Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

In contrast to seeds that are themselves eaten, as mentioned in the following halachah.

This applies even if the seller was not aware that the seeds were not productive (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:46).

He is not, however, responsible to reimburse him for the money spent in planting the seeds, (Kessef Mishneh; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:46) or the loss he suffered in not having a crop to harvest that year (Kin’at Eliyahu).

Therefore, there is no need for him to make an explicit stipulation to this effect.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:47 states that if there are no obvious external factors that could have prevented the seeds from growing, we assume that the reason they did not grow is that the seeds were not fertile, and the seller is responsible.

As long as the owner did not specifically say that he was purchasing the seeds to sow, the possibility (or probability) exists that he was purchasing them to cook.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 232:21) quote an opinion that maintains that if the purchaser had not paid the seller, he can withhold payment, claiming that he purchased the seeds for the sake of sowing them.

This reflects the principle (Bava Batra 92b): B’mammon ein holchin achar harov, “In financial matters, the ruling is not determined by the higher probability.”

I.e., it is considered as if the purchaser specified that he is purchasing them solely for that purpose.

I.e., if these seeds are used only for medicinal purposes or for dyes, the laws mentioned in Halachah 1 apply. If they are also used for food, the laws mentioned in Halachah 2 apply.

The previous halachot relate that the seller had to suffer the loss when the seeds were not fertile [i.e., the article he sold had a blemish]. Since the purchaser informed him that he was purchasing the seeds to sow - despite the fact that they were destroyed, the seller is not reimbursed for them at all. Similarly, since the purchaser informed the seller that he was taking the merchandise to a distant place, and it was discovered that it was unfit to sell because of a blemish, the purchaser is not responsible to return the merchandise to the seller.

And then I will reimburse you.

The above applies if the seller was not aware of the blemish the article possessed. If the seller was aware of the blemish, not only is he responsible to pay for the return of the article, he is responsible to pay for the purchaser’s cost of transporting the article [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 232:21)].

The simple meaning of the Rambam’s words appears to be “after he notified him of the blemish that the article possesses.”
In his Kessef Mishneh and in his Beit Yosef, Rav Yosef Karo raises the question regarding the ruling when the article is lost or stolen after the blemish was discovered, but before the purchaser notifies the seller. Because it appears to him that the seller would be responsible, he interprets “after he notified him” as referring to the purchaser’s informing the seller that he desired to sell the article in a distant place. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:51.

And the purchaser is not responsible.

This can be considered comparable to an instance where a person purchases flax seed without informing the seller that he intends to sow it. Since the flax seed can also be eaten, the seller is not liable to suffer the loss if it is sown. Similarly, in this instance - since it is possible that the purchaser will sell the merchandise without transporting it - if he does not notify the seller of his intent, the seller is not liable.

This is speaking about an instance where the article is not transported to a distant place.

I.e., the purchaser is regarded as a renter.

The Kessef Mishneh questions why the article is considered to be in the purchaser’s domain after the owner is notified about the blemish. Significantly, he does not discuss the matter in his Beit Yosef, while in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 232:22) he quotes the Rambam’s wording verbatim. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:54 indeed interprets the term “return” as meaning “notify the seller of his intent to return it.”

I.e., if there would have been an advantage in notifying the seller, because he could have disposed of the produce before it spoiled.

And he must suffer the loss.

The Maggid Mishneh states that an ox that can be used for plowing is ordinarily more expensive than one sold for slaughter alone. The law stated by the Rambam applies only in an abnormal instance, when the price of an ox acquired for slaughter is the same as that sold for plowing. Otherwise, from the price that the purchaser paid, we could determine his intent. This concept is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 232:23).

I.e., when he is both a butcher and a farmer (Rashbam, Bava Batra 92a).
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) explains that the above ruling applies only when the purchaser has already paid the seller. If, however, the purchaser has not paid yet, the seller may not expropriate the money from the purchaser. This applies not only when the majority of people buy oxen for plowing, but even when the same number buy for slaughter as for plowing. Since the seller desires to expropriate money from the purchaser, he is required to prove his claim indisputably.

If the seller does not know the purchaser, he can honestly explain that he was unaware of the purchaser’s intent (Ibid.).

For he is only a farmer (Ibid.).

It is as if he made an explicit stipulation that he was purchasing it only for the purpose of plowing.

