Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Both these terms mean “interest.” In his Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 245), the Rambam reckons the two injunctions mentioned here as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. Note also Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 343). See Note 3.
This subject - the prohibitions against interest - is the subject of the next seven chapters. After having outlined in the first three chapters the basic obligations to lend money to one’s colleague, the Rambam explains the details concerning a prohibition that is intrinsically related to this issue - taking interest. And then in the remaining chapters, he speaks about difficulties that might arise in the collection of the debt.
The Rambam’s inclusion of the prohibition against interest in this context has aroused the attention of the commentaries, who note that the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch do not discuss interest in Choshen Mishpat - the section devoted to monetary law - but rather in Yoreh De’ah, the portion of their texts that deals with the Torah’s chukim, prohibitions whose motivating rationale is not understood by human logic - e.g., kosher food, the laws of family purity and the like.
It is possible to explain that this classification is itself significant. The Rambam considers the prohibition against interest a point of monetary law and therefore includes it here. According to his perspective, it is improper to take interest. Doing so involves taking money that is not justly earned and bears a resemblance to theft (See the notes on Halachah 3; see, however, the notes on Chapter 5, Halachah 1.)
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, by contrast, place the prohibition against interest in Yoreh De’ah. According to their perspective, if the Torah did not prohibit taking interest, there would be no reason to forbid it. On the contrary, one of the cornerstones of financial thinking is that money makes money, and a person can justly expect a return for his money. Why is interest prohibited? For spiritual reasons that we do not understand, just like non-kosher food or a woman in her menstrual state.

This is the literal meaning of the Hebrew term.

The Rambam’s statements literally mean “to violate two transgressions because of it.” The intent is not, however, that there are two prohibitions, for as mentioned above, the Rambam mentions them as a single prohibition in Sefer HaMitzvot.
In his introduction to Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 9), theRambam elaborates on this concept, explaining that with regard to the prohibition against taking interest - as in the case of other Scriptural prohibitions - the Torah warns against their violation several times. These warnings are intended to emphasize the seriousness of the prohibition and are not to be considered to be a separate Scriptural commandment, for the activity prohibited is the same.

Indeed, Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 236) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 572) consider this to be one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. This concept can be derived from the fact that in contrast to the passage as a whole, which is written using the singular, this verse is stated in the plural. The implication is that the prohibition involves not only the lender, but also the many other people involved.

The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 160:1) quotes the Hagahot Maimoniot, which add that all the prohibitions mentioned apply even when the lender is poor.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 237) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 68) consider this to be one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. With regard to the status of the witnesses to a loan at interest, see the notes on Halachah 6.

For one can assume that a person who lends money at interest will press the borrower for payment. See Maggid Mishneh.

This is a general prohibition against performing an activity that will cause a colleague to sin.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that Bava Metzia 75b, the source for the Rambam’s statements mentions a third prohibition (Deuteronomy 23:21): “To your brother, do not offer interest,” and questions why the Rambam does not include it.

They do not violate the prohibition against placing a stumbling block in front of the blind, because they are not the instigators of the transgression. Tosafot (Bava Metzia 75b) explains that it depends whether or not the loan would be given without their involvement. If it would not have been given otherwise, they are liable for this transgression as well.

Since this person is not directly involved in the actual process of the loan, he does not violate any of the prohibitions against taking interest. He is, however, liable for violating the general prohibition against giving unworthy advice to a colleague.

And whenever a prohibition can be rectified by making financial restitution, the person is required to make restitution and is not punished by lashes. See the ruling in Hilchot Gezeilah 1:1.
Bava Metzia 62a interprets Leviticus 25:36: “And your brother shall live together with you,” as a charge requiring the lender to return the interest to the borrower. It is as if the Torah were saying: “Return it to him so that he may live.” The Ramban (in his Hosafot to Sefer HaMitzvot) reckons this as one of the 248 positive commandments. The Megilat Esther explains that the Rambam does not give it that distinction because he consider it to be included in the commandment to return a stolen article.
The commentaries question why the guarantor, the witnesses, the scribe and the others involved in the loan are not punished with lashes, for there is no act they can perform to rectify their error. Among the resolutions offered (Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 73) is that since the lender is not punished by lashes for this transgression, as stated above, it is not appropriate that the accessories to the loan be given more severe punishment than he.

I.e., at the time the loan was given, a fixed amount or percentage was stipulated to be repaid as an increment to the lender.

In contrast to interest forbidden by Rabbinic law, which - as will be explained in Halachah 6 and in Chapter 6, Halachah 1 - is not expropriated by the court.

Indeed, he may be compelled physically to return it. It cannot, however, be expropriated from his property without his knowledge [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 161:5)].

In his gloss on the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 161:6), the Dagul Mer’vavah questions whether a person who took interest is obligated to return the interest to the heirs of the person from whom he took the interest. There is room to postulate that since the obligation to return the interest is derived from the verse: “And your brother shall live together with you,” that obligation does not apply once he is no longer alive. He explains that when a person seeks to repent fully, he should try to return the money. The court, however, is not empowered to expropriate it.

For the prohibition against taking interest and the mitzvah to return it are incumbent on the father, not the son (Turei Zahav 161:4).

This indicates that the mitzvah to return the interest is incumbent on the gavra, the person who committed the transgression, and not on the cheftza, the money itself. The person must atone for his own sin. There is no obligation that the money itself be returned. Therefore, when the person dies, his heirs - who did not perform the transgression - return the money. See Bava Kama 112a.

I.e., an article that will be recognized by people at large as having been taken by the sons' father through interest (Turei Zahav 161:5).

See Hilchot Mamrim 6:5, which states that a person must honor his parents after their death.

For the public knowledge that their father committed a transgression will shame his memory. I.e., even in this instance, the obligation is not to return the article, but rather to preserve their father’s honor. That, however, can be accomplished only by returning the article.

For after their death, a person is obligated to give a full measure of respect and honor to his parents only when they conducted themselves righteously. During their lifetime, by contrast, regardless of a parent’s conduct, a son is obligated to show him honor (Hilchot Mamrim 6:11).

I.e., at their own initiative. As stated in Halachah 3, if, by contrast, a person who took interest persists in his wrongdoing, he should be compelled to return the money by the court, as stated in Halachah 3.

