Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

This does not necessarily mean a domain owned by the purchaser. It also includes a corner of the public domain (simtah) in which a passerby may put down a container. And it includes a courtyard jointly owned by the seller and the purchaser.

And thus acquired through the kinyan of hagbahah.

In which instance he would acquire it by virtue of its presence in his domain (kinyan chatzer).
The Rambam’s view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 200:3). The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that outside the purchaser’s own domain, the seller must measure the article into the purchaser’s container or tell him to acquire the article with his container to establish a kinyan that finalizes the transaction.

This clause applies to a container placed in the seller’s domain, but not one placed in the public domain [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 200:3)]. The purchaser acquires the article because the seller’s statement indicates that he is granting the purchaser permission to place his utensils in that place, and it is as if that place belonged to the purchaser.

And thus, it is as if he gave him permission to place the container there.

For the purchaser must have a right to both the container and the domain.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 200:5) emphasize that even if the seller tells the purchaser to acquire the article with the seller’s container, it is not effective. For the container does not belong to the purchaser.

According to the Rambam, the rationale for this halachah can be explained as follows: Mesirah is effective only for the acquisition of large articles like ships, and these are usually kept in the public domain. Meshichah is impossible, because one must pull the article into one’s own domain, and that would involve substantial effort (Rashbam, Bava Batra 76b).

According to the Rashba (as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh), mesirah is effective in a courtyard that does not belong to either the purchaser or the seller, only when the seller has placed the article there without the permission of the owner. If the owner granted permission, it is considered as if he is keeping the article as an entrusted article, and it is as if the place where the article is kept belonged to the owner of the article. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 198:9) quotes this as ha1achah.

Both of these places can be considered a private place for the purchaser at the time he wishes to acquire the article. And thus, it is like pulling it into his own property (Rashbam, Bava Batra 76b).

Even in a domain belonging to the seller. Picking up the object of sale indicates that one has acquired it.

The same laws also· apply in a private domain owned by neither the purchaser or seller [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 198:14).

Meshichah is not effective in the public domain, because there is no way that a portion of the public domain could be considered to be one’s own private property.

The Ra’avad protests this ruling, noting that as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 3, one must move an article from its place entirely to acquire it through meshichah. He states that it can apply with regard to the acquisition of an animal, for in that instance all that is necessary is for the animal to move two feet (Chapter 2, Halachah 6).
The Maggid Mishneh resolves the apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s rulings, explaining that this halachah refers to an instance where the purchaser has already drawn the article entirely away from its original place. Nevertheless, since this took place in the public domain, this meshichah is of no consequence. Once, however, he moves the article slightly into a more private domain, his acquisition is completed. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes this explanation.

Until a price is established, neither the purchaser nor the seller can be said to have wholeheartedly agreed to the transaction. See Halachah 11.

In which instance, he acquires the article via a kinyan chatzer - i.e., by virtue of its being in his domain.

In which instance, he acquires it through meshichah.

Needless to say, if it were measured into his containers in these places, he would surely acquire it.

And hagbahah is an effective kinyan in all places (Halachah 3).

Although measuring produce into one’s containers is considered to be meshichah, even meshichah is not effective in the public domain, because it is impossible to have the public domain considered to be one’s private property.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 200:1) follows the Tur, which emphasizes that the domain must be secure, or the owner must be standing nearby. The Rambam would agree to these conditions.
The Ramah adds that even if the security. of the domain is dependent on the seller, it is acceptable because he is the one transferring ownership of the article.

I.e., there is an agreement on the quantity and the price.

For the purchaser acquires the produce by virtue of a Kinyan Chatzer – i.e., since it is located in his domain, it is as if he picked it up with his hands.

Even if the article being sold was placed in the purchaser’s containers, he does not acquire it unless the seller explicitly tells him to do so.

In which instance, it is as if the article were located in the seller’s domain.

By renting the place where the produce is stored, he acquires the produce as his own, through either a kinyan agav or a kinyan chatzer.