Trefah means possessing a blemish that will cause the animal to die within a year. Such an animal is forbidden to be eaten; even proper ritual slaughter does not cause it to be permitted.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 232:12) rules that even if there is a doubt whether a condition renders an animal trefah or not, and it is forbidden to be eaten for that reason, the transaction is considered to have been concluded under false premises. For as a result of the blemish, the animal may not be eaten.

E. g., the animal has an internal wound that renders it trefah and the wound had already become covered by a scab. We know that it takes at least three days for a scab to form. Therefore, if the animal had been purchased within three days, we can assume that it was trefah at the time of the sale. See Chapter 20, Halachah 15.

Since the animal was unfit for slaughter, the sale was carried out under erroneous premises.

In this instance, the animal that is trefah.

In this instance, the purchaser slaughters the animal, making it unfit to be used for any other purpose.

Since this is the ordinary practice, the seller could have expected him to perform the act that he performed.

Although he is allowed to return the article he purchased because of the original blemish, since the blemish that he made was a deviation from the ordinary practice, he must take responsibility for it.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the laws stated in this halachah are also derived from the case mentioned in the first clause of the previous halachah.

He is not responsible for the garment’s reduction in value.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:32 explains the situation as follows: The purchaser paid ten dollars for the garment, but because of the defect it was really worth only eight. The cloak he fashioned was worth nine.
He should receive eleven dollars from the seller: the ten he originally paid, and one for increasing the value of the garment.

For if the transaction is nullified, it is as if the land had always been in the possession of the original owners. Thus, the purchaser is considered as having taken benefit that was due them. Moreover, since the purchaser receives the money that he originally paid, it resembles a loan, and the benefit he receives thus appears like interest. See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 6:4; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:33.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim (op. cit.) explains that even if the purchaser did not pay the seller before discovering the blemish, he must still pay him rent for the use of his courtyard.

The teeth used to grind food. These are essential for an ox, which relies primarily on grain for its sustenance.

For if he had placed it alone, he would have seen that it was not eating and should have inspected it, discovered the blemish and returned it to the seller, as stated in the following halachah.

The rationale is that we assume that the seller knew of the blemish and concealed it, in order to receive a higher price from the purchaser. Therefore, although the purchaser is responsible for checking his purchase, as stated in the following halachah, the seller is held responsible. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:40.

And the purchaser is required to suffer the loss.
Although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 232:18) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, the Ramah differs. He holds the broker responsible. He maintains that although the broker was cheated, that does not give him the right to cheat others, and he must reimburse the purchaser for selling him a blemished ox.

A firstborn animal is consecrated. In the present era, because the Temple is destroyed, the firstborn animal cannot be offered as a sacrifice. Therefore, the owner must wait until it suffers a blemish that renders it unfit for sacrifice. Once it suffers such a blemish, it should be given to a priest. Even if it is not given to a priest, its meat may be eaten by an Israelite (Hilchot Bechorot, Chapter 1).

As stated in Hilchot Bechorot, Chapter 3, even if a firstborn animal has an obvious blemish, its owner may not determine himself that it is unfit to serve as a sacrifice. Instead, he must show it to a recognized expert, who will render a ruling.

Although he derived benefit from eating the meat, because he was forbidden to partake of it that benefit is not taken into consideration. See the Sefer Meirat Einayim 232:4 which states that since the food that was eaten was forbidden, the person’s soul is revolted by the deed and is not considered as having derived benefit from it.

I.e., it is considered as if the sale had been concluded under an erroneous premise, and the seller is required to suffer the loss.

He must then bury the meat, as stated in Hilchot Bechorot 3:4. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 234:2 states that the purchaser should bury the meat lest the owner sell it to gentiles.

In this situation as well, it is considered as if the sale had been concluded under an erroneous premise, and the seller is required to suffer the loss.

The seller may sell this meat to gentiles, feed it to animals or use it for any purpose other than Jewish consumption.

An understanding is necessary, for the butcher may claim that he could have sold the meat for a higher price.

For kosher meat is always more expensive than non-kosher meat.

I.e., with regard to all forbidden entities from which it is permitted to benefit.

I.e., produce from which the terumot and the tithes have not been separated. See Hilchot Ma’aser 1:9, which states that the prohibition against eating tevel is Scriptural in origin.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot, Chapter 11, which explains the Scriptural prohibition against such wine.

The rationale is, as stated above, that the soul is repelled by forbidden foods, and the benefit is not considered to be benefit.

Premature death, the death of one’s offspring and severe punishment in the spiritual realms.

