Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

He would not be obligated to announce his discovery if he found it at the present time (Chapter 11, Halachah 12). Nevertheless, since he was obligated to announce its discovery at the time he took it into his possession, that obligation does not cease because of its decrease in value.

This point is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages, Bava Metzia 28b. Rav Yehudah maintains that one should mention merely that one found a lost object, lest one give a dishonest person a clue to the object’s identity. The halachah follows the view quoted by the Rambam to prevent inconvenience to the finder and the owner of the lost article.

See Halachah 5 and notes.

As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, there are three types of marks:
a) simanim muvhakim b’yoter, extremely distinctive marks - e.g., there is a hole next to a letter on a document. These are considered proof of identity even according to Scriptural law.
b) simanim muvhakim, distinctive marks - e.g., the weight of an object or its measure. There is a difference of opinion among our Sages (Bava Metzia 27b, 28a) if these are considered proof of identity even according to Scriptural law, or merely according to Rabbinic law. (See also the following halachah.)
c) simanim g’ru’im, “unsatisfactory marks” - e.g., an object’s color or whether it was large or small. These are never considered proof of identity.
As the Ra’avad mentions, the Rambam is speaking in this clause about simanim muvhakim, and excluding simanim g’ru’im.

We fear that the deceiver will know of a person who lost an article, and the deceiver will be able to identify the article with marks and thus take it as his own.

The Ra’avad and the Maggid Mishneh interpret this to mean that even if the deceiver identifies the article with simanim muvhakim b’yoter, we do not return the article to him unless he brings witnesses. Based on the statements of the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 267:6), Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:8 and other commentaries maintain that if a deceiver can provide a siman muvhak b’yoter, we should return the article to him even if he does not bring witnesses. This leniency is not, however, accepted by the Siftei Cohen 267:2 and others.

Sifre on the verse; Bava Metzia 28b.

I.e., “your brother” can be interpreted as the object and not the subject of the asking. We enquire about the person s honesty.

After our Sages’ decree, although it is not necessary for an ordinary person to bring witnesses who testify that the article belongs to him, he must bring character witnesses who testify to his honesty.
See also Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:9, which states that a person who is known as a Rabbinic sage need not bring character witnesses. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 267:6) says that a person who identifies an article with a siman muvhak b’yoter need not bring character witnesses.

I.e., not only with regard to the identification of a lost object, but also to return a bill of divorce to a woman, or to identify a man as dead and thus enable his wife to remarry (Bava Metzia 27b).

The Rambam’s statements have aroused the attention of the commentaries. For in Hilchot Gerushin 13:21, the Rambam writes:
If, however, any one of these identifying factors is missing, even if there are marks [through which he can be identified] on his body and on his personal artifacts, even if one of those marks is a mole, testimony concerning his death should not be offered.
This appears to indicate that marks that would be acceptable with regard to the identification of a lost object would not be acceptable with regard to the identification of a corpse. Seemingly, this contradicts the Rambam’s statement here that “distinctive marks are relied upon... in all matters.”
The Kessef Mishneh claims that the Rambam’s intent is that simanim muvhakim b’yoter are acceptable with regard to all matters, even the identification of a corpse, while ordinary simanim muvhakim are acceptable with regard to monetary matters.
See also Hilchot Nachalot 7:3, which explains that when a corpse is identified by marks, his property is transferred to his heirs despite the fact that license is not given to his wife to marry.
The Radbaz (Volume II, Responsum 798) differs and explains that the Rambam maintains that, as indicated by the simple interpretation of his words here, ordinary simanim muvhakim are acceptable with regard to all matters, even Torah prohibitions. The intent of the term “marks” in Hilchot Gerushin is simanim g’ru’im.

I.e., in contrast to the instances mentioned in the following halachah, where one person identifies the article with more distinctive marks than the other.

He should treat the lost article as any other whose owner has not been identified.

I.e., it is not necessary for the witnesses to testify that they saw the person lose the article. Knowledge of his prior ownership is sufficient [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 267:9)].

