Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The Rambam has completed his discussion of the first two general categories of damages: grazing and goring. He now goes on to the third category. The damages caused by a cistern.
Payment of these damages is also considered one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot (Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandment 238, and Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 53). This mitzvah can be defined as compensating a person for the death or damage to animals he owns that came as a result of an object owned by another person, which serves as a stumbling block.

The Rambam’s wording is taken from Exodus 21:33.

In which case the death of the animal was not caused by its fall, but by the foul air of the cistern. Even so, the owner of the cistern is held liable.

Although the cistern does not actually belong to him - for it is in the public domain - since he dug it without permission, the Torah holds him liable for the damages as if it were his own.

Since the opening of the cistern is accessible to others, its owner should haye taken precautions and made certain that it was covered.
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 410) maintains that this applies only until the owner of the adjoining courtyard is made aware of the cistern’s presence. Once the owner of the courtyard knows about the presence of the cistern, he is liable.

Since he declared the property ownerless, the cistern is accessible to others and therefore should be covered.

This applies even when the cistern was dug by an animal belonging to someone else. As long as a cistern accessible to the public exists within a person’s domain, he is liable to cover it. Moreover, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 410:4) add that even if the cistern is dug by another human being, the owner of the cistern is liable for any damages caused as soon as he discovers it.

From this, Ki’nat Eliyahu draws the conclusion that the owner is not required to check the cover continually to see that it is strong enough to serve its purpose.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 410:23) state that if, however, a camel falls into the cistern, the owner is liable. This is not considered a factor beyond his control.

For he should have protected against such a possibility.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining as follows: As mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 15, even though ultimately damage was caused because of forces beyond one’s control, if one has been negligent at the outset, one is liable. Therefore, in this instance, although the decay of the cover is considered to be beyond the owner’s control, since he had been negligent in not covering the cistern with a cover strong enough to support camels, he should be held liable.
The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the above principle applies when the negligence can, at least to a certain extent, be considered a cause of the loss suffered by forces beyond one’s control. In this instance, however, the fact that the cover was not sufficient to support camels can in no way be considered a cause of the decay of the cover.
The Maggid Mishneh’s resolution is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 410:24). Note the Tur and the Ramah, who develop the latter principle further.

I.e., the one who dug the cistern in the public domain, who is held responsible for its damages.

For he has merely returned the situation to its original state.
Note the comments of the Maggid Mishneh, who- in response to the objections of the Ra’avad - explains that this law applies even when the owner saw the other, person covering the cistern. The owner should know not to rely on a person who is not the cistern’s owner (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 410:3).

It is as if the second person had dug the cistern himself (ibid.:4).

It appears that the Rambam’s intent is that only the first partner is liable. Rabbenu Asher [and his conception is quoted by the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 410:25)] explains that since both partners saw the cistern uncovered, they are both liable. The Talmud’s intent by saying “the first is liable,” is that he must share in the liability. He cannot excuse himself by saying: “Since the other partner saw it after me, he must bear the entire responsibility.”

Note the Lechem Mishneh who, based on Halachah 9, explains that the buckets were used as the covering for the cistern. See the commentaries of Rashi and Rabbenu Chanan’el on Bava Kama 51b.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 41 0:26) explain that the second partner is also given time to hire workers to cover the cistern.

The Ra’avad interprets the Rambam’s words as meaning “until he would ordinarily know,” while the Maggid Mishneh explains that the intent is “until he actually finds out.”

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that if the cistern is covered thoroughly, the owner is not held liable. The Maggid Mishneh upholds the Rambam’s ruling, and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 410:45 explains that furthermore, we have reason to believe that the mentally incompetents opened the covering themselves.

That were taken without his colleague’s permission.

For he should have taken into consideration the possibility that the owner of the buckets would take them back. The owner of the buckets is not obligated to notify him.

For a cistern is usually at least ten handbreadths deep, while the others may not be that deep.
See parallels to this ruling in Hilchot Shechitah 9:8 and Hilchot Rotzeach 3:7.