The Rivash (Responsa 499) writes that there is no explicit source for this ruling. The Rambam derives it from the fact that Bechorot 37a, the source for the law requiring that the money be returned, mentions only Scriptural prohibitions. Thus, one can assume that if the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, this ruling would not apply.

Since the prohibition is not Scriptural in origin, the soul is not repelled to the same degree, and the benefit that the person received must be taken into account.

Even if the purchaser ate it or gave it to gentiles, the seller must return the money. For by eating it or giving it away, the purchaser did not cause the seller any loss, for he was forbidden to benefit from it in any case (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 234:6).

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 233:1) explain that this law applies even if the difference in value between the two is less than a sixth. Although the laws of ona’ah do not apply, the wheat is not of the quality specified by the seller, the transaction is considered to have taken place under an erroneous premise, and the purchaser has the right to nullify it.
From the fact that the seller cannot retract [in contrast to the instances mentioned in the following halachah], we see that the transaction is not nullified entirely, for the seller does not have the right to retract.
The distinction between the two is that the articles that are mentioned in the following halachah are clearly of different types. In this instance, although the descriptions “high quality” and “low quality” do distinguish one article from another, the distinction is not as clearly defined.

This addition is made on the basis of the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh.

In this instance as well, the Maggid Mishneh states that the principals have the right to retract even though there was no difference in value between the two types of produce.

The rationale is that both the purchaser and the seller can claim that the transaction was undertaken under an erroneous premise.

It would appear that the wine had already begun to sour while it was in the possession of the seller. Nevertheless, he is not held liable, because he can claim that it soured because of the containers that belonged to the purchaser (Bava Batra 98a).
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 230:10 states that this law applies even if the purchaser used new, clean containers. For it is possible the wine began to spoil when - and because - it was poured from the sealed containers of the seller.

In which instance, a large quantity of wine will not be used immediately. For this reason, the wine should be of a quality that can be stored without turning sour. Nevertheless, since the responsibility for the spoilage can be attributed to the containers, the seller is not held responsible.

And it is nullified. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 230:5) state that this law applies only when the purchaser says that he needs the wine for cooking.

Or if he told him: “I will drink it a little at a time [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 230:6)].”

The purchaser is allowed to nullify the transaction, because the product that he received - wine that has soured - is not what he desired to purchase.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam rules that if the wine goes sour within three days, the seller is held responsible. The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.) maintain that everything depends on the local custom. If the wine became sour within the time one would assume that it would be drunk, the seller is liable. if it became sour afterwards, he is absolved from responsibility. See the following halachah and notes.

Since initially the quality of the wine was acceptable, the seller is considered to have met his obligation, even though he knew that his wine might tum sour. He was not given any indication that the purchaser might set aside the wine for later use, and he therefore did not have to warn him (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., the beer was sold together with its container. If, however, the beer is transferred to a barrel belonging to the purchaser, the seller is no longer liable (Maggid Mishneh; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 230:14).

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 230) makes a distinction between wine and beer, stating that wine is more dependent on the fate of its owner. Therefore, after it remains in the purchaser’s possession for a day, it can be said that the purchaser’s fate caused it to sour. Beer, by contrast, is not as dependent on its owner’s fate. Hence, a three-day period is granted.
The Kessef Mishneh maintains that the Rambam does not make such a distinction. The Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 230) differs and maintains that the Rambam also follows the reasoning stated by the Tur.

For the chemical process had already begun before the sale. At the time of the sale, it had not become noticeable yet [Tur (loc. cit. 230)].

Therefore, he and not the seller must suffer the loss.

Since the purchaser informed the owner that he would not be selling the wine all at once, the seller should have given him wine that would keep for an extended time.

I.e., he makes a different hole to which to move the spout. This could cause the wine to begin to sour. The commentaries question why this factor is not mentioned in Halachah 3 as well.

And he may not return it if it sours.

The Rambam (based on Bava Batra 98a) is referring to a particular business convention. A person would purchase wine or other merchandise from a merchant who made both wholesale and retail sales, on the condition that he sell it in another location. He would pay the wholesaler after he returned. Thus, although he purchased the wine, since he purchased it with the intent of transporting it, the wholesaler would have to provide him with wine that would keep over the duration of this journey.

Since the wholesaler would protest if the purchaser sold it in his locale, for it would prevent him from making retail sales, he must accept responsibility that the wine retain its flavor until it reaches its destination.