This applies even if the article is identified by simanim muvhakim b’yoter. Witnesses are still considered a more effective means of identification (Siftei Cohen 267:7).

I.e., an oath is not required of the other claimant (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:12). The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 267:10) differ and maintain that the other claimant must take an oath.

For the fact that the article was woven for the person is not proof that he was the final owner of the article and that it fell from his possession.

For the length of an article, though more difficult to estimate than its width, can also be deduced from careful observation. The article’s weight, by contrast, cannot be determined by observation.

This is the Rambam’s interpretation of the term גמיו used by Bava Metzia 28a. See his Commentary on the Mishnah (Nega’im 11:10), where he defines the Hebrew term used in this halachah with Arabic words that refer to ornamental fringes placed on a garment.
Rashi interprets that term as meaning “area” - i.e., he states the total area of the garment, without mentioning its exact width or its exact length. In both his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 267:14), Rav Yosef Karo refers to Rashi’s interpretation.

At the stone outside Jerusalem mentioned in Halachah 1. The entire Jewish people gathered in Jerusalem for the pilgrimage festivals, and this was thus the most appropriate occasion to notify anyone who might have lost the article.

For the Hebrew words for second and third begin and end with the same letters. Were the person to think the article was being announced only for the second time, he might not appreciate the urgency of the matter and might not hurry home to check if he had in fact lost an article or not.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 2:6), the Rambam states that this refers to the eighth day of the holiday. The finder would make the first announcement on the first day of the holiday and wait until the final day (or the day after the holiday on Pesach or the day after the days of compensation on Shavuot) before leaving.

Although many Jews lived more than three days distance from Jerusalem, our Sages did not trouble the finder to wait longer than seven days.

And the Jews no longer would gather in Jerusalem as a unified people.

For these are places where many people congregate, and the word of the lost article would be circulated widely.

Bava Metzia 28a relates that the Persian rulers of Babylon had such a rule and would punish severely all those who disobeyed it.

At present, it is customary to make announcements in synagogues and houses of study. In many Jewish communities, there are also organizations that keep lists of lost objects that have been discovered. Anyone who loses an object thus has an address to turn to.

I.e., since it has a mark with which it can be identified, it never becomes the property of the finder. The finder must guard it until the owner comes, or until the arrival of Elijah, who with his holy vision will clarify all doubts that exist.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 267:16) differ and maintain that a person caring for a lost article is considered an unpaid watchman and is freed of all responsibility, except the loss of the article due to negligence.

E. g., to give charity to a poor person. This is worth at least a p’rutah and thus it is as if he has received a wage for his efforts. The differing opinions follow the approach of Tosafot (Bava Metzia 29a), who maintains that it is unlikely that the finder will be approached by a poor person at the time that he is caring for the lost article. Therefore, he is not considered to have received any benefit from caring for the lost article.

See the Siftei Cohen 267:15, who debates whether the finder’s responsibility is to prevent the article from decreasing in value, or whether he is obligated to cause its value to increase.

To air it out, so that it will not become mildewed. The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:19 states that one should not air it more frequently, lest this recurring use cause its value to diminish.

Lest it rip.

E. g., to air it out.

E. g., to cover a couch while it is being aired out. The rationale for the prohibition is that the finder may accidentally leave the garment there, and it will be stolen (Sefer Meirat Einayim 267:21). This rationale indicates that. there is no intrinsic difficulty in the finder’s benefiting from the use of the article. He simply must take care to use it in a way that does not cause it damage.

I.e., these three types of substances will not benefit from being used, and it is possible that they will be damaged. Hence, they should not be used at all.

See Hilchot She’ilah UFikadon 7:4, which states that this responsibility applies only when the owner goes on a long journey. In that instance, caring for the entrusted object is considered like returning a lost article, for the owner has no means of caring for it himself. If, however, the owner of the entrusted article is located in the same country as the watchman caring for the article, the watchman is not obligated to undertake these responsibilities.

