Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

All the authorities agree that a person is not liable until he transfers an amount of a substance large enough to be of benefit to a person, and that it is forbidden to transfer any article regardless of its size. The commentaries question, however, whether transferring less than a beneficial amount is forbidden according to Torah law or whether the prohibition is merely Rabbinic in origin.
Liability for most of the prohibitions of the Torah is associated with a specific measure.) רועיש (For example, with regard to the majority of the prohibitions against eating forbidden foods, one is liable only if one eats a k’zayit (a measure of food the size of an olive). Should one eat less than that amount יצח(,) רועיש one is considered to have transgressed the Torah’s commandment. Nevertheless, one is not liable for punishment. (See Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 3:6, 7:15.)
The Mishneh LaMelech states that this same principle applies with regard to transferring objects on the Sabbath. Although one is liable only for transferring a beneficial amount, transferring any amount is forbidden by the Torah itself.
Note, however, Totza’ot Chayim (8) and others, who explain that according to the Rambam, there is no concept of יצח רועיש with regard to the prohibition against work on the Sabbath. On the Sabbath, a person is liable only for performing תכאלמ תכשחמ, “purposeful work.” If an activity is not in itself beneficial, it does not serve a purpose. Therefore, it is not forbidden by the Torah on the Sabbath.
Kinat Eliyahu notes that in Halachah 23, the Rambam states that “A person who transfers half of the prescribed measure [of a substance] is not liable.” According to the principles the Rambam states in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, the use of the term “is not liable”) רוטפ (indicates that the prohibition was instituted by our Sages. Significantly, in Hilchot Ma’ achalot Asurot, loc. cit., and in other places where the Rambam discusses this issue, he uses the term, רוסא “forbidden.” Thus the use of the term רוזפפ in regard to the Sabbath laws clearly indicates a difference. See also S’dei Chemed, Klallim, Ma’ areches Chatzi Shiur.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 9, and notes.

In this and in the following halachot, the Rambam proceeds to list the minimum amounts for which one is liable for transferring particular substances. As explained in Halachot 20-21, this applies when one transfers an object without any specific intent. If, however, one intends to use the article one transfers for a specific purpose, one is liable for transferring even a smaller amount.

As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 8, Halachah 5, he considers a dried fig to be one-third the size of an egg. (As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, there are differing opinions regarding this measure.) Eating a smaller amount of food would not be significant at all. Therefore, one is not liable.

I.e., it is not that one must transfer an amount equal to the size of a dried fig from one particular type of food. Even if one transfers this amount from a combination of different foods, one is liable.

For they are not food.

Shabbat 8:1 states “wine, enough to mix a cup.” In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that a cup refers to the cup over which the grace after meals was recited, which must contain a revi’it. The wines of the Talmudic period were stronger, and it was customary to mix three portions of water to every portion of wine.

Tosafot 76b defines this as אלמ, וימגדל “a cheekful.” The Maggid Mishneh, however, explains that a smaller measure is intended.

The popular translation of the Rambam›s Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.) mentions “river water” instead of “dew.” Rav Kapach explains, however, that this is an erroneous translation of the Arabic, and there, too, the Rambam’s intent is “dew.”

Rav Moshe Cohen objects to the fact that the Rambam mentioned a measure that is not spoken of in the Babylonian Talmud. The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Rambam’s source is in the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 8:1), which he favors in this instance, because there is a difference of opinion on this matter in the Babylonian Talmud.

This represents somewhat of a new concept, because generally the Sages followed the principle (Shabbat 78a) that whenever an object has both an uncommon use and a common use, we follow the more lenient measure. For this reason, kosher milk, although just as beneficial as an eyewash as non-kosher milk, is considered to be a food. Accordingly, it is given a more lenient measure.
If so, the fact that honey is considered to be a salve instead of food raises questions. The Talmud, however, explains that since honey is also very commonly used as a salve, there is no difficulty.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:8), the Rambam interprets this is as sores that come from improper amputations.

This is useful for mixing clay for building (Shabbat 78a).

This is the most common use for this substance.

A larger measure than stated previously. Bean straw is harder than grain straw and is therefore given to camels, who have stronger jaws and larger mouths.

This reflects a general principle applicable with regard to the minimum measures for which one is liable for transferring: When a person has an individual desire for an object that makes it beneficial for him, he is liable even though most people would not use that object for that purpose. (See Halachah 20.)

This refers to softer straw that need not be chewed as forcefully as the straw from grain mentioned at the beginning of the halachah (Tiferet Yisrael, Shabbat 7:4). Hence, it is suitable for smaller animals with smaller and less-powerful mouths.

A lamb’s mouthful is equal to the size of a dried fig. Nevertheless, our Sages speak in terms of a lamb so that we will understand the motivating principle for this measure (Tosafot, Shabbat 76a).

This is the smallest measure in this halachah.

I.e., the leaves that sprout above ground (Tosefot Yom Tov, Shabbat 7:4).

Since the cow will not normally eat the bean straw, the amount of straw the person has taken out is not beneficial. Hence, he is not liable.

For the camel will eat the grain straw. Thus, the person has taken out an amount of fodder that will be beneficial.

This is the food that requires the least heat to cook (Rambam›s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 8:5).

The egg will then cook faster. Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.).

In the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), he mentions that the pot is already preheated, so that the wood must produce sufficient heat to cook the egg alone, and not to warm the pot as well.

In the Talmudic era, it was common for the point of a reed to be sharpened to serve as a pen in a manner similar to a quill.

I.e., the amount to cook a portion of an egg, as mentioned in the beginning of the halachah.

The rationale is that all spices serve a similar purpose (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 9:5).

Rashi (Shabbat 90a) explains that this does not refer to the species of pepper used as a spice (for if so, there is no reason to differentiate between it and other spices), but rather to a different species, which is used as a breath freshener.

See the notes on Chapter 5, Halachah 10, regarding our translation of the name of this substance.

Rashi (Shabbat 90a) states that this was used as a remedy for headaches. Even the slightest amount was beneficial.

For people will appreciate its fragrance.

For people will appreciate the removal of an unpleasant odor. Rashi (Shabbat 90a) offers a different interpretation.

This also has a pleasant fragrance (Rashi).

Our translation follows the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 9:6), which notes that these metals are mentioned in connection with spices and explains that this refers to parts of a utensil used for crushing spices. Even a small portion of metal is beneficial, because it can be fashioned into a needle or pin.

See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 1:15.

See Hilchot Sefer Torah 10:3-4.

As mentioned in the sources cited in the previous two notes, we are obligated to show respect for even the slightest piece of any of these articles and entomb them, rather than allow them to be discarded as trash. Accordingly, even the smallest amount is considered significant. Hence, one is liable for transferring it on the Sabbath.

For it may be used for cooking, or kindling a fire.

Beitzah 39a explains that a flame has no substance. Hence, one is not liable. This applies, however, only when the person carries only a flame and not the coal, or the piece of wood that is burning.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 9:7), the Rambam interprets this as referring to carrot seeds, turnip seeds, or onion seeds. (We have used Rav Kapach’s translation which differs slightly from the standard text.)

Were the seeds fit for human consumption, the minimum measure for which one would be liable would be the size of a dried fig. We assume that the primary reason for which a person would transfer seeds is to serve as food. Since these seeds, by contrast, are not fit for human consumption, they are given a smaller measure.
Rashi (Shabbat 90a) differs and explains that this law applies even to seeds that are fit for human consumption. Although these seeds are also fit to be eaten, a person usually takes them out with the intent of sowing them.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), where he interprets, the Mishnaic phrase, תוחפ תרגורגכמ in this fashion. Note the Mayim Chayim, which interprets this as referring to a k’zayit.

Since these seeds were more valuable than those of most garden vegetables, they were assigned a smaller measure.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:4), the Rambam explains that bran is placed on the opening of the crucible during the smelting process.

Which grow in vineyards. Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shvi’it 7:5).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pe'ah 6:10), the Rambam defines luf as a sub-species of onion.

A species of beans.

The commentaries note that although the Rambam’s statements are based on the Tosefta, Shabbat 9:8, they are problematic, for there is another Tosefta (Ma’aser Sheni 1:13) that appears to be a direct contradiction. The difficulty is intensified by the fact that the Rambam also quotes the latter Tosefta in Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 7:8. lt is possible, however, to explain the contradiction based on the possibility that in our halachah, the word, וקיתמי translated as “become sweet,” is a euphemism and means “become bitter.” See also Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 1:14 and Hilchot Sh’vitat Asor 2:6, where the Rambam mentions similar subjects, and the Responsa of the Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1425) and the Merkevet HaMishneh, who offer possible resolutions.

Shabbat 90b quotes a similar, but slightly different passage from the Tosefta. We can assume that the Rambam’s text of that passage differed from the one in our text of the Talmud.

The amount necessary to cook an egg, as mentioned in Halachah 4.

Rashi (Shabbat 90b) explains that when transactions were made, a seed was used as a symbol for a gold coin.

