Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., if the body ot the animal that caused the damage is not worth half the damage it caused, the remainder may be collected from its offspring. Even if for some reason the cow is not found, the entire sum may be collected from the calf [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 399:1)].

It would appear that according to the Rambam, this applies even before the eggs are laid. Even while within the chicken, they are not considered part of its body’. the Maggid Mishneh offers a different explanation, stating that while the eggs are within the chicken, they are considered to be part of its body (Ramah, Choshen Mishpat 399:1).

This is a fundamental principle, applicable in many contexts of Jewish business law.

And thus the owner of the bull has no responsibility for the death of the calf.

Even when the owner of the ox does not know whether or not his ox caused the damage, as long as the owner of the cow cannot support his claim with witnesses, the owner of the ox is not liable [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 399:3)].

I.e., the difference in value between a living calf and a dead one.

Implied is that when a cow is pregnant it adds weight, which increases its value.

Obviously, a lesser amount.

I.e., the owner had sold the rights to the calf to another person before it was born.

Which appears larger and is therefore worth more [Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 399:5)].

Even when it ran into the rock because it was pursued, the other ox is considered to be merely an indirect cause of damage (grama), and the owner is not liable (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 400:1).

And are withholding payment only because you know that I cannot produce witnesses.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 7.

One of this man’s oxen caused the damage, and the damage must be paid for from the body of the ox itself. If the damage was worth more than the value of the lesser ox, the owner of the damaged ox can collect only the value of the lesser ox. The rationale is that there is no proof that the damage was caused by the more valuable ox.

Payment for damage caused by an ox that is tam must be expropriated from the body of the ox. If that ox is not present, the damage cannot be collected.

This is significant when the extent of the damages exceeds the value of the smaller ox.

If there are no witnesses present at all (in contrast to the instance described in the following halachah), in both this and the second clause of this halachah the person whose ox caused the damage is not liable at all. For the obligation that he admits (that the smaller ox or the tam) caused the damage, is not the obligation claimed by the person whose ox caused the damage (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Bava Kama 3:11). (See also Halachah 11 and notes.)

This is significant because it determines whether the person receives half the amount of the damages or the full amount.

In this instance, as opposed to an instance where there are no witnesses at all, the owner is obligated to pay the debt he admits, because of the testimony of the witnesses (Maggid Mishneh).
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 400:3) quotes the Rambam’s decision. The Tur and the Ramah, however, differ and maintain that if the person whose ox causes the damage makes a definitive claim saying that the other ox caused the damage, he is not liable at all.

I.e., if the owner of the goring ox indeed did not know which ox caused the damage, he could not be held liable for the greater amount. The person whose ox was damaged is, however, maintaining that the owner in fact does know and is concealing the matter so as not to be held liable.

As the Rambam explains, whenever a person admits a portion of a claim lodged against him, he is obligated to support his claim with an oath. He is referred to as a modeh b’miktzat (Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:1).
The Ra’avad maintains that an oath is required only in a case when one ox is tam and one ox is mu’ad, for the claim against the tam can be considered to be part of the claim against the mu’ad. When, however, both oxen are tam, the two claims are considered to be unrelated and no oath is required. Rabbenu Asher goes further and considers the claims to be unrelated in both instances. See Siftei Cohen 400:5, which discusses this issue.

This difference is significant if the oxen that caused the damage are tamim, for then the payment is expropriated from the body of the ox, and it is possible that the value of the small ox that caused the damage will be less than that of the large ox that was damaged.

This difference is significant, because when an ox is mu’ad, its owner is responsible for the entire amount of the damages, while when it is tam, only half the damages are required. Needless to say, the full value of the large ox is far more than the full value of the small ox.

If, however, witnesses observed that the oxen belonging to the same owner caused the damage, but were not able to identify which one caused the damage, the owner is obligated to pay the amount he admits, as in the previous halachah (Maggid Mishneh).

Chapter 3, Halachah 10. The rationale is that with regard to the instance when one ox is mu‘ad, the defendant does not accept any liability with regard to the claim that the plaintiff makes, and the plaintiff has not made a claim regarding the sum the defendant admits liability for; therefore, the defendant is not held liable.
With regard to the instance where both of the oxen are tamim, the defendant is not liable, because payment of half the damages is considered a fine, and a person who admits culpability for a fine is not liable (Maggid Mishneh).

