Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

In this chapter, the Rambam focuses on defining the intention of the seller: which articles he intended to sell and which not.

I.e., in the contract of sale it is explicitly stated that the appurtenances are being sold together with the house itself.

Without making any specific conditions.

The Kessef Mishneh states that this refers to a patio built outside the house. If, however, the patio is within the house - e.g., a house that has a courtyard that it surrounds on all sides - the courtyard is automatically sold with the house.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 214:2 states that this law applies even if the only entrance to the patio is through the house.
The rationale is that since the patio is a distinct and significant entity, it is not considered to be subordinate to the house.

It is not considered to be an important entity in its own right.

Since it does not have an independent entrance of its own, it is not considered to be a distinct entity, but rather is subordinate to the house (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 214:4).

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies even if the room is less than four cubits in size, in which case, in many circumstances it would not be considered to be an independent entity. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 214:2), however, differ and maintain that the room must be four cubits in size. The Kessel Mishneh explains that the Rambam is referring to a storeroom.

See Chapter 21 Halachah 17, which states that there are times when a person will draw the boundaries of a property larger than those that he is actually selling.

A roof of this size is considered to be an important entity.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 4:2). The rationale for the ruling is that such a cistern or reservoir is a distinct and significant entity. From the statements of the other commentaries, it is not clear that they maintain that this type of cistern projects upward.

Chapter 24, Halachah 15.

See a parallel in Chapter 26, Halachah 4. Similarly in instances when a person sells a room or a roof, it is necessary for the previous owner to purchase a path.

Therefore, we assume that the seller did not retain for himself any further right to the property.

Since it is unnecessary to mention this condition in order to acquire the cistern, we assume that he is doing so to avoid having to purchase a path (Maggid Mishneh).

Here also we follow the principle that the seller is assumed to have been generous when making the sale and enabled the purchaser access to the article that he purchased (Maggid Mishneh).

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 214:2) writes that if the purchaser has a means of access to the cistern that does not involve going through his neighbor’s property, he is not allowed to access through his neighbor’s property.

Therefore, to enter his property, the purchaser or recipient of the inner room must purchase a path from the purchaser or recipient of the external room, or appease him so that he grants him such a path.
The Maggid Mishneh states that this law applies only when the owner sells or gives away both properties at the same time. If, however, he sells or gives away one of the properties first, the purchaser or the recipient of the second possesses the right of access to his property. The rationale is that when the owner sells or gives away the inner room, but retains ownership of the outer room, the purchaser or recipient of the inner room receives the right of access to that room with the gift or sale. He retains that right even if the owner transfers ownership of the outer room to another person afterwards.
Similarly, if the owner first sells or gives away the outer room, the owner does not retain the right to enter the inner room. And therefore, if he sells or gives away that inner room, he cannot sell or give this right together with it. These principles are affirmed by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpal 214:10).

For as the Rambam proceeds to explain, a recipient of a gift is granted greater privileges than a purchaser.

An oven has an opening for one pot, while a range has an opening for two.

This refers to an oven or a range that is permanently attached to the ground within a house. Those that are not permanently attached are not sold with the house (Maggid Mishneh).
The standard printed text of Bava Batra 65a states “He did not sell the oven or the range.” Apparently, the Rambam had a different version of this Talmudic passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 214:11) quotes the Rambam’s ruling.

A beam fixed in the wall used to bolt a door (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 214:42).

This fixture is permanently affixed to the ground (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Zavim 4:2).

Although these blocks are attached to the ground, Bava Batra 69a is unsure whether or not they are considered to be permanent parts of the house. Therefore, they are considered to be the property of the seller.

Although water reservoirs and cisterns are not included in the sale of a house, they - and larger storage structures - are included in the sale of a courtyard. For storage structures are standard for a courtyard, but not for a home (Ri Migash). The Rashba explains that since a courtyard is used for laundry and for livestock, water reservoirs and the like are necessary.

The rooms that open into the courtyard.

Even if they do not open up within the courtyard. (See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 215:2.)

For they are important entities and are not included in a sale unless explicit mention is made of them.