As mentioned, it is necessary for the purchaser to have a right to both the container and the domain for the transaction to be effective.

I.e., established a price per unit of measure.

A Talmudic measure equal to 30 Se’ah.

A coin of the Talmudic period containing 2.4 grams of pure silver.

A Talmudic measure equal to 8294 cubic centimeters in modern measure according to Shiurei torah and 14,333 cubic centimeters according to the Chazon Ish.

And until he completes the measurement, the transaction is not completed. For he stated that he wanted to sell the entire amount as a single unit. Thus until the entire amount is transferred, the sale is not consummated. Completing the measurement, however, establishes a binding agreement, despite the fact that the produce is in the seller’s containers, for we assume that the seller is temporarily lending his containers to the purchaser to complete the transaction.

Because of the rationale mentioned by the Rambam at the conclusion of the halachah.
From the Rambam’s wording, we can infer that he would rule that if the seller measured into the containers of the purchaser, the transaction would be concluded. The Maggid Mishneh, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 200:7) differ and maintain that even if the seller measured into the containers of the purchaser, the transaction is not concluded, because the seller did not desire that the transaction be concluded until he completed the measurement.

The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 200:7). The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that it is not definite that the purchaser’s acquisition of the units of produce is finalized by the measuring, even though the seller mentioned these units in his proposition. The produce is awarded to the purchaser only because it is in his possession. Therefore, if he has not paid for the produce, he still has the right to retract, because the money is in his possession, and he may return the produce instead of paying the seller.

The Kessef Mishneh maintains that this applies only with regard to an object in a domain belonging to the purchaser, but not to an article located in a shared domain or in a corner of the public domain. The Sefer Meirat Einayim 200:21 differs with this ruling, and maintains that both are bound by the same law.

I.e., why the produce is not acquired until it is measured.

This is a correction to the standard texts of the Mishneh Torah, suggested by the Maggid Mishneh and substantiated by the authentic manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The standard texts read “nor in the domain of the purchaser.” The inaccuracy of this version is reflected by the obvious contradiction to the following clause.

The Ra’avad objects, because seemingly the purchaser should acquire the liquid by virtue of its presence in his property (kinyan chatzer). The Rambam’s ruling can be justified because the liquid will be held in containers whose existence is not considered nullified with regard to the property.

The commentaries on Bava Batra 87a explain that a broker would negotiate the sale of the wine or the oil and supply the container in which the liquid was measured. Until the measuring. container is filled, it is considered as being on loan to the seller, and thus the liquid is considered as being in the seller’s containers. Therefore, the liquid is not acquired by the purchaser, as stated in the previous halachah.
Once the measuring container is full, the container is considered to be on loan to the purchaser, and the liquid is considered to be in his container. Therefore, he acquires it.

According to the standard text of the Mishneh Torah, the Ra’avad adds that the same rules apply if the measure belongs to the seller. Most commentaries explain, however, that the Ra’avad’s comments refer to the following halachah.

If, however, the purchaser was measuring, he would acquire the produce by lifting it up.

The Ra’avad and the Tur differ and maintain that if the measure belongs to the purchaser, the transaction is not completed until the entire measure is filled. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 200:10) quotes the ruling of the Rambam, while the Ramah follows that of the other authorities.

Therefore, he considers that aspect of the transaction to be completed.

If, however, he does not put the article down and remains holding it at the time he concludes the agreement, the transaction is concluded in this manner.

Until a price is established, the seller has not made a commitment to transfer ownership of the article. Nor can the buyer be certain that he will in fact desire to pay the price demanded. Thus, any act of contract performed by the purchaser is of no significance.

Since the price of the article is standard, the seller and the purchaser have agreed to the price by agreeing to the transaction.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 200:7) mentions another instance when the transaction could be completed although the buyer and seller have not agreed on a price: When the seller and the purchaser agreed to abide by the price determined by a third party.

I.e., because a price must be agreed upon before a transaction can be completed.

In which instance, if the price has been established, he would acquire it.

In which instance, a kinyan could then be effective.

