Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., if they come in contact with a source of ritual impurity, they contract ritual impurity.

See Chapter 3 where the concept of “designated for human consumption” is clarified.

Mentioned in Halachah 2.

Literally, “being made fit,” i.e., ready, to contract impurity. See Commentary to the Mishnah (Machshirin 1:1).

The verse continues to relate how the food can contract impurity if it comes in contact with an animal carcass. The implication is that only after it is dampened by water can it contract impurity in this manner.

As mentioned in Chapter 10, several of the liquids mentioned here also have derivatives that also can contract impurity and make objects susceptible to impurity.

As stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 3, this refers only to the blood that flows at the time an animal is slaughtered. Other blood does not have this distinction.

The intent is honey that comes from bees. Although in the Bible, the term honey often refers to date honey, that is not the intent here. The Sifra to the above verse uses Biblical exegesis to infer that these seven liquids (and their derivatives) alone make food susceptible to ritual impurity. See Chapter 10 for more details regarding these liquids.

If, by contrast, water spills accidentally on food, it may not become susceptible to impurity.

Leviticus 11:34 speaks of “liquids that will be drunk,” implying that in this context, only potable liquids are given this status (Sifra).

The term mei peirot, which literally means “fruit juice,” also applies to liquids of other origin as stated in Chapter 10.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that although fruit juices do not make foods susceptible to ritual impurity, if fruit was squeezed with the intent of producing juice, that juice is itself susceptible to ritual impurity. The Kessef Mishneh elaborates in support of the Rambam’s position, refuting the Ra’avad’s arguments.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sh’vi’it 4:9), the Rambam interprets this term as meaning that if they were squeezed in their present state, they would only produce a third of the liquid they would produce when left to ripen to maturity.

Our translation of this and the following terms are taken from Rav Kapach’s notes to his translation of the Arabic terms used in the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 3:5; T’vul Yom 1:5).

An Indian fruit resembling a pomegranate. Others interpret the term as a species of cinnamon.

E. g., cinnamon or nutmeg.

Chilba, a sharp pungent herb.

For then it is considered as a spice, as the substances mentioned in the previous halachah.

From the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 3:4), it appears that the intent is that raw dill is always considered a vegetable. If it was placed in a pot, it is considered a spice. Hence, after it was removed from the pot, it does not contract ritual impurity. This interpretation eliminates the basis for the question raised by the Ra’avad. See parallels in Hilchot Terumot 15:12, Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 7:10.

The standard text of the Rambam’s source, the Tosefta, Uktzin 3:8, speaks of the dates and the figs becoming spoiled to the point that they are not fit for a dog. The Rambam apparently had a different version of that source. According to his conception, once foods are no longer fit for human consumption, they do not contract the impurity associated with food. They do not have to be spoiled entirely. See Chapter 2, Halachah 14 and notes.

Beans usually used as animal fodder, but used for humans in a difficult situation.

Otherwise, like animal fodder, it does not contract impurity.

I.e., with regard to ritual impurity. The Rambam is quoting his source, Uktzin 3:7. In other contexts, it is considered as food; see Hilchot Berachot 8:6; Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 7:8; Hilchot Shmitah 5:21.

For a deed has been performed to place them in that category.

After one squeezed grapes to remove their juice for wine, one collected the pulpy mass that remained to eat.

Since people do not usually partake of the pomace, the fact that one person intends to do so is not significant.

This refers to grapes and olives that became dried out while on the vine or tree [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 3:6)]. Hence, they are so firm that rather than be crushed by the grape or olive press, they slip out and are expelled to the side.

Since they are so firm, they are not fit to be eaten or pressed to remove the liquids they contain.

A kor is 30 se’ah and a se’ah is six kabbim. Thus there are 180 kabbim in a kor. As such, we are speaking of slightly less than two percent of the grapes or olives being wasted in this manner. In contemporary measure, a kab is approximately 1376 cc. according to Shiurei Torah and 2400 cc. according to Chazon Ish.

Since there is such a large amount, we assume that the owner will desire to benefit from them (see Bava Metzia 105a).

The fact that the person collects them and sets them aside indicates that in his mind, they are considered as food. Since they are not entirely unfit to be eaten, the fact that a person considers them as food is significant.

The translation of this — and the following — terms are taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 3:6-7). The Kessef Mishneh offers a different interpretation.

The translation of all these terms are taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 3:4).