Even if its depth is small, if it presents a difficulty that could cause an animal to stumble and suffer damage, the owner is liable (Maggid Mishneh). See Halachah 15.

For under ordinary circumstances, a fall of less than ten handbreadths will not cause an animal to die.

The rationale is that the water impairs the quality of the air in the cistern and hastens the animal's death.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 11 and notes.

Therefore, the money is allowed to remain in the possession of the litigant - either the owner of the pit or the owner of the animal - in whose possession it is at the time the matter is brought to court.

Since each of them dug an amount sufficient to cause death, the damages are equally divided among them.

He is solely liable both for damages and for death. The rationale is that the original cistern was not deep enough to cause death. Hence, when the second person deepened it, making it deep enough to cause death, he is considered to have brought into being a new entity for which he alone is liable if it causes damages.

According to this view, once the second person deepened the cistern, it is considered to be his handiwork entirely, as if the first person no longer had any connection to it. Therefore, the second person has the responsibility of covering the cistern, and paying for any damages that might be caused.

Therefore, neither of the people who dug the cistern can be held liable. According to the views that maintain that a person who seizes property when an unresolved doubt exists is allowed to maintain possession, if the person whose property was damaged seizes property from either or both of the persons who dug the cistern, he is entitled to maintain possession (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 410:33).

I.e., ten or more handbreadths deep.

This addition is made based on the comments of Sefer Me’irat Einayim.: 410:24. It helps reconcile the difficulties with the Rambam’s interpretation mentioned in the notes that follow.

By widening the cistern, he enabled more fresh air to circulate.

By widening the cistern, he made it more likely that an animal would fall in. Therefore, he is considered to be the owner of the cistern and is held responsible for the damages, even when the animal fell from the other side.

This addition is made on the basis of the comments of Sefer Me’irat Einayim 410:25.

And the second person improved the quality of the air. Nevertheless, he is held liable, because had he not widened the cistern, it is possible that the ox would not have fallen in.

The Rambam’s ruling has attracted the attention of the commentaries, because it appears to fuse together two dissenting Talmudic opinions (Bava Kama 51b). As the Maggid Mishneh explains, according to the first of the opinions mentioned in that passage, it appears that what is significant is whether the animal died because of the blow it received or because of the foul air in the cistern, while according to the second opinion, what is significant is the side from which the animal fell.
The Kessef Mishneh reconciles the Rambam’s interpretation, explaining that the Ram bam did not see the two interpretations as being contradictory, for if that were the case, each one could be refuted by an obvious question. According to the first opinion: Why would the first person be held liable if the ox died because of the air in the cistern if the ox fell in from the side that the other person widened? Had he not widened it, the ox might not have fallen in.
According to the second opinion, the question arises: Since the second person’s action makes him liable if an ox falls in, what difference does it make from which side it fell.
For these reasons, the Ram bam maintains that the two opinions are complementary. See the D’rishah (Choshen Mishpat 410), which offers an alternate resolution of the Rambam’s view. Rabbenu Asher, the Tur, and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 410:16) differ with the Rambam and follow the second opinion, which maintains that the liability depends on the side from which the ox fell.

This ruling is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Talmud (Bava Kama 50b). The Rambam accepts the opinion of the sage Shmuel.

For the animal is considered to have died because of forces beyond the owner’s control (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 410:28).

I.e., there were substances at the bottom of the cistern that cushioned the animal’s fall (Tur, Choshen Mishpat 410).

The Rambam’s wording is carefully chosen. As opposed to the owner of a cistern, who can be held liable whether the animal dies from the blow it receives or from the foul air, a person who erects a mound can be held liable only when the animal dies because of the blow it receives.

See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 1:18.

In all three of these instances, the person who dug the cistern or who erected the mound is liable, for the animal is considered to be mentally incompetent and unable to appreciate the danger that the cistern or mound could cause.