Oil was produced in Talmudic times through two processes. Either the olives were ground in a grinder and then the oil left to drip out, or the olives were crushed and then the oil would seep out.

The Rambam’s rulings are quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 215:2). The Rashbam interprets Bava Batra 67b, the source for this halachah, slightly differently. His conception is cited by the Tur.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 4:5), the Rambam explains that they would have a wooden beam attached to the stone that would crush the olives. This beam was rotated, and by doing so lifted and let down the stone that would crush the olives.

The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that when the seller says “the olive press and all of its contents are sold,” the above articles are also included in the sale.

Made from animal hair.

Including the sacks (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 215:12).

Where many goods - e.g., bread and wine - are sold.

The sesame seeds are spread out to dry. This makes it easier for oil to be made from them. Although the press is used primarily to make olive oil, sesame seed oil is also produced there from time to time (Maggid Mishneh).

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 215:14 emphasizes that the seller must also say: “I am selling you an olive press and all its accessories.” When he makes such a statement and includes the stores in his drawing of the boundaries, it is apparent that he desires to include them in the sale.

In the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 4:6), he explains that in this room there is place to store away the people’s clothes. And in his Commentary on Keilim 22:10, he explains that this room would contain long wooden planks where the bathers would sit. Their clothes would be stored in baskets under which incense was burned to make them fragrant.

For they are movable property that is not an integral part of the building.

For these are distinct entities that are not necessarily associated with the bathhouse.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 214) states that for these to be included in the sale, the seller must include them in the drawing of the boundaries of the property he is selling. Although this does not appear to be the Rambam’s intent, the Ba’er HaGolah states that he follows this view.

It was apparently not uncommon in Talmudic times for entire towns to be the property of a single landowner, who would lease the properties to various tenants.

Needless to say, the courtyards are also included, for they are the fundamental elements of the town (Rashbam, Bava Batra 68a).

Although these are not included in the sale of a home (Chapter 25, Halachah 2), they are part of the landed property of a town.

Which provide water for the town’s trees (Rav Kapach’s edition of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Bava Batra 4:7). The Rashbam and others offer different interpretations, defining the term as “gardens” or “plots of fields.”

And the servants and the livestock (Bava Batra 68a).

The Rashbam (Bava Batra, ibid.) differs with the Rambam concerning this point. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 215:4) quotes the Rambam’s decision.

Our translation is based on Rav Kapach’s translation of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 4:8), which clearly states that the stones themselves do not serve as the fence.

After the grain is cut, it is collected in sheaves and left to dry. A stone is placed on the sheaves so that they will not be spread about by the wind.

Hence, even though they are movable property, they are considered to be part of the field.

The bark of the reeds would be planed off so that it would not attract worms (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 215:19).

Although the grain is ready to be harvested, since it is still attached to the field, it is included in the sale of the field. See Chapter 1, Halachah 17.

Because it is so small, it is not considered to be an independent entity.

The standard printed texts of Bava Batra 68b, the source for this halachah, read “which is not made with mortar.” The Rambam’s ruling is taken from the version of the text quoted by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi.
The rationale is that since the hut was made with mortar, it is considered to be a permanent part of the field.

When a carob tree is old, other trees are often grafted upon it. Therefore, it receives a certain measure of distinction and importance. When, however, it is young, it cannot be used for that purpose. Hence, it is considered to be part of the field (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 215:33).

In Talmudic times, wild fig trees would be cut off at the trunk for lumber. Afterwards, the tree would grow again from the stump and produce fruit.

The Talmud (Bava Batra, Zoe. cit.) does not mention date palms. The Rambam derives this law as follows. Since vines are considered part of the field, as mentioned above, it is logical to assume that the same applies for date palms.
The Sefer Meirat Einayim 201:35 states that this law also applies to other trees. They are also sold together with the field.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 215:5) state that if the stones had been used to weigh down sheaves previously, they are already considered to be part of the field.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 215:29 states that even if they have been used for this purpose previously only once, they are considered to be a permanent part of the field.