For it is common for a student to fidget with the scroll from which he is studying a new subject, which requires his concentration.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:28 states that this applies only with regard to texts like the Prophets or Scriptures, which are difficult to comprehend the first time, but can be readily understood by one who is familiar with them. ln contrast, the tractates of the Talmud always require thought, even by a person who is familiar with them. There is thus no difference whether or not one is studying the subject for the first time.

Rashi, Bava Metzia 28b, reverses these rulings, for in his opinion it is more likely for the scroll to be torn if read in this fashion. The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 267:20).

In such an instance, it is surely possible that the scroll will tear.

I.e., take them as his own.

I.e., they are not considered pieces of art, each of which has a unique importance and value. For this reason, the value of tefillin can be readily assessed and a replacement purchased easily.
Today, when writing tefillin has become a highly competitive profession, and there is no small difference in the prices charged by various scribes, it is questionable whether this law would still apply (Kin’at Eliyahu).

The finder should not sell the animal immediately, for a person who has trained an animal desires that the animal which he trained be returned to him so that he will not have to begin retraining another.

Implied by the Rambam’s wording is that the finder cannot hire out the animals for his own use; he must hire them out to others. This is a safeguard against his using the animals and paying less than their true value.

I.e., the money received for their hire should be used for their care. In this way, the finder will not suffer loss.

I.e., the finder is not obligated to care for the lost object for a longer period without receiving recompense for his efforts.

By a court, as in the following halachah.

The finder receives half of the increase in value as payment for his efforts. See Hilchot Shutafim 8:3.

I.e., they are too small to perform useful labor, but pasture on their own and do not require much effort to feed.

Who scavenge for their own food (Kessef Mishneh).

See Rashi, Bava Metzia 28b, who reverses these decisions. Larger fowl that require more food should be kept for only three days. Smaller fowl that do not eat as much should be kept for 30 days. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 267:24) quotes the Rambam’s rulings.

This ensures that he will seek a fair price for them.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat, loc. cit.) differ and maintain that since the price of animals is usually standard, it is not necessary that they be sold in the presence of a court. Like the tefillin mentioned in Halachah 14, all that is necessary is that the finder evaluate the price, and he may then take the article as his own.

Bava Metzia 38a records a difference of opinion among our Sages, when produce that a person entrusted for safekeeping begins to rot. One opinion maintains that it should be sold to protect the owner’s interests; the other maintains that if the owner wants it sold, he should order its sale himself. With regard to a lost object, by contrast, all agree that in such a situation it should be sold, for there is no way the owner could order its sale.

The loan is due as soon as the original owner comes to claim the lost article.

Note the contrast to Hilchot She’ilah UFikadon 7:5, and the notes of the Maggid Mishneh on that halachah.

And a borrower is liable even if the borrowed object is destroyed by forces beyond his control. The license to use the article is sufficient to lift his level of responsibility.
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 267) differs and maintains that until the finder actually uses the money, he is considered merely a paid watchman and is not responsible for the loss of the money by forces beyond his control. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:38 states that the Ramah accepts this ruling. All authorities agree that once the finder does make use of the money, he is considered a borrower.

Our Sages assumed that the original owner of the lost article would willingly give the finder this privilege in return for his care for the article.

Since he did not have to care for the found object, he is not given any added privileges.

See Halachah 10. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that the finder is considered an unpaid watchman.

This expression is usually employed by the Rambam to indicate a ruling for which he has no explicit source in the rulings of the Sages of the Talmud.

Generally, it would be fit to require the finder to substantiate his claim with an oath. Indeed, we find that even when a person is entitled to incur expenses on another person’s behalf, he must support his claim with an oath (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:40).

For otherwise, because of the general reluctance to take an oath, no one would care for a lost article, as stated in the following halachah.

