Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., in contrast to an entrusted object, a loan is the borrower’s responsibility even if the money was lost due to factors beyond his control.

Since the lender appointed him, he acts in the lender’s stead with regard to all matters.

The Hebrew term lo, “to him,” is lacking in the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah. It is, however, found in several of the authentic manuscripts and appeared in the text used by the Maggid Mishneh.
The question is not merely one of semantics. “To him” is interpreted to mean “into his domain.” If the borrower merely threw the money in the direction of the lender, he is not freed of responsibility until the lender actually takes possession of the funds. This interpretation is also borne out by the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin 8:3). The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 120:1) and commentaries, however, do not appear to accept this understanding.
See also the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 120:1), who comments on the second half of this halachah and states that if the money lands within four cubits of the lender when he is in a lane or at the edge of the public domain, he acquires it. It is considered as if it fell within his own domain.

See Hilchot Ishut 4:22; Hilchot Gerushin 5:14.

As the Rambam explains in those sources, the intent is not physical closeness, but rather the ability to protect the article. If the money can be protected by the lender, it is considered “close” to him. If it can be protected by the borrower, it is “close” to him.

The rationale is that once an agent is given money and instructed to bring it to the lender, it is considered as if he acted as an agent of the lender and acquired it on his behalf.
The commentaries note that, as stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:4, if a person gave an agent a present for a colleague and instructed him to give it to him with these words, he would have the option of retracting. Only when he explicitly told the agent: “Acquire it on behalf of so-and-so,” could he not retract. The difference between the two instances is, however, obvious, for the debt is owned to the lender, while the present is not.

Because the lender did not give him permission to send it to him with that agent.

Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi (as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh) explains that if the lender cannot collect the debt from the debtor, he may demand payment from the agent. The agent shares in the responsibility, for he gave money that had already been acquired by the creditor back to the debtor. Nevertheless, the lender may not approach the agent for payment without first approaching the debtor.
The Maggid Mishneh adds that if the agent was compelled to return the money to the lender by force, he is not held liable at all. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 125:1) quotes the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh as law. Significantly, however, he also cites the Rambam’s words as a second opinion, implying that they are different conceptions.

Such a transfer is called a maamad sheloshtan. It is a Rabbinical ordinance instituted to allow for a freer flow of financial dealings. Ordinarily, none of the participants can retract. See Hilchot Mechirah 6:8.

Had Levi known that Reuven was incapable of paying, he would never have accepted the transfer. Hence, the transaction was carried out under false premises and is nullified for that reason.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 126:26 quotes the Tur, from which it appears that even if Shimon did not deceive Levi - for he did not know that Reuven was poor - if in fact Reuven was poor at that time, the transaction is nullified. The Siftei Cohen 126:43, however, raises questions regarding this ruling.

The Siftei Cohen 126:44 states that the prevailing assumption is that he did not know of Reuven’s state. For if he had known, it would have been ridiculous for him to accept the transfer.

In the former instance he has nothing to complain about, because he knew of Reuven’s state. And in the latter instance, it is his misfortune that he suffered the loss. Since there was no deception involved, the transfer is binding.

This expression indicates a decision the Ramba:n reached through deduction, without having an explicit source in previous Rabbinic literature.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers to an instance where Levi has a promissory note from Shimon regarding the debt, in which instance Shimon must prove that he has not paid the debt. If, however, the debt is supported by a verbal commitment alone, the burden of proof is on Levi. For if Shimon had claimed that he paid the debt himself, his word would have been accepted provided he supported it with a sh’vuat hesset. Accordingly, based on the principle of miggo, his word is accepted if he claims that he did not deceive Shimon about Reuven’s financial position and takes a sh’vuat hesset to that effect. These concepts are quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 126:11).

If he cannot prove his claim, he must make financial restitution, provided Shimon takes a severe Rabbinic oath [Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.) and commentaries].

I.e., the agreement that Reuven should pay Levi is equivalent to a receipt. Just as the borrower would have to prove the authenticity of a receipt; so, too, he must verify this claim.

Hilchot Mechirah 6:9.

I.e., any one of the three may retract.

Since he was not under any obligation to Reuven, there was no debt that was transferred.

Since he was the original debtor.

We do not say that since he began paying him, he is obligated to pay the entire debt. Shimon can require Reuven to reimburse him for the portion he paid as the Rambam states above (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 126:10).

That he did not receive payment.