From Halachah 7, it is evident that generally when a seller completes measuring produce into his own containers, the purchaser acquires it. In this instance, however, that ruling does not apply, because the produce has not been unloaded from the animal or the porter yet (Tosafot, Bava Batra 85b).

The purchaser does not acquire the produce by virtue of its having been brought into his home (kinyan chatzer), because the produce is being carried by the animals or the porters and has not been placed down in his domain.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes other views which maintain that even if the produce was not measured, since it was unloaded and is resting within the purchaser’s domain, he acquires it by virtue of its presence there (kinyan chatzer).

And thus lifts up the produce in his own domain. Since a price was not established, this is not sufficient to acquire the article.

As stated in Halachah 12, once a person lifts up an article that has an established price, he is considered to have acquired it.

I.e., the purchaser agrees that if he desires the article, he will purchase it at the price requested by the seller (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 200:29).

Since a purchaser will most likely appreciate it, it is considered to his advantage to acquire it. For if he does not take it, the seller will have no difficulty in finding another purchaser.

For we do not assume that the purchaser will desire to acquire it.

I.e., since the article is not desirable, it is not acquired by the purchaser until he and the seller reach an agreement concerning the price, and he performs a kinyan.

Or acquires it in some other manner.

The other person acts as the shaliach - agent - of the purchaser and is able to execute any business transaction on his behalf. See Hilchot Sh’luchim, Chapter 1.

The Radbaz (Responsum 503) maintains that this type of transaction, chalifin, is a Rabbinic ordinance. Kiryat Sefer, however, maintains that such. transactions are binding according to Scriptural Law.

The contrast to the ruling in Halachah 6 is explained in the notes on that halachah. There are, however, some authorities who maintain that produce cannot be acquired through chalifin at all.

See Chapter 13, Halachah 1, which states that the laws of ona’ah, overcharging a customer, do not apply with regard to such a transaction.

I.e., even if it is in another place entirely and not within easy reach of the person acquiring it, and even if it is in the seller’s domain.

Thus, if the article is damaged by forces beyond the seller’s control, or if it diminishes in value, the purchaser cannot retract.

Even though - as opposed to the situation mentioned in Halachah 3 - each of the persons transferring property is concerned about the price, and is not merely making a transfer on whim, it is not necessary for them both to perform meshichah. Once one performs meshichah, both dimensions of the transaction are concluded.

I.e., the donkey remains the possession of its original owner.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 203:2) quotes the opinion of the Rashba, who maintains that this ruling applies in situations similar to the one described - i.e., with regard to an entity like the donkey, which cannot be divided. If, however, the article can be divided - e.g., one exchanged a cow and a lamb for a measure of wheat - when one performs meshichah on the cow, one acquires an equivalent measure of wheat.

For he did not perform meshichah on all the objects that he would acquire.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kiddushin 1:6), the Rambam writes that generally when coins are involved in a transaction, the people involved focus on the monetary value of the coins. In this instance, however, since the person neither counted nor weighed the coins, he is treating them as mere pieces of metal, and they should therefore be regarded as slabs of gold or silver.

The Kessef Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 199:1) quote the interpretation of Rashi (Bava Metzia 46b), who states that even if the purchaser knows the value of the coins he is giving the seller, as long as the seller is unaware of their value, this law applies.

As stated in Chapter 13, Halachah 2, there is a difference between this law and the law stated in Halachah 1, with regard to the principle of ona’ah. See the notes on that halachah.

I.e., although generally payment of money is not sufficient and meshichah is necessary to complete a transaction, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 1, our Sages did not institute such a requirement in this instance because it is an abnormal situation.

