Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The Rambam explains them one by one, beginning with this halachah. See Chagigah 20a ff. for the Talmudic discussion of the matter.

One may place smaller keilim that are impure inside a larger vessel that is pure and immerse them.

As stated in Hilchot Mikveot 3:26, the opening of the pure container must be as large as the mouthpiece of a drinking pouch. t

See Hilchot Mikvaot 8:1, 6 that explains that a hole this wide- calculated to be two fingerbreadths in diameter- joins two bodies of water together. Similarly, it joins water inside a vessel with a larger body of water (ibid. 6:8).

I.e., were a person to immerse keilim inside a container with a smaller opening, the immersion would not be acceptable. Nevertheless, with regard to keilim to be used for consecrated foods, our Sages instituted a safeguard and did not accept immersion even if the opening of the larger vessel was larger than the required measure. They did not institute such a safeguard for utensils to be used for terumah.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 3; Hilchot Keilim 13:4.

I.e., an indent in the rim enabling the container to be held without inserting one’s finger inside of it. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keilim 25:8).

This is the second of the 11 stringencies.

I.e., something on which a zav stood, sat, or lay on. Such an article is a primary source of impurity and imparts impurity to one who carries it.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Chagigah 3:1), the Rambam illustrates this situation with an example of a person carrying a board on which the impure support and the consecrated food were placed.

Were he to touch the support, he would impart impurity to it.

This is the third of the 11 stringencies.

It does not apply with regard to other sources of impurity, e.g., the carcass of a creeping animal or animal, that was carried.

From the gloss of the Ra’avad to Hilchot Parah 13:3, it would appear that the Ra’avad maintains that the consecrated food contracts impurity.

I.e., they impart impurity to a person and to keilim.

This is the fourth of the 11 stringencies.

I.e., with regard to immersion, it is considered as a single whole.

E. g., fat or the like [see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (op. cit.)].

For, because of the stringency, each of the components is considered as a separate entity.

Reassembling the k’li. This is the fifth of the 11 stringencies.

Even if the intermediate stages of fashioning the utensil were performed by an impure person, the utensil does not contract impurity. For it is only when it has reached its final stages that this can take place.

This is the sixth of the 11 stringencies. As stated in Halachah 16, there is a difference between these six stringencies and the following five.

Who is considered to be a zav by Rabbinic decree (Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 10:1). Hence, his spittle is considered as a primary source of impurity (ibid. 1:14).

Had the spittle have dried by the time the utensil was completed, it would not have contracted impurity (ibid. 2:1). Since the likelihood of this happening is high, the utensil is considered pure with regard to terumah. Nevertheless, for consecrated food, higher standards are required.
Our translation is based on the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The standard published text mistakenly placed the last words of this halachah at the beginning of the following one.

This is the seventh of the 11 stringencies.

Even when laws were instituted by Rabbinic decree, our Sages would often point to verses from the Torah as allusions to them.

Chagigah 23b.

E. g., the container held an entire isaron of flour, half in one comer and half in the other. In between the two halves, there was another entity.

E. g., it is something like frankincense which would complete the offering and make it fit for the altar.

E. g., meat or another entity that has no connection to the offering.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, offering a different interpretation of Menachot 24a, the Rambam’s source. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s approach.

As stated in Halachah 7.

I.e., the food is considered a derivative of impurity and it imparts impurity to the water.

Menachot 24a raises this question. As Rashi states in his commentary to that text, the question is: Does the concept that a container joins the two masses together apply only when the contact with the agent that imparts impurity occurs within the container or does it apply even when that contact occurs outside the container?
Rambam LeAm questions: True, the concept is left unresolved by the Talmud. But still, as the Rambam writes in Halachah 7, the entire concept of articles in the same container being considered as joined is Rabbinic in origin. Since, generally, we follow the principle that whenever a doubt arises regarding a point of Rabbinic Law, one should rule leniently, why is this instance considered to be different?

The container joins the masses together only when impurity is imparted to one of the masses at the time when they are both in the container.

And is therefore considered as a second degree derivative of impurity.

Rambam LeAm explains that the Rambam illustrates this concept by mentioning a person who immersed that day as the agent who imparted impurity and not another entity that is a primary source of impurity, e.g., a carcass, because there are times when contact with a primary source of impurity will impart a more severe state of impurity to an entity that is already impure. In contrast, a person who immerses himself imparts the lowest level of impurity.

It is considered as impure itself, but does not impart impurity to other entities. This is the eighth of the eleven stringencies imposed by the Rabbis.

As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 8, the liquid is considered as a primary derivative.