That he gave the money that the employer requested him to give.

In both instances, the plaintiffs are issuing a definite claim against the employer, and he is unsure of whether he paid them or not. Ordinarily, in such a situation, the plaintiff’s word would be accepted without an oath (see Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:9). Nevertheless, since the employer is certainly suffering a loss, our Sages required that an oath be taken. Although one of the claimants is unquestionably taking a false oath, the court is not concerned and requires that both oaths be administered. (See Sh’vuot 47b.)

The employer - and the court - have no way of determining which of the claimants is lying. The other claimant, by contrast, does know. By requiring each one to be present when the other takes the oath, the person lying will be embarrassed, for a person who knows that he is not being truthful will be present when he takes the oath (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 91:1) states that if one of the two claimants is not present, the other is not required to wait until his return before taking the required oath.

For example, a person told a colleague “Lend me $100 and pay it directly to my creditor,” the creditor claims never to have received the funds, and the person claims to have made the payment [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 91:1)].

I.e., although the store-keeper would not ordinarily be required to take an oath, an exception is made in this situation to placate the feelings of the employer, who is forced to pay twice.

Without taking the prescribed oath.

This law is not stated explicitly in the Talmud, but is derived by the Rambam (and other commentaries) based on the rationale stated further on (Maggid Mishneh).

The Ramban and the Ramah differ and maintain that the storekeeper must take an oath before collecting the money he claims. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 91:2) quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Ramah mentions the other opinion.

For he is denying the store-keeper’s claim entirely.
Rabbenu Nissim maintains that the employer is not required to take an oath at all. Since even if the owner agreed that he made this statement, the store-keeper would have to take an oath before he collected the money he claimed, this is not considered a claim that requires an oath. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 91:6) quotes the Rambam’s view.

If that person denies receiving payment, he is required to take a sh’vuat hesset and is then freed of responsibility.

This is the legal process used to transfer ownership of a promissory note, as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 6:11.

See Hilchot Mechirah 6:14. In this instance, a deed of transfer is not required. As stated in the notes on that halachah, this opinion is not accepted by all authorities

This applies even if there are no witnesses to the transfer of the promissory note, provided that the original creditor does not protest and claim that the promissory note was not sold. If he lodges such a protest, the purchaser must bring either the deed of transfer or witnesses who testify concerning the sale. This reflects the approach of the Rambam’s teacher, Rav Yosef Migash, and is indicated by the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Mechirah 6:11. As the Maggid Mishneh and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 66) state, many other Rishonim differ and maintain that the purchaser must also produce evidence of the sale of the promissory note in all instances, even when the original creditor does not lodge a protest. See also Hilchot Nachalot 9:10 where this issue is discussed.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 66:11) quotes the Rambam’s approach as well as that of the other authorities, without stating which should be followed. The Ramah, however, favors the approach of the other authorities.

And the note itself is considered proof that the debt was not paid.

As is his privilege, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 2.

Levi’s word is accepted and Shimon is freed of responsibility. The rationale is that if Levi desired, he could waive the debt and free Shimon of responsibility, as stated in Hilchot Mechirah 6:12. The rationale is that the sale of a promissory note is binding only according to Rabbinic law. According to Scriptural Law, the debt is still owed to Levi - despite the fact that he sold the note - and he has the right to waive the debt.

He must pay the full amount stated in the promissory note. This applies even if he sold the promissory note for less. For we assume that he received payment after the promissory note was sold. Even if he states that he was paid before the sale, thus admitting the sale was a deception, he must pay the entire amount. The rationale is that the reason Levi's word is accepted and Reuven is not entitled to collect the debt from Shimon is that Levi has the right to waive payment of the debt. If he waived payment, he would be liable to pay the entire amount of the debt (Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:10). Hence, when he admits accepting payment, he is required to pay the entire amount (Maggid Mishneh).
Similarly, if the original creditor does not admit accepting payment from the debtor, but refuses to take the oath, he is required to pay the purchaser (Maggid Mishneh).

He also states that the debt has been paid, and thus Shimon is no longer responsible.

For what is involved is a claim that Reuven lodges against Levi, and Levi denies entirely. Our translation follows the interpretation of Sefer Me’irat Einayim 66:33.
In his Kessef Mishneh and Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 66), Rav Yosef Karo offers a different interpretation, stating that Levi claims that the debt is unpaid, and that he lost the promissory note and it was found by Reuven. Hence, he requests payment from Shimon. Shimon, by contrast, maintains that he already paid the debt, received the promissory note in return, and that he was the one who lost it. In such an instance, Shimon’s word is accepted, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 13.