In these instances, although the animal was mentally competent, since it could not see the cistern or the mound, it was unable to appreciate the danger.

This is a decree of Torah law. Commenting on Exodus 21:33: “If an ox or a donkey fall into it,” Bava Kama 28b, 52a states: “‘An ox’ and not a man, ‘a donkey,’ and not utensils.”

For the leniency is not a result of the fact that a person takes care while walking, but a result of the Torah’s decree.

Although the owner must pay the full extent of the damages, he is not liable for the medical treatment, pain, embarrassment, and loss of employment suffered by the ·person, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 15.

With regard to an injury suffered by a human being, Tosafot, Bava Kama 27b explains that the Torah freed the owner of a cistern from liability only when a person died because of a fall (as is the case in the verse cited above), and not when he became injured. Even if the injury is suffered during the day, the person is liable, because it is not common for a person to look carefully at the road on which he is walking.
With regard to an injury suffered by an animal, the Rambam’s ruling is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Rabbis. The Ra’avad maintains that just as the owner of the cistern is not liable for the death of a mentally competent animal that falls during the daytime, he is not liable for its injury.
The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that although an animal may act with caution with regard to obstacles that can cause more severe damages, it will not be as sensitive with regard to obstacles that can cause lesser damages. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 410:20) quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Tur and the Ramah follow that of the Ra’avad. [Note, however, the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 412:3), which appears to follow the approach of the Ra’avad.]

E. g., an animal that suffered a disqualifying physical blemish after being consecrated. This law applies even in the present age, with regard to a firstborn animal.

In Hilchot Chovel UMazik 6:16, the Rambam states that this leniency applies even when the animal is merely injured.

And he is permitted to benefit from it.

Note the Ra’avad, who states that this leniency applies even when the disqualified animal has already been redeemed by its owner. Although the Rambam’s wording does not appear to include such an instance (for then, it is permitted to benefit from the animal), the Maggid Mishneh states that he would accept the Ra’avad’s ruling.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling, because it appears to contradict the understanding of Bava Kama 52b-53a. First of all, the Talmud explains that this matter is dependent on a difference of opinion between Rav and Shmuel. In Halachah 15, the Rambam rules according to Shmuel, while here his ruling appears closer to that of Rav. According to the Ra’avad, if the animal fell backwards into the cistern, the owner of the cistern is not held liable, but if the owner seizes property belonging to the other, it is not expropriated from him.
The Rambam’ s interpretation of this passage is obviously problematic. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 5:6), his interpretation also appears to differ from this halachah. There he writes that if the ox falls backwards into the cistern, the owner of the cistern is liable. If he falls backwards outside the cistern, the owner of the cistern is not liable. This understanding is reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 410:31).

For the animal died because of the blow it received from the land in the public domain, and not that of the cistern. The Ra’avad differs with regard to this clause as well and maintains that the property of the cistern’s owner may not be seized. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 410:31) also follows that understanding.

In which case, its owner is ordinarily responsible for the full extent of the damages it causes.

The ox that pushes the animal and the cistern into which it fell are considered equally responsible for the damage. Had the ox not been pushed, it would not have fallen. Had the cistern not been uncovered in the public domain, the ox would also not have fallen.

For the owner of an ox that is tam is required to pay half of the damages (in this case, half of a half), and that payment can be expropriated only from the body of the ox that did the damage. If the ox is not worth that amount, the owner is not obligated to pay any more.

I.e., one cannot say that the animal should have avoided the obstacles.

For had the cistern not been there, the animal would not have died.

As explained in the following chapter, placing any obstacle in the public domain is a derivative of digging a cistern and causes one to be liable for the damages suffered. In this instance, the person who placed the stone and the one who dug the cistern are considered to be partners in this liability, for were it not for the stone, the animal would not have fallen. And were it not for the cistern, the fall would not have resulted in its death.