I.e., if the original owner claims that the lost article was not returned to him in its totality, the finder is not obligated to take an oath to support his claim. Even a Rabbinic oath, a sh’vuat hesset, is not required of him.

Because of the severity of the prohibition against taking false oaths, people were reluctant to take oaths at all, even if they were true.

The Ra’avad notes that the Rambam’s ruling follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov in Gittin 51b. He states that this decision is not accepted by all authorities. Despite his objections, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 267:27) both accept the Rambam’s rulings.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 267:42 states that if the owner declares that he saw the finder pick up both wallets, an oath is required.

The Rambam’s exegesis of these verses is based on the comments of the Sifre and those of Bava Metzia 27a.

Bava Metzia 27a uses the term אוכף, which translates as “saddle,” while the Rambam employs the term מרדעת which is translated as “cushion” or “pack-saddle.” The Noda BiY’hudah, Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsum 32, focuses on the significance of this change in wording. Bava Metzia, loc. cit., explains that a saddle is not often lent out. A “cushion,” by contrast, says the Noda BiY’hudah, will be lent out. A question thus arises: Why should the donkey be returned when its cushion can be identified? Perhaps the cushion was borrowed. In resolution of this question, the Noda BiY’hudah explains that the Rambam maintains that the acceptability of identification by marks (simanim muvhakim) was ordained by Rabbinic decree. (See Chapter 13, Halachah 5, where this subject is discussed.) According to this approach, our Sages did not negate the identification of an article (or a person) because of a suspicion that an article by which it was identified had been borrowed.

Had the Torah not added this term, we would not require the return of the donkey unless there was an identifying mark on its body.

Even if the sheep grew wool in the possession of the finder, its shearings must be returned to its original owner.

As mentioned in Chapter 11, Halachah 12, a lost article that is worth less than a p’rutah need not be returned to its owner. Nevertheless, although it is possible that the oxtail’s shearing may not be worth this amount, it must be returned. Since the finder is required to return the ox, he is liable to return everything connected with it (Hagahot Maimoniot, Nimukei Yosef, Bava Metzia).

Bava Metzia 27a asks: Since the Torah tells us that the shearing of an oxtail must be returned, why does it mention the necessity to return the shearing of a sheep? Seemingly, this would be self-evident. The Sages do not resolve this question.

If, however, two or more of these articles are lost, the number of articles can serve as a sign of identification, as mentioned in Chapter 13, Halachah 5.

See, however, Halachah 5.

In which instance the owners are likely to assume that it was washed away and will never be returned to them.

In which instance the owners are like to assume that it was found by a gentile, who will not return an article that he discovered. See Chapter 11, Halachah 7.

More precisely, at the time they became aware of its fall.

This ruling is the subject of a difference of opinion between Abbaye and Ravva (Bava Metzia 22b). Although in such situations the halachah ordinarily follows Ravva’s opinion, this is one of the six exceptions, and it is Abbaye’s conception that is accepted as law. See the notes on Chapter 15, Halachah 1.

See Chapter 11, Halachot 1-2, which explains that by taking an article before the owner despairs of its recovery, the finder violates the positive commandment to return it, the negative commandment not to ignore it, and the negative commandment against robbery.
The above applies only when the person sees the money fall from its owner. If he discovers it afterwards, he is allowed to keep it, for we assume that the owner checked his pockets and realized his loss [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 262:3)].

If, however, he returns the money before the owner despairs of its recovery, he is not considered to have violated any of these transgressions (Tosafot, Bava Metzia 26b).

For once the owner despairs of its recovery, he relinquishes his ownership, and the money can become the property of the finder.

See Tosafot (loc. cit.), which states that by returning the money, the finder corrects the violation of the prohibition against robbery. He also fulfills the mitzvah of returning a lost article (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchot Metziah) The intent is that the prohibition against ignoring a lost object cannot be corrected.

As Rashi states (Bava Metzia 26b), the prohibition against robbery is violated only at the time the person takes the article, and at that time the finder did not intend to take it as his own. For the same reason, he is not considered to have violated the prohibition against ignoring the lost article.

