Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

As explained by the Sifre, Numbers 35:16-17 (see also Rashi’s commentary), to be liable for the death penalty, a person must strike a colleague with a stone large enough to kill him in an ordinary circumstance. If, by contrast, he kills him with an iron utensil, there is no minimum measure, for any iron utensil can cause death. See the following chapter where these principles are explained.

The rationale for these two examples is the principle that “A person is not considered to be an agent to commit a sin.” Since the murderer and the servants are also commanded not to kill, it is incumbent upon them to heed God’s command, rather than the request of the person who ordered the killing.

Since the person did not kill him directly, he is not to be executed by the court. See Chapter 3, Halachah 10, for other examples of this principle.
See Hilchot Melachim 9:4, which states that a gentile who kills a colleague in this manner is liable.

For a person’s life is not his own property, but that of God. (See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:1.)

And the verse states that his blood will be shed by a man - i.e., he may be executed by the court.

For it speaks “of the blood of your own lives.”

See Hilchot Melachim 3:10, which states that a king has the authority to enact laws and even kill subjects in order “to strike fear into [the hearts] of the wicked in the world, and break their power.”

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 24:4, which says that a court has the authority to execute people who commit acts that are not ordinarily punishable by death, if they suspect that the moral climate of the community at large will be affected by their conduct. For example, the court once executed a person for having sexual relations with his wife outdoors, because they feared that this would lead to licentious conduct among people at large. Similarly, if they fear that leaving such killers alive would lead to bloodshed in the community at large, they may execute them.

Imprisonment is never mentioned in the Torah as a form of punishment, and the commentaries have had difficulty pointing to the Rambam’s source. Although some have mentioned Sanhedrin 81b, which speaks of placing a person in a kipah so that he shall die, the intent here is not to cause the murderer’s death.

Cf. I Samuel 25:31. This verse speaks of Abigail’s counsel to David not to kill her husband Naval. It is thus chosen by the Rambam, not only to borrow a Biblical phrase, but to allude to its content.

Once the infant survives for 30 days, however, it is considered to be viable, and one is liable for killing it.

Needless to say, killing such an infant is forbidden, regardless of its state of health. From this halachah, we see a clear ruling with regard to the “mercy” killings of unhealthy infants. Killing such an infant is forbidden and may be punishable by death.

Note the contrast to the following halachah with regard to killing a person considered trefah.

Despite the fact that the person would otherwise die, by hastening his death one becomes liable for murder. Thus, this halachah highlights the prohibition against the “mercy” killings of adults who seek death to avoid facing their infirmity.

Sanhedrin 78a debates whether such a victim is compared to a person in his death throes because of old age and the like, or a person who is considered trefah. The Rambam accepts the latter position.

I.e., he has an ailment in one of his vital organs that will certainly cause his death, in contrast to the above halachah, which speaks of a person who will die because of general ill health or old age.

Implied is that the Heavenly Court does hold such a person liable.

I.e., that fact does not have to established by testimony.

I.e., the Rambam is explaining that every murderer cannot claim that he should not be held liable because his victim was a trefah. For we operate under the presumption that the victim was physically sound unless testimony to the contrary is presented to the court.

I.e., he cannot be executed for his deed.

Hazamah refers to disqualifying witnesses by testifying that they were in a different place at the time they claim that the incident took place. For example, a witness claims to have witnessed a murder in Jerusalem at 4 PM, Wednesday, while other witnesses testify that at 4 PM, Wednesday, the witness was together with them in Tiberias. Hazamah does not challenge the truth of the statement that the witness made (i.e., it does not say, “the murder did not take place at 4 PM”); it challenges the witness’s right to make such statements (Hilchot Edut 18:1-2).

With regard to a witness disqualified through hazamah, Deuteronomy 19:19 states: “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his brother” - i.e., he should be given the punishment that he desired to have inflicted on the original defendant. In this instance, however, the lying witness is not subjected to this punishment - execution - for the reasons mentioned by the Rambam.

While they, by contrast, are of sound body. Executing a person of sound body is a far more severe penalty than executing a trefah. Thus, the lying witnesses would not be punished “as they schemed,” but more severely so. This is beyond the scope of the fiat of Deuteronomy, ibid.

In elementary financial cases, by contrast, questions that might lead to hazamah are not asked of the witnesses. (See Hilchot Edut 3:1.)

The intent of this halachah is to underscore the status of a Canaanite servant, that with the exception of the law mentioned in Halachah 12, there is no difference between him and an ordinary Jew with regard to the laws of murder. Although a Canaanite servant is not a full-fledged member of our people and thus is not obligated to fulfill all the mitzvot, one is liable for killing him.

Although this phrase is found in the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, the intent is difficult to understand. [The Rambam La’am explains that the intent is “in the early ages, before the exile of the Ten Tribes.” For from the time of their exile onward, the laws of a resident alien do not apply (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14:8).] Significantly, authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah omit this phrase.

