim gave women (and other creditors) the right to collect their due from movable property.

See Beit Shmuel 106:6 who, on the basis of the enactment of. the Geonim, questions whether or not a woman who is given movable property in the present age forfeits the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

Without leaving heirs.

The share of the child who died is transferred to his father’s estate and from there to the father’s heirs. Since the woman retains the right to collect the money due her from property that accrues to her husband’s estate (Halachah 9), she may collect from this property.

To prevent her husband from taking control of her property and becoming her legal heir. See also Hilchot Ishut 22:9.

The property reverts to her ownership automatically. There is no need for a kinyan to confirm this. During the time she is married, however, the recipient derives the benefit from the property, as stated in the following halachah. It need not be given to the woman’s husband.
The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that this law applies even when the woman did not make a specific statement to this effect when transferring the property. The nature of the circumstances makes her intent readily apparent.

A the Rambam states in Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit., there are legal conventions that allow a woman to retain a portion of her property while giving away the remainder in this manner.

The Maggid Mishneh state that this principle does not apply when a gift is given by mistake, as stated at the beginning of this chapter. See, however, the explanation of this concept in Sefer Me’irat Einayim 246:23.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 9. Surely this applies in this instance, when it is possible that the gift will never be returned.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this applies only to gifts given by a healthy person. When, by contrast, a dying man is apportioning his property, we assume that he is giving it to his sons unless he explicitly states otherwise. See Chapter 11, Halachah 1.

Even if the person has daughters-in-law, we assume that he would rather give a gift to his daughters than to his daughters-in-law (Bava Batra 143b).

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 247:3 states that this principle stems from the fact that the person sending the gift uses the words: “Give these to ‘D.” For, even though •:c can be interpreted as “my children,” its more literal translation is “my sons.” See also the Bayit Chadash and the Siftei Cohen 247:1.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 247:2) quotes the opinion of the Tur, which states that these principles apply only when the man sending the gifts is no longer married. If he is married, we can assume that the gifts appropriate for women were intended for his wife.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 59:1) does not-mention that the bride must be a virgin. The Ramah adds this factor. The Chelkat Mechokek· 59: I states that there is no difference of opinion regarding this matter.

If, however, he married off a daughter first, it does not prevent the son from acquiring the home.

Our Sages assumed that only when the first two conditions are met will the father’s happiness be so great that he will desire to give his son a home. The third condition is an indication that this in fact was his desire. For the fact that he removed all his property from the home shows that he desired to transfer its ownership.
When stating this law, the Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.) add another condition: that the father must have another home in which to live.

The intent is not that there is no logical basis for this ruling, for on the contrary, the Rambam describes the logical basis immediately afterwards. Rather, the intent is that there is no halachic rationale why this transfer should be effective, for there are no kinyanim involved (Kin’at Eliyahu).

This rationale is added by the Rambam, although it is not found in Bava Batra 144a, the source for this halachah.

I.e., the father stated that he did not intend to give a particular utensil to his son.

I.e., in addition to the room in which the wedding is held, the house in which that room is situated has a loft, a porch or another apartment.

See Hilchot Ishut 23:13-15.

In Hilchot Ishut, the Rambam also states that this law applies when the commitments are made by the bride and the groom themselves.

With regard to the commitment made by parents, this law applies only with regard to a first marriage [Hilchot Ishut 23:14; Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 51:1).]

It is not necessary to formalize the transfer of the property through a kinyan. Instead, the transfer takes effect automatically at the time of the couple’s marriage.

The parents’ intent is not to give gifts to the bride and the groom as individuals, but to give the couple the wherewithal to start their lives together.

Note, however, the Chelkat Mechokek 51:4 which states that this applies only when the person giving the gift states that be is giving it as a gift. If he uses different wording, stating that he accepts an obligation upon himself. that obligation is binding even if he does not possess the articles he promised at the time he made that commitment.
(This is a very important ruling. One of the most common commitments made by parents is to provide food for the newly married couple for a given number of years. Now this food does not exist at the time of the engagement, and yet the commitment is binding.)