Because a coin does not have a mark by which it can be recognized.

See Halachah 2.

He does not violate the commandment requiring him to return a lost article, or the prohibition against robbery, for these apply only when he takes the article into his possession. At that time, the owner had already despaired of the article’s recovery, thus relinquishing his ownership.

I.e., with regard to all lost objects that do not have marks by which they can be identified.

Of at least a p’rutah in value.

I.e., certainly if the coin dropped from fewer than three people, the finder would be obligated to return it. Even if it dropped from three, he is obligated to do so for the reasons explained by the Rambam.

If, however, the finder knows that the three are not partners, he is not obligated to announce the discovery of the coin (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 262:10).

If, however, the coin is worth less than a p’rutah and a half, there is no obligation to return it, for it is unlikely that two partners will both forgo their share to the third (Rashba, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh).

The person who dropped the coin will not despair of its recovery, for he will assume that it was found by the people accompanying him (ibid: 11)

See Halachah 4.

The Ma’aseh Rokeach states that this law applies even if the person’s name is engraved permanently upon the coin.

I.e., even if he does not actually give the coin to another person since he has the possibility of doing so, marks on the coin are not accepted as a means of identification.

Bava Metzia 28b interprets this as referring to an instance when a person finds fruit (an object that lacks marks by which it can be identified) next to a container (an object that possesses marks by which it can be identified). (See Chapter 15. Halachot 13-15, where these laws are spelled out.)
The rationale for the Rambam’s ruling is that we assume that the fruits spilled out from the container and thus belonged to the same owner.

I.e., although there are no marks by which the article can be identified, a person can recognize the article as his own.

The Ra’avad states that the announcement must be made only in a house of study or other places frequented by Torah scholars.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ramban as stating that this law applies only if the article is discovered in a house of study. Should it be discovered elsewhere, it may be kept by the finder. The rationale is that even if it was lost by a Torah scholar, he will assume that tl1e finder will think that it was lost by an ordinary person and will not announce its discovery.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo states that the Rambam would not accept this distinction, and in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 262:21), he ignores it. The Tur and the Ramah, by contrast, quote the Ramban’s view.

Not only a Torah scholar, but any person can recognize an article as his own. Nevertheless, our Sages feared that a person who was not a Torah scholar might not be honest and would falsely claim an article as his own. They did not harbor such suspicions with regard to Torah scholars, for study should affect the character of a student and prevent him from lying to achieve personal gain.

Our translation of the word ותיק is based on the interpretation of the Aruch.

The explanations to follow represent the Rambam’s interpretation of Bava Metzia 23b. Rashi offers different explanations of these concepts.

The laws of ritual impurity resulting from menstruation.

The laws of ritual immersion.

The classic example of such conduct is that of Aharon the priest. If he saw two people quarreling, he would go to one on the following day and tell him how the other had told him how sorry he was over their argument. Then he would hurry to the other person and tel1 him how his colleague had expressed sincere regret over their dispute. And so, when the two people would meet, their bonds of friendship would be renewed (Avot D’Rabbi Natan 12:3). (See also Yevamot 65b and Hilchot De’ot 5:7.)

A Torah Sage is disqualified only when there is conclusive evidence of his dishonesty. Otherwise, our presumption is that he tells the truth.

Note Sefer Me’irat Einayim 262:46, which questions whether this privilege must be granted to Torah scholars in the present age. In this context, he cites several examples of distinctions that were granted to Torah scholars previously, but are no longer applicable.