Bava Kama 94b relates that there was a person who had lent money at interest. He felt an urge to repent and began to consider returning the money he had taken. When his wife saw him contemplating this, she reproached him: “If you return what you have taken, you will have nothing left. You will have to sell even the shirt off your back.” When the Sages heard this, they ordained that people should refuse to accept the penitent gifts of robbers and people who lent money at interest.

See the Hagahot Maimoniot and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 161:7) who state that this applies only when the primary occupations of the lender was to lend money at interest. If, however, he earns his livelihood through other means, but also lends at interest, one may accept repayment.

The commentaries have noted the difference in the wording used by the Rambam. With regard to a stolen article, the Rambam uses the wording “was intact” - i.e., even when it was not specific, while with regard to an article taken as interest, he speaks of “a specific article.” Nekudot HaKesef 161:7 notes that the Perishah and Rabbenu Yerucham interpret the law as referring to any article taken through interest, even one that others will not recognize. Nekudot HaKesef refutes this interpretation, explaining that a stolen article remains its owner’s property until: a) the owner despairs of its return, and b) it is given by the robber to someone else. Therefore, as long as it exists intact, it should be returned. Money given as interest, by contrast, legally belongs to the person to whom it was given. Hence, it is only a specific article that people will associate with the interest that must be returned.

Which is forbidden by Scriptural Law.

The Maggid Mishneh states that there are commentaries that explain this ruling as follows: Bava Metzia 72a mentions an opinion that disqualifies the promissory note entirely and considers it of no legal value, as punishment for the fact that it mentions interest. This opinion is, however, not accepted as halachah. Instead, despite the fact that the witnesses to the promissory note violate a prohibition (see Halachah 2), the promissory note is valid. The reason that the witnesses are not disqualified is that the prohibition is not of common knowledge. According to this view, the principal can be collected even from property that has been sold.
The Ramban differs and states that if the witnesses to the promissory note knew that it involved interest, the witnesses - and therefore the promissory note itself - are disqualified. The principal cannot be collected from property that is sold. Moreover, the only way it can be collected from property in the borrower’s possession is when the borrower acknowledges the loan or when there are other witnesses to the loan besides those who signed the promissory note. The Ramban does, however, offer an explanation for the baraita (Bava Metzia 72a) on which the Rambam’s ruling is based, stating that it applies when the interest was not specified in the promissory note, and the witnesses did not know that the loan involved interest. Alternatively, it applies in a situation when they were compelled at the pain of death to sign the promissory note.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 161:11; Choshen Mishpat 52:1) rules that when a promissory note includes interest, the lender may collect the principal, provided a distinction is made between the principal and the interest. From this (and from his statements in Choshen Mishpat, Chapter 34), it appears that he does not disqualify the witnesses and the promissory note. If, however, the interest and the principal are lumped together as a single sum, the promissory note is disqualified and even the principal cannot be collected unless the borrower admits his obligation.

I.e., when the lender sues for payment of the debt, he is not entitled to collect this interest.

If it was paid and then the borrower seeks to have the money expropriated by the court. The lender does, however, have a moral and spiritual obligation to return it [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 161:2)].

The verse reflects a thematic connection. The lesson from the exodus is that not only is God in the heavens, but His providence controls the events that transpire here on earth. Now when a person lends or borrows money at interest, what he is implying - whether or not he consciously admits it - is that he feels that God will not manifest His providence in a manner that will enable him to earn his livelihood in a permitted manner. (See Maggid Mishneh.)

Our translation reflects the Rambam’s understanding of Bava Metzia 75a. Although this understanding is also indicated by the rulings of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 160:8), the commentaries note that the wording of the Talmud suggests that the person is lending to his sons, not borrowing from them.

I.e., he is not giving them the increment because the conditions of the loan obligated him to do so, but out of his own generosity.

Our Sages feared that once they tasted the possibility of receiving an increment for money without effort, this would spur them to continue seeking financial gain in this manner.

It would appear that according to the Rambam, this concept applies even when the borrower promises at the outset to give the lender more than he received from him. As long as the lender does not stipulate that the borrower must pay more, this is permitted. There are, however, other opinions, which maintain that this leniency applies only with regard to food items (as could be postulated based on the story from Bava Metzia 75a, which serves as the source for this ruling), and only when the interest is only a small amount (Maggid Mishneh).
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 160:17) and the Ramah accept the latter perspective. The Hagahot Maimoniot and the Ramah add that even Torah scholars should not make it a custom to make such loans, lest the common people observe their conduct and become less conscious of the seriousness of the prohibition against taking interest.

The Turei Zahav 160:13 quotes the Hagahot Asherei, which state that different laws apply with regard to a common person. Paying more than the principal is forbidden even if he explicitly states that he is giving the increment as a present.

There are some printings of the Mishneh Torah that do not include this clause or place it in brackets. Nevertheless, it is included in the text of the Maggid Mishneh and is also logical within the context of these laws that deal with a borrower paying more than the principal.

I.e., we do not consider the extra amount to be interest. This applies even if a Torah scholar is not involved.

As stated in Hilchot Gezeilah 1:8, this is considered to be an effective manner of returning stolen property. It is not necessary to notify the person from whom the property was stolen. We assume that he will become aware of the extra amount.

Bava Metzia 63b offers this explanation with regard to a person who is stingy and is unlikely to give a present.

I.e., in a situation where the two never had any contact before, we assume that this was the reason he gave him the extra amount (ibid.).

I.e., it is obvious that an error of one (when a person counts individually) or two (when he counts in pairs) can be made. The Maggid Mishneh states that if it is local custom to count according to other groupings, the possibility of erring with regard to that number is also taken into consideration. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 232:2) quotes this ruling.

I.e., there were six or eleven extra.

It was customary for a person to place an additional coin next to a group of five or a group of ten. When he was finished counting, he would count the ones to know the entire sum. Perhaps this coin became mixed with the group.

The Maggid Mishneh interprets this phrase to mean that the lender lent the borrower produce or merchandise worth such and such, stipulating that he be repaid an amount in the currency used in a particular locale.

In Talmudic time, the value of coinage and its weight were dependent on each other. In other words, unlike the present age, when a coin’s value is merely symbolic. In that era, a dinar was worth an equivalent weight of silver, no more and no less. There were times when the ruling authorities would increase the weight of the local coinage by a specific percentage.