All of these substances are somewhat bitter. For them to be considered as foods, they must be sweetened through a pickling process (ibid.).

A type of bean that had to be cooked seven times before it was fit for human consumption (Beitzah 25b).

Since they are usually pickled, they are considered as foods even before they are actually pickled.

The pickled olives look more attractive when they are served together with their leaves [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 2:1)]. The leaves themselves are not eaten.

I.e., if impurity touched them without touching the zucchini itself, neither they nor the zucchini are impure, for they are not food, nor are they of any value to the zucchini [see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (op. cit.)].

But not as a liquid. The impurity associated with liquids is more severe than that associated with foods (see Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 1:5).
This ruling reflects a change in the Rambam’s thinking. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 3:11), he writes that when honey is in its honeycomb, it is considered as neither a liquid, nor a food.

I.e., it is considered as food even before one had a specific intent to remove it.

When taking it out of the hive, one had the intent to use it for jam or as part of a cooked dish (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 168:7).

I.e., and not a liquid (ibid.). As explained in that source, the designation of the honey as either a food or a liquid depends on the person’s intent. If he intended that it serve as food, it is considered as food. If his intent is that it serve as a liquid, it is designated as such. The Turei Zahav 168:6 differs and maintains that even if the person opened the beehive to use the honey as food and it is there considered as such, it is also considered as a liquid.

The Rambam’s ruling is based on the Tosefta (Taharot 2:2). As the Ra’avad notes, that source, however, does not state “congealed.” The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam assumes that this is the intent, for oil is one of the seven liquids mentioned in Halachah 2.

Since most people would not consider it as a food or a liquid, the fact that a given person does is of no consequence. Similarly, whenever the term batlah da'ato is used in the following halachot — and in subsequent chapters — the intent is since the common and accepted practice follows a given pattern, even if one person deviates and has in mind to use the entity otherwise, his conception is outweighed by that of people at large and his intent is of no consequence.

See the notes to Chapter 9, Halachah 2, where it is suggested that perhaps the intent is cheilev, fat.

In that era, it was not common to eat milk in that state. The Rambam’s ruling is based on the Tosefta (op. cit.). Apparently, the Ra’avad had a different version of that source. Hence, he objects to the Rambam’s ruling.

This is the intent of the term honey in the description of Eretz Yisrael as “a land of milk and honey” (Rashi, Eruvin 4b).

Because there are people who eat it as a food.

For it is never drunk as a liquid.

For it can be melted and converted to water. Even then, however, it does not make produce susceptible to impurity as liquids do.

For it is not considered as one large entity, but rather as a composite of many smaller entities. Only the snow that actually touched the impurity is impure. See, however, Chapter 2, Halachah 23, and notes.

Apparently, the intent is: placed in the inner space of. For being within the inner space of an impure earthenware container causes an entity to contract ritual impurity. The Kessef Mishneh offers this explanation, but suggests that the Rambam should have used clearer wording.

Because it was all located within the container’s inner space.

Since the congealed milk had already mixed with the nursing animal’s digestive juices, it would be useful as a curdling agent in making cheese or the like (Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:19). Apparently, however, there were also some people who would use this milk as a dip for other foods. The commentaries note that Hilchot Sh’ar Avot HaTum’ah 1:15 appears to imply that such milk is considered as wastes and is not viewed as food at all and is always pure. The Ra’avad suggests that this ruling should also be stated here.

One of the ways to remove the juice from grapes was to tread on them.

Because one’s intent is to obtain the grape juice.

The Ra’avad states that this refers to an instance where the olives were not crushed at all, but instead, remained entirely intact. He then asks: How is it possible for olives that were pressed to remain totally intact? He explains that this refers to an instance where the press was not applied to its full extent.

Fruit that grows in the first three years of a tree's life (Leviticus 19:23; Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 10:9).

A species of grain or a type of vegetable that grows together with a vine (Deuteronomy 22:9; Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 10:6).

I.e., an ox condemned to be stoned for killing a human being or being used for relations with a man or woman. Even if one slaughtered the ox before it was stoned, it is forbidden to benefit from its meat (Exodus 21:28; Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 4:22).

When a wayfarer was discovered to have been murdered and it is impossible to determine the identity of the murderer, the court of the town nearby must secure atonement by having a calf killed by breaking its neck in a special rite (Deuteronomy, ch. 21; Hilchot Rotzei’ach, ch. 9).