I.e., to use in the purification process of a metzora or a person who came into contact with a human corpse.

These are all substances which produces dye.

A root that produces a red dye.

This represents a difference between the Rambam’s interpretation of Shabbat 9:5 and that of other commentaries, including Rashi and Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro. Instead of stating דגב, ןזפק חנבםנ as in the Rambam’s version of the Mishnah, the text quoted by the latter authorities states דגב, ןזפק חנבםב “a small cloth in the hairnet,” referring not to the entire hairnet, but to one cloth within it.

Note Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 9:37, which states that aged urine is one of the cleansing agents used to determine whether a stain is blood or not.

These are also cleansing agents and are mentioned in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah (9:37).

The Mishnah (Shabbat 8:3) states that one is liable for transferring an amount of ink sufficient to write two letters. The Jerusalem Talmud (loc. cit.) states that one is not liable unless one transfers this amount of ink while it is on the pen. Otherwise, there is a doubt (as reflected in the following clause), for it is difficult for all the ink that is in an inkwell to be picked up by a pen.

The person is not Iiable for transferring the quill or the inkwell, for they are considered secondary to the ink. As the Rambam states in Halachah 28, when a person transfers a measure for which he is not liable in a utensil, he is not Iiable for transferring the utensil, since it is considered secondary to its contents.

The hanachah without which one is not Iiable for transferring.

He is not Iiable for transferring. He is, however, Iiable for writing.

At no one time did he transfer the minimum measure for which he would be held liable, for by the time he transfers the second portion of ink, part of the first portion will have dried. Therefore, he remains exempt (Rashi, Shabbat 80a).

,לוחכ rendered by some translators as “stibium,” was reputed to have medicinal properties in addition to its cosmetic qualities. Even if only one of a person’s eyes was affected, it would be common for him to apply לוחכ to that eye alone. Hence, one is Iiable for transferring the amount necessary to paint one eye.

Rashi, Shabbat 80a, relates that modest women would veil their faces entirely, exposing only one eye to enable them to see. They would, however, paint this eye.

Rashi (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to small villages, where frivolity was not commonplace. Therefore, women would walk outside with their faces uncovered. Hence, if a woman painted her eyes for cosmetic purposes, she would paint both eyes. Note the Ra’avad, who offers a different interpretation of that Talmudic passage.

Rashi (Shabbat 78a) interprets this as referring to a phial of mercury that is sealed closed with these substances. Afterwards, a hole is made in the sulfur or tar with a pin through which the mercury can be poured, but through which it will not spill excessively if the bottle falls on its side. The Meiri interprets the Talmud as referring to making a seal for a jug of wine.

The Maggid Mishneh interprets this as referring to stopping a hole in a wine barrel.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:4), the Rambam interprets this as referring to a board with paste taken into a dovecote on which the fledglings perch and are thus captured. Rashi (Shabbat 80a) interprets this as a board with paste used to catch wild fowl.

A coin of the Talmudic period with a width of a handbreadth, approximately 8 cm. according to Shiurei Torah.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:5), where he emphasizes that the Hebrew המדא means both “earth” and “red.”

In the Talmudic period, letters were sealed with clay. This refers to a seal like that of a notary placed on a letter to testify to its authenticity.

Rav Kapach notes that in this instance the Rambam does not state “a goldsmith’s crucible,” for crucibles used for smelting other metals need not be as heat-resistant as those used for gold.

Shabbat 80b relates that plaster is mixed with sand in order to strengthen the structure.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:4). Rashi (Shabbat 78b) interprets תיסרח as “crushed brick.”

Shabbat 80b states that hair was mixed with clay when a crucible was fashioned for smelting gold.

Shabbat 80b states that lime would be applied to the bodies of young girls, one limb at a time. Rashi states it would make their skin red. Tosafot maintains that it would whiten their skin.

As Leviticus 17:13 states that after a bird or a wild animal is slaughtered, its blood must be covered with earth or ashes. (See Hilchot Shechitah, Chapter 14.)

For in this way, the pebble will be beneficial in shooing the animal (Shabbat 81a).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:2), the Rambam gives a more specific definition, mentioning an Arabic term that Rav Kapach identifies as cypress.

This is a smaller measure than the amount sufficient to make a handle. Nevertheless, rope would not be used for this purpose, because it is coarse and might damage the utensil (Shabbat 78b).

To use as a filter.

The Mishnah (Shabbat 8:6) mentions sharpening a needle. The Talmud (Shabbat 8 la) mentions cutting threads. Apparently, the Rambam considers the two measures to be identical.

Rashi, Shabbat 90b, states that these hairs were used by bird hunters.

Rashi (ibid.) states these hairs are used in sewing leather.

From the Rambam’s statements, it appears that his interpretation—and perhaps even the wording in his text—of Shabbat 90b was different from Rashi’s interpretation of our version of that passage. (See the commentaries of the Meiri and Rabbenu Chanan’el on that passage.)

The Rambam’s source appears to be the Tosefta, Shabbat 9:3 which states m’lo hasit kaful which, as mentioned in Chapter 9, Halachah 10, is equivalent to four handbreadths.

See Hilchot Keilim 22:1.)

Fabric made from camel’s hair and other fibers that are rough and are therefore generally not used to make garments for humans.

See Hilchot Keilim 23:3.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:3), the Rambam interprets this as referring to the wrapping in which the amulet was held, and not to the amulet itself.

Although at present, the word k’laf is commonly translated as “parchment,” the Rambam is referring to a more specific meaning. In Hilchot Tefillin 1:6-8, he differentiates between three types of parchment, stating:
There are three types of parchment: g’vil, k’laf, and duchsustos. What is implied? The hide of a domesticated or wild animal is taken. First, the hair is removed from it. Afterwards, it is salted and then prepared with flour. Then resin and other substances that cause the skin to contract and become harder are applied to it. In this state, it is called g’vil. After the hair is removed, the hide may be taken and divided in half in the manner known to the parchment processors. Thus, there are two pieces of parchment: a thin one, which is on the side where the hair grew, and a thicker one, on the side of the flesh. After it has been processed using salt, then flour, and then resin and the like, the portion on the side where the hair grew is called k’laf and the portion on the side of the flesh is called duchsustos. It is a halachah transmitted to Moses on Mount Sinai that a Torah scroll should be written on g’vil on the side on which the hair had grown. When tefillin are written on k’laf, they should be written on the side of the flesh. When a mezuzah is written on duchsustos, it should be written on the side of the hair.

This is the shortest passage of the four passages included in the tefillin. In the head-tefillin, each of these passages is written on a separate piece of parchment.

This appears to be the Rambam’s interpretation of the statement of the Mishnah (Shabbat 8:2), “One who transfers a customs officer’s receipt is liable.” Since the Mishnah already stated that a person who transfers a piece of paper large enough to write such a receipt is liable, it goes without saying that a person who transfers an unused receipt is liable. When explicitly telling us that a person is liable for transferring such a receipt, the Mishnah is obviously referring to a receipt that has already been used. See Shabbat 78b.

Note Shabbat 78b, 79a which discusses the propriety of maintaining possession of such a promissory note.

Since the paper has already been erased, it is no longer fit for writing. Therefore, it is considered to be suitable for other purposes and requires a larger measurement.

Shabbat 94a quotes Rabbi Natan as stating, “A living creature carries itself.” Although the Sages differ with him, their objections concern animals only, for the latter resist being carried and struggle to free themselves. In contrast, a human being assists in being carried. This is obvious from the fact that it is far easier to carry a living person than the same amount of “dead weight.”
lt must be emphasized that although there is no prohibition from the Torah against carrying a living person, our Sages forbade this. (See Mishnah Berurah 308:153,154.)

For in this instance, the person being carried is unable to assist the one carrying him.

1. e., the child must propel himself forward. His mother may not, however, drag him (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:41). Note the Mishnah Berurah 308:154, which states that the principle, “A living being carries itself,” does not apply to a child unless he is old enough to take steps by himself.

As reflected in Halachah 28, when a person transfers two articles, one of primary importance and one of secondary importance, whether or not he is liable depends on the article of primary importance. If he would be liable for transferring this article by itself, he is liable. If not, he is not liable. The article of secondary importance is of no significance whatsoever.
When does this apply? When the article of secondary importance is subsidiary to the article of primary importance. If they are, as in the example cited in this halachah, two unrelated objects, the person is liable for transferring the article of secondary importance.

They are considered to be separate objects, unrelated to the person who is holding them.

Shabbat 90b states that locusts are often used as playthings for children. Hence, regardless of the locust’s size, one is liable.
The Rambam’s ruling is quoted from the Mishnah (Shabbat 9:7), which also mentions two opinions: One that maintains that this applies only to a kosher locust, and that of Rabbi Yehudah, which states that it applies to all locusts, whether kosher or nonkosher. In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam states that the halachah does not follow Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion.
From the fact that the Rambam does not mention whether the locust must be kosher or not in this halachah, the Merkevet HaMishneh concludes that he has reversed his opinion and accepts Rav Yehudah’s view. Others differ and maintain that this is clarified by the second clause, which mentions “[an amount] the size of a dried fig”—i.e., the measure applying to food. Just as the second clause applies only to kosher locusts, so too, does the first clause.