A gentile who has accepted the observance of the seven universal laws given to Noah and his descendants, and who is therefore given the privilege of living in Eretz Yisrael.

And a resident alien is not considered “your colleague.” This term refers only to a Jew.

Who has not accepted these seven universal laws.

I.e., one may use corporal punishment to influence a servant’s conduct.

If the blow is not sufficient to cause death, and the servant dies regardless, one is not liable, just as one would not be liable for the death of any Jew in this manner (Chapter 3, Halachah 1).

I.e., since he is his property, he has the right to strike him.

For if it is sufficient for him to survive one day, there is no need to mention “two”.

And not merely the daylight hours.

See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:3, which states that it is forbidden to strike a Canaanite servant belonging to some else. Since it is forbidden to strike him, one is liable for killing him in all instances.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 3.

This expression indicates a conclusion reached by the Rambam without an explicit source from the previous Rabbinic literature.

The Rambam’s logic is that the Torah did not give the owner permission to beat his servants wantonly and to inflict malicious wounds upon them. For such blows, there is no leniency.

For he has been sold.

As mentioned above, this leniency stems from Exodus 21:21, which states that the servant is “his [the master’s] property.” Bava Kama 90a explains that implied is that for the leniency to apply, the servant must belong solely to the master who kills him.

E. g., he had been owned jointly by two masters, and one released him from servitude, while the second did not.

For either the servant himself or the other owner also has a share in the rights to the servant.

If the murder weapon would not usually cause death, the killer is not held liable. The motivating principle for this assessment - and the others mentioned in the following halachot - is that if the weapon would not ordinarily cause death, and it did so only as a chance occurrence, the killer cannot be liable. For his actions in and of themselves were not sufficient to cause death.

I.e., striking a person on his thigh will require a much more severe blow to kill him than striking him on his heart.
In most authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, this paragraph is considered to be part of the previous halachah.

I.e., whether or not the force imparted by the hand to the object is sufficient to kill.

The Rambam is saying that an object that is thrown initially picks up speed and force as it traverses a short distance.

Once a stone passes a minimal distance, its force will decrease over space.

I.e., did the person strike him with all his strength?

I.e., how capable is he of wielding a deathly blow?

I.e., how strong is his constitution? Is he capable of enduring serious blows, or will he succumb easily?

I.e., the verse omits the phrase: “fist-sized... that could cause death” with regard to an iron object.

For any pointed iron object can pierce a person’s flesh and cause harm to a vital organ.

The term “maliciously” implies that not every blow that kills warrants the killer’s death. We must see if the killer struck “maliciously,” with the force and intent to kill. And we can infer that other factors should also be assessed.

I.e., his act must be such that his hatred for the victim and desire to kill him are evident.

This phrase indicates that the concept to follow is the Rambam’s independent conclusion.

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 12:10, which explains that if an animal falls into a cistern that is less than ten handbreadths deep, the owner of the cistern is not liable, for the animal’s death is considered an abnormal occurrence.
The Rambam prefaces this conclusion with the expression “It appears to me” - which, as explained above points to an idea that does not have an explicit source in the works of our Sages - because the constitution of a human is not the same as an animal, and it is not necessary that the same principle apply.

The intent is blunt objects that can cause death because of the force of the blow and their own weight.

For it was holding him in the fire or the water, and not pushing him there, that caused his death.

In all the instances mentioned in this halachah, the person performed an act that will inevitably lead to the victim’s death unless he is saved by another person.

I.e., in the previous halachah, the victim was exposed to the heat or the cold immediately. In this halachah, the influence that ultimately killed him had not begun to affect him when he was left by the killer.

A barrel is not entirely air-tight. Therefore, it is possible that the victim would live.

I.e., he held the snake close to the victim, so that the snake could bite him. Nevertheless, the snake had to make a decision to kill.

Unlike the previous instance, the animal that killed must approach to attack on its own volition.

For he is not a direct and immediate cause of the person’s death. In all the instances mentioned in this halachah (and those mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 2), either the factor that caused the victim’s death was not present at the time the killer left the victim, it was not an absolute certainty that the victim would die, or the animal that caused the person’s death acted on its own accord. The killer’s actions are considered merely as g’ram mitah, secondary causes of death.

I.e., God; see Psalms 9:13.

For neither performed an act that in and of itself was sufficient to kill the victim. Instead, their actions are categorized as g’ram mitah.

From Sanhedrin 77b, it appears that this instance also refers to a person who threw a ball against a wall and it killed another person on the rebound.

For the person who threw the ball certainly intended that it travel more than four cubits (Sanhedrin, ibid.)

Halachah 1.