I.e., before the increase in the weight of the currency, a dinar could purchase a pound of wheat; and after the increase, it could purchase a pound and a quarter.

In the above instance, since the old coinage is now worth only 4/5 of the present coinage, he should pay only 4/5 of the sum mentioned in the promissory note or the ketubah. If the lender does not make such a deduction, there are authorities who consider this to be interest forbidden by Scriptural Law, and others who maintain that it is forbidden only by Rabbinic Law [Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 165)].
We rely on the local professionals who are knowledgeable concerning such manners with regard to the determination of whether the price of produce has risen or not. Even if they are gentiles, we accept their statements provided they are made in the course of conversation - i.e., without the gentile knowing that his word is being relied upon [Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 165:1)].

The Maggid Mishneh states that if there are other countries where the old coinage is still employed, and the lender can travel there easily, the borrower may pay him in the original coinage.

The Siftei Cohen 165:3 states that this law applies even when the price of the produce was reduced because it was a year of plenty. Since the increase in the weight of the coin did not increase its buying power, an adjustment need not be made.

I.e., despite the increase in the hard metal value of the coin, its buying power remained the same.

In many contexts - e.g., the obligation to pay an additional fifth for terumah when it was eaten unintentionally, when returning a stolen article and the like - the Rambam defines a fifth as “a fifth of the new total.”

The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 165) explains why the figure one fifth was chosen. Since there is no difference in the buying power of the new coin, a person who possesses one might think of melting several of them down and printing copies of the older, smaller coin. If the addition is no more than one fifth, this will not be a worthwhile proposition, because the jeweler who fashions the new coins will charge for his services. If, however, the new coin weighs more than a fifth more, such a proposition could become conceivable.

I.e., in the appropriate circumstances, he is required to pay an increased amount. Making such an adjustment is not considered to be interest.

If, however, a new coinage is instituted without the previous coinage being disqualified entirely, loans in the previous coinage should be paid in that coinage even though its value depreciated significantly (Rambam in one of his responsa).

Since that coinage is still legal tender in an accessible place, the borrower may repay him in that coinage, because that was the original stipulation. We do not consider significant the fact that the lender will be compelled to undergo some extra difficulty to journey to the other country.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rambam uses the same wording as in the previous halachah, indicating that this also refers to a situation where the lender gave the borrower produce or merchandise, but attached a monetary value to it. Taking this concept further, there are authorities who maintain that if, at the outset, the loan was made in coinage, it can be returned using that coinage, even if the coinage has been disqualified. It does not appear, however, that the Rambam makes such a distinction.

Or if the country in which the person is living has regulations forbidding taking such coinage to the other country [Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 74:7)].

See Hilchot Ishut 16:6. Several points mentioned there also relate to the previous halachah.

A formal act of contract attesting to his willingness to be bound by the stipulations he makes.

I.e., the court will expropriate it for him.

The Rambam’s wording indicates that although he differs with the Geonim with regard to interest that is already in the possession of the lender, he does not necessarily differ with regard to interest that has not yet been paid. It would seem that he would not desire the borrower to pay the additional amount (Maggid Mishneh).

Bava Kama 92b, as quoted in Halachah 5.

See Hilchot Nachalot 11:1, where the Rambam describes this arrangement in detail; he mentions it here only to emphasize that the prohibition against taking interest is superseded.

Since it is not a loan, but rather an investment that involves commercial dealings, and profit is not guaranteed, it is forbidden only by Rabbinic Law, not by Scriptural Law.
See Chapter 5, Halachah 8, which forbids this type of investment and instead advises the employment of a heter iska, an arrangement where the potential for profit and loss are equally balanced, and the person managing the investment receives a wage. See Hilchot Sh'luchin V'Shutafin, Chapter 6, with regard to the particulars involved in such arrangements.

I.e., our Sages felt that the need to protect the financial future of the orphans takes precedence over employing safeguards for the prohibition against taking interest.

The term “resident alien” refers to a gentile who has formally accepted the observance of the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants. For this reason, he is granted permission to dwell in Eretz Yisrael. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6.
The Lechem Mishneh notes that although the verse (Leviticus 25:36), “And your brother shall live with you,” is also applied to a resident alien, it is permitted to take interest from him. This implies that lending at interest is not taking unfair advantage of the borrower.

Note the Maharam of Padua, who interprets this as referring to an idolater. He explains that one may lend to a resident alien at interest, but there is no obligation to do so. With regard to an idolater, by contrast, it is a mitzvah to charge interest. See the following notes.

Our translation is based on Chapter 4, Halachah 2, which cites this verse as the source for the prohibition against borrowing - not lending - money at interest. Significantly, in the summation of these mitzvot at the beginning of these halachot, the Rambam defines the mitzvah as “to borrow and lend money to a gentile at interest.” The Kessef Mishneh questions: “How can borrowing from a gentile at interest be considered a mitzvah? Why should we bring him benefit?” Based on the explanation in note I, one might say that since lending at interest is the ordinary pattern and is considered fair business practice, it is proper to borrow from a gentile at interest.

Sifri in its commentary on the verse.

See Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 198) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 573), which include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. The Ra’avad - and his view is supported by the Ramban (Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 6), the Maggid Mishneh, the Rashba and others - differs with the Rambam and states that this charge is not considered a positive commandment. They interpret the Sifri as speaking about a loan given to a Jew, and explain that if such a loan is given at interest, both a positive and negative commandment are violated.
The Migdal Oz supports the Rambam’s decision, noting that we are prohibited against being gracious to a gentile (Deuteronomy 7:4). As explained in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:4, this prohibition is interpreted as meaning that we may not give a gentile a present without charge. Now, since lending at interest is the ordinary pattern of the world, giving them a loan without interest would be equivalent to giving them a present. (See also the statements of the Maharam of Padua.)
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 159:1) use the expression: “According to Scriptural Law, it is permitted to lend money to an idolater at interest.” The implication is that making such a loan is permitted; there is, however, no mitzvah to do so.

Which our Rabbis modified, as the Rambam continues to explain in the following halachah.

According to the Rambam, our Sages’ prohibition involves the negation of a Scriptural commandment. Nevertheless, the Sages have this power, since one is not performing a deed to violate the Torah’s command.