Once it has been designated for this purpose, it is forbidden to benefit from it.

It is not considered as an animal killed without ritual slaughter (and hence, a primary source of impurity). Since breaking its neck is mandated by Torah Law, it is equivalent to ritual slaughter (Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 3:13).

Two birds are used in the purification process of a person afflicted with tzara’at (Leviticus, ch. 14; Hilchot Tum’at Tzara’at, ch. 11). It is forbidden to benefit from the bird that was slaughtered. In his gloss to Hilchot Tum’at Tzara’at, the Mishneh LeMelech adds that it is also forbidden to benefit from the bird that is sent away until it is sent away.

Which must be redeemed for a lamb or its neck must be broken (Exodus 13:13; Hilchot Bikkurim, ch. 12). The Kessef Mishneh explains that we are speaking about meat cut from the donkey after it was slaughtered, but before it dies, because once it dies, its meat contracts the more severe impurity associated with the carcass of a dead animal.

See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 3:3.

A sacrifice that was slaughtered with the intent to partake of it at a time when it is forbidden to do so (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 13:1).

Sacrificial meat left beyond the time designated for it to be eaten (ibid. 18:10).

Although it is forbidden to eat all these substances, they are all edible and considered as foods in this context.

In Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 10:12, the Rambam defines this as a root “even as thin as a needle over which embroiderers wind thread.”

If, however, they cannot sustain themselves through this nurture, they are considered as having been uprooted and are susceptible to impurity.

As explained in Chapter 5, Halachot 1-2, there are substances that are considered as “handles” for food. Although they are not susceptible to ritual impurity in their own right, since they are considered as a “handle,” if impurity comes in contact with them, the fruit becomes impure and if the fruit contracts impurity, they also do.

This is speaking about an instance where the produce is dry and unfit to be considered as food.

And subject to the laws of ritual impurity. The fact that the person does not intend to use them as food is of no consequence.

Because once the tree dries out, its fruit no longer derives nurture from it. The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s source and the Kessef Mishneh explains the Rambam’s position.

I.e., even though they are connected to the tree and the tree is connected to the ground.

As long as the animal is alive, it is not considered as food, but as a living entity which does not contract impurity. See Hilchot Tum’at Meit 1:13.

This refers even to a non-kosher animal or fowl. The rationale is that once a kosher animal has been slaughtered, it is halachically considered as “food” and it is permitted to partake of it even though it still makes convulsive movements. Hence, it contracts impurity from this time onward. True, with regard to the impurity associated with an animal carcass, an animal is not considered as dead until it ceases movement. Stringency is, however, required in that context because the relevant prooftext {Leviticus 11:39) states: “If an animal... will die” (Kessef Mishneh).
Since slaughter changes the status of a kosher animal in this manner, it can also change the status of a non-kosher animal, causing it to be considered as food and, hence, susceptible to ritual impurity. See also Chapter 3, Halachah 4.

There is no concept of ritual slaughter for fish. See Hilchot Shechitah 1:3.

Due to an injury or illness that will cause them to die in the near future.

And thus susceptible to ritual impurity.

I.e., although not severed from the body entirely, it was dislocated and its inner organs crushed to the extent that it will no longer regenerate itself. See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 2:5; Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 5:6; the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 9:7).

I.e., it came in contact with one of the seven liquids, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachot 1 and 2.

Because the blood that emerges during ritual slaughter causes it to receive this status (Halachah 7).

Chapter 5, Halachah 3.

There is a Mishnaic view (Chulin 2:5) that the ritual slaughter itself is sufficient to make an animal susceptible to impurity, but the halachah does not follow that opinion.

I.e., come in contact with liquids.

Moreover, the owner must be pleased that the water was detached from the earth, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 3.

Otherwise, almost all produce would be susceptible to ritual impurity because it came in contact with rain while it was growing (Sifra; Rashi; Chapter 12, Halachah I).

Unless it is lifted up from the ground again.

As evident from the continuation of the Rambam’s words, this is speaking about a flowerpot with a hole.

The Ra’avad objects to the usage of the phrase “even though.” He maintains that this is referring to a flowerpot without a hole. Nevertheless, the portions of the plant that grow outside the flowerpot are considered as attached to the ground outside the plant. Hence, they are not susceptible to ritual impurity. The Kessef Mishneh notes that there is a Tosefta (the end of Uktzin, ch. 2) that supports the Ra’avad’s conception, but the Rambam’s source (the mishnah, Uktzin 2:10) can be understood according to his interpretation here.