Significantly, when quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 230:10) substitutes mevushal (“boiled”) for mevusam (“fragrant”).

After Shavuot, the summer heat reaches its peak and it is possible for even fine wine to lose its flavor and aroma. In Eretz Yisrael, the grape harvest takes place during the month of Tishrei, so the wine must retain its flavor for approximately eight months.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 230:10) state that this law applies only when the wine is kept in the seller’s barrels.

Since wine was usually made during Tishrei, the intent is that the wine must retain its flavor for a full three years (Maggid Mishneh).

Even when the local custom differs with the above guidelines, the local custom takes precedence. The rationale is that any stipulation made by the participants in a business transaction is binding. Since the custom is well-known, it is assumed that both parties agreed to it and considered it as part of their business transaction. See Chapter 18, Halachah 12.

The rationale for this ruling is that by saying “this,” the seller indicates that he is selling the wine as is, alluding to the fact that there is something amiss with the wine that he is selling. Hence, although the seller knows that the wine will be used for cooking and therefore must retain its flavor over time, the purchaser must be willing to accept that a certain amount is of lesser quality (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 230:1).

And may return it.

By stating that the wine is fit for cooking, the seller implies that it is of high quality and will retain its flavor over time.

Even though the seller did not say “for cooking,” since he is selling him only one barrel, that barrel must be of high quality (Maggid Mishneh).
Significantly, the standard texts of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 230:2) write “barrels,” using the plural, but that appears to be a printing error.

From the Rambam’s wording here and in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 6:2), the intent appears to be wine of ordinary quality. The Tur and others interpret this to be referring to wine that has already begun to sour.

Since the seller did not mention that it was wine, nor that it would be used for cooking, the purchaser should have investigated the item he was purchasing before completing the transaction.
Kin’ at Eliyahu mentions that in all the transactions mentioned above, the laws of ona’ah apply. Thus, if the purchaser pays one sixth more than the value of the product purchased, that sixth should be returned to him, and if the unfair gain is more than a sixth, the transaction can be nullified.

The commentaries note that with regard to the prohibition against ona’ah (Chapter 12, Halachah 1), the Rambam uses the term chavero (one’s colleague), implying a fellow Jew. In Chapter 13, Halachah 7, he explicitly states that the prohibition does not involve gentiles. With regard to deception, by contrast, the prohibition extends also to gentiles.
With regard to the prohibition against deceiving gentiles, see the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 12:7), which castigates people from deceiving gentiles, explaining that violation of this prohibition also leads to the desecration of God’s name and the acquisition of undesirable character traits.

See Hilchot De’ot 2:6.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 228:7 explains that this law applies even if there is no substantial difference in the price of the article.

Our translation is not literal and refers to activities that a person performs that appear to honor a colleague, but actually do not. For example, one should not beg a person to eat at one’s home when one knows he will not accept the invitation. One should not offer him gifts that one knows he will not accept. These examples are mentioned in Hilchot De’ot, loc. cit.

Bava Metzia 60b gives as an example: dyeing the hair of a servant so that an older man appears younger.

The exact term used by Bava Metzia, ibid., means “make his hair stand on end.”

To give a healthier and more comely expression.

I.e., which make meat look more attractive than it actually is.

Even if there is no difference in the quality of the meat, if the gentile desires to purchase kosher meat, that is what he must be given.

Although this improves the appearance of the grain, it also provides the purchaser with a quantifiable monetary benefit. One can see the difference in price between husked grain (beans) and ordinary grain.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 4:12), the Rambam explains that a customer could tell by the husks of the grain whether the grain would cook easily or not. Nevertheless - although husking the grain prevents a customer from gaining this information - since no deception is involved, it is not forbidden.

This advertising technique is still followed today. Giveaways are used to lure customers to a store in the hope that they will purchase other items.

Even though this and the practice mentioned directly beforehand are techniques intended to generate customer volume and are often compensated for by higher prices on other items, this is not considered deception, for the customer is not compelled to buy any particular article.

I.e., two batches from different fields (Kessef Mishneh).

And the entire amount is sold as if it were freshly harvested.

And the produce that was harvested previously will not be able to be stored for the same amount of time (Maggid Mishneh).

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 228:19 explains that this follows Rashi’s interpretation of Bava Metzia 60a. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 228:11) offer a different conception of that passage.

Literally, the Rambam’s words mean “between the wine vats.” At the time the wine is fermenting, the flavors of the two wines will mix naturally, without one’s impairing the flavor of the other.