In his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 260:9), Rav Yosef Karo follows the Rambam’s view. The logic of this position is that if it is possible that the owner of an article placed it down in a certain place, he was willing to take the risk of its being taken. There is no need to do more on his behalf than he himself desired.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the opinions of the Rashba and the Ramban, who differ and maintain that if the article has a mark by which it can be identified, there are instances when it should be taken. To quote the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 260:10):
There are three categories:
a) If [the article] was secure where it was placed - e.g., a garment or an axe placed at the side of a wall - if there was a doubt whether it was placed there intentionally or not, it should not be touched....
b) If it is in a place where it is not secure at all - even if it was definitely placed there intentionally -... if it has a mark, he should take it and announce its discovery....
c) If it is in a place where it is somewhat secure, if it has a mark - even if it is possible that it was placed down there intentionally - he should take it and announce its discovery.
The fundamental point of this approach is that when an article is not secure in the place where it is located, even when it could have been placed there intentionally, it is in the interest of the owner that it be taken. Although this might cause the owner some difficulty in recovering it, the article will definitely be preserved. Otherwise, it is possible that it will be taken. The Siftei Cohen 260:24 states that all authorities agree with this latter position.

For by the time the finder took it home and returned, the owner could have returned to the place of the article and seeing that it was taken, abandoned hope of its recovery. Thus, if the finder placed the article in its original place, it is possible that the owner would never come to look for it there again. Therefore, it is preferable that he announce its discovery.
When, however, it appears that the owner intentionally placed the article there, and the finder did not leave the place where the article was located, the finder may return the article to its place. But if there is a doubt whether or not it was intentionally placed there, it should not be returned (Maggid Mishneh; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 260:41).

In this instance as well, the Ra’avad, the Maggid Mishneh and others take issue with the Rambam’s logic. Since it is possible that the finder took possession of it before the owner despaired of its recovery, why is he allowed to keep it as his own? For this reason, these authorities [and the Ramah (loc. cit.)] rule that the lost article must be set aside until the prophet Elijah comes. In both his Kessef Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), Rav Yosef Karo follows the Rambam’s view.
The Radbaz (Volume VI, Responsum 2285) explains the Rambam’s view, maintaining that the Rambam is referring only to an instance when there is a doubt that the owner placed it there intentionally. Although the finder was forbidden to take the article, since he did not definitely violate a transgression, he is allowed to maintain possession.

Based on this and the previous halachah, the intent of this phrase is that if the person erred and took an article that had been intentionally placed down, he is obligated to announce its discovery (Maggid Mishneh).

For it is common practice for an owner of animals to let them pasture freely during the day. If, however, they are found at night, they should be taken and returned to their owners, as stated in the following halachah.

We assume that the owner hid it there temporarily.

Although the Hebrew word בדרך (“in the way”) appears in the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah, it is most likely a printer’s error. It is not found in the proof-text, nor in the authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah.

All these situations indicate that the animal or the object was not intentionally placed there by the owner. See the following halachot and notes for details with regard to animals, and Halachah 7 and notes for details with regard to an article hidden in a garbage heap.

And should be taken and returned to its owner. The very fact that an animal is out at night, even though everything else appears ordinary, is enough to have it considered a lost object.

There are times when a person will take his animals out to pasture earlier than usual or leave them pasturing later than usual. Therefore, on the first two occasions the animal is not considered lost. When, however, the situation repeats itself on three consecutive occasions, we assume that something is amiss and require that the animal be cared for.

We assume that it is running back to its owners (Bava Metzia 31a).

I.e., the cow will eat the twigs from the vines, and damage the plants. In contrast to Halachah 2, we are not, however, concerned about the cow. Since it is grazing in a normal manner, it will not be damaged.

I.e., 2000 cubits from the furthest home.

Thus, if the cow is found within the city’s Sabbath limits, even in the public thoroughfare, one is not obligated to return it. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 261) states that even if the cow is found in a public domain within the Sabbath limits, and it is likely to be taken by others or to flee, it should be taken and returned. This ruling is quoted by Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 261:3).

The Maggid Mishneh (based on Bava Metzia 32a) states that this law applies even if the barn or pasture-land is beyond the city’s Sabbath limits. The Tur differs and states that if the barn or pasture-land is beyond the Sabbath limits, the cow should be taken and returned. The Ramah concludes his discussion of the matter with a practical directive: If the cow is likely to be taken by another person, it should be taken and its discovery announced.