I.e., even if impurity touched only the portions outside the flowerpot, they are not considered as separate from the portions in the flowerpot.

Because it is considered as water on the earth; see the previous halachah.

Even though the plant and its fruit are still attached to the earth in the flowerpot, it is considered as if they are already detached.

As does water in other containers.

I.e., a vessel made of earth that was not fired in a kiln.
In his gloss to this halachah, the Ra’avad explains that these laws also apply to an earthenware container that has been fired in a kiln.

For ultimately, the roots of the plants will protrude through the flowerpot and extend outward. This interpretation reflects a change from the Rambam’s position in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 2:11).

As stated in Hilchot Keilim 18:1, an earthenware implement is not susceptible to ritual impurity unless it serves as a container.

I.e., foods that had not yet been made susceptible to ritual impurity.

As will be explained (Chapter 12, Halachot 1-2), generally, to make food susceptible to ritual impurity, the liquids must fall on the foods as desired by the owner. An exception is made, however, when the liquids are impure (Chapter 10, Halachah 5). In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Machshirin 1:1), the Rambam explains that when the food is merely made susceptible to ritual impurity, it is necessary for the owner to desire that the liquid fall on the food. When, however, the food contracts impurity at the same time it becomes fit to do so, that is not necessary. The rationale is that Leviticus 11:38, the verse that requires that the owner desire that water come into contact with the food, speaks about it contracting impurity afterwards. One can infer that if it would contract impurity at the same time, there would be no such stipulation.

As stated in Halachah 8. See also Chapter 15, Halachah 1.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, citing Taharot 8:6 and other sources that appear to indicate that, for food not to be susceptible to ritual impurity, it must become spoiled to the extent that it is not fit for a dog to eat (a far greater degree of spoilage). In his Commentary to the Mishnah (see Rav Kappach’s version), the Rambam addresses this issue, stating that food that is not fit for human consumption is not considered food at all (see the following note). Although the mishnah mentions food becoming spoiled to the extent that it is unfit for a dog to eat, that refers to food that has already contracted impurity and then spoiled. Since it already became impure, becoming spoiled to the point that a person would not partake of it is not sufficient for that impurity to depart. It must become unfit for a dog to eat (see Halachah 18). When, by contrast, a food has not yet contracted impurity, as long as it is unfit for a human, its status remains pure.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam does not need a prooftext to support this concept; it is obvious. After all, the spoiled food is considered like ordinary earth or waste. Leviticus 11:34, the prooftext which teaches the entire the concept of impurity of foods states: “from any food that would be eaten.” The Sifra comments: “This excludes food that has spoiled, because it is not fit to be eaten.”

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

Implied is that it must be suitable for drinking. Although the phrase primarily comes to teach that such water does not make food susceptible to impurity, it also implies that it does not contract impurity itself. See also Halachah 21.

Even when it is not cooked. An animal’s hide is tough and would not be fit to be eaten unless it was cooked. A placenta, by contrast, is soft and could be eaten. Nevertheless, since it is not normally eaten, one must have a special intent for it to be considered as food.

I.e., even if one did not cook these articles with other foods. If they were grouped with other foods, they would contract impurity even if they were not cooked (Kessef Mishneh to Halachah 16). Although, generally, these articles are not considered as food (see Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 1:9, 15), if they are designated as such, they are susceptible to ritual impurity.

I.e., even if they were not cooked with other foods.

Even after being cooked, it is virtually inconceivable that it would be eaten.

For they are considered as disgusting (see Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 6:13) and unfit for human consumption.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Tosefta, the end of ch. 9 of Taharot, states that it is only when one thinks of partaking of them at the time he gathers them do they become susceptible to ritual impurity. If he has this intent afterwards, they are not susceptible to impurity. The Kessef Mishneh states that it is possible — but not absolutely necessary — to interpret the Rambam’s words in that manner.