I.e., the liquid contracts impurity and is considered as a primary derivative. If the person’s other hand would touch the first, it would contract impurity. Even if it is not known that it touched the first hand, we considered it impure as a safeguard, for perhaps it did so unknowingly. The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that, if it was not touched, there is no reason for the second hand to contract impurity. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that these laws are Rabbinic safeguards and the Rabbis felt that such a decree was necessary.

For consecrated foods, in contrast to terumah, it is not sufficient to wash hands that contracted impurity. They must be immersed in a mikveh, as stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 7. If the person did not touch his other hand and his first hand did not become moist, only that one hand must be immersed.

If, however, he touches the second hand while the first is moist, the second does contract impurity (Kessel Mishneh).

This is the ninth of the eleven stringencies. Tosafot (Chagigah 20b) explains that the two distinctions mentioned in this halachah are not considered as separate stringencies, for the Sages counted only the stringencies involving contracting impurity, not purifying oneself from it (the subject of the distinction between immersion and washing).

As explained in Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 1:1-2, for food to be susceptible to ritual impurity, it must first come into contact with one of seven specific liquids.

I.e., contact with the person’s hands does not render the food impure.

Even if it was not touched by liquid beforehand.

According to the Rambam, this stringency applies even if he is eating that consecrated food alone. Chagigah 24b states that this is a safeguard imposed lest the person take a moist vegetable with his hands (thus making the vegetable impure) and eat it together with the consecrated food, causing the consecrated food to contract impurity.
The Kessef Mishneh states that this safeguard is the tenth of the eleven stringencies. The previous concept- that the cherished quality of consecrated food causes it to be considered as susceptible to impurity even if it did not come into contact with liquids — is not considered as one of these eleven stringencies, either because it is of Scriptural origin or because it is a separate Rabbinic decree that was not instituted together with these eleven.

That the cherished quality of consecrated food causes it to be considered as susceptible to impurity even if it did not come into contact with liquids.

The Kessel Mishneh notes that the Rambam’s source is Chulin 36a which raises this question with regard to remnants of flour from the meal offerings that were not touched by oil and leaves the matter unresolved. The Kessef Mishneh notes that in Chapter 8, Halachah 3, the Rambam rules that primary and secondary derivatives can be reckoned after contact with such remnants. He states that, according to the Rambam, the principle that the cherished quality of consecrated food causes it to be considered as susceptible to impurity even if it did not come into contact with liquids applies in all contexts with regard to Scriptural impurity and even with regard to most instances of Rabbinic impurity. Here the Rambam is speaking solely with regard to our Sages’ decree that hands alone can be deemed impure (Chapter 8). Since the impurity imparted by such hands is itself a Rabbinic stringency, the Sages questioned whether the foods to which they imparted impurity can themselves impart impurity to other substances.

I.e., one who lost one of the relatives for whom he is required to mourn (his mother, father, son, daughter, brother, and sister; one must mourn for his or her spouse according to Rabbinic Law). On the day of the person’s death, he is considered in acute mourning according to Scriptural Law. And at night, he is in acute mourning according to Rabbinic Law (Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 2:9; Hilchot Evel 2:1).

I.e., a zav or the like, who must bring sacrifices before being permitted to partake of sacrificial foods.

This is the eleventh stringency.

In the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chagigah 3:3), he rules slightly differently than here, stating that a person in acute mourning may touch consecrated foods, but one who is lacking atonement is forbidden to touch them and imparts impurity to them if he does. There is a difference of opinion regarding the wording of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 12:1). Some versions of the text follow the ruling here, but others state that it is forbidden for such a person to touch sacred food.

Chapter 11, Halachah 9. Here, as there, the Ra’avad differs.

These distinctions are all Rabbinic stringencies. According to Scriptural Law, if a person is pure, he is pure with regard to all circumstances (see the conclusion of Halachah 2).

I.e., something on which a zav stood, sat, or lay upon. Such an article is a primary source of impurity and imparts impurity to one who touches or carries it.

Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 10:1. As stated there, this refers even to a person who is an observant Jew. Since he is unaware of the intricacies of the laws of purity, we fear that he contracted impurity without realizing that he did so.

Which must be eaten in Jerusalem in a state of ritual purity (Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 3:1).

The term literally means “those who are set apart,” for these people would avoid contact with ordinary people lest they become impure. See Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 16:12. This is the source of the term Pharisees found in secular literature describing the Talmudic period.

Since terumah is referred to as kodesh and there are more severe laws regarding its impurity than the second tithe, our Sages imposed greater stringencies regarding it.

Hilchot Parah Adumah 13:7.

See also Hilchot Mikveot 1:8.

From the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Zavvim 5:12), one might conclude that there is a problem even with regard to touching terumah unless one immersed with that intent.

See Hilchot Mikveot 1:8, 9:17.

I.e., in a situation where only his hands become impure, as mentioned in ch. 8.