Through meshichah or another valid kinyan.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger questions why the Rambam mentions a servant in this halachah. The point of this halachah is that in the unique situation described, a kinyan can be completed by the payment of money, and meshichah is not necessary. With regard to the acquisition of servants, this rule applies in all instances, as the Rambam states in Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam with regard to this ruling, offering an alternate interpretation of Kiddushin 28a, the Rambam’s source. The later authorities explain that the Rambam’s ruling is based on the tradition of Rabbenu Chanan’el and Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. It is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 199:2).
The commentaries do, however, raise a theoretical question with regard to this ruling. Kiddushin 47a states that when a person consecrates a woman by forgoing a debt that she owes him, the consecration is not binding, because he is not giving her anything at the present time; the money for the debt was given previously. Why then is this transaction binding? Not only was meshichah not performed, but there was not even a transfer of money.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that in this instance, since the debt originated in the sale of an article and is being nullified by the sale of an article, our Sages considered it as if the two objects were exchanged for each other, as has been explained in Halachah 1.
The Ramah (based on the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh) interprets the passage from Kiddushin differently and maintains that the transaction is effective only when the purchaser states: “Sell it to me for the satisfaction you receive in having your debt nullified.” If, however, he says: “Sell it to me for the debt,” the transaction is not effective.

In contrast to the previous law in this halachah, our Sages considered this a more common situation and imposed their decree, requiring property to be acquired by meshichah (Maggid Mishneh). The seller is, nevertheless, obligated to receive the adjuration of mi shepara. (See Chapter 7, Kessef Mishneh.)

This means of acquisition is mentioned in the Bible, as Ruth 4:7 states: “Now this is the custom from former times in Israel concerning... exchange to confirm all manner of transactions. A man pulled off his shoe and gave it to his colleague. This was the manner of recording in Israel.”
This transaction appears to be an extension of the principle of exchange mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. Just as the exchange of an article concluded a transaction, the symbolic exchange mentioned in this halachah concludes a transaction.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 195:1) write that it is not customary to make a verbal statement at the time of the exchange, because the terms of the transaction have already been negotiated.

It is not necessary that the exchange be observed by witnesses for the transaction to be finalized (Halachah 9).

With regard to actual money, any value less than a p’rutah is not considered of consequence. A utensil worth less than a p’rutah is, however, considered of value.

Although produce can be used to effect an exchange of one type of article for another as stated in Halachah 1, it is not effective in bringing about the symbolic exchange mentioned in this halachah. The difference between the two is that in the exchange mentioned in Halachah 1, the person is exchanging two objects that share the same value, while in this halachah the exchange is merely symbolic in nature (Maggid Mishneh).

For generally when a coin is used, it is not considered to be an object in its own right, but a unit of currency (Bava Metzia 45b).
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 203:8) state that in this context an animal is considered to be a utensil and may be used for this exchange. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 195:8 states, however, that other entities in their natural form - e.g., stones - are not considered to be utensils, even if they have some value. See Siftei Cohen I95:4, who states that these two rulings contradict each other.

For in the narrative from Ruth cited above, it was Boaz, the purchaser, who removed his shoe and gave it to the seller.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 195:3) notes that this applies even if the purchaser was not present at the time.
The Even HaEzal cites as the source for this concept the law (Kiddushin 7a) that explains that a woman can be consecrated if she tells a man: “Give a p’rutah to so and so, and I will be consecrated to you.” The motif follows that of the sale of a Hebrew servant by a court, where the servant is acquired although the money is paid to the court.
In actual practice, this law is often applied. For when a transaction is completed using a kinyan sudar (a form of chalifin), more often than not the handkerchief (see Note 24) that is exchanged belongs to the Rabbi conducting the transaction or to the witnesses.

This is the most common manner in which chalifin is performed. A handkerchief or similar article is given to the seller, he lifts it up to show his acquisition of it and then returns it to its owner.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:9, where this concept is discussed.

This law is derived from comparison to a bill of divorce. See Hilchot Gerushin 5:16. The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 195:4) quote the Rashba, who maintains that the comparison to a bill of divorce is not appropriate and rules that the person must hold at least three fingerbreadths of the garment for this transaction to be effective.

The piece of fabric must be three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths, as explained in Hilchot Keilim 22:1.