I.e., we follow the principle of miggo. If the debt was still outstanding and the third party desired to defraud the creditor, he could simply have destroyed the promissory note. By entrusting a promissory note to a third party, a creditor makes a tacit agreement to accept his word.

In contrast to the following halachah, this is speaking about an instance when the note that was discovered is not signed by witnesses.

As mentioned in Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 6:7, a lender can claim that his admission that a debt was paid was facetious. See Sefer Me'irat Einayim 56:12, which explains that the note could have been written in anticipation of the creditor's paying the debt.

It is not ordinary that a lender will have the authenticity of the witnesses’ signatures verified. Hence, we assume that the borrower paid the debt, the lender gave him the promissory note, he had the witnesses’ signatures verified and then returned the note to the lender for safekeeping (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 65:63).

We assume that the lender prepared the receipt for the borrower before he actually paid him, as mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah.

These additions are made on the basis of the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh and that of the Maggid Mishneh on Chapter 17, Halachah 2.

It appears that the Rambam’s text of Bava Metzia 20b) stated peruyim, “paid.” The standard printed text of that passage states keruyim, “torn.”

For otherwise, why was it placed together with the other notes that had been paid?

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 65:70 states that this law applies even when the lender protests that the loan was never repaid.

Nor the lender (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 65:71).

This does not refer to a debt that is owed to him, but rather a promissory note recording a debt owed one colleague by another colleague.

I.e., he does not recall who entrusted it to him, the borrower or the lender, nor does he know whether or not the debt was paid.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba, who compares this to a promissory note that fell and was discovered by a third party. In such an instance, even if the borrower admits that he did not repay the debt, it should not be returned to the creditor, for we fear that he will use it dishonestly to expropriate property that the borrower sold. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 65:3) quotes this opinion, but also quotes another view that maintains that if the borrower and the creditor agree, we should follow their requests.

For each of the borrowers can claim that it is his note that was not paid, and the lender cannot prove otherwise. In each case, the borrower is given the benefit of the doubt.

In which instance, one of the promissory notes is certainly unpaid.

For the debtor is given the benefit of the doubt.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 65:23) states that if a receipt for the lesser one is found, that note is considered to have been paid and not the greater one.

For the wording he used could imply that the borrower has paid his entire debt to the lender.

I.e., the court does not require him to take an oath. Instead, it considers the promissory note in his possession to be an indication that the loan is still outstanding. An heir is always judged more leniently than the person whose estate he acquired. If that person had been able to collect the debt without taking an oath, certainly an heir is granted this privilege.

As is his prerogative, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 2.

This oath is referred to by the Sages (Sh’vuot 45a) as “the oath of the heirs.”

Just as the lender would have had to take a severe oath before collecting the oath; so, too, this is required of the heir. Nevertheless, while the lender himself could take an oath that the debt was unpaid, the heirs cannot state that with certainty. They can, however, state unequivocally that to their knowledge the debt was unpaid.

Before his death.

As stated in the notes at the conclusion of the previous chapter, for a promissory note to be invalidated, the note itself must be found among promissory notes that have been paid, or a second note must be found stating that the promissory note has been paid.

If, however, the lender died first, different rules apply, as stated in the following halachah.

In this instance, the court obligates the lender’s heirs to take the oath. The rationale is that since the borrower would have had this prerogative, the court acts on behalf of his heirs and requires the lender’s heirs to support their claim by taking this oath.

Similarly, if a person has no sons, and his brother inherits his estate, the brother must take an oath: “My brother did not tell me...,” My brother did not instruct me....” (Sh’vuot 48b).

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 108:9) states that the lender’s heirs must also include in their oath that the borrower did not pay them themselves.

Needless to say that the oath is not taken until the heir attains the age of majority.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 108:5) states that in such a situation, he must take an oath only that he did not find a note saying that this promissory note was paid, because it is highly unlikely that the lender would have spoken to the infant about his finances. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 108:23 adds that he must also take an oath that he was not informed by others, because it is a distinct possibility that the lender had advised a friend about his financial affairs.
Our text of the Mishnah (Sh’vuot 45a) quotes Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka as saying that even when the heir was born after the lender died, he is required to take this oath. The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam’s wording implies that he does not accept Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka’s view. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh’vuot 7:7), however, the Rambam emphasizes that the halachah follows Rabbi Yochanan’s view.