Even the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 400:3), who view this situation more stringently than the Rambam, accept this principle. Moreover, according to, their logic (see Choshen Mishpat 399:3), if there are no witnesses that the plaintiff seized possession of the property of the defendant, the plaintiff may keep an amount equal to his own claim.
The above applies only when the plaintiff seizes possession of the defendant’s property before taking the matter to court. If, however, he took the matter to court, and the court ruled in favor of the defendant, as the Rambam states, and then the plaintiff seizes the defendant’s property, he must return it.

Since the owner of the gored ox is granted a share in the body of the ox that gores, he is also given a share in the responsibility for its damages.

See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 401:1, which notes that generally after goring three times, an ox becomes considered mu‘ad, and from that time onward, full damages for the damage caused by the ox must be paid. This complicates the matter.

I.e., half the damages, as required when a tam gores.

I.e., since he was responsible for the ox at the time it caused the damages, he bears the entire financial responsibility.

The Rambam’s view is also shared by Rashi (Bava Kama 36b) and Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, and is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 401:2). Tosafot, Rabbenu Asher and the Tur differ and maintain that the law mentioned in the previous halachah applies in this instance as well. Their view is quoted by the Ramah.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 402:1) explain that the laws mentioned in this halachah apply only when the second ox gores the first after the two oxen have been separated. If, however, directly after the first ox gores the second, the second gores it in return, the owner of the second ox is not liable for the damages. (See also Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 421:13.)

For a man is always responsible for the damages he causes.

In this and the previous clause, the intent of the Rambam’s wording requires the clarification of the examples that follow.

I.e., in the latter two instances, one determines the damages to be paid by the mu'ad and those to be paid by the tam and then subtracts one from the other. One does not subtract the amount of the damages caused and then have the owner pay half the remainder if tam, and the entire remainder if mu'ad.

I.e., in either a private domain or the public domain.

This law applies only when the animal kills intentionally, as stated in Halachot 9-10 (Kessef Mishneh).

The universality of this law is explicitly stated in Exodus 21:29-32: “If it kills a man or a woman, the ox must be stoned... This law also applies if it gores a boy or a girl. If it gores a servant... or a maid-servant... the ox should be stoned.”

Exodus 21:28 states that this penalty should be given to an ox that is tam, and the following verse speaks about a mu’ad.

See The Guide for the Perplexed, Volume III, Chapter 40, which states that this sentence is not considered punishment to the animal that killed the person, but rather punishment for its owner, so that he will know to restrain his animals. Some of the laws of this chapter (e.g., Halachot 6 and 8) indicate, however, that the intent is to kill an animal that is prone to kill.

The verse mentions an ox because it speaks about situations that are most probable.

Exodus 21:28, which speaks about an ox that is tam, states: “the owner will not be punished.” The following verses, which speak about a mu’ad, state that the owner will pay an atonement fine. The nature of that fine is discussed in the following chapter.

I.e., that the owner was warned three times that his ox killed (or came close to killing) an animal or a man, as mentioned in the following halachah.

I.e., the animal should seemingly have been executed after he killed one human being. How was it possible for him to kill three?

In which case it is not obligated to be executed, as stated in Halachah 1.

The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that although Bava Kama 41a, the source for this halachah, mentions this resolution (and the following one), according to the commonly accepted version of the Talmud, it appears that these hypotheses are rejected. The Maggid Mishneh explains that most likely the Rambam possessed a different version of this Talmudic passage.

The word t'refah refers to an infirmity that will cause the person (or animal) possessing it to die within a year. Since the person will die anyway, the ox is not executed for killing him (Bava Kama, loc. cit.).

There are exceptions to this principle, as reflected in Halachot 9 and 10.

In Chapter 6, Halachah 8, the Rambam states that an ox that is mu’ad with regard to a human is not mu’ad with regard to an animal. From that, we can derive that an animal that is mu‘ad with regard to an animal is not mu’ad with regard to a human.
This does not necessarily represent a contradiction to this halachah. For there, the Rambam is speaking about causing damage, and here we are speaking about causing death (Kessef Mishneh).

And it is not a monetary obligation imposed by civil law.