The Tur explains that the later Rabbis abrogated this decree and permitted Jews to make loans to gentiles, even for profit. He explains the rationale for this license as follows. “At present... there is no way that we can make a profit from any business dealings unless we engage in financial transactions with [gentiles]. If so, there is no greater concern that one will learn from the gentile’s deeds with regard to interest than there is with regard to any other commercial dealings.”
The Maggid Mishneh mentions another reason for the license: Since extensive taxes are levied against the Jews and the cost of living is high, any profit can be considered as merely “earning one’s livelihood.” These opinions are echoed by the ShulchanAruch (Yoreh De’ah 159:1).

For he will seek out the gentiles' company so that he can make loans to them.

To avoid payment.

Because of their involvement in Torah study.

Since even for a Jew these activities are not forbidden by Scriptural Law, our Sages did not establish a safeguard for a safeguard, and did not forbid them when a gentile is concerned.

I.e., the Jew paying the Jew interest.

For the original borrower is not considered to be the gentile’s agent, but instead a principal acting independently.

Although the money was brought to the gentile, the gentile might desire that the original loan remain in force, because he knows and trusts the first Jew, but not the second.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 168:1) states that the restriction applies even if the second Jew composes a legal document acknowledging his debt to the gentile and pays the interest directly to him. As long as the original borrower is not freed of the obligation, the second loan is forbidden.

And thus free the original borrower from his obligation.

We do not consider the gentile to be acting as the agent of the Jewish lender, but rather as a principal. Thus, the two Jews have no direct association with each other. The Jewish borrower owes the gentile, who in turn owes the original lender. Hence, interest is permitted for both loans. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 168:6) states that this applies even when the Jewish borrower informs the Jewish lender of this arrangement.

I.e., it is forbidden by Scriptural Law. The rationale is that in this instance, the gentile is considered to be acting as the Jew's agent. Although generally, a gentile cannot be considered to be a Jew’s agent, with regard to prohibitions we adopt a more severe stance and place him in that role (Maggid Mishneh, explaining the positions of Rabbenu Chanan’el, Rashi and Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi).
This conception is not shared by all authorities. The Ramban and the Rashba consider this only as equivalent to “a shade of interest,” for, according to Scriptural Law, a gentile can never be considered to be a Jew’s agent. The practical difference between these two positions centers around whether the money taken may be expropriated by the court (as is appropriate if forbidden by the Torah) or not.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 168:6) follows the more lenient view. Moreover, the Ramah mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Tam, who maintains that such an arrangement is permitted; even according to Rabbinic law, there is no prohibition involved.

Without ever returning it to the original lender. And thus, one Jew never gave money to the other.

Our translation is based on the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 160:3) offer another interpretation of this concept, stating that it means pretending that the money in his possession belongs to a gentile.

With the intent of splitting the profits between themselves.

In contrast to the practice required by Scriptural Law, as the Rambam states in Chapter 25, Halachah 3. Note the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 170:1-2), which question if the intent is that according to the gentile practice, the lender would go straight to the guarantor and does not have the right to demand payment from the borrower. Or perhaps the intent is that the gentile practice is similar to that of an erev kablan in our laws, and the lender can demand payment from either the guarantor or the borrower, as he ch, ooses.

It would be forbidden for the borrower to pay the guarantor - because we consider the guarantor as having undertaken the debt and the interest - and then charging the Jewish borrower that interest. Hence, interest is paid from Jew to Jew. The fact that the original lender was a gentile is not of consequence.
The Tur and the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 170:1) state that, after the fact, if a fellow Jew acted as a guarantor, the borrower is required to repay the principal and reimburse him for any other loss he suffered. He is not, however, required to reimburse him for the interest.

In such an instance, even if the gentile requires the guarantor to pay the interest, it is considered as if the guarantor lent the borrower one lump sum (the principal and the interest). The borrower repays this sum to the guarantor without interest.
The Tur and the Ramah state that at present, it is taken for granted that the gentile agreed to approach the borrower first. Hence, such loans are permitted even if such a stipulation is not explicitly stated.

Tallying the principal and the interest as a single sum.

For the convert had already accepted liability for the entire sum before his conversion (Turei Zahav 171:1; Siftei Cohen 171:1).

The Maggid Mishneh quotes opinions that maintain that the lender should be entitled to collect all the interest due before he converted. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that a more stringent perspective be followed. Hence, they made everything dependent on when the reckoning was made. Otherwise, it might appear that one was taking interest from a Jew.

I.e., so that he would not have to pay the interest.

There is a difference of opinion if the borrower is liable even though a reckoning was never made. The Rashba maintains that the convert is liable, while the Maggid Mishneh cites other views - and maintains that the Rambam shares their opinion - that the convert is not liable unless a reckoning is made. See the Siftei Cohen 171:3, who rules that one should be stringent and follow this conception.

Implied is that the convert is not liable for the interest on the loan that accrued after the conversion, even when a reckoning was not made until after the conversion. This opinion is also shared by the Ramah and apparently quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 171:1). Significantly, however, Rabbenu Asher maintains that the lender may collect all the interest that accrues - even after the conversion - until a reckoning is made.

The Rambam maintains that it is a mitzvah to lend money to a gentile at interest (Halachah 1). That mitzvah is, nevertheless, superseded by the mitzvah of lending to a fellow Jew (Merkevat HaMishneh).

Our translation in this and the following clause is based on the interpretation of the Shitah Mekubetzet to Bava Metzia 70a.

Since an investment is involved and there is a possibility of loss, receiving the profit is not considered to be taking interest as forbidden by Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, since the likelihood of profit is high, our Sages considered it similar to interest and forbade it.

For disobeying our Sages’ charge (Shitah Mekubetzet, loc. cit).

See Hilchot Sh'luchin V'Shutafim 6:1-2, which explains the legal construct known as hetter iska as follows: Half of the money with which the investor endowed the partnership is considered a loan to the manager, and half as an investment. Thus, the borrower/manager is entitled to half the profits (for the money given as a loan is his), and the lender/investor to half the profits (for the other half of the money is his). Our Sages, nevertheless, forbade these arrangements, because they resemble interest. The borrower/manager is managing the lender/investor's money without charge, in return for having received the loan. They required the lender/investor to take either of the two measures mentioned at the conclusion of the following halachah to remove all similarities to interest.