I.e., the previous clause was speaking about an instance in which one mixed only a small quantity of the other wine. As such, its presence would not be detected and one would be deceiving the purchaser into thinking that the entire quantity of wine he was purchasing was of the same type. When a large amount of the other wine is used, the purchaser will be able to sense the addition. Hence, this is not considered to be deception.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 228:14) states that in a place where it is customary for the purchaser to taste the product he acquires, it is permitted to mix wine. If it is not customary for the purchaser to taste, this is forbidden.

I.e., if water became mixed with wine, after the fact the wine may be sold; it need not be destroyed.

And sell it to them without informing them that the wine has been watered down already. (In that era, the wines were far stronger and were always mixed with water before being drunk.)

For if the water is mixed with the wine while it is fermenting, it will acquire the flavor of the wine. The mixture will not taste like diluted wine (Maggid Mishneh).

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 228:16) explains the rationale for this ruling. Anyone buying from a wine or grain merchant knows that the merchant does not produce all the wine or grain himself, but rather purchases from others. Thus, he is not purchasing from him under the perception that the entire quantity of produce will be the same.

The Shulchan Aruch [(ibid.), based on Rashi, Bava Metzia 60a] is more specific, explaining that the merchant should not purchase the majority of his produce from a source that has an excellent reputation and the rest from sources where the quality is not so high. For then he will gain an unjustified reputation for selling quality produce.

Since wine and oil are both natural products, over time the portions of the fruit suspended in the liquid settle, producing a certain degree of sediment. If separated from the liquid, this sediment may not be mixed with liquid again. For the purchaser desires that the wine or oil he purchases be as pure as the sample he was shown (Sejer Me’irat Einayim 228:25).

I.e., one need not leave the dregs at the bottom of the first container and suffer the loss.

Instead, the oil must be entirely pure. If the oil contains any dregs, the sale may be nullified.

And if the seller has only pure oil, he may give the purchaser only 98 1/2 measures of oil. The Rambam’s ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 228:20). The Tur and the Ramah maintain that the seller may not give a lesser measure, but he may add 1 1/2 measures of dregs. The Lechem Mishneh indeed interprets the Rambam’s ruling in accordance with this interpretation.

A larger measure is given to compensate for the residue suspended in the oil.

I.e., since in Nisan the oil will generally not be cloudy, the quantity the purchaser receives is less, because the residue will not take up space. Rashi (Bava Metzia 40b) gives a different interpretation.

A kav is one sixth of a se’ah.

For legumes frequently grow among wheat.

The Hebrew term implies dried out by the wind.

This is the average amount of grain that will be spoiled.

For lentils are picked by hand and therefore usually become mixed with sand and pebbles (Bava Batra 94a). Because grains are reaped in a different manner, this measure does not apply with regard to them (Maggid Mishneh; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 229:1). The Siftei Cohen 229:1 differs with this view and maintains that as the Ram bam states in the final clause, a purchaser must accept one fourth of a kav of dirt when purchasing any form of produce, and this applies with regard to grain as well.

I.e., it is likely that ten percent of the figs will be inedible [Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 229:1)].

The bracketed addition was made on the basis of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 229:1). It appears that there is a printing error in the Mishneh Torah. This is also indicated by certain authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah.

From the Rambam’s words, it appears that this applies even when we know that the seller did not purposefully mix sand into the produce. The Ramah mentions a difference of opinion on this matter, quoting views that state that if we certainly know that the seller did not mix any sand or pebbles into the produce he is selling, the purchaser must accept the produce from him even though the ratio of dirt exceeds the above measures.

The rationale is that any stipulation made by the participants in a business transaction is binding. Since the custom is well-known, it is assumed that both parties agreed to it and considered it to be part of their business transaction. This principle applies not only in this context, but with regard to all aspects of Jewish business law.

I.e., because it is permitted to sell produce while mixed with other substances if this is the local custom, the following law applies.

And thus by removing it, he causes his colleague a loss. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 329:9, which explains that this is considered to be dina d’garmi and not grama dinezikin. See the notes on Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:7 for an explanation of the distinction between these two terms.

The name of a portion of the coastal plain in Eretz Yisrael. Although the Rambam is quoting the Mishnah (Bava Batra 6:2), one wonders why this geographic fact is relevant if this law is universally applicable.

To prevent them from leaking. If they leak, or they are unattractive, the purchaser is not required to accept them (Rashbam, Bava Batra 97b).