For it is customary for workers to leave their articles in such a place (ibid. 31b).

For no one will purposefully leave an article in a thoroughfare.

For since they are tied in a standard manner and are hopping from place to place, there is no mark of identification for them. As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 1, there are authorities who differ with the Rambam’s ruling and maintain that the doves should be set aside until the prophet Elijah comes. See Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 260:10).

According to the Rambam, this applies when the finder transgressed and took them. According to other authorities, this applies when it is questionable if they were placed there intentionally, and the place where they are located is not entirely secure.

In contrast to those mentioned in the first clause, which were hopping.

Halachah 2. This is speaking about a garbage dump that is not usually cleared away. If it is found in a garbage dump that is usually cleared, according to the Rambam’s opinion (see Chapter 11, Halachah 11), one is not allowed to take it. According to the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 260:11), the article is considered ownerless and may be taken by the finder.

Otherwise, when he clears the garbage dump, the article will be lying in the open and may be taken by any passerby.

For it is likely that they were accidentally thrown out of a person’s home with the garbage, rather than buried there intentionally.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 262) questions the Rambam’s ruling, because Bava Metzia 21a rejects an interpretation of “scattered fruit” in the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 2:1), which parallels that offered by the Rambam, and instead interprets it as referring to grain left over on the threshing floor. (See Halachah 12.)
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo explains the Rambam’s ruling, stating that the Talmud’s rejection of the interpretation quoted by the Rambam applies only in the initial stages of the argument. According to the final resolution of the subject, this interpretation can be accepted. Accordingly, he accepts the Rambam’s ruling. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 262:15 questions why the Ramah does not quote the Tur’s opinion.

In contrast to the larger sheaves mentioned in Halachah 10, the loss of smaller sheaves of this nature may not be realized by the person carrying them. Also, they can be kicked from place to place by animals. Thus, the place in which they are found is not considered a valid mark of identification.

I.e., all these are standard items that will not usually have distinctive markings by which they can be identified.

As long as the mark remains intact, it can be used to identify the article. We do not say that since the owner knows that ultimately the mark will be obliterated, he will despair of the article’s recovery at the outset.

Which are distinct and can thus be identified.

The seal on the jug was signed and thus can serve as a mark of identification.

For the wholesale sale of these products.

The Ra’avad agrees with the Rambam’s ruling, but gives a different rationale. Since the mark is standard, it will be known by all. Thus, a deceiver who wants to claim the jug will also be able to identify it. Therefore, the person who loses it will despair of its recovery.
The Ra’avad, Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 262:9) state that this law applies only at the river bank when a large quantity of similar jugs are unloaded at the same time. In other places, the seal on a jug can serve as a mark of identification.

Since they are light, the person who lost them will not know whether he dropped them in a private domain or a public domain. Hence, the place where they are located cannot serve as a mark of identification. Since they do not have any other marks by which they can be identified, the owner will despair of their recovery. Therefore, they may be kept by the finder.

I.e., at the outset, he should not take them, but if he erred and took them (see Halachah 1), he must announce their discovery.
This is the Rambam’s intent when using the phrase “he must announce their discovery.” When, by contrast, he uses the phrase “he should take them and announce [their discovery],” the intent is that, at the outset, the finder is obligated to take the lost objects and announce their discovery. See, however, the commentary of the Or Sameach mentioned in the following notes, which offers a different interpretation.

I.e., the person who placed them down can identify them by saying where they were discovered. Since they were in a private domain, we do not fear that they were kicked from place to place by passersby.