I.e., it still has to be spread out over the field to dry (Ramah, loc. cit.).

This is of sufficient size for it to be considered to be a distinct entity.

The Rambam in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Kilayim 3:1) explains that this refers to a block of rows in which vegetables or spices were commonly sown.

Since it has a name of its own, it is considered a distinct entity. Even though this block is small, it is still given this importance because spices are not necessarily grown in large fields.

With regard to this point as well, the standard printed texts of Bava Batra 68b follow a different version, reading “which is made with mortar.” The Rambam’s ruling is taken from the version of the text quoted by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi.
The rationale is that since the hut was not made with mortar, it can be picked up at any time. Hence, it is not a permanent part of the field.

Since other trees have been grafted onto them, they are granted more importance and are singled out from the property as a whole.

When the fig trees are cut down, new and more valuable trees sprout from the stump.

As reflected in Chapter 25, Halachah 2, a water reservoir is considered to be a separate and distinct entity.

See Chapter 25, Halachah 3.
From the Rambam’s statements, it appears that it is not necessary for the seller to purchase a path to the trees whose ownership he retains, as mentioned in the previous halachah. The Maggid Mishneh quotes a difference of opinion between the Rabbis concerning this issue.

Note the parallel in Chapter 25, Halachah 3.

A purchaser knows that there are times when restrictions are made with regard to a sale. Since he is paying for the property he is purchasing, he should not be shy about protecting his rights and making sure that all the desired articles are included in the sale. Indeed, if he fails to do so, this is a sign that he does not desire those articles.
Even though we say, “whoever sells, sells generously,” that means that the seller does not intend to hold back the sale of an article that he stated that he was selling. It does not mean, however, that he includes articles that are not mentioned explicitly (Rashbam, Bava Batra 71a). On the contrary, we assume that he did not desire to part with his landed property and therefore sold only what was absolutely necessary. If the purchaser claims that the sale is more inclusive, the burden of proof is on him (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 215:37).

The Maggid Mislmeh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 215:6) explain that this refers to only those articles that are physically located within the property being given as a present, but might be considered to be distinct entities because of their importance. If, however, an entity is outside the confines of the property being given, it is not included in the present even though it shares some association with it.

This also applies to a bathhouse, although it is not explicitly mentioned. It does not apply to a town, because none of the articles excluded from the sale of a town are attached to it.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this phrase excludes a ship. See the initial halachot of the following chapter.

If, however, produce is found within the field, but not attached to it, it is not included in the present. If, however, the produce requires the field, even though it is no longer attached, it is included in the present (Maggid Mishneh; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 215:40).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 4:9), the Rambam explains the rationale for this halachah: The recipient of a present will be embarrassed to tell the giver: “Tell me specifically what you gave me.” Hence, we rely on the principle, “whoever gives a present, gives generously” and assume that everything is included.

For a division of an inheritance is intended to be complete, without leaving further complications (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 215:41).

This refers to a convert who dies without leaving any heirs. His property is acquired by the first person who manifests ownership over it (Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:6).

It is unnecessary for the person to manifest ownership over all the articles individually. By manifesting ownership over the field, he acquires them all.

Here also we say: “Whoever consecrates property does so generously.” No one is compelling him to make such a gift. If he does so, we assume that he is giving generously (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 215:43).

For it is assumed that the seller and the purchaser had this intent in mind when making the sale.

I.e., when a ship docks, it is pulled into the harbor by ropes. And river-boats are sometimes pulled down the river by ropes. This is the interpretation of the Ri Migash. The Ramah interprets the term as referring to the oars.

See Rav Yosef Karo’s Kessef Mishneh, which resolves an apparent question that Bava Batra 73a would seem to present. For from a superficial reading of that passage, it appears that a beitzit and a dugit are one and the same. He explains that in Israel, where ships would travel on the Mediterranean Sea, they would have a larger auxiliary boat used to catch fish. In Babylonia, where ships would travel on the Tigris or Euphrates Rivers, there would be a smaller auxiliary boat used to bring the sailors to land. This interpretation is reflected in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 220:1).