In such a situation, the food is not spoiled, but it is not fit to be eaten by a dog. For any food that becomes this dry is considered as dust (see Nidah 55a).
The commentaries note that in Hilchot Tum’at Meit 2:1, the Rambam rules that the flesh of a human corpse that has become dry like a shard retains its impurity. Nevertheless, a distinction can be made between these two types of impurity. In that vein, see also Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 1:13,4:12, and 5:14, where it is stated that when a source of impurity becomes dried out, its impurity departs. In those sources, however, it is mentioned that when the source of impurity would become soft after being soaked in water for a day, the impurity does not depart. Kin’ at Eliyahu suggests that here greater leniency is shown, because unlike the sources of impurity mentioned previously, here, the impurity is a derivative.

I.e., its impurity departs without a person having to take any action.

E. g., an onion or the like.

For then they are considered as having become connected to the earth and are no longer considered as food (Rashi, Pesachim 34a).

For their previous status is not considered to have changed.

E. g., the remnants of dough that become attached to a kneading trough.

I.e., as part of the utensil.

See a parallel expression of this principle in Hilchot Tum’at Tzara’at 14:10.

The Ra’avad writes that if a liquid was once fit for human consumption and then it spoiled and became foul (even before it contracted ritual impurity), it can contract impurity in that state. The Kessef Mishneh offers two interpretations of Torat Kohanim (the Rambam’s source), which do not follow the Ra’avad’s conception.

More specifically, impure water, for only water can regain impurity, as stated previously [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 8:9)].

As evident from the mishnah cited previously, one might think that since there is water on the entire staff and part of the staff is immersed in the mikveh, even the water that is on the portion of the staff that was not immersed should be considered as joined to the mikveh. That conception is not accepted and the water that is outside the mikveh is not considered as pure (see parallels in Hilchot Mikveot 8:12). Moreover, when the portion that was immersed in the mikveh is removed, the water on it becomes impure because of its contact with the water that had not been immersed.

The commentaries note the apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s ruling here and his ruling in Chapter 1, Halachah 22, where he states that if a portion of snow becomes impure, the snow does not become impure in its entirety. A possible resolution is offered by Rabbenu Shimshon in his commentary to Taharot 3:2. He explains that since snow can be considered as an integral part of a mikveh, any contiguous portion of snow is considered as joined to the mikveh.

A mixture of grape dregs or peels and water that produces a drink that is not wine, but is grape-colored. If it is left for a significant time, the mixture can develop a vinegar taste [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 1:6); see also Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 7:6-7].

E. g., someone who touched a person who had touched a corpse, someone who had touched an animal carcass, or the like.

For, as stated in Halachah 21, it is only water that is purified through contact with a mikveh.

See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 7:2. The pot does not contract impurity from the person who touched it, as stated in the clause that follows.

See Hilchot Tum’at Meit 5:7; Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav 6:2; Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 1:1.

Someone who touched a corpse, a zav, or the like.

The water it contains does not become impure, as long as it is connected to the water of the mikveh. Once, however, the pot is lifted from the mikveh, the water it contains also becomes impure.

Indeed, an earthenware container can never regain ritual purity. See Leviticus 11:33; Hilchot Mikvaot 1:3.

For we assume that some impure water was mixed with it. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Machshirin 2:3).

As the Rambam writes in Chapter 15, Halachah 4, when a majority of rain water is added to the drainage water, the drainage water is considered as if was nullified.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that although generally we follow the principle that the status of the water that is there originally is the determinant, here the water is not collected in a given place. Hence the water that comes afterwards causes the water that was there initially to flow away. Accordingly, it is the status of the second water that is significant.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s rationale. The explanation of the Kessef Mishneh mentioned above was given to clarify this objection.

Before the rainy season, mud was spread over the roofs of homes to seal them, because it is possible that the heat of the summer caused cracks to develop.

To regain purity.

For this small amount of oil is considered insignificant. If, however, he used a larger amount of oil, the oil is considered as significant and contracts impurity from the person. Its purity is not restored when the person immerses.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 1.

I.e., after coming into contact with liquids.

The Rambam is speaking about a non-kosher animal that was slaughtered for a gentile which is in its death-throes. Although it does not impart impurity as a carcass until it actually dies, it becomes susceptible to impurity from the time that it was slaughtered. If it comes in contact with a source of impurity at that time, it contracts impurity and can impart it to foods or liquids.

The Rambam proceeds to explain these general statements in this and the following halachot.

According to Scriptural Law, it is permitted to eat certain species of locusts. See Leviticus 11:22, Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 21:23. In practice, it is common in most communities not to partake of any species of locusts, because we are unsure of the identity of the kosher species (Turei Zahav 85:1).