Since, generally, a person’s hands are considered as impure, one must wash one’s hands before partaking of the second tithe. This ruling is evident from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chagigah 2:5). There are, however, several other places in the Rambam’s works from which one might conclude that such a washing is not required.

This applies even if the person is certain that he did not contract impurity.

As would be required had he contracted Scriptural impurity.

And it is possible that they came in contact with a source of impurity [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 7:8)]. Rabbenu Asher (as quoted by the Kessef Mishneh) asks: If so, seemingly, the person should be required to immerse his entire body?

In contrast to the instance mentioned in the first clause, in this situation, the person does not know that he did not contract impurity.

For according to Scriptural Law, unless a person knows with certainty that he is impure, he is not required to immerse himself.

Shabbat 15b.

Where they are unlikely to be touched by people.

Accordingly, it would appear that the ashes of the red heifer must also be sprinkled upon them. This conclusion is borne out by Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 11:12.

In contrast to the previous halachah.

That position would indicate that they were impure and were being taken there to be immersed.

Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 11:12.

The day the Paschal sacrifice was offered. Since all the pilgrims to the Temple would be offering their sacrifices that day, it was likely that the knife was brought for that purpose and immersed beforehand so that it would be pure.

Were the knife to be impure, the sacrifice would be disqualified. Even so, the Sages did not suspect that they contracted impurity [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Shekalim 8:3)]. This leniency is particularly relevant on the Sabbath, because if the sacrifice was not acceptable, one is considered to have violated the Sabbath laws by slaughtering.

For as stated in Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 11:9, it is assumed that even the unlearned purified themselves on the festivals.

I.e., we assume the purification process for the knife had already been started and must be completed. Therefore the knife may not be used until after nightfall on the thirteenth. The knife should not be immersed on the festival itself, because that is forbidden by Rabbinic decree (Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 4:17).
The Ra’avad forcefully differs with the Rambam’s ruling. Nevertheless, the Kessef Mishneh substantiates the Rambam’s understanding.

We assume that it was discharged by an unlearned person who is considered as a zav whose saliva is impure.

Individuals who maintain a state of ritual purity at all times (Halachah 1).

If, however, the reason the primary source is considered impure is a Rabbinic decree, when there is a question whether consecrated food or terumah touched that primary source, the consecrated food or terumah is not burnt. This follows the general principle: A doubt concerning a matter of Scriptural Law is judged stringently. A doubt concerning a matter of Rabbinic Law is judged leniently.

Consecrated food and terumah that are pure are not permitted to be destroyed without reason. Nevertheless, because there is a question concerning their purity, it is permitted—indeed, deemed necessary—to burn them.

For there is a question whether they contracted impurity and it is forbidden to partake of these foods if they are impure.

For, as stated above, consecrated food and terumah that are pure are not permitted to be destroyed purposelessly. In such a situation, terumah is left until it definitely contracts impurity (Hilchot Terumah 12:3) or until it rots. Consecrated foods are left until one of the above occurs or they are disqualified because of the passage of time.

Since the laws concerning consecrated foods are more stringent than those concerning terumah, if a situation warrants that terumah be burnt, certainly, consecrated foods should be burnt (Kessef Mishneh).

E. g., as described in the following halachah, there is a question whether or not the food touched a beit hapras. Since a beit hapras itself is impure only because of a doubt and there is a doubt whether it touched the beit hapras, the situation is considered one of compounded doubt. In that instance, we rule leniently and do not burn the food. Nevertheless, the doubt is considered serious enough to prevent the food from being eaten.

Since burning consecrated food is more severe than burning terumah, it is appropriate to say “needless to say” in this instance (Kessef Mishneh).

This ruling applies in a private domain. If such a situation would arise in a public domain, the food would be considered as pure [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 4:5)].

A field containing a grave that was plowed and the bones of the corpse were lost in its earth (Hilchot Tum'at Meit 2:16, 10:2).

Since the gentile nations are not always careful about burial, we fear that some bones from a corpse might have unknowingly been mixed in the earth (ibid. 2:16).

As stated in Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 10:1, because of his unfamiliarity with the laws of impurity, such a person and his clothes are deemed impure.

As mentioned in Halachah 4 above.

It must, however, be known that the person is impure. If not, there is another element of doubt involved and a more lenient ruling is warranted (Rambam LeAm).

See Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 2:6 where the basis for this ruling is explained.

For in none of these instances is it definitely established that impurity was present.

I.e., another entity touched one of the six and thus became impure, that entity touched another entity and the third entity touched the terumah.

This is a situation of compounded doubt, as mentioned in Halachah 12.

In Halachah 12. Generally, if there is a doubt whether or not terumah contracted impurity, the ruling is held in abeyance. Only when it has definitely contracted impurity is it burnt. In these six instances, our Sages were stringent and considered the initial questionable situation (the beit hapras, the earth from the Diaspora, etc.) as definitely impure and calculated the doubts accordingly.