The rationale is that we assume that a person will not make false statements on his deathbed. Since the promissory note is itself considered an indication that the debt is outstanding, the lender’s statements provide the added clarification that would otherwise be contributed by the oath.

Without taking that oath. Even if the lender took that oath before passing away, his heirs cannot collect the debt if there was a possibility that he was paid after taking the oath [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 108:11)]. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 108:36 interprets this as referring to an instance when the lender took the oath in the borrower’s lifetime, and then the borrower died. In such an instance, he would have had to take another oath to the borrower’s heirs before collecting the debt from them.

They cannot state that their father was never paid with the certainty an oath requires.

I.e., the oath mentioned in Halachah 2.

The question of whether the heirs are allowed to collect the debt in such a situation is the subject of a difference of opinion between the Amoraim in Sh'vuot 48b. Since there are opinions that maintain that the borrower's heirs are not required to pay the debt, at the outset we do not obligate them to pay. Nevertheless, if a judge erred and required them to pay, we do not expropriate the money from the lender's heirs, because there are opinions that maintain that the money should be given to them.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 108:11) also states that if the lender’s heirs seize the money that was owed them from the property of the borrower’s heirs, it should not be expropriated from them, based on the same rationale.

And in this way prevent it from being used to collect the debt in the future.
The Rambam’s words appear to imply that a judge before whom the case was brought should not tear the promissory note for the reason to be stated. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 108:11) quotes the opinion of the Remo, who maintains that the instruction not to tear the promissory note is addressed to the heir’s guardian. If he finds such a promissory note in the estate, he should not tear it. If, however, such a promissory note is taken to court, the judge should rule in favor of the borrower’s heirs and allow them to maintain possession of the money. Afterwards, he should have the promissory note torn to prevent the matter from being brought before another court.

By tearing it, we would prevent this possibility.

Sh’vuot 48b states that although the more lenient opinion should be followed in the previous instance, we should not make any logical extensions and apply the concepts to similar cases. Another parallel could be an instance where one witness testifies that the promissory note has been paid. If the lender dies before taking an oath, his heirs may take the oath mentioned in this halachah and then collect the debt (Maggid Mishneh). The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 108:14) explains that this principle applies only in instances when the claim of the lender's heirs is supported by a promissory note. Otherwise (e.g., the heirs of a worker or a person who claims that property was stolen from him), the heirs are not given the opportunity of taking an oath.

I.e., who states that the borrower paid a portion of the debt stated in the promissory note, as explained in Chapter 14, Halachah 1 and notes.

As required by Halachah 2.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo states that the Rambam’s words can be interpreted as meaning that when the lender dies before the borrower and then the borrower dies, the lender’s heirs may expropriate the money from the borrower’s heirs on the basis of the oath mentioned by the Rambam. If, however, the lender dies after the borrower, the lender was obligated to take an oath to the borrower’s heirs, and such an oath cannot be bequeathed to an heir. And in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 108:14), he states this interpretation as halachah.

I.e., the oath required of an heir mentioned in Halachah 2. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 108:15) states that this law applies even if the lender died during the lifetime of the borrower.

A person who does not admit incurring a debt will certainly not have repaid it. Hence, we interpret the borrower’s objection that he never incurred the debt as an admission that he never repaid it. (See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 6:3.) On the other hand, we do not accept his word that the debt was never incurred. Since the lender has produced a promissory note that has been verified by the court, we assume that the debt has been incurred. And since the statement of the borrower’s heirs is interpreted as an admission that the debt was never repaid, the lender’s heirs are not required to take an oath before collecting.

The law that follows is not explicitly stated in the Talmud, but is derived from the previous law, which is. The rationale is that if the lender himself were required to take in oath in such a situation, an oath would also be required of his heirs (Maggid Mishneh).

See Chapter 15, Halachah 6. Although the lender stipulated that he would accept the borrower’s word with regard to repayment, in this instance the borrower is not stating that he repaid the debt. On the contrary, his statements are interpreted as an admission that he never repaid the debt (Maggid Mishneh).

As stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 6.

I.e., the legal power of the promissory note is dependent on the borrower's statements.
Our translation is based on the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah. The Rambam La’Am cites a passage from Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi on which basis he reads akar instead of ikar, which allows for the interpretation of the phrase as: “The promissory note is uprooted by the stipulation.”