With regard to a sin offering or a guilt offering that also comes for the purpose of atonement, we do not find an obligation to expropriate the sacrifice from the person’s property. Nevertheless, it is possible to explain that since the atonement fine is paid to a colleague, and not offered in the Temple, people might view its obligation more laxly. See Lechem Mishneh.

This is a reflection of the concept that this fine is not recompense for the person’s death, but rather a means for the person who caused his death to attain atonement.

For whom a guardian was not appointed.

The intent is an ox belonging to a minor, deaf mute or mentally incompetent person that was entrusted to a guardian for safekeeping.

In contrast to the damages an ox in their care causes, for which they are required to reimburse the party whose property was damaged, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 4.

All of these individuals are considered to be mentally incompetent and are not held responsible for any aspect of their conduct.

The Ra’avad writes that if an ox kills a person in the presence of a court, it is executed. The leniency applies only when it kills in the presence of witnesses.
The Ra’avad’s statement is based on a comparison to a human being. When a human being who is t’refah kills another human in the presence of witnesses, he cannot be executed, because there is no way that the witnesses can be disqualified through the laws of hazamah. When, however, he kills in the presence of a court, there is no need for the testimony of witnesses, and the court is charged to “obliterate the evil from your midst.” (See Hilchot Rotzeach 2:9.)
The Maggid Mishneh does not accept this equation, because he maintains that the obligation to obliterate evil applies with regard to a man who performs an evil act, and not to an ox.

The rationale is that the animal is not considered to have killed as a result of its own tendency, but in response to prompting by the other person.

If, however, it intended to kill one Israelite, and instead it killed another, it is executed (Maggid Mishneh). There is a debate among our Sages (Bava Kama 44b) regarding both a human and an ox who kills with such an intent. With regard to a human, the Rambam rules that the killer is not liable for execution (see Hilchot Rotzeach, ch. 4), while with regard to an ox, he rules that it should be executed. See the Ra’avad and the Kessef Mishneh to Hilchot Rotzeach.

Our Sages (ibid.) derive this law from the parallel established between the owner and the ox being put to death mentioned in Halachah 6. Since a human being would not be executed for killing in such a manner, the animal is also not executed.

And the owners should therefore have watched it to prevent this from happening.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 7.

If the owner grants his consent, he is liable for the atonement fine if his ox kills the visitor.

The Maggid Mishneh and others note that Bava Kama 33a appears to present a difficulty to the Rambam’s ruling. Several resolutions are, however, offered.

Chapter l, Halachot 5,7.

This expression indicates a conclusion drawn by the Rambam that has no explicit source in the works of our Sages.

Exodus 21:32.

If it killed the servant intentionally, the law requires that the ox be stoned to death, and no benefit to be derived from it. Thus it is impossible to exact payment from its carcass. When, however, it kills unintentionally, it is not stoned and remains the property of its owner.

The Rambam’s rationale can be described as follows: If an ox kills a Jewish male or female, the owner is not obligated to pay damages, because the case is considered to involve capital matters. A servant, by contrast, is considered to be his owner’s property, and therefore, just as the owner of an ox that is tam must pay half the cost of any damages caused by his ox, so too, he is liable for half of these damages.

The antecedent of the pronoun “his” is a matter of debate among our Sages (Bava Kama 40a), who debated whether it refers to the soul of the owner or that of the person who was killed. According to the Rambam, there are dimensions of both opinions that are relevant. As evident from the previous chapter, by paying the atonement fine the owner of the ox is “ransoming” his own soul. On the other hand, as the Rambam states in this halachah and in Chapter 10, Halachah 4, the atonement fine is for “the person killed,” and the amount is determined according to the worth of the person who was killed.

See Exodus 21:32. A sela is equivalent to four dinarim (zuzim).

I.e., pure silver.

10,000 zuz.

E. g., a servant who has been declared ownerless by his master, or one whom his master caused to lose one of the limbs that require his release.

A woman’s property is inherited by her husband. He, however, is entitled only to the property that she possesses at the time of her death, but not property that will accrue to her afterwards. For this reason, he is not entitled to the atonement fine. Needless to say, if the woman has already borne children, the atonement fine is given to them.

E. g., a servant was owned by two partners, and one of them freed him while the other did not.
Note the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh, who states that this law applies only to a maid-servant, but not to a male servant. The Radbaz (Volume VI, Responsum 2249), however, justifies the Rambam’s view.