Our Sages define a pious person as one who goes beyond the letter of the law and is willing to sacrifice his own interests in favor of a colleague.

In these two instances, the storekeeper and the produce wholesaler will not invest any capital and will receive half the profits of the sales as their wages.

In this instance, a profit will be reaped by selling the hatched chickens, for they are far more valuable than the eggs. The investor buys the eggs, and the manager has his chickens sit on them until they hatch.

A donkey or a cow will be worth far more in a year or two than it is directly after birth. The investor purchases the young animals, and the manager takes care of them until they reach the desired size.

These arrangements also resemble a hetter iska, as described in the previous halachah. Unless the manager is given one of the advantages that the Rambam mentions, the arrangement is forbidden, because it resembles interest.

In which instance he is not working in return for receiving the loan, but is instead working for the wage he receives.

Such a profit-sharing arrangement is considered tantamount to receiving a wage.

See Hilchot Sh’luchin V’Shutafim, Chapter 8.

I.e., the investment will not lead to a profit, but the lender/investor will not believe the borrower/manager and will require him to pay the entire sum stated in the promissory note. Since there will be no profit, this extra amount will be interest.
The Siftei Cohen 177:48 writes that this applies even if the promissory note states that the investment was an iska, for there is a possibility that an error might occur.

I.e., instead of the document recording the investment stating that the money was given as an iska, it would state that it was given as a loan.
The Siftei Cohen 177:49 states that even the principal may not be recorded as if it were a loan. For the heir will not know that it was an investment and will demand payment of the entire sum. Hence, if there is a loss, he will be demanding money unfairly.

I.e., if the entire sum was written as if it were a loan, the heir will demand payment of the entire sum, regardless of whether there was a loss or a profit. Thus, if in fact there was a loss, if the borrower/manager paid the entire amount, it would be considered interest.

Even if he does not state that he is giving the present for the sake of receiving a loan. This is the interpretation of the Rambam’s conception by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 160:6). The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that as long as the potential borrower does not say that the present is being given for the sake of the loan, there is no difficulty in giving such a present.

In this instance as well, the other perspectives maintain that if the borrower does not state that he is giving the present because of the loan, the present is permitted.

Since the obligation to pay interest was not stated at the time of the loan, the Scriptural prohibition against interest has not been violated.
Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 5:11), the Rambam writes: “The words of Rabban Gamliel [who states that such gifts are considered interest] are correct, but one must know that these matters and the like are very shameful.” Rav Kapach notes that this wording represents a change from his wording in the first edition of the Commentary on the Mishnah, and maintains that the Rambam adopted the perspective that this considered interest according to Scriptural Law. Others, however, maintain that the Rambam’s intent is that there is no question even of “the shade of interest” - merely shameful behavior.

Davar, translated as “types,” literally means “word.” Bava Metzia 75b explains that even words can be considered interest.

See the notes on Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:7, which explain that there are opinions that maintain that it is permitted to charge a fee for teaching adults Scripture. All agree that it is forbidden to charge for teaching Talmud. Nevertheless, even in places where it is customary not to charge for teaching Scripture, a borrower may not do so unless he was accustomed to doing so previously.

Since he was accustomed to teaching the lender previously, he is not doing him a favor because of the loan.

The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 160) and the Turei Zahav 160:5 raise a question: Seemingly, the lender is asking the borrower to provide the guest with services that are worth money. Why then does he mention this law together with other prohibitions involving interest associated with speech? [Indeed, on the basis of this question, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 160:12) interpret Bava Metzia 5:11 (the source of. this halachah) as meaning “Notify me if so and so from this and this place is coming.”]
The Turei Zahav, however, explains that this is speaking about an instance where the borrower would honor the guest regardless. Hence, there is no prohibition involved. Nevertheless, it is forbidden for the lender to make this request of the borrower, for he is receiving benefit from having given the loan.

I.e., a person may purchase a $100 check from a colleague that is post-dated for 6 months for $90. Although this resembles interest, for he is receiving an increase of $10 over his investment, it is permitted, provided he accepts the risk of the check’s bouncing. If, however, he will hold the seller of the check responsible for the loss, this is forbidden. Since the possibility of profit is great and the likelihood of loss is small, it resembles interest [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 173:4)].

Even if the borrower did a favor for the person who paid the money so that the lender would offer the loan, it is permitted as long as he does not pay him actual cash. This is the opinion of the Maggid Mishneh. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 160:13), however, quotes an opinion that forbids this as well.

Even the son of the lender, provided he maintains an independent financial capacity [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 160:16)].

The person receiving the money may not, however, give it to the lender to encourage him to make the loan (Maggid Mishneh). The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 160:16) mentions this opinion, but also mentions the view of the Mordechai, who cites one of Rashi’s responsa that states that it is permitted for a Jew to tell a colleague: “Borrow money for me from so and so, who is Jewish, at interest,” and for him to pay him the interest via an emissary. Since the interest is not being paid directly from the borrower to the lender, there is no prohibition involved. Now all these authorities - Rashi, the Mordechai and the Ramah - state that this leniency should not be made public, lest the seriousness of the prohibition against taking interest be eroded in the eyes of the common people. Nevertheless, they do maintain that the ruling is within the bounds of Torah. The Beit Yosef and the Turei Zahav 160:11 object strongly to this decision, to the extent that they question whether Rashi ever issued such a ruling. The Ramah in his Darchei Moshe, the Bayit Chadash and the Siftei Cohen 160:22 support Rashi’s decision, explaining that as long as interest is not paid from the borrower to the lender, there is no prohibition involved.

I.e., the lender accepted upon himself a debt of a maneh, 100 zuz.

And the wheat was still worth 100 zuz [Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 163:3)].

And thus the lender gave 90 zuz and will be paid 100. Since sales - originally, from the lender to the borrower and then from the borrower to the lender - are involved, there is no Scriptural prohibition. Nevertheless, since this is an obvious circumvention of the prohibition against taking interest, it was forbidden by the Rabbis.