This is another example of a case where two people are considered to be partners in damage that is caused. Each is considered to be liable for the entire amount. Nevertheless, since the person whose property was damaged does not have to receive more than the amount he lost, the loss is divided between the two (Bava Kama 53a). In this instance, as in Halachah 19, the owner of the dead animal cannot collect from the owner of the ox that was disqualified as a sacrifice. Hence, he collects the entire amount from the owner of the other ox.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 1, from which it is evident that the present halachah refers to an ox that was consecrated, disqualified, but not redeemed as yet.

I.e., he does not have to pay an atonement fine, nor is the ox stoned, as reflected by the ruling in Chapter 10, Halachah 9. The person digging the cistern is considered to be negligent, and the fact that the ox fell is his responsibility.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 11:4.

Similarly, as stated in the following halachah, the owner of the cistern is not held liable if the utensils are damaged. With regard to a human, by contrast, the owner is liable for damages. (See Chapter 12, Halachah 16; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 410:21.)

See Bava Kama 28b, 53b.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 16.

See the Tur (Choshen A1ishpat 410), which defines the derivatives of a cistern as including “any property that causes damage in its place, which does not move.” Although the Rambam mentions “a moving obstacle” in Chapter 2, Halachah 19, the intent is that the obstacle is being moved by another force.

The person stumbled on the earth, and this is what caused the injury. Nevertheless, since the earth is ownerless, he collects the damages from the person who left the obstacle in its place. Were it not for the obstacle, the damage would not have taken place.

If, however, he left a jug on his own property and then declared it ownerless, he is not liable. At the outset, he had permission to leave the jug there. See Chapter 12, Halachah 2.

I.e. a place in front of oil vats or beehives, where jugs of oil or honey would be filled.

Although, as stated above, it is not the general practice for people to watch for obstacles as they walk, since jugs are often left on the ground in places like these, a passerby should watch his step (Kessef Mishneh).

In the dark, the owner of the jugs should have removed them before nightfall, for he knows that a passerby will not be able to see. If he filled the path with jugs, he made it likely that a person would break a jug as he passed by.
Note the quotation of this law in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 412:2). There a further category is added: an instance where a person places so many jugs in the road that it is impossible for people to pass without breaking some of the jugs: the passerby is not liable even if he intentionally broke enough jugs to allow him to pass.

Since the jug broke accidentally, the owner is not considered negligent with regard to the damages that were caused. For this reason, the laws stated in Halachah 5 are not applied to him.

If he did not have time to gather the shards before the other person was injured, he does not have such a moral obligation (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 412:4.)

For the camel, like the broken pitcher, fell accidentally as the pitcher broke, and is thus considered to be an obstacle unintentionally placed in the public domain. Bava Kama 29a states that this is speaking of an instance where the camel died, and its owner rescinded his ownership over its carcass. Otherwise, he would be held liable.

Halachah 1.

I.e., his body is considered like an obstacle in the public domain.

Although one might think that he could have been held liable for not warning his colleague, this presumption is not accepted. His concern for his own welfare takes priority. Rabbenu Asher (and his opinion is accepted by the Tur and the Ramah [Choshen Mishpat 413:1]) differs and maintains that if the first potter had the opportunity to warn the second and failed to do so, he is liable.

Halachah 2. Implied by the Rambam’s wording in this halachah (and the following one) is that the body of the first potter is considered to be an obstacle. He is not considered to have caused damage to his colleague with his person.

This reflects the concept mentioned in the previous note. A person’s body is considered to be an obstacle. Therefore, the Rambam mentions damage to the body of the second person, implying that if the second person’s utensils were damaged, the first would not be held liable.

From Halachah 7, it would appear that this ruling applies only when the potter did not declare his wares ownerless. See the Ra’avad, the Maggid Mishneh, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 413:2).

This argument does not apply, however, with regard to injury caused by the body of the second person. Since he had time to rise, he is liable for the injuries suffered.

In this instance, there is no difference whether or not the person declared the water ownerless, as reflected in Halachot 2 and 7.

For the owner of a derivative of a cistern is not liable for damages to property (Halachot 1 and 2).