As mentioned in Halachah 2, the designation of a substance as food depends on the prevailing attitude of the specific locale and varies from place to place. The inhabitants of rural areas have less sophisticated tastes and are willing to eat species that would not be eaten by the inhabitants of larger towns and cities.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam’s ruling, although supported by the Tosefta, T’vul Yom 5:1, runs contrary to a ruling of the Mishnah Uktzin 3:9. He suggests that the Rambam had a different version of that mishnah. While that interpretation appears to be borne out by the conclusion of this halachah, even Rav Kapach’s version of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah does not provide support for such a thesis.

When an animal from a kosher species dies without ritual slaughter, its meat together with its fat are sold to gentiles who consider it as food. Hence, it does not require special intent.

Without ritual slaughter. The fat of a non-kosher animal is inherently impure like the meat of such an animal and the fat of a kosher animal that was slaughtered properly is pure. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 3:9).

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.) which explains that for the fat to become impure, it need not come into contact with a source of impurity. Instead, it is inherently considered as impure food. (Nevertheless, as explained in Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 1:5, this fat does not impart impurity like an animal carcass does.) As the Kessef Mishneh states in his gloss to ibid. 3:14, many authorities differ and maintain that it must come in contact with a source of impurity.

For they are not normally considered as human food.

The Rambam is speaking about meat that is not separated purposefully. If, however, one cuts the meat from the living being with the intent of using it as food, it contracts ritual impurity.

Such meat does not require exposure to liquids, because ultimately, an olive-sized portion of it becomes a source of impurity.

As stated in Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah, ch. 3 and mentioned below, the carcass of an unslaughtered kosher fowl is a source of impurity. This does not apply with regard to the carcass of a nonkosher fowl. If, however, a person had the intent of partaking of it, it is considered as food and, if exposed to liquids, can contract impurity.

Since the animal was slaughtered properly, its fat will be separated from its meat and sold to gentiles. In larger towns, there will be a market for such meat. In smaller villages, buyers may not necessarily be found and it is not considered as food.

The blood that flowed at the time of ritual slaughter, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 7.

Since it was not considered food at the time, the fact that it was exposed to liquids is not significant. Hence it must be exposed a second time after it was considered as food.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 3:2) where he speaks of “the type of onions that is extremely sharp tasting.” Here the Rambam uses the term kashim which, while also meaning firm or hard, could be translated as above.

Uktzin 3:9 states “unkosher fish and locusts.” (As stated above, the Kessef Mishneh maintains that the Rambam had a different version of that mishnah.)

These vegetables are generally used as animal fodder, but are sometimes eaten by humans. Some commentaries offer a different translation.

After they dried. If they were still moist at the time of the person’s change of mind, however, they are considered to have been exposed to liquids.

In Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 14:7, the Rambam defines this term as referring to: “the meat that slipped by the knife at the time the animal was skinned and remains cleaving to the hide.”

I.e., an insignificant entity.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 3:4), the Rambam explains that this is a general term referring to blood vessels, nerves, and sinews.

Our translation of these terms is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 1:2). There he explains that after the large feathers are plucked from a fowl’s wings, there still remain small, thin feathers. And after the feathers are plucked from its crop, there remain wooly hairs.

For these substances are not usually considered as food.

See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah, chs. 1 and 3.

The rationale given by the Rambam applies with regard to the carcasses of fowl and animals from kosher species. Fat from kosher species does not require exposure to liquids, because it was exposed to the blood of the animal when it was slaughtered (Kessel Mishneh).

Since there are fewer people living in these areas, the carcass is unlikely to be used as food.

I.e., less than an olive-sized portion of these substances that is combined with other impure foods so that there is an egg-sized portion of impure food present (see Kessef Mishneh). Less than that amount will not impart ritual impurity.

The windpipe and the gullet.

Since ritual slaughter causes a kosher animal to be considered as food even before it actually dies, it also brings about such a change with regard to the status of a non-kosher animal. See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 2:1.

After it dies, it imparts the impurity associated with an animal carcass.

Obviously, it is being considered as food.

For this is not acceptable slaughter. When the animal dies, it contracts the impurity associated with an animal carcass, but until then, it is pure.

Since slaughtering the animal in this manner would cause it to be considered as fit to eat if performed by a Jew, the animal is still considered as food when the slaughter was performed by a gentile.

For it was exposed to the blood of the slaughter.