As mentioned in the previous note, this is the minimum measurement for food.

In Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 1:21 the Rambam defines this as a species of kosher locusts. Others define it as a bird.

Shabbat 10:1 states that one is liable for transferring even the slightest amount of any substance that is retained for its medicinal purposes.

According to Shabbat 90b, partaking of such a creature enhances one’s intellectual capacities.

Shabbat 93b-94a states that Rabbi Shimon exempts a person from liability in this instance, for in contrast to other situations, the person is not removing the impure object because he desires it itself, but because he desires the place to be free of impurity. Hence, this is a חפונל חכירצ חניאש,חכאלם a labor that is not performed for the same purpose for which the labor was performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. In the construction of the Sanctuary, articles were transfered because they were, themselves, desired. In contrast, in this instance, the person’s intent is to remove impurity. Nevertheless, as the Rambam rules in Chapter 1, Halachah 7, one is liable for performing a חכאלם. חניאש חכירצ חוכuל

See Hilchot Tum’at Meit 2:1-2.

See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 1:1.

More specifically, this refers to the eight species mentioned in Leviticus 11:29-30. (See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 4:2.)

In this instance, the phrase “half the size of an olive” is not intended to serve as an exact measure. The intent is any measure that will reduce the size of the portion of the animal carcass to less than the size of an olive. The same principles apply to flesh from a human corpse.

For an amount large enough to convey ritual impurity still remains intact.

Since even the small amount of the substance the person transfers is valuable to him, he has a reason for transferring it. Accordingly, his act is considered to be “purposeful.” See the notes to Halachah 1.

The commentaries note that Halachah 6 mentions taking seeds for sowing and mentions specific measures. Among the possible resolutions is that there is ordinarily a measure for seeds as well. This halachah, however, specifically focuses on the exceptions to the general rule, and there are indeed individuals who will sow a single seed in a flower pot (Rav Kapach, Kinat Eliyahu).

Note the Mishneh LaMelech, who states that with this statement the Rambam does not intend to negate totally the measures he mentioned previously. For example, if a person transfers food, he is not liable unless it is the size of a dried fig. Even if a particular person desires to eat a smaller amount, that intent is not considered significant, since most people would not appreciate such an amount. In this halachah, the Rambam is stating that in certain instances, as in the examples he mentions, there is a particular intent which requires merely a tiny amount of a substance to be accomplished. In such an instance, the person is liable for transferring an object of this small size.

Before the commencement of the Sabbath (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 10:1).

On the Sabbath (ibid.).

1. e., even if he forgot the intent for which he originally stored away the article.

By setting the article aside for a specific purpose, the person shows that it is important to him, regardless of its size. Therefore, if he later transfers the article, he is liable (Shabbat 90b, 91a).

I.e., the intent a particular individual has for an article is important regarding the measure for which he is liable for transferring that article. lt does not affect the status of that article vis-a-vis others.

As opposed to being mixed together with the other objects in the storeroom. This might be considered to be a sign that it is being saved for a specific purpose.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:3), the Rambam interprets this phrase as excluding an article that is commonplace and easily obtainable. Therefore, it is not stored away. [Note Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro and Rashi (Shabbat 75b), who interpret this as excluding an amount of a substance smaller than the prescribed measure.]

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam explains that this excludes objects that will spoil if stored.

By storing the article in question, the person indicates that he considers it important. Therefore, he is liable for transferring it.

The intent is any amount less than the full measure.

See the notes on the first halachah of this chapter which discuss whether the prohibition against this activity stems from the Torah itself or is Rabbinic in origin. As mentioned there, according to the principles the Rambam states in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, the use of the word רוזפפ indicates that the prohibition was instituted by our Sages.

For he has transferred a full measure of the article in question. As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, it is clear from the following halachah that this refers to actions performed in a single period of unawareness.

Since a full measure of the entity in question was never transferred into the second domain and placed down there at a single time, the person is not liable.

Based on the principle of l’vud, an article held within three handbreadths of a second article is considered as having been placed down nס that article, as implied by Chapter 13, Halachah 6. Therefore, the two half-measures of the substance in question are considered to have been placed down in the same place. Hence, the person who placed them down is liable. See the commentary of Rabbenu Chananel to Shabbat 80a.

Even if it passes within three handbreadths of the ground, as long as it does not come to rest even momentarily (see Chapter 13, Halachah 16, and notes).

As mentioned in the notes on the halachah cited above, it would appear that the object would have to come to rest on a substance four handbreadths by four handbreadths, or come to rest within three handbreadths of the ground.

One is liable to bring a sin offering for performing a forbidden labor only if one performed the labor without intent to violate the Torah's commandments. Furthermore, if in the midst of one's performance of a forbidden activity, one becomes conscious of the prohibition involved, even if one loses awareness immediately afterwards and completes the measure of forbidden activity without the desire to violate the law, one is not liable. (See Hilchot Shegagot 6:8.)

As long as the two half-measures were taken from the same original domain and placed down together in the same domain, they can be combined. If, however, a totally separate domain interposes between them, the two actions cannot be considered to be complementary.

For according to the Torah, a carmelit is considered to be a makom patur. (See the notes on Chapter 14, Halachah 1). Hence, it is not considered to be an interruption between the two domains.

The commentaries note the apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:11. (See the gloss of the Lechem Mishneh on that halachah.)

As explained in Chapter 13, Halachah 5, the forbidden labor of transferring involves removing an article from one domain and placing it down in another domain. A sin offering is not required unless both activities are performed in a forbidden manner.

Thus the akirah (removal) of the article is performed when the article is of sufficient size to incur liability (Halachah 1).

In which case, he is liable, regardless of the size of the article (Halachah 20).

Since at the time of both the removal and the placing down (hanachah) of the substance, its size was sufficient to incur liability according to the intent which the person had in mind, he is liable. The fact that he experienced a change of mind in the interim is not of consequence.

For at the time he placed the object down, it was not of sufficient size to incur liability.

Based on the following halachah, it is clear that the increase in the seed’s size must take place before the person’s change of mind.

For at the time the article was removed from its original place and it the time it was placed down, it was of sufficient size to incur liability.

The question of the Rambam (based on Shabbat 91b) is whether the fact that the object was too small for its transfer to incur liability in the time between its akirah and its hanachah causes these actions to be considered as unconnected or not.
Note the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh on Hilchot Sh’ar Avot HaTum’ah 4:13, which quotes the distinction made by Rav Yitzchak Korcus between that halachah and the present one.

Because of the presence of a corpse or the presence of tzara’at.

The Maggid Mishneh questions why the Rambam changes the wording used in the source for this teaching (Shabbat, loc. cit.), which mentions food that is terumah and applies this concept to all foods. The Mishneh LaMelech, however, resolves this difficulty, explaining that according to the Rambam’s conception of the laws of ritual impurity (see Hilchot Tum’at Ochalin 4:1), there is no difference between terumah and other foods.

The commentaries cite this passage as a source, teaching that a dried fig is larger than an olive. Ordinarily, a person who transfers an amount of food the size of an olive is not liable. Nevertheless, this instance is different, because of the laws of ritual impurity. Food cannot impart ritual impurity to other substances unless a portion equivalent to the size of an egg is present. Thus, before the person threw the food into the house, there was not sufficient food there to impart impurity, and the food he threw in completed that measure. Hence, the Rambam asks whether the fact that the transfer of the food is significant with regard to the laws of ritual impurity is of consequence with regard to the Sabbath laws.

Since the container is desired only because of its function as an accessory for its contents, it is not considered to be an entity in its own right. Unless the person has a desire for it itself, he is not liable for transferring it, regardless of its size. (See Shabbat 93b.)
Likkutei Sichot (Vol. XVII, p. 48, Vol. XIX, p. 193) focuses on the homiletic dimensions of this halachah, interpreting it as an indication of how an object’s spiritual qualities are of such primacy that they eclipse totally its material dimensions.

This ruling depends on the principle stated in Halachah 16: “A living creature carries itself.” As mentioned in that halachah, this principle does not apply if the person is bound. Since the person would not be liable for carrying the man, he is also not liable for carrying the bed on which he is lying.

Although the box contains several distinct entities, the person is considered to have performed a single forbidden activity. Therefore, he is not liable for a separate sin offering for every article he transfers.

With this clause, the Rambam indicates that this ruling is not dependent on the principle (see Chapter 12, Halachah 11) that the contents of a box are considered to be a single entity, but on a different rationale.

1. e., this prohibition applies to all weaponry. As the Rambam continues, there are instances where carrying such weaponry violates a Torah prohibition, and other instances where the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.
This chapter represents a turning point in the structure of this text. From the middle of Chapter 12 onward, the Rambam has delineated the various factors involved in the forbidden labor of transferring articles from one domain to another. In this halachah, he begins speaking of the Rabbinic safeguards associated with this forbidden labor.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:2).