The Ra’avad explains that this ruling applies only when the ground is still muddy because of the water. The Maggid Mishneh states that even when the water has been absorbed totally, if the ground is still slippery, the person is liable. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 412:5) appears to follow the Ra’avad’s view.

Although the ground did not belong to him, since the fall was caused by the water that he poured, he is liable.

During these months, the streets are clean and it is forbidden for someone to soil them. Moreover, in Eretz Yisrael it does no train during these months, and the sewage will remain in the streets for months.

For the streets are muddy at that time, and there is water flowing to wash away the sewage. Needless to say, as our sewage and sidewalk shave become more sophisticated, the relevance of these laws has faded.

Although our Sages granted a person permission to release his sewage at this time, they did not absolve him of responsibility.

There is an unresolved difference of opinion among the Sages (Bava Kama 30b) if the penalty takes effect from the time the straw was taken out, or from the time it became useful as fertilizer.
Note the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 414:1), who state that at the outset a person who asks whether he may take the straw and the hay, should not be told that he may retain possession of its initial value. Instead, he should be told that he may keep only the increment. After the fact, he is allowed to keep the initial value as well.

The Tur and the Ramah differ with regard to this point as well and maintain that in this instance, the straw should be expropriated from the person who took possession of it.

Whenever damage is caused by an object that was declared ownerless after being placed in the public domain without permission, the person who placed it there is liable.

As stated in Hilchot Gezelah 6:5, this applies even if a person takes his compost out at a time when it is forbidden to do so. A person who takes it is liable for theft.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 414:2) state that if the compost causes damage, it is considered to be ownerless, and it may be taken by another person.

For these will remain in the public domain for an extended period.

To be used for building in the near future.

In this instance as well, the license to perform an activity in the public domain does not absolve a person of liability.

To transport to a construction site.

To carry it to the builder.

If they were partners, once the task is completed they all share in the responsibility. Until the entire task is completed, however, the person who is responsible for the activity at the time the damage was caused must pay for the damages, even when they were all partners.

I.e., each person is liable for the portion of the task that he performs.

The Maggid Mishneh emphasizes that this applies when damage is caused by the tree or the wall as it falls. After it falls and the tree or the stones are lying in the public domain, the owner is not liable, if he declares them ownerless.

This is considered an oness, a loss due to forces beyond his control. The Maggid Mishneh clarifies that this applies only when the wall was constructed properly to begin with. When, however, it is built faultily, the owner is liable.

Generally, despite the fact that a person declares an obstacle that he created in the public domain as ownerless, he is liable. In this instance, however, since he had permission to plant the tree or build the wall, and it fell because of forces beyond his control, he is not held responsible.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the owner is liable, if he desires to establish his possession over the entities which fell. The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.) differ.

As Bava Metzia 118a states, this is the ordinary time granted by the court to adjust difficulties.

The thorns or glass that projects is considered to be an obstacle placed in the public domain.

Even if they project beyond the wall itself, as long as they are contained within the owner’s property, he is not liable.

And thus one could assume that it would be torn down in the near future.

The owner of the thorns or glass is not liable, because he had no reason to think that someone would tear down a sturdy wall. If the damage was done when the wall was being destroyed, the owner of the wall is liable, because he should have taken care that no passersby were hurt. If the damage was done after the wall was destroyed, the owner of the wall is liable, because he was responsible for clearing the debris remaining from his wall (Tur, Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 415).

I.e., men who went beyond the measure of the law. This teaching is based on the examples of sages cited by Bava Kama 30a.

Lest another person stumble over them and be injured.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 417:1) states that in his era, it had already become customary to dig below the streets of the public domain. This is surely the case in our age, when engineering has progressed to the point that safety is not compromised by digging in this manner.

E. g., to provide travelers with drinking water.
This law is stated in a separate paragraph, because as is stated in the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 410:7, but see 417:1), it is a separate clause, and not a continuation of the previous idea. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch also mention that the person must cover the cistern and entrust the cover to the trustees of the people at large, or at the very least inform the court that he has dug a cistern for people, but is expecting the court to arrange for its being covered.