When a debt involves “a shade of interest,” the interest may not be expropriated from the borrower (Chapter 4, Halachah 6; Chapter 6, Halachah 1). With regard to “the circumvention of the prohibition against interest,” by contrast, the “lender” may collect the additional amount. Indeed, the court must facilitate his collection of it. The Tur and the Ramah cite opinions that differ and maintain that interest forbidden by Scriptural Law is involved.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah emphasize that the license granted by the Rambam applies when, at the time that the lender gave him the wheat, he did not stipulate that the borrower would sell it back to him at a lower price. If the lender makes such a stipulation, the transaction is considered to be interest forbidden by a Scriptural prohibition.

See the conclusion of Chapter 6 and the beginning of Chapter 7 for the details concerning this practice. In the Talmudic era, when a field was designated as security for a loan, it was given to the lender.

As above, the court must enforce the collection of the rent (Maggid Mishneh).

Although our Sages forbade this practice, there is no Scriptural prohibition or even “a shade of interest” involved, because the money is being paid as rent.
This is the Rambam’s view. Rashi (Bava Metzia 68a) maintains that a Scriptural prohibition is involved. The Siftei Cohen 164:2 maintains that the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 164:1) follows Rashi’s view.

I.e., instead of speaking of a loan, the person giving the money and the recipient speak of “hiring” the coins as one hires other utensils. Since a loan is not involved, the concept of interest according to Scriptural Law does not apply.

The Turei Zahav 176:1 states that even if the recipient does not spend the money and returns it to the giver as is, since he had permission to spend it, the prohibition applies.

The Maggid Mishneh states that from the Rambam’s wording, it would appear that if the recipient did not desire to spend the money, but merely to display it and would return the same coins, it is permitted to hire them out. He supports his statements by quoting the Tosefta, which states that one may hire out coins to a moneychanger to use as adornments or to use in learning his profession. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 176:1) quotes this ruling. The Ramah clarifies that this leniency applies only when the recipient does not accept responsibility if the money is lost due to forces beyond his control.

As opposed to a leader of brigands (Hilchot Gezelah 5:18).

I.e., even a fellow Jew.

I.e., there is no question of interest involved. The rationale is that the payment of the tax is comparable to a sale and not to a loan. Since the king is the ruling authority of the land and “the law of the land is your law,” it is permitted to take control of the Jew and employ him as a serf. See also Hilchot Gezelah 5:18 - which discusses the validity of the king’s authority and why enslaving him is not considered robbery - and also Hilchot Avadim 1:8, which discusses the degree of servitude that can be imposed.

Which is equivalent to four dinarim.

Thus, he will be receiving a dinar as interest.

Thus, he will be receiving a se’ah as interest.

The Lechem Mishneh explains that the word “any” indicates that it is forbidden to take interest even if the interest is not worth a p’rutah (the coin of least value employed in the Talmudic age). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 161:1) states that taking interest worth less than a p’rutah is forbidden by Scriptural Law, but it may not be expropriated from the lender through legal process.

The intent is that all forms of interest - whether money for money, produce for produce, money for produce, or produce for money - are prohibited.

As stated in Chapter 4, Halachah 3.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 161:5) states that the lender may be compelled physically to return the interest.

At the time the loan is agreed upon, in contrast to the situation which is described in Halachah 3.

From the particulars mentioned in Halachah 2, it appears that even when one would not ordinarily pay rent for a property, and the owner of the property is not accustomed to renting out his property, if a stipulation is made at the time of a loan that the lender may dwell in this property, it is considered to be interest forbidden by Scriptural Law [Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 166)].
The Ramban and the Rashba differ and note that a person is not obligated to pay rent when he squats in a courtyard that is not ordinarily rented out. (See Hilchot Gezelah 3:9.) Hence, they argue, dwelling in such a courtyard is not considered interest as forbidden by Scriptural Law. Their opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 166:2). The Siftei Cohen 166:6 questions why the Rambam’s opinion is not mentioned, since it is supported by other authorities.

If the lender or tenant did not make this stipulation at the time of the loan, even if such an arrangement was agreed upon afterwards, it is not considered interest as forbidden by Scriptural Law (Rashba, Vol. V, Responsum 165).

Note the contrast to the laws applying to a field or orchard, as mentioned in Halachah 7. The Rambam’s approach follows that of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. As will be explained, there are opinions that differ.

Although landed property is involved, since the lender receives a tangible benefit from his loan, that benefit is considered interest.

As explained in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 11, which describes an asmachta when a stipulation is not confirmed by a kinyan and/or it is apparent that one of the principals never made a hard and fast commitment to the transaction involved.

I.e., the money given by the purchaser will be returned because the transaction is not binding. Thus, if the purchaser were also given permission to benefit from the produce, he would receive both his money and an increment. This is considered as taking interest. See Halachah 4.

See Halachah 6, which explains why both of the principals may not benefit from the produce.

This subject, the forms of interest forbidden by Rabbinic decree, is the subject of the laws from Halachah 7 until the conclusion of Halachah 10.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 161:2-3) rule that although the court does not expropriate interest forbidden by Rabbinic Law from the lender, the lender has a moral and spiritual obligation to return it. They also rule that if the borrower seizes possession of such interest after paying it to the lender, it is not expropriated from his possession.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Gezelah 3:7, when a person takes a colleague’s slave who is sitting idly and has him work, he is not liable. In this instance, however, since he has given the colleague a loan, having the slave work for him as interest.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this ruling applies whether he dwells in the courtyard with or without the knowledge and/or consent of the owner/borrower. By paying rent, he removes any question of there being interest involved.

The Maggid Mishneh states that if the courtyard is usually rented out, even if the lender dwells in it without the borrower’s knowledge, he is liable to pay rent to the borrower. Although it is merely “the shade of interest,” and therefore would not normally be expropriated by the lender, in this instance he could be required to pay the rent even if he had not given a loan at all. Hence, the fact that he did give a loan does not minimize his obligation.

As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 1, the Rambam’s wording appears to indicate that had such a stipulation been made at the outset, the prohibition would have been Scriptural in origin, despite the fact that the courtyard is not fit to be used for a dwelling. As mentioned above, other authorities differ.

The borrower is entitled to make such a reduction, because as mentioned in Chapter 4, Halachah 6, interest that is forbidden by Rabbinic law need not be paid to the lender.