The Maggid Mishneh questions the wording of this phrase. For if an object’s location is not an acceptable mark of identification, why should it be returned to the finder on this basis? Moreover, in Chapter 13, Halachah 5, the Rambam explicitly says that location can serve as a mark of identification. For this reason, the Maggid Mishneh and others maintain that this phrase is a printing error and should be deleted.
There are, however, authorities - e.g., the Kessef Mishneh - who attempt to resolve the Rambam’s wording. See the Or Sameach, who explains that although the location of the article is an acceptable mark of identification, it is not a desirable one, especially in this instance, where the sheaves can be kicked from place to place. Therefore, rather than leaving the sheaves in their place, as is done with most articles that are intentionally placed down, the finder should take them and announce their discovery.

I.e., even if the sheaves were dropped in the public domain, since they are large, they will be noticed by their owner, and the place in which they fell can serve as a mark of identification. Moreover, because of their size, we do not worry about their being kicked from place to place.

Rabbenu Asher and the Tur reject the Rambam’s ruling on these two points, explaining that it is likely that the shard accidentally fell into the figs, and the coin accidentally fell into the dough. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 262:15), Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Ramah quotes that of the Tur. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Karo explains that the difference reflects a textual difference in the versions of Bava Metzia 23a, b available to the various Sages.

E. g., in a triangular form (Bava Metzia 23b).

I.e., after the owners took their produce home. The question is whether the owners abandoned the remaining produce intentionally, or they intended to return and collect it.

A kav is approximately 1800 cubic centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, and 3100 cubic centimeters according to Chazon Ish.

A cubit is approximately 48 cm according to Shiurei Torah and 57.6 cm according to the Chazon Ish.

Who intended to return and collect it.

Although the area is one fourth the size, since the amount of produce is less, we are not sure whether or not it is significant.

In this instance, there is a larger quantity of produce, but an area four times the size.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 260:7) state that a similar ruling applies with regard to even a kav of any one of these types of produce.

Although the fruit itself is standard, the number of fruits or its location can serve as a mark of identification.

In both these instances, the container is likely to have a mark by which it can be identified.

See the illustration of this concept in the following halachah, and see Chapter 14, Halachah 11.

Which curls inward.

For it is apparent that the produce fell from the container.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Ma’asrot 3:4), which interprets קציעות as “berries cut off from any tree.” This interpretation also enables us to understand why he rules differently regarding קציעות and figs in Hilchot Ma’aser 3:21 and 3:24. The Maggid Mishneh, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 260:6), and others rely on Rashi who interprets this halachah as speaking about figs.

And we could assume that they fell from that field.

These berries have a certain amount of value. Hence, they will be watched by their owner. He will notice their loss and will despair of their recovery before they are picked up by a finder (Bava Metzia 21b).

Olives and carobs have a thicker skin than berries (or figs) and will not become repulsive when they fall to the ground.

The owners know that the wind will blow a certain portion of the dates from the tree. Unlike the olives and carobs mentioned in the previous halachah, the dates are likely to be eaten by animals because of their sweetness. The owners are aware of this and, therefore, at the outset, they forgo their ownership over this fruit (Bava Metzia 22b).

According to Jewish law, a minor can acquire property, but he cannot transfer ownership to another person.

This law also applies to the berries (figs) mentioned in the previous halachah. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 260:26.

Our text of Bava Kama 86a speaks of a cat that “cut off the arm of an infant.” As reflected in the Maggid Mishneh and in ancient manuscripts of the Talmud, the Rambam probably possessed a version of the text that speaks of a cat “kill[ing] an infant.” The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 266:4) follows our reading of the Talmud and therefore speaks of a cat that “maims children.”

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 260:8) emphasizes that all the laws to follow apply only with regard to young doves that cannot fly. If they can fly, we assume that they came from an outside place and the finder may acquire them.

Thus, we assume that the dove was dropped by a passerby. Since it does not have a mark by which it can be identified, or alternatively, because most passersby are gentiles, it may be acquired by its finder. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 260:32; Tosafot Yom Tov; Siftei Cohen 260:22.

And within 50 cubits of each.

This is a principle applicable with regard to other points of Torah law as well, as reflected in Hilchot Rotzeach 9:6 and Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 10:13; 12:28.