Although the Ra’avad accepts the fundamental premise to be explained by the Rambam in this halachah, he differs with the Rambam with regard to chalifin, explaining that Bava Batra 40a requires that such a transaction be observed by witnesses. The Maggid Mishneh substantiates the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that Bava Batra, op. cit., mentions the need for two witnesses so that a transaction confirmed by chalifin can be immediately recorded in a legal document.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 195:1) cites the Rambam’s ruling. The Ramah adds that even if a transaction was confirmed by chalifin in the presence of unacceptable witnesses, when both parties admit that the transaction has taken place, it is binding.

The Rambam’s wording perhaps alludes to a difference between the function of witnesses with regard to monetary law and with regard to the laws of marriage and divorce. As the Rambam explains in this halachah, witnesses are not necessary to finalize the transaction with regard to monetary law. They are important only to clarify if a transaction took place in the event of a dispute between the parties involved.
With regard to the laws of marriage and divorce, by contrast, witnesses are necessary for the marriage bond to be established or severed. Even if both parties admit that a marriage or a divorce took place in private, it is of no consequence.

In one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that even if the parties are still sitting together, if they have concluded their discussion of the matter, neither can retract.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 126) explains the rationale for this distinction: Certain of the other kinyanim - meshichah, lifting up the article, transferring it or manifesting ownership over it - involve taking physical possession of the article being acquired. Others - e.g., the payment of money or the transfer of a legal document - involve an act that causes the seller to withdraw his ownership entirely. This does not apply with regard to chalifin.
Siftei Cohen 195:9 adds further explanation. The other kinyanim are generally not made on the spur of the moment. A kinyan chalifin, by contrast, since it can be made merely through the exchange of a handkerchief, may be made hastily, without full consideration of the issue. Therefore, an opportunity was granted to retract.

A divorce requires a formal bill of divorce. Once that is given, nothing else is required. With regard to the other matters mentioned in this halachah, nothing more than a verbal statement is necessary; there is no need to affirm one’s commitment with a deed of contract.

A kinyan can be effective with regard to a financial commitment or with regard to either landed or movable property. The matters that the Rambam mentions do not fall into either of these categories.

As the Ra’avad mentions, the Rambam is speaking here of a commitment to establish a partnership, but not a partnership agreement itself. The Rambam discusses how a partnership agreement can become binding in Hilchot Sh’luchim V’Shutafin]

I.e., if a person makes a kinyan to affirm a commitment that a colleague can partake of the fruits of his orchard, that commitment is binding.

Chapter 5, Halachah 6.

The rationale is that whenever a coin is used in a transaction, it is considered to be a measure of legal tender and not an ordinary piece of metal.

Chapter 5, Halachah 1. A slab of metal cannot itself be used to bring about a kinyan chalifin, because it is not a utensil. And a utensil is necessary for chalifin to be effective.

When viewed together with the next halachah, the Rambam’s statements can be seen as establishing a double standard with regard to gold coins. With regard to silver coins, gold coins are considered to be “produce”; but with regard to other movable property, they are considered to be legal tender.
In taking this position, the Rambam continues the tradition of his teacher, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi (see his Halachot, Bava Metzia, Chapter 4) and the latter’s mentor, Rabbenu Chanan’el. This position was disputed by Rav Hai Gaon, who maintains that gold coins are always considered to be “produce.” The Rambam’s view is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 203:3).

Chapter 3, Halachah 1.

A coin of the Talmudic era.

I.e., as the Rambam states in the next halachah, they are considered to be movable property and must be acquired through meshichah. Only then is the transaction concluded.
Gold coins are given this status with regard to silver coins, because although gold is more valuable than silver, its value causes it to be a less popular means of exchange. Silver coins, by contrast, are the more commonly used type of coinage.

Because silver coins are more valuable, they are desired more than copper ones.

And the recipient lifted the gold up, thus taking it into his possession.

I.e., as a purchase, not as an exchange (chalifin). For coins can never be used for exchange.

Acquiring the gold is like acquiring any other movable property. It creates a financial obligation for the purchaser.