Although a claim against an heir is generally judged more severely than a claim against a principal, an exception is made in this instance, because the legal power of the promissory note is entirely contingent on the borrower’s admission that he has not repaid the debt.

The Maggid Mishneh cites a difference of opinion among the commentaries. Rabbenu Yosef MiGash, the Rambam’s teacher, maintains that this applies even though the lender did not demand payment of the debt before his death. Since the borrower was in possession of a receipt, he should have brought it to court and nullified the promissory note. The fact that he did not do so casts suspicions on the validity of the promissory note. The Rashba differs and maintains that as long as the lender did not demand payment of the promissory note in his lifetime, we do not question the borrower’s intent.
The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 108) states that the Rambam follows Rav Yosef MiGash’s understanding. The Siftei Cohen 108:31 states that it is not imperative to say so.

I.e., we do not automatically accept the validity of the receipt and on that basis destroy the promissory note.

At which point they are deemed capable of protecting their interests in court.

I.e., the fact that he did not produce it during the lender’s lifetime - when the lender could have attested to or denied its authenticity - leads us to the suspicion that it might be a forgery. Hence, we wait until the lender’s heirs reach an age when they are capable of protecting their interests. If they desire to contest the matter in court, the borrower will have to verify the authenticity of the note against their claims.
Even if the borrower brings witnesses who verify the authenticity of the receipt before the lender’s heir comes of age, their word is not accepted. The rationale is that we do not accept testimony of witnesses unless it is made in the presence of the litigant. Since the litigant - the lender’s heir - is a minor, it is considered as if he is not present [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 108:16)].
The Bedek HaBayit notes that although testimony against a minor is not accepted by the court until he reaches majority, the authenticity of a legal document is verified and the document accepted even if the party to which it applies is under age. The Bedek HaBayit explains that an exception is made in this instance, because of the suspicion created by the fact that the borrower did not produce the receipt in the lender’s lifetime.

At the outset, it is required that a promissory note - and similarly, other legal documents - contain the name of the place where the note is composed.

The coins used in Babylon were heavier than those used in Eretz Yisrael, and the Babylonian coinage was therefore more valuable. Needless to say, if the note explicitly stated that it was given in a specific coinage, the debt must be paid in that currency.
To relate these concepts to contemporary circumstance: Loans made to Americans in dollars in Canada. Are the dollars mentioned Canadian dollars or American dollars?

If the note does not state the type of coinage in which the loan was given, we assume that it was given in the local coinage.

See Hilchot Ishut 16:6, which states that with regard to a ketubah, a woman is always given the lesser sum.

For we assume that the loan was also given in that coinage. The Kessef Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 42:14) quote Rabbenu Nissim, who explains that according to the Rambam, if the borrower can prove that he was in another place at the time that the loan was given, we assume that the loan was given in the coinage of that place.

As stated above.

To respond to the claim of the borrower. The Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 42) compares this to a situation where the borrower claims to have repaid a portion of the debt. In such an instance, if the debtor asks that the creditor take an oath before collecting, he is required to do so (Chapter 14, Halachah 2).
The Siftei Cohen 42:33 explains the objections of Sefer HaTerumot to this ruling, stating that the borrower’s protest bears a greater resemblance to a claim that the promissory note was given on faith or that it was written in anticipation of a loan that was never given, than to a claim that the debt was paid. In those instances, as the Rambam states in Chapter 14, Halachah 3, the lender is not required to take an oath. Similarly, in the instance at hand, Sefer HaTerumot argues, the lender should not be required to take an oath.

I.e., if the promissory note says “X owes Y 100 pieces of silver” without specifying which coins are intended, the borrower can repay the loan using whichever silver coins he desires (Maggid Mishneh).

For the lender has no legal support to demand more.

It may not, however, be used to expropriate property from people who purchased property from the borrower [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 43:1)].

Hazamah refers to the nullification of the testimony of witnesses on the basis of the testimony of other witnesses who state that at the time a witness claims to have observed a particular event, that witness was together with them in another place and could not possibly have observed the event that he testified about. (See Hilchot Eidut, Chapters 18-20.)
Testimony that cannot be nullified through Hazamah is generally not acceptable (Sanhedrin 41a; Hilchot Eidut 1:5). In this instance, since the promissory note does not mention either the date or the place of the loan, there is no possibility of hazamah. Nevertheless, the promissory note is not disqualified, for the reason stated by the Rambam.