For the half-servant is dead, and he or she has· no heirs. Even if he or she bore children as a servant, they are not considered as the half-servant’s sons or daughters.

Exodus 21:22 speaks about men fighting together, and one of them causing a woman to miscarry.

As mentioned at the conclusion of the previous chapter, servants are considered in certain contexts to be no more than their master’s chattel.

Our Sages note that there are two elements lost with the miscarriage: a) the fetus, which would otherwise become the owner’s property, and b) the fact that while pregnant, a woman looks larger and healthier (Bava Kama 49a).

I.e., if the ox was mu’ad, the owner must pay the entire difference. If it is tam, he must pay half the difference.

See Halachah 1. No extra remuneration is made in consideration of the miscarriage.

Chapter 10, Halachah 9.

Our Sages explain that one might think that although the owner is liable if his ox damages another ox in this manner, he would not be liable for injuring a man. The rationale is that an animal does not have a spiritual source protecting it, while a person does. If injury occurs despite that spiritual protection, one might think that it is willed by God, and therefore the owner of the ox is not liable. (See Bava Kama 2b.)

See Chapter 7, Halachah 3.

To a man or to another animal.

For the payment for the damages caused by an ox that is tam must come from the body of the ox itself. In this instance, since the ox must be stoned to death, we are forbidden to benefit from its carcass. Thus, there is no source from which this obligation can be met.

They must pay from·resources other than the body of the ox.

I.e., the ox is hired out by the court to work for different people. When enough money accrues to pay for the damages, it is executed.

The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s position as follows. It is clear to the Rambam that once an animal is sentenced to be executed, it is no longer considered the property of its owner, and the owner is not considered responsible for the damages, even if the damages took place before the death sentence was delivered. (It appears that the Rambam considers that the obligation for the damages takes place only after the matter is taken to court.) For this reason, the Rambam maintains that the ox itself should be made to work for the damages.
For this reason, the ox will not be executed immediately after being sentenced. Although it is not proper to delay the execution of a human, there is no such principle with regard to the execution of an ox. There are other authorities who differ with several elements of the Maggid Mishneh‘s interpretation.

I.e., the ox. Rashi interprets Bava Kama 91a, the source of this halachah, as referring to the flight of the owner of the ox.

For the ox is not present to be hired out to work.

Once an ox has been sentenced to death, it is no longer considered to be the property of its former owner.

And the watchman must reimburse the owner for his ox, for he is responsible for it.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 4:22, Hilchot Issurei Mizbe’ach 4:2 and other sources.

The purchaser should slaughter the ox immediately. Otherwise, its meat will become forbidden.

Although the ox will be sentenced to death, the watchman is considered to have fulfilled his obligation, for the owners have the option of slaughtering the ox before it is sentenced to death.

And since the ox cannot be identified, that is not possible.

The animal is not considered to become bateil b’rov, insignificant because it is mixed with a larger quantity of permitted substances. Indeed, even when it becomes mixed with a far larger number of oxen, its identity is never considered insignificant. The rationale is that a live animal is important. And an important entity is never considered to be insignificant (Zevachim 72a; Sanhedrin 79b-80a).

See Hilchot Ma‘achalot Asurot 16:7 and Hilchot Pesulei Hamukdashim 19:11.

This apparently refers to an animal used by a human for sodomy, which must be executed, as stated in Leviticus 20:15. For no other sin is an animal executed.

This follows the principle stated in the next halachah: “A fetus is considered to be an extension of its mother.”

For it was not part of its mother’s body, neither at the time of the killing, nor at the time of the sentence.

Literally “the thigh.”

And so, just as the sentence caused the mother to become forbidden, it also caused the calf to become forbidden. The calf is not executed, however. Instead, it is left to die.

In this instance as well, all the calves need not be executed. It is, however, forbidden to benefit from them, because the presence of a live animal in a mixture is never considered to be insignificant.

Since the owner of the ox does not know whether or not the ox gored, he is dependent on the testimony of the witnesses. Once their testimony establishes that the ox gored, the owner assumes that it will be executed and despairs of retaining ownership. After he has made such a decision, even in error, anyone has the right to take possession of the ox. A parallel ruling is delivered in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 4:8.

Thus performing the kinyan of meshichah, a formal act of acquisition.