Note Sefer Me’irat Einayim 303:11, which states that in general, older coins are preferable to newer ones, but there are times when a person will desire newer coins.

Because a transaction is completed through taking possession of the movable property (in this case, the gold coin), and not by the payment of money (the silver).

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 195:2) rule that such a coin is regarded like a utensil. According to this opinion, it may also be used for a kinyan chalifin.

Like produce - as opposed to coins, which cannot be acquired in this manner.

For like other movable property, it is their acquisition that completes a business transaction.

The Rambam is referring to kinyan agav, as discussed in Chapter 3, Halachah 8.

In which instance he acquires the coins by virtue of their presence within his domain (kinyan chatzer). One might ask: Why does the Rambam not mention the alternative of acquiring the coins through a kinyan agav?

If the coins are being acquired through a kinyan agav, they need not be on the landed property that is being acquired. They must, however, be a defined entity kept in a specific place.

This expression refers to a conclusion that the Rambam derived from his own logic, without an explicit source in the previous Rabbinic literature. In this instance, there are two sources in the Talmud (Bava Kama 104b and Bava Batra 77b) that deal with the question. They appear to contradict each other. Based on his logic, the Rambam concludes that kinyan agav is not effective.

For kinyan agav is effective only when a specific entity is involved. Since the debt is not a defined entity, it cannot be acquired through kinyan agav.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 126:1) states that this applies whether the lender is giving the debt to the third party as a gift, or he himself owes the third party money.

This applies even if the money that had been lent was already spent, and there is no object that is being transferred, but merely a non-specific monetary obligation.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers even to the person who receives the debt. For example, if Reuven owed Shimon 100 dollars and Levi owed Reuven 100 dollars, should Reuven transfer Levi’s debt to Shimon in the manner described above, Shimon cannot demand payment from Reuven again. It is considered as if Reuven’s obligation to him has been met.

I.e., of monies that one owes the other.

In contrast to the previous instance, where a person transferred a debt owed to him, in this instance he is asking the person to undertake an obligation on his behalf. A mere verbal commitment is not sufficient for this obligation to become binding.

Even if Levi retracts with regard to the remainder of the obligation, Reuven is required to reimburse him for the money that he already spent on his behalf.

Nor does the purchaser acquire the actual note itself. Instead, the sale is considered to be a transaction performed in error, and the seller must return the purchaser’s money and the purchaser must return the promissory note [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 66:1)].
The Ramah adds that the purchaser may retain possession of the note until his money is returned. Moreover, if the seller (who is the lender) does not have the money to repay him, the debtor specified in the promissory note must pay him. For we apply Rabbi Natan’s principle of transferred responsibility - i.e., if a person who owes a colleague is himself owed money, the latter debtor can become responsible to the first creditor.

As explained in the following halachah, a kinyan such as meshichah or chalifin is effective only with regard to a specific entity that has a financial worth. Since the obligation of the debtor is not tied to any specific entity, it cannot be transferred through such a kinyan.

Who is the creditor mentioned in the promissory note.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 66:3) states that even when the seller makes a verbal statement to this effect and confirms it with a kinyan chalifin, the debt is not transferred until a written document is prepared.

I.e., according to the Rambam, the seller should write a legal document, mentioning the transfer of the promissory note. According to Sefer Me’irat Einayim 66:1, one may write this message on the promissory note itself.

By adding the latter phrase, the seller makes it clear that he is not transferring merely the physical piece of paper, but the debt.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 66:4) mentions the opinion of the Nimukei Yosef, who states that first the promissory note must be transferred, and afterwards the written document should be composed.

In his gloss on Bava Batra, the Nimukei Yosef explains that the ownership of the actual paper on which the note was written is transferred with the physical transfer of the promissory note, and the debt is transferred through the written message.