The Rambam’s statements have aroused the attention of the commentaries. As related by the Tur (Yoreh De’ah 166), there is a difference of opinion between Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Ephraim concerning this issue. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi maintains that even though the lender has a monetary obligation to the borrower for living in his property, the prerogative belongs to the lender. If he chooses to ignore that obligation and demands payment of the entire debt, the borrower is required to pay him. His rationale is that deducting the money would be considered as forcing the lender/squatter to return “the shade of interest.” Rabbenu Ephraim differs and states that if the borrower has not paid the debt, he may deduct the money due from the debt. His rationale is that since the borrower may not be required to pay “the shade of interest” and the borrower is owed this money, he has a right to withhold payment.
The Rambam’s position: a) appears to be a compromise between the two views, but does not satisfy the halachic demands of either of them; b) does not specify what amount should be deducted.
In his commentary on the Tur, the Beit Yosef quotes the Rashba (Vol. V, Responsum 158), who explains that it would appear that the Rambam accepts the foundation of Rabbenu Ephraim’s approach. Nevertheless, the Rambam does not free the owner/borrower of total responsibility for the debt. For if he did so on the advice of the court, it would be as if the lender were forced to return “the shade of interest.” But, the Rashba asks, why doesn’t the Rambam say that the borrower is freed of liability entirely except for the last p’rutah? In this way, it could not be said that the court forced him to pay “the shade of interest.” He concludes that perhaps since the entire amount is not deducted, we deduct only the amount that is common in that locale. (See the Ra’avad.)
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 166:3) ignores the Rambam’s position and quotes the views of both Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Ephraim. The Ramah states that Rabbenu Ephraim’s view should be followed.

The Rambam appears to be inferring that since the proof-text speaks of “giving” a loan, as long as the neshech interest was not specified when the loan was given, the Scriptural prohibition is not violated (Maggid Mishneh). Significantly, the commentaries have not pointed out any prior Rabbinic source in which this concept is derived from the exegesis of this verse.
As the Ramah comments (Yoreh De’ah 166:2), this ruling does not apply only to dwelling on property, but rather to any type or form of interest. According to the Rambam, as long as interest was not agreed upon at the time the loan was given, even when the borrower volunteers it afterwards, it is considered only as “the shade of interest,” and is not prohibited by Scriptural Law.
The Ra’avad, the Ramban, the Rashba and others differ and maintain that offering benefit when the lender agrees to extend the term of the loan is also considered interest forbidden by Scriptural Law. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 166:2) quotes both perspectives. The Siftei Cohen 166:8 states that most halachic authorities follow the Ra’avad’s position.

I.e., even though the borrower does not return the debt within the time period stated, the field is not transferred to the owner for the reason the Rambam states.

See Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 11, which explains that an asmachta is an agreement that at least one of the principals did not take seriously at the outset. And since he did not take the transaction seriously, it is not binding. To illustrate using the example the Rambam employs: The borrower fully expects to repay the debt before the three years. Hence, he does not take the stipulation made by the lender seriously. Accordingly, it is not binding upon him.

Both the produce consumed within the three years and the produce consumed afterwards.

E. g., if the loan was for $5000 and the lender consumed $700 worth of produce, the borrower is required to return only $4300.

Since the field does not belong to the lender, he is not entitled to its produce. Taking it is considered to be interest, because, as stated in Halachah 1, produce can be considered interest for money. The Ra’avad and the Tur differ and maintain that the produce consumed within the three years is considered only as “the shade of interest.” The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 164:4) quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Ramah cites the other perspective. [Moreover, when quoting this law in (Choshen Mishpat 207:10), the Shulchan Aruch quotes both perspectives without favoring one over the other.]

The same laws would apply if the stipulation were stated by the lender and agreed to by the borrower (Lechem Mishneh).

I.e., the borrower/seller recognizes the possibility that he will not repay the loan and states that, in such an eventuality, the money will be considered as having been given to purchase the property. Moreover, the sale will be considered as having been made at the time the money was transferred.

For the field belongs to the borrower, and taking the produce would be interest, as explained above.

Since the payment was delayed, the transaction is binding and the field is considered as having been transferred to the lender/purchaser. If he desires, he can return it to the borrower/owner, but that would represent a new transaction. In the interim, the property belonged to the purchaser and he is entitled to benefit from its produce.

Because the seller never really intended to sell it. In the back of his mind, there is always the thought: “Soon, somehow, I will get the money to pay for my field.” Hence, the sale is considered an asmachta which is not binding.. Compare to Hilchot Mechirah 11:11.

The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 174:1) states that even when the seller did not make such a stipulation himself, but this was the usual practice in that locale, the purchaser is forbidden to benefit from the produce. The rationale is that local business practice is binding, and the seller has the right to retake his property. Hence, the produce belongs to him.
The Siftei Cohen 174:1 states that the opinions mentioned in the notes on Halachah 7 that maintain that consuming the produce of a field given as security without deducting from the principal is only “the shade of interest” would maintain that the agreement mentioned in this halachah would fall into that category.

Note the comments of the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh on Hilchot Mechirah, loc. cit. They cite two opinions: one that states that the purchaser must make this statement after the sale is concluded, and one that allows it, even if the sale has not yet been concluded. The rationale is that once the seller has agreed to sell the field without any condition, the fact that the purchaser adds a condition that is to his benefit is of no consequence.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 174:1) rules that if the purchaser makes these statements in the midst of the negotiations, and the seller focuses on the matter and includes it as part of the terms of the transaction, the agreement is an asmachta and the purchaser is not entitled to the produce. If, however, the seller does not insist on the matter, the transaction is binding even though the purchaser mentioned this point before the transaction was concluded.

I.e., the transaction is binding. If the seller brings money, he will be repurchasing the field in a new transaction. Hence, the purchaser may consume the produce, for it belongs to him and he does not have any obligation to the seller. Instead, the agreement is his own voluntarily decision. (See Hilchot Mechirah, loc. cit.)

I.e., if the field was sold for 100 zuz and the purchaser paid 70, he acquires 70% of the field. The seller retains the remainder until he is paid the outstanding amount. In this situation, each one owns a portion of the field and is entitled to the produce of the portion that he owns.

Lest that benefit be considered interest, as the Rambam continues to explain.

I.e., it would be as if the remainder of the money were a loan, and the produce he consumed as interest given him because the loan was not yet paid.