Leather sacks into which merchandise is placed to protect it during the voyage.

For none of these are integral parts of the ship.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 220:3) which states that this applies only with regard to the sale of the carriage. If one hires out the carriage, the mules are included in the rental.

We have chosen the secondary interpretation offered by the Rambam in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 5:1). His primary interpretation is the beams extending from the carriage, with which the carriage is drawn.

If, however, the mules (beams) are attached to the carriage, if one sells the carriage, one sells the mules (beams) [Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 220:2)].

According to the Tur and the Ramah (ibid.), this applies even if the mules are attached to the carriage. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 220:7 explains the rationale for this ruling. One can detach the mules from the carriage and ride to one’s destination upon them.

There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries if this applies whether or not the oxen are connected to the yoke (i.e., whether or not the laws governing oxen are the same as those governing mules). See the Maggid Mishneh. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 220:4) rules that when the oxen are attached to the yoke, if one sells the yoke the oxen are also sold.

When; however, a particular phrase has a certain implication that is understood by all - or the majority - of the people in a locale, that implication is followed. See the concluding laws of both this and the previous chapter. See also the Ramah’s statements (Choshen Mishpat 220:8).

The Ra’avad and the Tur question the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that there is no rationale to explain it. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo tries to support the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that it probably reflected the language used at his time. In his, Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 220:5), he quotes the Rambam’s decision, while the Ramah favors the opinion of the Ra’avad and the Tur.

See the Kessef Mishneh, which explains why this and the previous halachah are not redundant. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 220:6), who differs with regard to the previous halachot, differs in this instance as well.

See Halachah 5 with regard to the laws of ona’ah and the nullification of a sale.

Since a donkey is primarily used for riding, and these ·are the essential gear used when riding a donkey, they are included in the sale (Maggid Mishneh).

For these are appurtenances that are not fundamental to the donkey’s use.

I.e., if the article is worth one sixth less than the price paid, that sum must be returned to the purchaser.

If the difference in value is more than one sixth.

See Chapter 12.
Since the price the purchaser paid is within range of the value of the donkey, we assume that he intended to purchase it alone, and he gave the extra sum because of a misjudgment of the donkey’s value.

I.e., we assume that the purchaser knew the value of a donkey and did not err in evaluating it. Why then did he pay so much extra? Because he was giving the seller a present.

None of the money is returned to him. Indeed, the Tur writes that even if the purchaser has not paid all the money he promised, he is compelled to pay the entire sum.

By telling the purchaser that the maid-servant or the cow is pregnant, the seller obviously intends to include the fetus in the sale.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 220:10) quote the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that if a maid-servant or cow is sold when pregnant, the fetus is automatically included in the sale unless a provision against its inclusion is explicitly made.

For a maid-servant who is nursing can be used to nurse other infants, and a cow that is nursing can be used to provide milk. Therefore, describing it as nursing does not imply a desire to sell the infant or the calf.

I.e., not even to nurse another donkey colt (Rashba).

Since the life of the servant or the donkey is dependent on this organ, we consider it as if half the servant or donkey has been sold.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, stating that he sees no source for the Rambam’s statements in the Talmud. The Rambam’s ruling is, however, cited in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 220:12) without objection by the other commentaries.

I.e., we see the value of the organ or limb in question with regard to work (Ramah, loc. cit.).

Thus, there is no implication that anything other than the head is being sold.

A cow or a bull.

Apparently, these were the practices commonly accepted in butcher shops in the Talmudic era.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Rashbam (Bava Batra 83b) state that the word “windpipe” in this context refers to the lungs.

A sheep or a goat.

Again this is a practice that was common in Talmudic times. The rationale for the difference is that the head (or the lungs) of a sheep or a goat is not large enough to be considered a significant entity.

Although this ruling contradicts that of an explicit mishnah (Bava Batra 5:3), Bava Batra 79b explains that the mishnah represents a minority opinion. The Rashbam, however, understands the passage differently and rules according to the mishnah.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 220:16) cites the Rambam’s view, while the Ramah follows that of the Rashbam.

See the conclusion of the previous chapter.