Sanhedrin 77b-78a explains that if the ball fell directly downward after reaching its apex, it would be obvious that the force imparted to it by the person who threw it already ceased. If it killed as it fell downward in such a situation, the thrower would not be liable. Nevertheless, the fact that the object continues moving to the side indicates that a certain vestige of the thrower’s force remains. Therefore, if the object causes death, the thrower is liable.

In such an instance, there is no difference between the water and any other murder object, for the victim dies as a direct result of the killer’s act. When, however, the water flows in gradually, the situation is considered to be one of g’ram mitah, and it can be compared to the situations mentioned in Halachah 10.

The Rambam’s decision is based on the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, Sanhedrin 79a. Rabbi Shimon cites Deuteronomy 19:11, which states: “When a man hates his colleague, lies in wait for him, rises against him and strikes him fatally....” The phrase “lies in wait for him” is seemingly unnecessary. Hence, Rabbi Shimon interprets it as teaching that the murderer must intend to kill his victim. That fact that he intended to kill another person is not sufficient to have him executed as a murderer.
Rabbi Shimon’s view is contested by the Sages. Nevertheless, the Rambam follows his ruling, because it appears to be accepted by the later Sages, as reflected in the continuation of the Talmud’s discussion (Sanhedrin 79b). The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s decision and favors the opinion of the Sages, for generally when the opinion of one Sage is contested by others, the majority view is followed.

I.e., he does not have to pay damages to the victim’s heirs.

He may, however, be killed by the blood redeemer, and is, of course, subject to Divine retribution.

Chapter 6, Halachah 4.

Since his intent was not to deliver a fatal blow, he is not held liable.

The killer is not liable for execution, as explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 1.

Even in the first instance, he is considered to have killed intentionally. For although he did not intend to kill the victim, he did intend to strike him.

As explained by Makkot 7b, Deuteronomy 19:4 speaks of a person striking a colleague “without knowing.” This excludes a person who kills intentionally.

For the killer intended to kill the victim, and the blow was sufficient to bring about that intent. The fact that he did not intend to strike him on that limb is not significant.

Exodus 21:18-19 states: “If men strive together and one strikes his colleague with a stone or a fist, and [the victim] does not die, but falls into infirmity; if he gets up and walks around outside on his own power, the one who struck him is absolved. He shall pay only for his unemployment and provide for medical attention.”
This halachah explains that immediately after the blow is given, an assessment is made whether or not we are dealing with a capital case. Depending on that assessment, either of the courses of action suggested by the Rambam is followed.

The damages for loss of limb, pain, embarrassment, unemployment compensation and medical attention. See Hilchot Chovel UMazik, Chapter 1, where these concepts are explained.

We do not say that the judges who made the original assessment erred, and that the person in fact died because of the blow he received. Instead, we assume that their assessment was correct and attribute the victim’s death to other factors.

Although the Torah does not include imprisonment as one of its punishments, there is no alternative in this instance. If the one who struck the blow is not imprisoned, he will certainly flee to avoid trial.

The fact that the victim survived for a time after receiving the murder blow does not mitigate the punishment to be given to the killer.

As stated in the quote from Exodus mentioned above.

Although the Hebrew word משענת means “support” and sometimes is interpreted as meaning “staff,” that is not the intent in this verse, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

But did not improve to the extent that he could walk on his strength in the market place.

On which basis the killer could be absolved.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that there is a difference of opinion among the Sages concerning this matter in Sanhedrin 79a. The Rambam chooses to follow the majority opinion - that of the Sages - and not the minority view, that of Rabbi Nechemiah.
There is a slight difficulty, because in the standard published text of that passage, the phrase “there is a basis for [the assumption]” - which the Rambam uses to explain the position of the Sages - is attributed to Rabbi Nechemiah.
The commentaries note, however, that in the statement of the passage in the Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 9:3) and in the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, this phrase is attributed to the Sages.

This law applies regardless of whether or not the blows given by each of the attackers are sufficient to kill in their own right.

According to this interpretation, the meaning of the verse would be rendered: “When one strikes the entire soul of a person, he should die.”

Sanhedrin 80a states that this ruling applies when there are only two people in a group, and one of them is a sage esteemed for his refined character. Nevertheless, if an arrow emerges from between them and kills, we do not charge the other person with murder. For a person is never charged with murder on a mere assumption, regardless of how strong the basis for that assumption is.
Kin’at Eliyahu notes that the two laws in this clause are not motivated by the same rationale. The first law stems from the principle developed in the first clause: that a killer must be entirely responsible for the person’s death to be charged with murder. The second law communicates a different principle: that if we cannot pinpoint the identity of the murderer, we do not charge all those under suspicion.

For he alone delivered a blow sufficient to cause the victim’s death.

I.e., the murderer cannot be recognized amid the group.

For the innocent people are not forced to suffer because of the murderer’s deeds.