See Hilchot Eidut 1:4-5.

See Hilchot Eidut 3:1.

I.e., if a lender saw that the witnesses he brings are being subjected to rigid cross-examination, and as a result their testimony is disqualified, and he is consequently unable to collect his debt, he will refrain from giving loans to others in the future.

I.e., the date stated on the promissory note is later than the date when the note was actually composed.

Chapter 23, Halachah 1. See also Hilchot Eidut 19:3.

Both movable and landed property, as the Rambam continues to state.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the person’s property is considered “a guarantor.” For that reason, as the Rambam continues to explain, the creditor must first demand payment from the borrower. If he is unable to make restitution, he should demand payment from the “guarantor” - i.e., the borrower’s property. See also Chapter 11, Halachah 4 and notes.

He may not, however, take the property from the lender by force without first bringing the matter to the court.

With this statement, the Rambam emphasizes that first, the borrower’s property is expropriated. Only if he does not have sufficient resources to pay the debt is the property that he sold attached (Maggid Mishneh).

When a loan is supported by a verbal commitment alone, the borrower’s property is also on lien to the debt. In such an instance, however - as explained in Chapter 11, Halachah 4 - even if the loan is still outstanding, the lender cannot expropriate the property that he sold from the purchasers. The rationale is that they can claim that the loan was never public knowledge, and thus they were not aware that the property was on lien. When, by contrast, a loan is supported by a promissory note that is signed by witnesses, it is assumed that the matter has become public knowledge.

As mentioned by Bava Metzia 14a (see Hilchot Mechirah 19:3), even if the promissory note did not explicitly state that the borrower’s property is on lien to the debt, that lien is considered to have been established.

If, however, it is still in the possession of the borrower, it may be expropriated (Maggid Mishneh).

See the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on Chapter 23, Halachah 2.
The Rashba does not accept the latter principle, but instead maintains that even if this stipulation is not explicitly stated in the promissory note, we assume that this was the borrower’s and lender’s intent. The Rambam’s view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 112:1), while that of the Rashba is cited by the Tur and the Ramah.
The Siftei Cohen 112:1 explains the positions as follows: When a person gives a loan, he wants to be secure that he will be repaid. Hence, it is a foregone conclusion in his mind - and hence, in the mind of the borrower - that if the borrower cannot pay him, he will expropriate property belonging to the borrower. Therefore, even if it was not stated that the borrower’s property is on lien to the loan, it is considered to be on lien.
This, however, applies only with regard to property that was in the borrower’s possession at the time of the loan. With regard to property that is not in his possession, since it is not at hand at present, unless an explicit stipulation that it is on lien is made, a lien is not established. For one would not automatically conclude that the lender - and the borrower - have it in mind.
Nevertheless, when a lender takes the trouble of having a promissory note composed with all the technicalities required of a legal document, we presume that he will do everything in his power to secure his money. Hence, it can be assumed that he will also have in mind to collect the debt from property that has not yet been acquired.

The rationale is that since the movable property could have been hidden or lost, the lender never really took seriously the possibility of expropriating such property as payment for the debt (Rashi, Bava Metzia 67b).

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 113:1) states that this law applies even when the property is sold after the creditor warns potential purchasers that he desires to collect his debt from it.

I.e., to encourage the creditor to make the loan, the debtor gave him greater rights than he would ordinarily receive.

Hilchot Mechirah 3:9 states that the ownership of movable property can be transferred via the acquisition of movable property (kinyan agav). In this halachah, the Rambam explains that this concept also applies with regard to the establishment of a lien on the movable property.

As explained in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 11, the term asmachta refers to a stipulation conditional on a specific occurrence to which the principal agreed verbally, but never took seriously, because he did not expect that the occurrence would in fact take place. Because he never made a genuine commitment to the stipulation, it is not binding upon him.
Similarly, in the present instance, one could say that since the borrower never intended not to have the money available to repay his debt, he did not make a genuine commitment to place his movable property on lien. To nullify such a supposition, the borrower must explicitly make such a statement in the promissory note.

There are scribes who carry with them promissory notes that have already been written up, and all that is necessary is to add the names of the principals, the sum, the date and the place where the loan was completed. Such a standard form may state that the lien will be extended to movable property - or to movable property that will be purchased in the future. Since this stipulation is not binding unless the borrower has explicitly agreed to it, the above expression is added to clarify that he did in fact consent (Maggid Mishneh).