A camel was the highest popular means of conveyance in Talmudic times. Needless to say, in every era, the height should be adjusted to fit the highest contemporary means of conveyance, e.g., in the present era, allowances should be made for semi-trailers.

I.e., knock down the existing walls and build new walls further removed from the public domain.

If, however, people do not frequently walk through this space (e.g., the person prevented that by building a platform there), he may rebuild the walls in their original place when he desires [Rabbenu Yerucham; Beit Yosef, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 417:2)].

I.e., that the person who originally constructed the building built its walls removed from the public domain, so that the protrusions and balconies were permitted.

I.e., the rivers of Eretz Yisrael and Babylon were for the most part neither wide nor deep. When a ship wanted to dock, several of its crewmen would descend and they would pull the ship to the riverbank by ropes. This halachah requires that enough empty space be left along the river banks to allow these crewmen to maneuver. From Hilchot Geneivah 8:2, it appears that we are speaking about four cubits.

This can be derived by the conduct of Rabbah bar Rav Nachman (Bava Metzia 108a), who cleared space without informing the owner of the property.

See Halachah 24.

This is derived from the width of the public thoroughfare in the camp of the Jews in the desert.

Without permission.

This is considered as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah by Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandments 241) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 56).
As the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 418:2) point out, this applies even when the person took the precautions mentioned in the following halachot. Since he kindled a fire on his colleague’s property without permission, he must bear the consequences.

As the Rambam states in Halachah 16, a major category has derivatives. The derivatives of fire are any asset that one owns that is transported further by the wind and causes damage.

This communicates a fundamental principle. Although he is acting within his own domain, a person must take the necessary precautions to ensure that he will not cause damage to another person’s property.

I.e., the higher the fire, the further he must retreat.

The Hebrew wording used by the Rambam leads to the inference that a stream or irrigation ditch that is dried out is not considered to be a sufficient fire barrier.

For it is not usual for a fire to spread across a body of water that size.

Or wood. The Hebrew term used by the Rambam could be translated either way. The intent is combustible fuel.

Here too, the assessment is simple. The higher the flame, the higher the fence must must be.

We find this term in Deuteronomy 32:22: “There is a piercing fire in My nostrils.” From the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan’el (Bava Kama 61a), it appears that the intent is a very hot fire that burns powerfully, but does not produce a high flame.

When a flame is this high, there are no limits to the extent the fire may spread.

I.e., he kindled a fire, and the flame flew out of control.

Had the wall not fallen, it would ordinarily have been considered sufficient to impede the spread of the fire. If the fire was so great that it toppled the wall, the person would be liable for the damages the fire caused. In the instance at hand, however, the question is: Is he held responsible for the damages the fire caused, because he could have rebuilt the wall and thus prevented the fire from spreading.

The comparison is taken from (Bava Kama 23a).

I.e., the ox was placed in a corral that was not securely locked. (See Chapter 4, Halachah 1.)

These three individuals are not liable, because their incompetence causes them to be freed of responsibility for their conduct. The person who gave them the fire is not held liable, for he did not set the fire himself.

For he is an indirect cause of the damage.

In this instance, he is considered a direct cause of the damage.

This follows the principle “When a student’s (the principal who charged the agent with causing damage) words conflict with a master’s (God’s, who forbade causing damage), whose words should be heeded?” Since the agent is mentally competent, he must accept responsibility for his conduct.

When he accepted the responsibility to guard the fire, he also accepted the liability if he failed to do so adequately. See Chapter 4, Halachah 4 and notes.

For were it not for the wood, the fire would not have spread.

Since the wood was already there, it is the person who kindled the fire who must accept responsibility.

Because it is the fanning that causes it to spread.