Even if the entire group of murderers is brought to court together, it is still considered as if the suspected murderer is being tried in absentia. For as long as his identity is not known, testimony is not considered to have been given in his presence.

For they are all murderers and are potentially harmful to society. They are not, however, forced to enter a kipah. (See the following halachah.) Since one of them has not been convicted, the court does not ordain their death.

Since the two did not see the entire murder together, their testimony is not acceptable, as explained in Hilchot Edut 4:1.

And without a warning, punishment cannot be imposed upon a person by the court (Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 12).

We have translated this clause somewhat loosely. Bedikot, translated as “the fine points of the testimony,” refer to questions that a judge may ask a witness to verify secondary matters in his account of a crime - e.g., what type of clothes was the killer wearing, what color were they? Once a judge even asked: What color were the figs of the tree under which a murder was committed? Did the figs have long stems or shorter ones? (Hilchot Edut 1:6).
Chakirot, translated as “the fundamental questions,” refer to the questions asked to determine what crime took place, when it took place, and where it took place (Ibid.:5).
If the witnesses contradict each other with regard to either the chakirot or the bedikot, their testimony is not accepted (Ibid. 2:1-2). Nevertheless, in the present halachah, the Rambam is saying that if the testimony of the witnesses is disqualified only because of minor bedikot, and the judges are certain that the defendant in fact committed the murder, they may not execute him formally, but they may put him to death using a kipah, as will be explained.

A small arch-shaped room the size of a person’s body (Sanhedrin 81b). See also Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:4.

As explained in the following halachah, this punishment is meted out because of the seriousness of the crime of murder. Since it has been established that the defendant did commit a murder, this measure is taken.

As reflected by the fact that they are punishable by execution by stoning or being bumed to death, which are considered more severe forms of execution than beheading (the punishment given for murder).

A metaphor for Gehinnom, Hell (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:4).

As I Kings, Chapter 21, relates, Navot possessed a vineyard that Ach’av coveted. When Navot refused to sell it to him, Ach’av - through the intervention of his wife Izevel - framed him for blasphemy and had him executed. After this murder, Elijah the prophet came to Ach’av and foretold his death.

Sanhedrin 102b.

In the previous halachah, the Rambam explained the severity of the sin of murder. In this halachah, he explains that notwithstanding all that was said, because of the desire to preserve the spiritual wellbeing of our society, it is desirable to kill certain individuals. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:1, which states that these individuals should be destroyed, because “they cause difficulty to the Jewish people and sway the people away from God.”

For the sake of clarity, we have restructured the wording of this halachah from that in the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah. Also, the definitions of the terms minim and apikorsim are taken from the authoritative manuscripts and early printings; they reverse the order and differ slightly from those of the standard text.

The Aruch explains the derivation of the word min as follows. The early Christians described themselves as ma’aminim. As a term of derision, our Sages shortened the name to minim, meaning “types,” and used it to refer to many types of deviant beliefs.
In Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7, the Rambam describes a min as a person who does not believe in God, or whose belief in Him differs fundamentally from the Jewish conception. See also Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:5.

I.e., this does not refer to a person who transgresses because he cannot overcome his desires, but rather to one who violates a prohibition with a deliberate desire to flaunt God’s commands.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10:1), the Rambam defines apikoros as “An Aramaic term implying the lack of appreciation of authority, the scorning of the Torah or its students.” Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro (Avot 2:14) continues that line of thinking by explaining that the term apikoros is derived from the Hebrew hefker, meaning “ownerless” - i.e., one who rejects authority. The Aruch associates the term apikoros with a Greek philosopher of a similar, phonetically coincident name Epicurus, who did not believe in the eternity of the soul.
In Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7, the Rambam describes an apikoros as one who denies prophecy or who disputes the prophecy of Moses - i.e., it refers to a person who contests, not the existence of God, but His communication with mankind.

As evident from the following halachah, these shepherds would continually pasture their flocks in fields belonging to others, thus violating the prohibition against robbery.

Nor, needless to say, may we kill them outright.

See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:2, which states that it is even forbidden to administer medical treatment to a gentile idolater. Nevertheless, if one fears that refusing to do so will endanger one’s safety or will create dangerous animosity between Jews and gentiles, one rnay administer medical treatment, provided one charges for one’s services.

As stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 11, this verse is a commandment, enjoining us to save a colleague’s life.

The Rambam mentions that these shepherds repeatedly violate the prohibition, and their conduct would be excused if they transgressed merely occasionally, since they are doing so for financial gain, as the Rambam continues to explain. Nevertheless, the fact that they continually violate these prohibitions indicates that they have no respect for the property rights of others. This lack of awareness of the basis for human relations is sufficient to warrant the severe measures suggested by the Rambam.

I.e., they are included in the scope of the commandment (Chapter 2, Halachah 11) that enjoins us to save a colleague’s life.