Even when hanging from one’s garments—e.g., a sword in a scabbard attached to one’s belt.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:4). Rashi (Shabbat 63a) renders this term as “a mace.”

The Rambam’s ruling is based on Shabbat 63a, which mentions a difference of opinion between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer. Our Sages rule that one is liable, while Rabbi Eliezer differs and states that one is not liable for carrying weapons, for they are ornaments, like jewelry.
Our Sages support their position by quoting Isaiah’s (2:4) prophecy of the Era of the Redemption, “And they shall beat their swords into plowshares.... Nation shall not lift up sword against nation.... “Since weaponry will be nullified in that era of ultimate fulfillment, it is a sign that it is not a true and genuine ornament.
The Lechem Mishneh (in his gloss on Hilchot Teshuvah 8:7) notes that there is a slight difficulty with the Rambam’s ruling. The Talmud associates the opinion of the Sages (which the Rambam accepts) with the conception that Mashiach’s coming will initiate a miraculous world order, and Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling with the opinion of Shemuel that “there is no difference between the present era and the Messianic era except [for the emancipation from] the dominion of [gentile] powers.” In Hilchot Teshuvah 9:2, and more explicitly in Hilchot Melachim 12:1-2, the Rambam explains Shmuel’s position, stating:
One should not entertain the thought that in the Messianic era any element of the natural order will be
nullified, or that there will be an innovation in the order of creation. On the contrary, the world will continue
according to its pattern.
Nevertheless, this approach does not necessarily contradict the Rambam’s rulings here. The Rambam also maintains that war will be nullified in the Messianic era, as he writes (loc. cit. 12:5): “In that era, there will be neither famine nor war, neither envy nor competition.” Nevertheless, its nullification will not come because of miracles that defy the natural order, but because of the reasons he continues to mention in that halachah—that “good will flow in abundance” and “’the world will be filled with the knowledge of God’ (Isaiah 11:9).”

The Ritba (in his gloss on Shabbat 60a) states that these nails were used to fasten the soles of the sandals to the upper portion.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah [Shabbat 6:2 (based on Shabbat, loc. cit., and Beitzah 14b)], the Rambam explains that in an era ofreligious oppression, many Jews gathered together for prayer and study in a hidden place. When they heard a noise outside, they suspected that they had been discovered by their enemies and panicked. In the confusion, hundreds were crushed by these nailed sandals.

Since these are days of public assembly, our Sages felt that wearing these sandals would arouse disturbing memories of the abovementioned incident.
There is a question whether the prohibitions against wearing such sandals apply at present despite the fact that our nailed sandals are made differently from those of Talmudic times. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi quotes this prohibition in his Halachot. Since he mentions only those laws that are relevant in the post-Talmudic era, this inclusion would seem to imply that the prohibition should be followed now as well. Rabbenu Asher differs. Significantly, Rav Yosef Karo does not mention this prohibition in his Shulchan Aruch, nor does the Ramah refer to it in his gloss on that text.

This reason, that perhaps an article will fall and be carried in the public domain, is mentioned several times throughout this chapter and is relevant to both men and women.

As reflected by Esther 3:10 and other sources, in Biblical and Talmudic times men wore signet rings, using the seal to authorize their approval of documents.

The commentaries draw attention to a problematic statement in the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:1), where he states that a ring without a seal is somewhat like, but not exactly, a piece of jewelry for women.

Since these rings are not considered to be jewelry for these individuals, they are considered to be carrying them in the public domain.

As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachot 12-14, a person is liable for transferring an article only when he does so in an ordinary fashion.

This point is mentioned several times in this chapter as a rationale for restrictions governing women’s wearing jewelry in the public domain.

Although all Talmudic authorities prohibit women from wearing jewelry in public on the Sabbath, it has become customary for women to do so. Among the rationales offered by the Rabbis (See Tosafot, Shabbat 64b; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 303:18) is: The socio-economic climate of the age has changed. In the Talmudic period, most women did not have jewelry, nor did they see their friends that often, nor did they have private places in which to socialize. Therefore, there was reason for the concern that jewelry would be taken off and displayed in the public domain. When the above mentioned conditions changed, this suspicion no longer applied, and there was no reason for this stringency.

Indeed, our Sages never imposed any restrictions on men’s carrying in the public domain for this reason.

Since it has an eye, it is used as a needle for sewing, and therefore is not considered an ornament. Women are liable for transferring them on the Sabbath, because they frequently sew, and often carry needles by sticking them in their clothes. Hence, they are considered to have carried the needle in an ordinary manner.

With the exception of a tailor, a man is not liable for carrying a needle stuck in his clothes on the Sabbath, since this is not the ordinary way in which these items are carried.

Since it is not a piece of jewelry for him.

Shabbat 60a relates that ordinarily these pins would have a gold plate attached to them. The pointed end of the pin would be stuck into her head-covering, and the plate would hang down over her forehead.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:4). As mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 303:15), there are authorities who forbid the wearing of forearm bracelets.

These threads are tied to the woman’s hair. Accordingly, they would be considered to be a חֲצִיצָה, “intervening substance,” and would have to be removed before immersion (see Hilchot Mikvaot 1:12, 2:5). The suspicion is that afterwards, they would be carried in the public domain.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah [Shabbat 6:1 (based on Shabbat 57b), the Rambam describes this as a gold plate extending on the forehead from ear to ear.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah [loc. cit. (according to Rav Kapach’s translation), which is based on Shabbat 57b], the Rambam adds “and are sewn into her head-covering.” Since a woman is not likely to remove her head-covering entirely when her jewelry is sewn into it, we do not suspect that she will take it off and show it to her friends in the public domain. (See Halachah 10.)
This interpretation (which resolves the question the Ra’avad raises in his gloss on this halachah and which reflects the interpretation of our Sages, Shabbat 57b) presents difficulties, because of the Rambam’s final clause, “It is forbidden to go out [wearing] any ofthese articles, lest they fall and one carry them by hand.” Note the commentaries of the Merkevet HaMishneh and the Seder HaMishneh, who address themselves to this difficulty.

A golden crown engraved with an impression of the city of Jerusalem.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:1), the Rambam interprets this as a necklace with golden beads. Rashi (Shabbat 57b, 59b) interprets this as referring to a golden choker necklace. (See the notes on Halachah 4 regarding the Rabbinic opinions regarding wearing jewelry at present.)

Significantly, even in Talmudic times earrings were permitted. Rashi explains that this leniency was granted because earrings are difficult to remove. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 303:8) offers a different rationale: that a woman’s head covering would cover her ears as well. Hence, there is no need to worry about her showing the earrings to her friends.

ln his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:3), the Rambam mentions that musk would usually be carried.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat, loc. cit.), the Rambam mentions that this pouch was also attractive, being made of gold or silver.

Balsam oil is renowned for its pleasant fragrance.

Significantly, our text of the Mishnah states kovellet, replacing the כ with a.כ The meaning of the term, however, does not change.

This refers to attractive hair glued to a thin surface and placed on a woman’s head (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 6:5). Needless to say, in addition to the more inclusive leniencies involving jewelry in general, the nature of wigs and false teeth are different today. Therefore, there is no difficulty in wearing these items in the public domain.

This pad was placed on a woman’s forehead beneath the frontlet of gold (Shabbat 57b) in a manner similar to the woolen pad that the High Priest would wear under his forehead plate (Chulin 138a). Apparently this pad was also attractive and could serve as an ornament in its own right.

This clause is set off by braces, because based on manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah and early printings, it appears to be a printer’s addition and not part of the Rambam’s original text. According to the Rambam, this suspicion is not relevant with regard to these particular articles.

Although the prohibition against carrying in such a courtyard is Rabbinic in origin and there is no possibility of transgressing a Torah prohibition, our Sages imposed the restrictions against carrying there as well. The Maggid Mishneh explains that this is not considered as instituting “a safeguard for a safeguard.” Were women allowed to wear these adornments in a courtyard, they would most likely inadvertently proceed into the public domain while wearing them.
The Maggid Mishneh also explains that according to the Rambam, there appears to be no prohibition against women wearing such articles at home. We do not suspect that they will inadvertently go outside while wearing them. Other Rishonim (the Ramban and the Rashba) differ and prohibit wearing ornaments even in one’s home. As mentioned above, however, at present it is customary to adopt a more lenient approach regarding the entire issue of wearing jewelry.

ln contrast to the strands of wool or linen mentioned in Halachah 6. As the Rambam continues to explain, the reasons the Sages forbade wearing strands from other fabrics do not apply in this instance.

See Shabbat 64b for an explanation why it is necessary to mention all three instances.

Based on an alternate interpretation [or perhaps an alternate version] of Shabbat 64b, Rabbenu Asher and others differ and also forbid a young woman from wearing strands of hair from an elderly woman.