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies even if the movable property was purchased after the landed property was sold. This concept is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

I.e., although the lien would not ordinarily be extended to such a great extent, since the borrower agreed to this stipulation, it is binding upon him and his property.
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 60:1, 113:3) write that in the present age even though one composes such a promissory note, movable property is not expropriated from purchasers. This institution was ordained because otherwise people would never purchase movable property out of fear that it would be expropriated from them. The Siftei Cohen 60:4, however, disputes this ruling.

Ipotiki is a composite of three Aramaic words, whose connotation is “From here, you shall collect your debt” - i.e., the property is designated to be given to the creditor in payment of the debt owed him or to the women in place of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that they should benefit from the field, subtracting a specific amount each year as payment for the debt.

Washing away the topsoil and reducing its value.

We do not say that it is the creditor’s loss and the debtor is under no responsibility to him.
This ruling does not imply weakness in the creditor’s hold on the field. On the contrary, as long as the field is in the creditor’s possession, the debtor cannot compel him to accept another property in its stead [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 117:1)].

For in this instance, the creditor must suffer the disadvantages as well as the advantages of such a designation. Since the field was singled out for him, he is required to suffer the loss.

I.e., this stipulation must be explicitly stated in the promissory note. If the note does not mention the subject of a lien at all, the lien is established, for we assume that the lien was not mentioned as a result of a scribal error.

As stated above, any condition a person makes with regard to financial matters is binding.

Since it is possible that the creditor will be paid from other resources possessed by the debtor. This applies to an ordinary ipotiki. If, however, the debtor specified that the creditor should not derive payment from any place but this, the sale is nullified even when there are other properties that he could expropriate.

This applies even if there are other properties that the debtor sold after the designated property. Although a creditor must normally expropriate the last field that the debtor sold as payment for the debt, in this instance an exception is made, because the field was originally designated an ipotiki (Maggid Mishneh).

This applies both to an ipotiki that is explicit (i.e., the debtor told the creditor that he should expropriate payment only from this field) and to an ordinary ipotiki.

I.e., the debtor sold the field until the time it would be expropriated.

I.e., without informing the purchaser that it could be expropriated from him because it was designated an ipotiki.

Because the transaction was concluded under false premises. Had the purchaser known this, he never would have purchased the field.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that it is based on a mistaken interpretation of a passage from the Jerusalem Talmud (Shivi’it 10:1). The commentaries explain that he understands the Rambam as implying that even when the ipotiki is explicit, the creditor can expropriate only when the debtor has no other property. To this he objects, maintaining that the debtor can expropriate this field in all circumstances.
Similarly, according to the Ra’avad’s interpretation, the sale is binding - even when the ipotiki is explicit - until the creditor comes to collect the debt.
The Maggid Mishneh acknowledges that other Rishonim also interpret that passage differently from the way that the Rambam does. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 117:1) quotes the Rambam’s view, but the Tur and the Ramah quote that of the Ra’avad.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 107:8 explains that the Rambam also agrees that a creditor with an explicit ipotiki can expropriate the field from the purchaser in all situations. It is only with regard to the last point that there is a difference of opinion.

There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries regarding whether this applies only with regard to a creditor whose claim is supported by a promissory note or even with regard to a creditor whose claim is supported by a verbal commitment alone. The Maggid Mishneh expresses the first view, stating that when a loan is supported by a verbal commitment alone, property that has been sold is never expropriated.
The Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 117, based on the statements of Rabbenu Asher, Responsum 86:11), by contrast, maintains that this is an exception. The reason why a person cannot expropriate property from purchasers when a loan is supported by a verbal commitment alone is that the matter did not become public knowledge. In this instance, even when the ipotiki is not stated in a promissory note, it will become public knowledge, because the servant himself will spread the report. He will tell everyone that his master designated him as an ipotiki. Hence, even if he was sold, he can be expropriated, because the purchaser could have had knowledge of the matter. The Siftei Cohen 117:4 cites a commentary of Rabbenu Asher that echoes the Maggid Mishneh’s view.

This applies when the debtor does not have any other property - if we are speaking about an ordinary ipotiki - or even if he has other property if we are speaking about an explicit ipotiki (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., it would become public knowledge that this servant was designated an ipotiki. Hence, a person purchasing the servant should have inquired before making the purchase. If he did not, the loss is his own responsibility.