The Rambam lists the twelve situations here and goes on to elaborate upon them in the subsequent halachot in this and the following chapters.

Water that was drawn using a container and then used by humans to fill a pool. This term is explained at length in Hilchot Mikvaot, ch. 4.

A log is 344 cc according to Shiurei Torah and 600 cc according to Chazon Ish.

Three luggim.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 4:8; see also the following halachah and Chapter 15, Halachah 8), the Rambam emphasizes that this applies only in a private domain. In a public domain, there would be no need for such a leniency, for its status would be pure regardless.

There is an allusion to this in the Torah. Leviticus 11:29, the source that teaches that the carcass of a crawling animal imparts impurity, speaks of “a crawling animal that crawls on the earth.” Since this carcass is not on the earth, but floating, there is room for leniency [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (op. cit.)].

Although the Mishnah (Taharot 4:7-8) speaks of “impurity floating,” from Nazir 64a, it is apparent that the principle applies only with regard to the carcass of a crawling animal.

Since they are being held by a person, they are considered as placed down and not floating (Kessef Mishneh).

Chapter 15:7-8. As stated there, this principle applies with regard to people and also with regard to keilim or foods.
This halachah points to an issue that requires resolution. The rationale for two of the twelve situations involving a doubt — a doubt whether an object touched a carcass of a crawling animal that was floating and a doubt that such a carcass that was discarded — is seemingly the same: Since the impurity does not have a definite place, we rule leniently. Why, then, are they considered as two different situations?
In resolution, it can be explained that the ruling here involves humans and thus there is room for stringency, because a human has the knowledge to inquire about his status. In contrast, the doubt involving a discarded carcass involves food where there is greater room for leniency, because the food cannot question its status.

Since the ashes of the red heifer had been sprinkled upon it, it is thicker than other water and can be considered as a separate entity.

The commentaries question: What is the distinction between the paper and the container or semen mentioned in Halachah 4?

Since the kneading trough is impure, the water contracts impurity because of it and is considered as a primary derivative. Hence, if the water would come in contact with the loaf, it would render it impure.

Which would render it impure.

I.e., if there was a question whether a loaf of bread that was terumah touched the carcass.

For the leniency mentioned by our Sages involved a carcass floating on water, not on wine.

Who were perushim and sought to maintain a state of purity at all times (Kessef Mishneh).

For liquids impart impurity to other substances only due to Rabbinic decree and when a doubt arises regarding a point of Rabbinic Law, we rule leniently (Kessef Mishneh).

The fact that the impure person inserted his hand into the inner space of the jug does not render it impure, as stated in Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 8:4. Nor does he contract impurity from the liquids for the reason stated by the Rambam.

Due to the principle stated in the previous halachah.

I.e., if the liquids are not touched by an impure entity, their status depends on the status of the jug. If it becomes impure, they are also deemed impure. If it remains pure, so do they.

For the liquids in the jug derive questionable impurity from the liquids that enter it.

In the Talmudic era, the floors were often simple earth and water would be sprinkled upon it to keep the dust down.

Because the question concerns articles that contract impurity from liquids.

See Chapter 15, Halachah 8; Chapter 16, Halachot 1-2. Although loaves of bread which cannot inquire about their status are involved, since it is known that a source of impurity was present, there is no room for leniency.

The Ra’avad opines that it is impure, only because of the impression that might be created (marit ayin). An onlooker will see that a question is being raised about the status of the loaf, but he will not know about the liquids that caused the question to be raised. Were the loaf to be deemed pure, he might receive a wrong impression regarding questions of impurity in a private domain in general.

I.e., a situation where the person himself is not impure, but his hands are impure due to Rabbinic decree, as stated in ch. 8. Since the entire question is a matter of Rabbinic Law, when a doubt arises, we rule leniently.

This refers to loaves that are a primary derivative of impurity. Hands do not contract impurity from a secondary derivative or lower (Chapter 8, Halachah 1).

Would it be known that he had touched them, he would have contracted impurity.

I.e., the impurity of the hands was definite and the doubt is whether or not they were purified.

I.e., drawn water disqualifies a mikveh and there are four factors that disqualify water for washing hands (e.g., that work was performed with the water, see Hilchot Mikveot 11:11, Hilchot Berachot 6:7).

40 se’ah for a mikveh, a revi’it for washing.

Which would disqualify the immersion or the washing.

The Kessef Mishneh compares this to Halachah 2. Other commentaries (see Mishneh LeMelech, Hilchot Mikveot 10:6) make a distinction between the two.

If, however, he touches them with both hands before washing his hands, they are impure, for he will have certainly have touched them with his impure hand.