Even of wool and linen. As the Rambam continues to explain, the reasons why it was forbidden to wear strands of these fabrics tied to one’s hair do not apply in this instance.

lt is, however, forbidden for a woman to wear a choker necklace (Maggid Mishneh).

This ruling serves as the basis for some of the lenient opinions mentioned in the notes on Halachah 4, which allow women to wear jewelry in the public domain at present. All our women are dignified and are not accustomed to removing their jewelry and showing it to their friends.

See Halachah 6 and notes.

To absorb the fluids it produces (Rashi, Shabbat 64b).

To make walking more comfortable (ibid).

As reflected by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:13), this applies only when the woman’s intent is that the blood from the discharge will not cause her discomfort when it dries. If her intent is to prevent the discharge from soiling her clothes, it is forbidden. See Halachah 22.

I.e., if a woman had such a substance in her mouth before the Sabbath, she may continue holding it in her mouth on the Sabbath. She may not, however, place these substances in her mouth on the Sabbath itself, nor may she return such a substance to her mouth if it falls out.

So that the holes in their pierced ears will not close (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 6:6).

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid. Rashi (Shabbat 65a) and others translate תולוער as “veiled.” See the notes on Halachah 18, which discuss the laws regarding wearing bells on the Sabbath.

Jewish women living in Media would wear a coat with a strap in one of its upper corners. They would place a stone, nut, coin, or the like under the cloak to serve as a makeshift button. The strap would be looped around this button to fasten the cloak closed (Rashi, Shabbat 65a).

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 303:22) emphasizes that a stone must be set aside for this purpose before the commencement of the Sabbath. Otherwise, it is muktzeh and is forbidden to be moved.

Even if a coin was set aside for this purpose before the Sabbath, it is still considered to be muktzeh (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

Before the commencement of the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

A toothpick.

We are permitted to wear any entity that heals the body on the Sabbath. Such articles are not considered to be a burden, but a garment or jewelry. In Chapter 21, Halachot 26-27, the Rambam discusses whether it is permissible to place wadding or bandages on a wound on the Sabbath.

These restrictions do not apply to a rag, because it is inconsequential. Since a cord or a string is considered somewhat important, it is not considered to be subsidiary to the bandage. Hence, the person is considered to be carrying them in the public domain.

A coin from the Talmudic period.

A cure for weak thighs (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 6:10).

A cure for both insomnia and hyperactivity (ibid.).

A cure for continuous high fever (ibid.).

This halachah is very problematic for the Rambam. As explained at length in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, Chapter 11, the Rambam maintains that all occult arts and superstitious practices are not only prohibited, but are absolute nonsense. lt would appear that the latter cures mentioned are surely not practical medical advice, but rather a charm stemming from folklore (and perhaps pagan folklore). lndeed, for the latter reason, Rabbi Meir (according to the Rambam’s text of Shabbat 6:10, our version states “the Sages”) forbids the use of these practices even during the week.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1436) compounds our difficulty in understanding the Rambam’s view, citing the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Yoma 8:4), which states:
We do not transgress a commandment except for the purpose of healing, [using] an entity that both logic and
experience say is necessary, but not to heal through charms, for these are weak matters that have no logical
support, nor has experience proven them.
The Radbaz, therefore, maintains that the Rambam is describing a situation where these articles are worn as pendants. Hence, they can be considered equivalent to pieces of jewelry. (See the following halachah with regard to an amulet that has not proved its efficacy.) If, however, they are carried by hand, it is forbidden to go out to the public domain with them on the Sabbath. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:27) does not make such a stipulation and quotes the Rambam’s words in this halachah without emendation.

A stone worn by a woman to prevent a miscarriage (Rashi, Shabbat 66b).

A weight equivalent to that of the tekumah stone, which is purported to have a similar positive effect (ibid.).

The Maggid Mishneh states that, in contrast to Rashi’s view, according to the Rambam, an amulet that healed one person three times is not considered to have proved its efficacy.

At the outset, however, one is forbidden to go out wearing such an amulet.

l. e., the amulet is considered to be an ornament, like a piece of jewelry.

There is no obligation to wear tefillin on the Sabbath, and we are therefore forbidden to wear them in most circumstances. (See Halachah 23 with regard to the exceptions.) Nevertheless, since they are worn as a garment, a person is not liable for wearing them.

Rashi (Shabbat 60a) gives two rationales for this ruling:
a) The Jerusalem Talmud states that a person who wears only one shoe will be suspected of carrying the other in his cloak.
b) Wearing one shoe may arouse the attention of others and cause them to mock him. We fear that in such a situation the person will remove the sandal that he is wearing and carry it.
lt is questionable whether the Rambam accepts the latter rationale. Although Rashi suggests that it applies with regard to several of the items mentioned in the previous halachot, the Rambam does not mention it—neither in this chapter nor in his Commentary on the Mishnah.

This is the simple interpretation of the word.ןזפק Note, however, the commentary of Rashi on Shabbat 141b, where he interprets the term as referring to a small adult. Since the obligation of a child is Rabbinic in origin, the Sages would not enforce any further safeguards on his conduct.

The rationale is that the sandal may fall off and the child might carry it in the public domain.

Rashi interprets the Talmud (loc. cit.) as referring to a torn sandal.

Lest the sandal prove uncomfortable and the woman carry it.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 6:8). Shabbat 66b offers three different Aramaic interpretations of this term. These interpretations, in turn, are understood differently by the later commentaries.
In the above source, the Rambam states that since it is uncomfortable to walk in wooden shoes, they are not considered to be garments.

For he did not transfer them in an ordinary manner (Merkevet HaMishneh).

This reflects a fusion of the interpretation by Rav Hai Gaon (and Tosafot) of Shabbat 50a, which understands these substances to be makeshift wigs to cover baldness, and that of Rashi, who explains that these terms refer to wool that is placed on wounds.

I.e., he performed a deed that indicates that he desires to use the wool as a wig.

If he wore the wool as a wig once before the Sabbath, this indicates that he is willing to use it for this purpose. Otherwise, since most people would not wear a wig of this nature, it is forbidden to wear it on the Sabbath because it is muktzeh (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:62).

The source for this halachah is Nedarim 55b. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Nedarim 7:3), the Rambam defines this term as “coarsely woven material that is not sown.”

Our translation is taken from Rav Kapach’s translation of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Oholot 11:3).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Nedarim 7:3), the Rambam defines this term as “a wrap made from an extremely coarse and thick fabric... used for protection from rain.”

Although these are not proper garments, since they resemble clothing and are useful in protecting one against the rain, they may be worn.

In this instance, although the person is seeking protection from the rain, since these are not garments, he is considered to be carrying a burden (Rashi Nedarim, loc. cit.).

If, however, the bells are not woven into the garment, there are restrictions against wearing them, lest they become severed and the person carry them in the public domain. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:21, Mishnah Berurah 301:80.)

Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 301:23), who states that this leniency applies only to bells whose clappers have been removed. Otherwise, it is forbidden to wear them, for jingling a bell is forbidden on the Sabbath.

This refers to an eved Cana'ani—i.e., a servant who has been circumcised and has been immersed in the mikveh, and who has accepted the observance of the Torah's laws.

A seal indicating to whom he belongs. The seal is permitted because it resembles a piece of jewelry. In contrast to a metal seal, he is allowed to go out wearing a clay seal, since were it to fall, it would break and would be worthless.

But not hanging from his clothes (Maggid Mishneh).

The intent here is not necessarily a prayer shawl, but also a garment worn for mundane purposes as well. We have, nevertheless, merely transliterated the Hebrew term rather than translate it as "garment," to indicate the type of clothing that is under discussion. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:31) specifically states that this restriction does not apply to contemporary garments, because they are of a different type.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam does not state that the person is liable, for the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.

Rashi (Shabbat 147a) explains that tying the string around one’s finger will prevent the wrap from falling. We do not fear that the wrap will fall and the person will carry it in the public domain.
The commentaries explain that in contrast to the garment mentioned in the first clause, since it is customary to wear a wrap folded, there is no difficulty in wearing it in this manner on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, in light of the final clause, they require that the wrap be large enough to cover one’s head and the majority of one’s body.
Although there are more stringent opinions, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:37 and the Mishnah Berurah 301:115 permit the wearing of scarfs that are not this large if it is accepted practice in a community to wear such garments.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh explain that this clause refers to a passage from Shabbat 147b which describes a wrap worn by women after a bath.

Our translation is based on Rashi, Shabbat 147b. Rav Kapach suggests a different version of that text. Since this cloth is not large enough to cover the person’s head and the majority of his body, the only way it may be worn is when one ties it as a belt.

This does not refer to a tallit used for prayer, but rather to an ordinary shawl that resembles such a garment.

See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 29:1).

Since they are of no consequence to the person whatsoever, they have no halachic importance either. It is as if they did not exist at all. If, however, the person was disturbed by their presence, it would be forbidden.

Since the tzitzit are important to the person, they are not considered to be subsidiary to the garment. Hence, wearing a garment to which they are attached is considered to be carrying a burden.