The Ra’avad questions why stabbing a kosher animal does not cause it to be considered as food while it is in its death throes. Seemingly, since a slaughtered animal is considered as food when it is in its death throes, the categorization should also apply with regard to an animal stabbed with the intent of killing it. He offers two resolutions: a) Since it is being stabbed to death for a Jew, it is not fit to be eaten and it is therefore not considered as food. (Implied is that if the gentile stabbed it to death to partake of it himself, it would impart the impurity associated with food.) b) Since stabbing an animal to death is not considered as slaughter, the time of the animal’s death is not determined. It could be considered as a person who fainted, but is still alive.
The Or Sameach maintains that the Ra’avad’s question is based on his position (see his gloss to Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 2:10) that there is no difference whether a gentile slaughters an animal in the ritual manner or stabs it to death. The Rambam, however, maintains that ritual slaughter performed by a gentile has halachic significance. Hence, there is no’ room for the questions raised by the Ra’avad.

As stated in Hilchot She’ar Avot HaTum’ah 2:3, an entire limb severed from a living animal conveys the same impurity as an animal carcass. If, however, one cuts off meat from this limb, it does not have that status.

For it became a distinct entity before it was considered to be used as food.

Since it was considered as food while it was still part of the limb — and impure — it retains its impurity when its status changes.
The Ra’avad differs with the rationale given by the Rambam, based on Chulin 128b-129a. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s position.

The same law would also apply with regard to meat from a kosher animal, except, in that instance, it would not be necessary to have a special intent to use that meat as food. It would be taken for granted that it would be considered as food, even without that intent.

For a smaller measure of impure foods do not impart impurity.

Even that portion stemming from other foods.

Since it is wrapped in dough, one will not touch the impure meat, only the dough surrounding it.

As stated in Halachah 3, for the carcass of a non-kosher animal to be considered as food, it is necessary that one have a special intent concerning it.

I.e., were it to be carried.

As stated in the conclusion of Halachah 2.

For all humans see partaking of human flesh as revolting. Nevertheless, if a person explicitly has such an intent, it can be considered as food. The Ra’avad (on the basis of Keritot 21 b) objects and maintains that even if one has such an intent, it is of no consequence and the flesh is never considered as food. The Kessel Mishneh explains that the Talmudic passage can also be interpreted in a manner that supports the Rambam’s position.

Since it could ultimately be susceptible to more severe impurity, i.e., the impurity associated with a human corpse, it does not require exposure to water.

Even if a person or a k’li touches only the dough around the flesh. The rationale is that since there is an olive-sized portion of a human corpse present, the impurity pierces through its covering.

The Ra’avad objects to this ruling and maintains that it must be exposed to water, for flesh cut from a living human being does not impart impurity. This understanding is supported by Uktzin 3:2 (and perhaps alluded to in the Rambam’s Commentary to that mishnah). For this reason, there are some who maintain that the text is in error and should be changed. Note the apparent contradiction to Halachah 3 above.
Rav Yosef Corcus and the Kessef Mishneh explain that the flesh became exposed to liquids (i.e., blood) at the time it was cut off from the person. The Rambam is emphasizing that when the person changed his mind and thought to feed the flesh to a person rather than to an animal, the exposure to liquids that made it susceptible to impurity at that time is not affected by his change of mind (in contrast to the situations mentioned in Halachah 3 where the fact that a substance was not considered as food initially caused its exposure to liquids to be of no consequence).
[The Ra’avad raises another question: It would appear that the fact that the person cut the flesh off with the intent of serving it should cause it to be considered as food. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the mishnah in Uktzin does not represent a contradiction, because that mishnah refers to an instance where flesh was separated from a person’s body unintentionally.]

Where there are many people and hence, the animal carcass would ordinarily be considered as food (see Halachah 3).

And would not be considered as food.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 8:6), the Rambam speaks of having such an intent while the chick is in the vat.

Even though it would not normally be considered as fit for human consumption, since it was fit for animal consumption and a human thought of partaking of it, it can contract impurity (ibid.).

For it was not designated for human consumption.

Since they are not intellectually developed, their intent is not significant and it is not considered as if one thought of it as food for humans.

I.e., their intent was obvious from their actions.

I.e., susceptible to the impurity associated with foods.

This is a general principle, applicable in several contexts. See Hilchot Berachot 6:13, et al. See also Hilchot Keilim 8:11.