If, however, such winds are common, the persons who brought the wood and started the fire must accept responsibility. They should have taken this factor into consideration.
Note Maggid Mishneh and the gloss of Sefer Me’irat Einayim 418:9, who explain that the term “an uncommon wind” does not refer to a storm wind that rarely comes, but rather to a wind that is an infrequent and out-of-the-ordinary matter, but still a somewhat recurrent meteorological occurrence.

For without the wind’s influence, the fire would not have spread.
If, however, the wind is blowing at the time a person is involved with the fire, and he ignores the possible danger, he is held liable (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah, Choshen Mishpat 418:9).
The Ramah (based on the Tur) also maintains that if it is a common wind that caused the fire to spread, the last person who had anything to do with the fire is liable.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s statements, maintaining that the liability of the person who fanned the fire is dependent on the viability of his deeds. Were his fanning sufficient to have caused the fire to spread even if it had not been fanned by the wind, he is liable. If not, he is not held liable.
The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling, citing several interpretations by the Sages in Bava Kama 60a. He nevertheless questions the Rambam’s decision here, based on the Rambam’s own words in Hilchot Sh’chenim 11:1-2.
The Kessef Mishneh resolves this difficulty, explaining that in Hilchot Sh’chenim, the Rambam mentions a situation in which a person winnows grain in his own domain, but the wind carries the chaff outside his domain. There, even though an ordinary wind is involved, the person is not held liable. This appears to contradict the ruling here. Nevertheless, as the Rambam himself states in Hilchot Sh’chenim, had it not been for the wind, the chaff would never have caused damaged. In this instance, the person’s fanning of the fire would have caused it to spread sufficiently to cause damage.

Wood is consumed entirely by fire. Stone and earth are not consumed entirely. Nevertheless, a fire might cause them to deteriorate until they are no longer useful (or as useful as they had been). The liability for both these types of substances is alluded to in the verse the Rambam cites: “Thoms” are consumed entirely by flames (as are standing ;md bound grain, which the verse also mentions). Why does the verse also mention a field (for the liability for standing grain is mentioned explicitly)? To teach that even when the field is lying fallow, but its value deteriorates because it is charred, the person is held liable. See Bava Kama 60a.

Since it is the ordinary practice for such articles to be hidden in a grain heap, the person who kindled the fire should have considered this possibility. Therefore, he is liable for their destruction.

Since it is abnormal for such articles to be hidden in a grain heap, the person who kindled the fire is not held liable. As stated in the notes on the following halachah, the place taken by the utensils is considered as if filled with grain, and restitution for that must be made.

As in Halachah 1, since he kindled a fire in another person’s domain without permission, stricter rules apply.

Bava Kama 60a derives this law from the above verse, which mentions standing grain. It comments: “Just as standing grain is openly revealed, so too, [a person is liable only] for entities that are openly revealed.”
Note the Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 418:13), which state that this applies in an instance where the fire would have been stopped by a wall, the wall fell for reasons not dependent on the fire, and the person had the opportunity to repair the wall. Although he is liable for the grain heap, he is not liable for the articles hidden in it.
The rationale is: If the fire were large enough to spread by itself, the person would be liable. If its spread was caused by factors not dependent on the person who kindled the fire - e.g., an abnormal wind - he is also not liable for the grain heap.

I.e., if the utensils took up a cubic foot of space, the person who kindled the fire must pay for a cubic foot of grain. This also applies with regard to a person who bums clothes or glassware hidden in a grain heap, as mentioned in the previous halachah.

The Rambam’s words are based on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 6:7). The Maggid Mishneh states that the intent is that the person is liable only for the kid. Since the kid is tied, it cannot flee. He is not liable for the servant, because the servant is mentally competent and should have fled.

He is not held liable financially for the death of the servant, because he is considered to have murdered him, and is liable for capital punishment for his death. Therefore, we follow the principle that a person who is liable for capital punishment (even when that sentence cannot be administered) is free of liability for monetary loss.
There is a question if he is liable for the loss of the kid in this instance even when a servant is not killed. Some explain that he is not liable, because the kid should have fled. Others explain that a kid is not of sufficient mental competence to know whether or not to flee (Maggid Mishneh). Significantly, these laws are not mentioned by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch.