I.e., as in any other business transaction, witnesses are necessary only to prevent a denial of the claim. Thus, if a person produces a promissory note, claiming that he purchased it, and the creditor mentioned in the note claims that he entrusted it to that person for safekeeping or that he lost it and that person found it, the claim of the person in possession of the note is believed. He is not required to produce the legal document stating that the promissory note was sold to him (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 66:28).
See the Siftei Cohen 66:29, who states that many authorities dispute this ruling.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 66:29 explains that we follow the principle: “A person who wishes to expropriate money from a colleague must prove that it is due him.”

If the debtor does not issue such a claim on his own initiative, the court instructs him to pay the debt [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 66:11)].

Note the Siftei Cohen 66:1, who quotes the opinion of the Ritba, who maintains that the sale of promissory notes is binding according to Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, even the Ritba accepts the principle that a person who sold a promissory note retains the prerogative of nullifying it, as explained in that source. This perspective is also reflected in the gloss of the Ra’avad.

Despite the fact that according to Rabbinic Law the debt was transferred, according to Scriptural Law the debt is still due the original creditor. Therefore, if he waives payment of the debt, the debtor is no longer liable.
In Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:10, the Rambam writes that if the seller-original creditor does waive the debt, he is responsible and must reimburse the purchaser for “the entire amount [mentioned] in the promissory note, for he caused him to lose [the money that he could have collected with] the note. It is as if he destroyed it by fire.”
With reference to this law, the Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 66:23) state that even if the debt is waived, the purchaser is not required to return the promissory note to the debtor.
See also the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 66:23), which advises the purchaser of the note to have the debtor restate his obligation in writing, transferring it to the purchaser. Once this is done, the debt can no longer be waived.

For according to Scriptural Law, the right to the debt is transferred to the heir, and he has the prerogative of waiving payment.

In some respects a husband is considered to be a purchaser of his wife’s property. Hence, one might think that his wife retains the right to waive payment of the promissory note, as in the previous law. Nevertheless, when a woman marries, she gives up her independent financial capacity and cannot make any decisions without her husband’s approval.

I.e., employing the medium of a kinyan agav.

Although Rabbenu Chanan’el and Rabbenu Asher maintain that a promissory note cannot be transferred via kinyan agav, the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 66:10) and the Ramah’s final decision support the Rambam’s view.

I.e., even if it was not located in the property that was sold. (See Chapter 3, Halachah 9.)

In his Kessef Mishneh, and similarly in his Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), Rav Yosef Karo states that the creditor must verbally state that he is transferring the obligation that the promissory note carries.

As mentioned above, this expression denotes a conclusion reached by the Rambam for which there is no explicit source in the previous Rabbinic literature. The Rabbis did not discuss whether or not one could waive payment of a promissory note that was transferred through kinyan agav. Nevertheless, since the Rambam considers kinyan agav to be a Rabbinic institution, he concludes that the original creditor can waive payment in this instance as well.

As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 30, Halachah 1, the composition of a deed of sale is totally to the purchaser’s advantage, and moreover, the purchaser can still retract. Hence, there is no reason for the purchaser to be present when the bill of sale is composed.

Acquiring it through chazakah, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachot 3 and 8.

There are commentaries (see Tosafot, Bava Batra 77b) that maintain that this law applies only when the field is being given away as a gift, but not if it is being sold. The Maggid Mishneh and the Lechem Mishneh write, however, that the fact that the Rambam included this law in Hilchot Mechirah, “The Laws of Selling,” indicates that it applies to a sale as well. (Significantly, the Shulchan Aruch includes this law in the section dealing with the laws of gifts.)

Until the deed of title is actually transferred to the recipient, the agents have not completed the mission requested of them. Therefore, the giver may retract his commitment. He may desire to do so, so that his gift (or sale) of the field will not become public knowledge and thus cause his financial reputation to be shaken (Prishah, Choshen Mishpat 243).

For once the agent manifests ownership over a field, it becomes the property of the person on whose behalf he is acting.

The rationale for the Rambam’s decision is that the giver appears to have made the gift of the field conditional on the composition of the deed of title. Since he has a right to retract with regard to the deed of title, he may also retract with regard to the field as a whole (Maggid Mishneh).