The Rambam elaborates slightly in this instance to negate the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who maintains that it is forbidden to wear tzitzit on Friday night. He explains that since one does not fulfill a mitzvah by wearing tzitzit at night, and yet the tzitzit are important, wearing a garment to which they are attached is equivalent to carrying a burden on the Sabbath.
The Rambam does not accept this rationale, explaining that since the tzitzit are halachically acceptable, they are considered to be an adornment of the garment even when a mitzvah is not fulfilled by wearing them. In one of his responsa, the Rambam deals with this issue at length.
In this context, note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:45, which states that this applies to a man, but not to a woman. For a woman, tzitzit are always considered a burden on the Sabbath. Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah, which cites differing views.

The commentaries note a slight difficulty with the Rambam’s statements. Although there are only two positive commandments whose observance supersedes the Sabbath prohibitions—circumcision and the offering of the Paschal sacrifice—it is because of a specific divine decree and not because of the fact that they are punishable by karet that these mitzvot supersede the Sabbath laws.

Used by a carpenter to see if the different pieces of wood are level (Rashi, Shabbat 11b). This and all the other items mentioned are symbols that the various artisans would wear so that people could identify their professions.

I.e., since it is not the ordinary practice for most people to carry an article in this fashion, the fact that certain people do carry in this manner is not significant.
It must be noted that this ruling (which follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, Shabbat 11 b) appears to contradict the explanation given by Rabbenu A vraham, the Rambam’s son, to Halachah 5. (See the notes on that halachah.)

A man with a discharge from his sexual organ resembling that resulting from venereal disease. (See Leviticus, chapter 15; Hilchot Mechusarei Kapparah, chapter 2.)

As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 11, it is forbidden to wear an article merely to prevent one’s clothes from being soiled.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 7.

We have used the word “man” in consideration of the ruling of the Magen Avraham 301:53, who states that for a woman, tefillin are always considered to be a burden. (See the Mishnah Berurah 301:158, which cites a differing opinion.

Halachah 14 states that a person who wears tefillin is not liable—i.e., since tefillin are worn as a garment, he is exempt. Nevertheless, the Rabbis forbade wearing tefillin, because there is no mitzvah to do so on the Sabbath. They did not, however, apply this prohibition in this instance out of reverence for the sacred articles. Were the tefillin to be left there, they might be treated with disrespect.
The Sha’agat Aryeh (Responsum 41) questions the Rambam’s ruling, because—as reflected by Hilchot Tefillin 4:11—the Rambam maintains that there is a prohibition from the Torah against putting on tefillin when there is no obligation to do so. He resolves that difficulty by stating that the prohibition applies only when one puts them on at an improper time, with the intent of fulfilling a mitzvah. If that is not one’s intent, there is no prohibition.

stay there and protect them all rather than bring them in one pair at a time. When, by contrast, there is a possibility of bringing them in before nightfall, the Sages were willing to allow him to leave the remainder of the tefillin unattended briefly, so that he could complete the task earlier.

Shabbat 130a relates that the Romans made the wearing of tefillin punishable by death.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 17, which explains this leniency applies even with regard to one’s personal concerns. Surely, it applies with regard to matters associated with a mitzvah.

There, a person in the courtyard should remove the tefillin from the body of the person who was carrying them while he is still walking outside the courtyard. Thus, one person will have performed the akirah (the removal of the article from its original place) and another the hanachah [the placement of the article (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:52)).

For the possibility exists that they are merely an amulet (Eruvin 97a).
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s conception of that Talmudic passage and maintains that there is no question concerning the identity of the tefillin, for we do not suspect that a person would make an amulet that resembles tefillin. The difficulty is that if the knots of the tefillin are not tied, it is forbidden to tie them on the Sabbath. Thus, it will be impossible to wear the tefillin on the Sabbath.
The difference between these two views is that, according to the Ra’avad, if one finds tefillin without straps, one is obligated to remain watching them until after nightfall. The Rambam, by contrast, would allow a person to leave them.
The Maggid Mishneh cites a responsum purported to be written by the Rambam to the scholars of Lunil concerning tzitzit, which indicates that he accepted the Ra’avad’s position. When citing the law regarding tefillin, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:42) quotes the Rambam’s view. The Magen Avraham 301:53 states that even if the Rambam’s view would have applied in previous generations, it is not relevant at present, for amulets are not commonly made in the form of tefillin. Therefore, he suggests following the Ra’avad’s ruling.

Since a Torah scroll is not usually worn as a covering, the person is not allowed to cover himself with it under ordinary circumstances. Rather, he must linger and protect the scroll until after nightfall.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 301:54 states that one should cover the scroll to protect it. It is questionable why the Rambam makes such a statement with regard to tefillin (Halachah 23), but does not do so in this instance.

Although a Torah scroll is not usually worn, and indeed, doing so is not respectful to the scroll, this leniency is granted lest the scroll become ruined. The Or Same’ach questions why the person cannot carry the scroll less than four cubits at a time, as mentioned in the previous halachah. He explains that the problem is transferring the scroll from the public domain to the home. In Chapter 13, Halachah 9, the Rambam states that one should throw an article that one is carrying from the public domain into a courtyard in an abnormal manner. This would be disrespectful to the Torah scroll. Therefore, it is preferable to wear the scroll. With regard to the propriety of wearing parchment as a garment, the Or Same’ach cites the use of similar substances, as mentioned in Halachah 17.

The Maggid Mishneh cites Shabbat 11b, which, as the Rambam states in Halachah 21, rules that a tailor is not liable for carrying his needle stuck into his clothes. Therefore, forbidding a tailor from wearing his needle on Friday afternoon would be a “safeguard to a safeguard,” a Rabbinic decree enforced to insure the observance of another Rabbinic decree. Therefore, the prohibition is directed only at carrying a needle in one’s hand.

See Hilchot Tefillin 4:14, which states that the holiness of tefillin surpasses that of the tzitz, the frontlet worn by the High Priest. Hence, they are worthy of such constant attention.

Compare to Hilchot Tefillin 4:12, which mentions similar concepts.

The commentaries state that this is necessary lest others receive the impression that it is permissible to wear tefillin on the Sabbath.

We have translated the verse as it appears in the Torah. The standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah include several additional words.

Bava Kama 54b explains that although the verse mentions only an ox and a donkey, the obligation to rest refers to all animals. “The Torah referred to common circumstances”—i.e., since these animals are generally those used for work, they were the ones mentioned specifically.

I.e., the positive commandment of resting on the Sabbath also implies not having one’s beasts perform labor.

See Halachah 6 and notes.

This is the prohibition against working on the Sabbath mentioned in the Ten Commandments.

This principle (which has its source in Makkot 13b and which the Rambam quotes in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2) generally means that if a person transgresses a prohibition punishable by death, but for certain reasons that punishment cannot be administered, he should not be lashed instead. The rationale is that the only punishment which the Torah prescribed for this transgression is execution. There is no source in the Torah which prescribes a lesser punishment. Nevertheless, within the context of this principle is also the concept that if a certain dimension of a prohibition involves capital punishment, the punishment of lashes is not given to a person who violates another act that is included in this prohibition, but is not punishable by death.
To apply these concepts to the case at hand: Working with an animal is the subject of a Torah prohibition. When a person works with an animal, however, he is not punished by lashes as are others who violate Torah prohibitions. Why? Because there are certain instances when working with an animal is punishable by death—i.e., when the activity is performed by a man and the animal together—for example, plowing. Therefore, even when the labor a person has the animal perform does not cause that person to incur the death sentence—for example, leading it while it is carrying a burden—he is not punished by lashes. This is the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh.

Although the Jew is not making the animal work himself, he is not fulfilling the Torah’s command that his animal rest.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 4:3), the Rambam emphasizes that there is no difference in this instance whether the gentile is an idolater or not.
Based on the rulings of the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 151:4) states that it is customary not to enforce this prohibition in the present age. The Siftei Cohen 151:12 states that the socio-economic conditions under which our people live have changed, and substantial losses would be sustained if the prohibition were observed. Furthermore, the reason for the prohibition is no longer applicable, for it is uncommon for a Jew to lend or hire his animals to a gentile.

The Kessef Mishneh and others note that Avodah Zarah 15a mentions another reason for this prohibition: A Jew who sells an animal to a gentile on Friday afternoon may be required to assist him in training it to follow its new master. This activity may be prolonged past the commencement of the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since this is an infrequent possibility, and the Jew is not performing this task entirely by himself, the Rambam does not mention this matter here. (Significantly, however, he does mention it in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Pesachim, loc. cit.)

Note the parallel in Hilchot Avadim 8:1. Significantly, in that halachah, the Rambam states that if the gentile demands a price greater than this figure, the Jew has no further obligation.

And is unfit for most labor. Since, however, there are tasks that it can perform, the prohibition is not nullified (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit.).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam emphasizes that the Jewish owner must not be present while the broker is making the sale.