For he gave him permission to store grain in his domain, not utensils.

Wheat is more valuable than barley. Nevertheless, since in actuality it was barley that was burned, the person who kindled the fire is liable only for the barley.

In this instance, he is liable to pay him only for barley, because that is what he gave him permission to store.

This applies even if he was granted permission to make a heap of wheat. Since the person who kindled the fire saw only barley, he is liable only for that (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 418:20).

If he gave him permission to make a heap of barley, he is liable to pay him only for the barley. If he gave him permission to make a heap of wheat, he is liable to pay the value of the wheat that was actually burned, and the value of remainder of the barley (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 418:21).

I.e., all the personal goods the person claims.

Note the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh, which states that when it is supported by an oath, the claim of the house owner is accepted, not only when the person who kindled the fire is uncertain about the value of the articles in the home he destroyed, but even when he claims to be certain that they were not worth the money the house owner demands.

A Torah scroll (Hilchot Sh‘vuot 11 :8). In certain circumstances, tefillin are substituted for a Torah scroll (Ibid.: 12).

See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:17; Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:2. (See also Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:6.)

I.e., that according to his standard of living, one might assume that he owns.

In that era, retail outlets were usually stalls in the public domain, rather than enclosed edifices. The flax protruded into the stall, where it caught fire from the shopkeeper’s oil lamp.

And caused the flax to protrude beyond the borders of the public domain and enter the confines of the shopkeeper’s stall.

If the animal stands still, there is more reason to hold the camel driver liable, for once the fire was kindled, he should move his beast to prevent it from spreading the blaze. Nevertheless, even when he does keep his animal moving, since he caused the fire to start, he is liable for all the damages.

This is considered an act of negligence on the part of the shopkeeper. For the camel drivers and wagon drivers in the public domain do not suspect that there are lamps hanging there.

Which we are commanded to place at the outside of our homes.

In and of themselves, the actions of the person who bent the grain were not sufficient to cause the fire to reach the grain; the influence of the wind was also necessary. Since the fire was spread by an uncommon wind, it is considered a factor beyond the person’s control, and he is not liable.

For had he not bent the grain, the fire would not have reached it, even though an uncommon wind was blowing. As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 7, if the uncommon wind was blowing at the time the person bent the grain toward the fire, he is liable.

The two examples are carefully chosen. Earth reduces the likelihood that the grain will be consumed by fire, while straw increases it. Nevertheless, in either case the same laws apply.

For he himself did not set the fire.

See Halachot 8 and 9.

See Hilchot Chovel UMazik, ch. 1, for a detailed explanation of these five categories of compensation.

This is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages (Bava Kama 22a). Rabbi Yochanan maintains, as the Rambam rules, that kindling a fire is regarded like shooting an arrow. Resh Lakish differs and maintains that a fire is regarded no differently from a person's cistern or his animals.
To explain Rabbi Yochanan's opinion: When a person shoots an arrow, he is considered to have caused damage with his person although the damage took place far from him. So too, when he kindles a fire, despite the fact that the damage occurs in a distant place, it is as if he caused the damage with his person.
Note the Maggid Mishneh, who points to an apparent contradiction in the Rambam’s rulings. For Rabbi Yochanan does not free a person of liability for articles that are buried. It is, however, possible to explain that the Rambam does not accept Rabbi Yochanan’s perspective blindly. He accepts it in this instance, but follows the other interpretations with regard to buried property.

Chapter 11, Halachah 6, and Chapter 13, Halachah 2.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 418:1) defines the derivatives of fire as referring to any property that one owns that is transported further by the wind and causes damage.

For just as a person is liable when an ordinary wind spreads a fire, so too, he is liable for any other damage his property causes that comes as a result of an ordinary wind.

Just as he is not liable when an uncommon wind causes a fire to spread (Halac. 7).