I.e., it would be as if the money he paid were given as a loan, and the produce he consumed as interest given him in consideration of that loan.

I.e., until the transaction is completed or nullified.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 174:5) suggests an alternative: that the purchaser be allowed to benefit from the produce and if he defaults on the purchase, the seller will deduct the value of the produce that the purchaser consumed from the money that he is obligated to return to him.

I.e., the transaction will not be completed until the entire amount is paid. In this instance, the field remains the property of the seller and he is entitled to the produce.

For it is considered to be interest forbidden by Scriptural Law, which can be expropriated by legal process. The money the purchaser paid is considered to be a loan, and it is as if he were receiving benefit for having given that loan.

This also is considered to be interest forbidden by Scriptural Law, which can be expropriated by legal process. It is as if the purchaser were giving the seller benefit for extending him the credit to purchase the property.

I.e., Rav Yosef MiGash, in contrast to the perspective of his own teacher, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, which is mentioned in the following halachah.

I.e., in contrast to the present custom, in the Talmudic era - when an article was designated as security - it was physically transferred to the lender and he was given the opportunity to derive benefit from it.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 1 and notes.

Rav Moshe HaCohen (as quoted in the Shitah Mekubetzet) equates an orchard with a courtyard, for the orchard will certainly produce some benefit.

As the Rambam continues to explain, when a person gives a house or a courtyard as security, it is considered to be interest forbidden by Scriptural Law, and the value of the rent may be expropriated from the lender.

For despite a person’s effort and investment, there are times when a field does not yield a crop.

I.e., with regard to a house the benefit is readily available, for dwelling in the house is worth money. Since the lender receives immediate and tangible benefit, that benefit is considered to be interest forbidden by Scriptural Law. Since the lender may not receive such benefit from a field, using the produce is considered merely “the shade of interest.”

Which, as explained in Halachot 4-6, may involve interest forbidden by Scriptural Law.

The Rambam is saying that when a person sold a field under an asmachta, he did not transfer the ownership of the land to the purchaser. Hence, since the sale is nullified, the produce belongs to the seller, and by benefiting from it, the purchaser is taking benefit (consuming his produce) from the lender for the fact that he gave the seller money. That is considered interest.
When, by contrast, a borrower designates a field as security, he is transferring the right to the produce to the lender. Hence, if produce does in fact grow on the land, it belongs to the lender. He is not taking anything from the borrower. And giving the lender the right to benefit from the produce is not in and of itself considered to be interest forbidden by Scriptural Law, because - as the Rambam explains - it is possible that there will not be any benefit at all. Thus, at the time of the loan, ti1e borrower did not agree to pay the lender interest (Chiddushei Rav Chayyim HaLevi).

Bava Metzia 62a quotes Ravina as telling Rav Ashi that when property is given as security without a deduction being made, the interest cannot be expropriated by a Jewish court. Thus, he is stating that it is forbidden by Rabbinic Law.

For Bava Metzia 67a relates that Ravina expropriated produce as interest when a field was sold under an asmachta. Similarly, Bava Metzia 64b implies that letting a person live in a home is interest forbidden by Scriptural Law. According to the Rambam’s teachers, these statements can be reconciled with the statement of Ravina quoted previously, only by making the distinction the Rambam suggests. Note, however, the commentaries of the Ra’avad and the Ramban, who offer different interpretations of these passages, which support the view stated in the name of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi.

Since he can continually benefit from the property, he will certainly receive an increment for his money. Hence, such an arrangement is considered to be fixed interest.

Ordinarily, rent for such a courtyard would be much more. Nevertheless, a deduction is being made and paying only the lesser amount is not considered to be fixed interest, because (in contrast to the situation described in Halachah 1) the lender did not say that he is demanding such a low rental in consideration for having given the loan.

Since it is unsure that there will be a profit, and the lender has paid for the use of the property, leniency is granted.
The Tur and the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 172:1) quote opinions that do not make the same distinction the Rambam does, and maintain that whenever a deduction is made - whether for a house or for a field - the property can be given as security and the lender may derive benefit from it.

As mentioned above, this is the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, the Ramban and others.

The apparent contradiction in the words of Ravina cited in the notes on the previous halachah.

This arrangement is referred to by the Talmud as “security [as prescribed] in Sura.” For it was in that city, the site of one of the great Talmudic academies in Babylon, where this formula was developed. All authorities agree that such an arrangement is permitted.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam with this point, maintaining that just as giving property as security and making a deduction is forbidden; so, too, making this stipulation is forbidden. According to his perspective, the only arrangement permitted is the “security [as prescribed] in Sura” mentioned above. The Maggid Mishneh defends the Rambam’s position as explained below and his opinion is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 172:1).

The use of this term has attracted the attention of the commentaries, for seemingly, the borrower is the owner of the field and this clause is simply a repetition of the previous one. Indeed, there are some who suggest that a printer’s error crept into the text, and the proper version is “If the lender stipulated....” Nevertheless, most - though not all - of the authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah substantiate the version reflected in our translation.
The Kessef Mishneh differentiates between the two clauses as follows: The previous clause is speaking about the rental of a field, while this clause speaks about the rental of a courtyard or house. In such an instance, since there is little likelihood of loss involved, there are opinions (Rashi, Bava Metzia 64b) that maintain that this resembles interest. Hence, it is necessary to state explicitly that it is permitted (Turei Zahav 172:2).
The Lechem Mishneh offers a different explanation, stating that the previous clause represents an instance where at the outset, the rental agreement was made for each year individually. The present clause, by contrast, speaks of an instance where the agreement was originally made for a ten-year period. Hence, it is necessary to state that the arrangement can be shortened.

I.e., rather than consider this as a loan involving interest, we consider it a rental agreement with a stipulation that the owner can redeem the property. The difference between this arrangement and the designation of other properties as security is that in other instances, the arrangement is fundamentally a loan and is indeed referred to as such. At any time, the lender has the right to return the property and demand payment from other properties belonging to the borrower. In this instance, by contrast, the lender has no choice but to retain the property for the entire time stipulated. Even if the property was flooded and he suffers a loss, he cannot demand payment from other properties belonging to the owner. Instead, he must bear the responsibility for the loss himself (Maggid Mishneh).

Hilchot Sec hi rut 7:1.