Note the differences between this ruling and the Rambam’s statements in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 4:3). The Rambam interprets that Mishnah to be referring to a specific type of horse that is used for transporting birds and not humans. Nevertheless, even according to the Commentary on the Mishnah, ordinary horses are primarily used for human transport.

Note the Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 151), which states that even though it is now customary to perform other tasks with horses, since our Sages did not apply the prohibition to them originally, the scope of their decree need not be extended in the present age. See the notes on the previous halachah.

See the explanation of this principle in Chapter 18, Halachah 16.

Note the parallel in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 9:8.

The Lechem Mishneh and others question if this prohibition applies when one sells an animal to a gentile butcher as well. Even if the butcher does not slaughter the animal in one’s presence, it is clear that he did not purchase it for the sake of labor.

E. g., a sheep or a goat.

The Siftei Cohen (based on Rashi, Avodah Zarah 14b) explains that the reason for the prohibition is our suspicion that the gentile may sodomize the animal, and there is no relation to the Sabbath prohibitions at all.
Work is generally not performed with a small animal, nor would it be proper to forbid the sale of a small animal lest one sell a latge animal. The sale of a large animal is only a Rabbinic prohibition. Accordingly, instituting another prohibition
because of it would be improper, since the Rabbis did not “institute a safeguard for a safeguard.”.
Note, however, the Sefer HaKovetz, which differs and maintains that the prohibition against selling a small animal is a safeguard for the prohibition against selling a larger one. Were this not so, the Rambam would not have mentioned the prohibition against selling a small animal in these halachot.

Although we are forbidden to ask a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on our behalf on the Sabbath, as explained in Chapter 6, leniency is granted in this case. We suspect that if the person was required to abandon his money on the Sabbath, he would disobey the law and carry it himself instead. (See Chapter 6, Halachah 22, and the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 24:1.)

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:4, which states that this ruling applies only when the animal belongs to him, for the verse mentioned at the beginning of the chapter states “and thus your ox and your donkey may rest.” When the animal belongs to another individual, it is preferable to have the animal carry the purse. Although we are forbidden to perform a forbidden labor with an animal (Halachah 2), that prohibition can be avoided by making sure the animal does not perform the akirah or the hanachah. There is also a Rabbinic prohibition against working with an animal that belongs to another person. That prohibition is, however, less severe than the prohibition against asking a gentile to perform labor on one’s behalf.

The Mishnah Berurah 266:7 explains that the prohibition against working with an animal also mentions the term melachah. Accordingly, it is the same activities that a man is prohibited from performing on the Sabbath that are forbidden to be done with an animal.
As mentioned previously, the forbidden labor of transferring involves akirah, removing the article from its previous position, and hanachah, placing the article down in a new position. When a person—or an animal—who is carrying an article begins walking, he is considered to have performed an akirah, and when he stops he is considered to have performed a hanachah. (See Chapter 13, Halachah 8.)
Accordingly, were a person to place a burden on an animal while it is at rest and remove it from him after the animal has come to rest again, he would be considered as having performed labor with the animal, for the animal will have performed both the akirah and the hanachah.
If, however, one follows the course of action suggested by the Rambam, the animal will have performed neither of these acts. Since the article was placed upon the animal after it began to walk, it is not considered to have performed the akirah. Similarly, if the article was removed from the animal before it halted, it is not considered to have performed the hanachah.

The Rashba and others question the Rambam’s ruling in this instance, arguing that since the animal does not perform the akirah and the hanachah (as explained above), what difference does it make whether one leads the animal or not? There is no possibility of the animal’s performing a forbidden labor. The Rambam, however, maintains that leading an animal carrying a burden is also forbidden. Otherwise, the license granted a person would be too extensive (Maggid Mishneh).

Shabbat 17b.

As the Rambam states in Chapter 6, Halachah 16, we are not commanded to see that a gentile rests on the Sabbath, while we do have such an obligation with regard to our animals.
(See also Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 266:6, which state that the above rules also apply when a person is accompanied by a gentile whom he does not trust.)

These three types of individuals are often mentioned together in the Talmudic literature. They are all considered to be lacking the intellectual capacity to control their conduct. Hence, they are not obligated to observe the mitzvot.

Rashi (Shabbat 153a) adds that if one of these individuals were allowed to carry the purse, one might err and think that an ordinary Jew is also allowed to carry.

The deaf-mute has a minimal amount of understanding, and thus, were he to carry an article on the Sabbath, the potential for making an error and thinking that all are allowed to carry is greater (ibid.).

The Rashba, the Ramban, Rav Moshe Cohen, and others differ with the Rambam and maintain that one should should give the individual the purse while he is walking, and should remove the purse from him before he stands (as explained in the previous halachah), so that the individual carrying the purse will perform neither the akirah nor the hanachah. They maintain that although a mentally incompetent individual (and similarly, the others mentioned) are not obligated to observe the mitzvot, it is forbidden to “feed him non-kosher food with one’s hands.” (See Hilchot Ma’ achalot Asurot 17:27.) Similarly, in this instance it is forbidden to give these individuals an article and tel1 them to carry it. See also Chapter 24, Halachah 11, and notes.
This opinion is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 266:6) and accepted by the later authorities. There is. a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether the above law applies if one gives the article to one of these individuals before the commencement of the Sabbath. On the one hand, it is obvious that one’s intent is to have the individual carry the article on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, since one gives the article to him before the commencement of the Sabbath, one is not considered to be “feeding him non-kosher food with one’s hands.” (See the glosses of the Ramah and the Magen Avraham on that law.)

Since the child will ultimately become obligated to perform mitzvot, it is preferable that he not violate them in his childhood.

Shabbat 153b explains that on the one hand, it is preferable to give it to the child, because when the deaf-mute carries, the impression will be created that an adult may carry on the Sabbath. Conversely, however, there is a disadvantage in giving it to the child, for he will ultimately mature and become obligated to observe the mitzvot.
The Be’ur Halachah 266 emphasizes that when the minor is one’s own son, it is definitely preferable to give the purse to the deaf-mute, for a person is obligated to train his children in the observance of the mitzvot.

As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachot 15 and 19, a person is permitted to carry within a space of four cubits. Thus, each time he stops, the four cubits in which he is allowed to carry become redefined, and in this manner he can carry the article several miles on the Sabbath. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 10, and Chapter 6, Halachah 22.)
It must be emphasized that transferring the article less than four cubits at a time is permitted only when carrying the article in the public domain, but not with regard to transferring the article into the private domain. This must be accomplished by throwing the article in an irregular manner (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:12; Mishnah Berurah 266:17).
Significantly, in contrast to Chapter 13, Halachah 9, the Rambam does not say that the person should run without stopping until he arrives home. lt is possible to differentiate between the two instances by explaining that the present halachah refers to an instance when the person had stopped after the commencement of the Sabbath, while the halachah cited refers to an instance when the person had continued walking.

The leniencies granted to allow a person to maintain possession of his own property do not apply to a lost object that he discovered, since he will not suffer a loss by leaving it. Nevertheless, once a person has already taken possession of the lost object, it is considered to be his own property.

I.e., if there is a danger, because of thieves or the like

According to the Rambam, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 22, there is no prohibition against carrying an article less than four cubits at a time. Most authorities, however, differ with him on this issue and maintain that this is a leniency that is permitted only in rare instances. Hence, in the case of a lost article when a person will not suffer a loss, the leniency is not granted. It is the opinion of these authorities that is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 266:7).

The bridle and reins are not considered muktzeh, because the person had the intent of using them before the Sabbath. One must, however, be careful not to lean on the animal when putting the bridle and the reins on it, for it is forbidden to make use of a live animal (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 305:1 and commentaries).

This halachah revolves around the following principle: A restraint that is necessary to control an animal is not considered to be a burden and may be borne by the animal on the Sabbath.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:1), the Rambam writes that female camels are more powerful than males and need stronger restraints. The rope used to tie a male camel is, however, apparently different from that mentioned later in the halachah in regard to a horse.

A person who leads an animal into the public domain with such a restraint is thus considered as having violated the prohibition against having an animal work on the Sabbath.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions “a very excessive restraint”—i.e., we are not expected to measure exactly the strength of the animal and the restraint. As long as the restraint is more or less appropriate for the animal, it is not considered to be a burden.

The Tur (Orach Chayim 305) appears to differ and to allow one to lead merely one camel at a time.

If the rope extends longer, it might appear that one is carrying the rope and not using it as a restraint for the animal (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:3).

If the rope hangs lower, it does not appear to be a restraint for the animal, but rather an unnecessary burden (Rashi, Shabbat 54b).

Shabbat 54a states that a person leading a group of camels appears as if he is going to a.אגנח The Rambam, based on the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan’el, interprets that term as having both the meanings mentioned above. lt appears to refer to a country-fair that was an occasion for both commerce and celebration for the populace at large.

A bell will make the animal look more attractive (Rashi, Shabbat 54b).

Rashi and Tosafot (Shabbat 58a) states that the reason stated in the previous halachah—that one appears to be taking them to a fair—applies in this instance as well.