Articles of movable property are not distinguished as individual entities. Hence, the purchaser will not necessarily be able to know that the article was designated an ipotiki.

This applies even if the matter is recorded in a promissory note and the purchaser was aware which article was designated an ipotiki, for our Rabbis did not make distinctions when making their decrees [Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 117:3)].

As a donation to the Temple treasury.

I.e., the prohibition against possession of leaven on Passover. If a Jew placed a lien in favor of a gentile on leaven that he owned, and the Passover holiday arrives, the leaven becomes forbidden and must be destroyed, despite the gentile's claim to it.

If a person consecrates property to the Temple treasury, the consecration is effective even if the property was on lien to a debt.

But not from the time of the first promissory note. This is a loss that the creditor incurs, because if the debtor sold property in the interim, the creditor is not entitled to expropriate it. Since the servant was designated an ipotiki in the previous promissory note, it is considered as if that promissory note has been paid. The debtor, however, established a new obligation by freeing the servant. The lien created by that obligation, however, takes effect when the creditor frees him.

By freeing the servant who was designated as the creditor’s property, he caused the creditor a loss.

See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 7:13.

I.e., the creditor who should have acquired the servant.

I.e., there is no legal obligation for the creditor to free the slave, for he never really became his property. Our Sages, nevertheless, compelled him to do so for the reason stated by the Rambam.

This applies not only to animals that are consecrated for the Temple sacrifices - and thus they themselves become sacred - but also to objects dedicated to the Temple treasury that by and large will be sold, and the proceeds used for the Temple.
In Hilchot Arachin 7:14, the Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining only that articles that are themselves consecrated for the Temple worship lift the lien of an article. According to his view, even while the field is in the possession of the Temple treasury, it is still on lien to the creditor. The Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on our halachah states that most authorities follow the Ra’avad’s perspective. In his Kessef Mishneh in his gloss on Hilchot Arachin, Rav Yosef Karo supports the Rambam’s position, yet in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 117:7), it appears that he follows the other view. The Tur and the Ramah explicitly state that the Ra’avad’s position should be followed. i’,

Hilchot Arachin 7:14-16. There the Rambam explains that the person who redeems the field is required to pay the creditor or the woman the money owed them, and he must pay at least a minor sum to the Temple treasury for the right to redeem the field. This applies when the value of the field is equal to - or slightly less than - the amount owed. For in such a situation, it is probable that another person will be willing to redeem the field. If, however, the debt is much more than the value of the field, the lien is lifted from the field entirely, for otherwise no one would ever desire to redeem it.

I.e., if both the purchaser and the creditor desire the field, the purchaser is given priority and he may pay the debt and retain possession of the field. The rationale is that the purchaser originally bought the field, while the creditor originally gave money. Hence, the purchaser is allowed to retain possession of the field, and money is returned to the creditor.
See Chapter 22, Halachah 16, which states that even if the field was already expropriated from the purchaser’s possession, he can reclaim it by paying the creditor his due. Many other authorities do not accept this principle. See Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 114:3) and the gloss of Sefer Me’irat Einayim 114:4.

Who is also the debtor.

On the basis of Bava Metzia 15b, the Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers only to an explicit ipotiki - e.g., the debtor told the creditor: “You will receive payment from this source alone.” If, however, it was merely designated as an ordinary ipotiki, the creditor’s claim may be eliminated through payment.

The fact that the field was designated as an explicit ipotiki indicates that the creditor was also concerned with receiving the land. Hence, since his lien was established first, his claim is given precedence over that of the purchaser.

This is a description of an incident that took place in Babylon and was recorded in Ketubot 91 b.

100 zuz.

And return the field to me that you expropriated.

Because Shimon had the option of being paid the entire amount that he was owed.
If, however, the field was designated as an explicit ipotiki for Shimon, this law does not apply (Maggid Mishneh).

For that is all that he paid for it.

As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 8.

. As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 7, movable property inherited by heirs is not on lien to the creditor. Therefore, when the heirs make such a statement, it is as if they are stating that they are repurchasing the field from the creditor with their own funds. Hence, neither he nor any other creditor can expropriate it from them (Maggid Mishneh).
The Siftei Cohen 107:9 states that the law stated by the Rambam applied in the era of the Talmud. In the present era, however, different rules apply. As stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 11, the Geonim already ruled that the movable property left in an estate is on lien to the deceased’s debts. Hence this halachah is no longer relevant.