And an article that one does not own is considered as if it does not exist.

Hilchot Mechirah 22:5.

It does, however, establish a binding commitment with regard to the parents and the newly married couple, and if it has not been sold, it is considered to belong to them. The matter can be compared to the difference between a loan supported by a verbal commitment and one that is supported by a promissory note.

In both these instances, a formal divorce is necessary to dissolve the marriage bond.

Neither to him nor to his heirs.

We might think that the money should be returned, because certainly the groom gave it only for the sake of marriage. Nevertheless, were the money to have to be returned, one might think that the consecration was not binding and that the man is permitted to marry the sister of his first wife (Bava Batra 145a; Chelkat Mechokek 50:2).

E. g., a person consecrated a woman whose husband went overseas, and rumors were heard that he died. Since the consecration is not valid, the money must be returned to the groom (Chelkat Mechokek 50:6).
As reflected by this example, the intent is an error that is not a point of common knowledge. When the matter is a point of common knowledge, as in the instance stated in the following halachah, the money is considered to be a gift.

This Jaw applies also if the consecration was made conditionally and the condition was not kept, or there is a doubt about the validity of the consecration and it is not considered to be binding [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 50:1)]. Note, however, the statements of the Chelkat Mechokek 50:4 and the Beit Shmuel 50:5 regarding the latter point.

The precise meaning of the term m·, v is defined in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 1.

I.e., we take it for granted that the person knew this fact, and therefore had another intent when giving his sister the money.

Kiddushin 46b mentions another opinion, which states that we assume that he gave it for safekeeping, but that opinion is not accepted as halachah.
The Lechem Mishneh cites the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Gezelah 9:7, which speaks of a person buying a field that he knows does not belong to the seller. In that instance, the Rambam considers the money that the purchaser pays as having been entrusted for safekeeping, rather than given as a gift.
A distinction can, however, be made between the two instances. Our halachah speaks of a person’s sister - i.e., someone with whom we assume he shares close feelings. Therefore, we conclude that his intent was to give her a gift. There is no reason to assume that a person would show such generosity to the salesman mentioned in Hilchot Gezelah.

The Rambam includes this phrase, because one might think that a distinction would be made between a gift of significant value and one of lesser value.

With regard to the ruling when the woman retracts, see Halachah 23.

As reflected by the following halachah and by the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 9:5), if any of the gifts become destroyed, they are considered like food and drink, and need not be returned.

For he gave her the right to use them in her father’s home.

The Tur and the Ramah (Even HaEzer 50:3) differ and maintain that if the prospective groom did not partake of a betrothal feast in his father-in-law’s home, everything - even food and drink and articles of minor value - he gave his prospective bride must be returned. (For in such an instance, the prospective bride’s family did not suffer any loss.) And if he did partake of a betrothal feast in his father-in-law’s home, nothing - even articles that are still intact - need be returned. (For they also suffered a loss.)

The rationale is that we assume that if the prospective father-in-law had known that he was going to have to pay for the food, he would not have ordered expensive fare.

See the description of dina d’garmei in Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:7.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, comparing this to a well known case of grama dinezikin (Bava Batra 93b): A person sold garden seeds to a colleague. The purchaser sowed them and they did not grow. The seller is not liable for the costs undertaken by the purchaser in sowing the seeds.
The Maggid Mishneh supports the Rambam’s ruling, making the following distinction between the two cases. In the case mentioned in Bava Batra, the purchaser sought to profit. Therefore, he must undertake a certain risk. In this instance, the prospective groom was not entering a business arrangement; he was merely fulfilling his social responsibilities. Therefore, since the woman was the cause of his loss, she should bear the responsibility.

This option is granted in certain cases (see Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 4:1; Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:17), but not here. A distinction can be made between those instances and the case at hand. In those instances, a person willfully stole or damaged a colleague’s property. Therefore, our Sages imposed a penalty on them and accepted the plaintiff’s oath. In this instance, although the woman caused her prospective husband a loss, she did not intend to do so, and there is no reason for her to be subjected to a penalty.