Identifying it as belonging to its master.

This prohibition applies even if the seal is woven into the animal’s covering (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:15; Mishnah Berurah 305:45).
From the context here, it would appear that the reason for the prohibition is that the seal is considered to be an unnecessary burden. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc. cit.), which states that the prohibition was instituted lest the seal fall and the owner pick it up and caו;ry it.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:4, based on Shabbat 54b), the Rambam interprets this as referring to a leather strap tied around the hoof of an animal that has been wounded.

This refers to wooden restraint placed on the animal's neck to prevent it from being able to turn its head backwards. Such a restraint would be placed on an animal to deter it from chewing on a wound on its back.

Shabbat 53a states that a donkey is always cold, and hence, a saddle-cloth is necessary, even in the summer, to keep it warm. Accordingly, the saddle-cloth is considered to be a garment and not a burden.
The saddlecloth must be tied to the animal, lest it fall and its owner carry it on the Sabbath. It must be tied before the Sabbath, because there is no way that it can be tied on the Sabbath itself without leaning on the animal, which is a forbidden act. Our Sages prohibited a person who violated their decree and tied the saddle-cloth on the Sabbath from taking out his donkey on that day (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:2).
Other commentaries explain that if the saddle-cloth was not tied to the animal nסFriday, we can assume that it does not suffer from cold so seriously. Hence, it is forbidden for it to wear the saddle-cloth on the Sabbath.

A patch is used as a sign of identification or for superstitious reasons (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah).

Our translation is based on Rav Kapach’s commentary.

Our translation is based nס the Rambam’s Commentary nס the Mishnah (loc. cit.).

I.e., one of its back feet to one of its front legs, so that it can walk on only three legs (ibid.). In both these instances, the animal is able to walk, but cannot walk fast.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:4), the Rambam emphasizes that this applies to both male and female chickens.

Attached to their feet for the purpose ofidentification (ibid., based on Shabbat 54b).

The Rambam (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to straps that hang loosely from a chicken’s feet. He does not explain their purpose. Others (based on Shabbat 54b) explain that these straps served as a restraint.

The Rambam explains that this refers to a unique species of rams. When they are fattened, all the fat collects in the fat tail, which swells in size. Because of its size, the ram is unable to lift it easily. Therefore, a small wagon is constructed and attached to them to support their tails and prevent them from dragging on the ground and becoming bruised and cut. The Rambam states that he was familiar with such a species of rams.

The Rambam (ibid.) states that this refers to chips from the yachnun tree. Based on Shabbat 54b, he explains that these chips were not necessary for rams. Since they butt each other frequently, this would dislodge the worms from their heads.

Significantly, Shabbat 54b singles out the species yalei, which Tosafot (based on Bava Batra 4a) identifies as the hedgehog itself. The Biblical name for this species anaka (Leviticus 11:30) resembles the word yenikah, “sucking,” and refers to this species’ tendency to suck milk.

The sharp prickles of the hedgehog skin will annoy the crawling animals and prevent them from sucking the cow’s milk (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, loc. cit., based on Shabbat 54b).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah [loc. cit. (based on Shabbat, loc. cit.), the Rambam relates that Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah had a neighbor who let his cow go out with a strap between its horns. Rabbi Elazar did not rebuke him for this act, and hence the responsibility for this transgression was considered his. The Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 5:4) relates that as penance, Rabbi Elazar fasted until his teeth became black.

Shabbat 53b offers both these interpretations for the word ןיבובל in the Mishnah, Shabbat 5:2. The Rambam interprets them as not being mutually exclusive and hence cites both of them as halachah. See also the following note.

The Ra’avad, however, objects to this particular interpretation, explaining that, as obvious from the ruling in the previous halachah regarding a strap tied between a cow’s horns, any article placed on an animal for the purpose of ornamentation is considered to be a burden and forbidden. The Maggid Mishneh offers an explanation that can resolve this difficulty. An ornament that an animal wears during the week is also permitted on the Sabbath. The ornaments that are forbidden are those that are placed on the animal for the Sabbath day alone.

In his Co1nmentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 5:2), the Rambam states that these coverings are placed over ewes and not over rams, because ewes’ wool is softer than that of rams.

This may be done to change the goats’ hormonal balance so that they will conceive faster.

Rabbenu Yonah explains that the goats’ teats were tied for this purpose on the Sabbath and not during the week. During the week, they would be milked in the morning and in the evening, and there was little chance of sufficient pressure building up to cause the milk to ooze out. On the Sabbath, by contrast, they could not be milked from sunset until after nightfall on the next day, and the possibility existed that extra milk would ooze out.

Although a donkey may go out wearing a saddlecloth, as stated in Halachah 10, a saddle itself is considered a burden.

Rashi (Shabbat 53a) explains that this was used as a talisman to ward off the evil eye.

Because it is an unnecessary ornament and therefore considered a burden. See the notes on the previous halachah.

Note the Mishnah Berurah 305:41, which states that this restriction does not apply to iron horseshoes that are permahently affixed to the animal’s feet.

Even if an amulet has proven its efficacy for a human, as long as it has not proven its efficacy for an animal, we are in doubt of its usefulness. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:21 states that a human being has angels and spiritual forces that will assist his recovery, and an animal lacks these. Therefore, the amulet used by a human need not bt: as powerful.

Chapter 19, Halachah 13 grants a person license to go out with a bandage on a wou’nd. The same concept applies regarding an animal.

So that it will set in place and heal (Maggid Mishneh).

The bell must be plugged, since it is forbidden to ring bells on the Sabbath as stated in Chapter 23, Halachah 4.

In this and the following instance, the leniency is granted in a courtyard, but not in the public domain.

The saddle cloth may not be tied, since by doing so one would be making use of an animal. (See the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 305:8 and the notes on Halachah 10.)

This leniency applies only to a donkey that chronically suffers from cold, as explained in the notes on Halachah 10, and not to a horse or other similar species (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:10) mentions that, in a courtyard, a feeding bag may be attached to calves and ponies which do not have long necks and find it uncomfortable to eat by themselves.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s decision, explaining that since the servants are themselves obligated to observe the prohibition against working on the Sabbath, of what purpose is the prohibition imposed on their master? The Maggid Mishneh and Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1525) explain that the servants may be lax in their observance. Therefore, an additional command is given to their master.

In Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14;9, the Rambam explains that a Cana’anite servant goes through a process similar to that of conversion when purchased by a Jewish master. This process includes circumcision, immersion in the mikveh, and the acceptance of mitzvot. Once this process is completed, the servant is bound to observe all the mitzvot that are incumbent upon Jewish women.

These seven universal laws include the prohibitions against the worship of false gods, cursing God, killing, stealing, incest and adultery, eating a limb torn from a living animal and the obligation to set up courts of law to judge civil matters. The Rambam explains these laws in Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 9 and 10. A servant may temporarily refuse to accept the mitzvot incumbent upon Jewish servants. In this instance, he does not undergo the process of circumcision and immersion and is given twelve months to decide whether to accept Jewish observance or not. If he refuses, he must be sold (Hilchot Avadim 8:12). In the interim, this servant must accept the observance of these seven universal laws. If not, he should be killed immediately (see Hilchot Avadim 1:6 and commentaries).

But not for the sake of a Jew. In Chapter 6, it was explained that there is a Rabbinic prohibition preventing a Jew from instructing a gentile to perform a forbidden labor on his behalf. This halachah emphasizes that when a gentile is the Jew’s servant, the Jew is violating a positive commandment of the Torah itself by having the gentile work for him on the Sabbath. See notes 87 and 88 below.

As explained in Hilchot Shemitah V’Yovel 10:9, there are many mitzvot whose observance is dependent on the observance of the yovel, the Jubilee year. The observance of the Jubilee year itself is dependent on the proportion of the Jewish people living in Eretz Yisrael. Only when the majority of our people live in the holy land is this mitzvah observed.

The intent of this question is not directly obvious in a translated text. The Hebrew word גֵּר has two meanings in Halachic terminology: a convert—גֵּר צֶדֶק—and a resident alien—גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב. Since, as the Rambam indicates, the verse does not appear to refer to either of these individuals, what is the intent of the word גֵּר in that verse?

The Maggid Mishneh states that this positive mitzvah prohibits not only one’s servant or one’s hired hand, but any gentile who has accepted the observance of these seven universal laws, from working on one’s behalf on the Sabbath. For as soon as the gentile agrees to perform the forbidden labor on behalf of a Jew, he is considered as the Jew’s hired hand.
The question may arise: Concerning whom is the Rambam speaking in Chapter 6 when he states that asking a gentile to work on our behalf is prohibited merely by virtue of Rabbinic decree? A gentile who has not accepted the observance of any mitzvot at all.

Thus, according to the Rambam, the verse quoted above contains two prohibitions: one requiring one to watch that any servants who have accepted the mitzvot observe the Sabbath laws, and another, prohibiting us from benefiting from any work done on our behalf by a gentile who has not accepted these mitzvot.