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I.e., the woman had been consecrated or wed, but before she and her husband engaged in marital relations, she was either widowed or divorced.

Even if there are witnesses to the fact that her husband died directly after they entered the chuppah (Ketubot 11a).

The rationale is that even if a woman engaged in intimate relations before the age of three, her hymen will grow back, as stated in Halachah 3, based on Ketubot 11b.

Literally, ‘‘one struck by a piece of wood,’’ a woman who claims that she did not have hymeneal bleeding at the time of her first intimate experience, because she had previously been ‘‘struck by a piece of wood’’ and caused to bleed at that time. As mentioned in Halachah 10, the term is used to refer to any woman who claims that her failure to have hymeneal bleeding resulted from causes other than intercourse.

Although one might think that the marriage would be annulled, because the husband was operating under a misconception (mekach ta’ut), Ketubot 11b rules that this is not so. As long as she had not engaged in intimate relations previously, their marriage is binding.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 67:4) follows the ruling of Tosafot, Ketubot 11b, who explain that this law applies only when the woman’s hymen remains intact despite these relations.

This point is necessary to mention because of the factors stated in Halachah 12.

Ketubot 36b explains that we are afraid that such a woman might have suffered hymeneal bleeding from causes other than intercourse, but will not have noticed the fact.

Rashi (Ketubot 36a) explains that since an aylonit is considered a bogeret, this point must be clarified, as it must with regard to a bogeret. The above ruling applies only when the husband was aware that the woman was an aylonit. If he was not aware of that fact, the woman is not entitled to a ketubah at all, as explained in Chapter 24, Halachah 2.

Even if she was a virgin at the time of their original marriage, she is not a virgin at present.

I.e., a marriage between a mentally and/or emotionally challenged man and an ordinary woman will constantly be pained by strife and will not last. (Yevamot 112b).

This refers to a girl who has been orphaned of her father or who was divorced after being wed. The Torah — and not our Sages — gives a father the right to consecrate his daughter before she becomes a na’arah.

If the girl remains unmarried, the prohibitions against relations with her are not as severe and the Sages feared that they would not be upheld. If she were allowed to marry, the prohibition against adultery would be respected and she would be treated differently. Moreover, her husband will guard against her association with other men.

I.e., only the fundamental requirements of the ketubah, but not any additional amount that the youth added to the marriage contract, unless he renews that commitment after he reaches majority. Otherwise, that commitment — like any commitment made by aminor — is of no substance. Moreover, he is obligated for the fundamental requirement of the ketubah only when he engaged in marital relations with his wife after he attained majority. If not, the marriage — and thus the marriage contract — is of no consequence.
With regard to the fundamental requirements of the ketubah, the Rambam writes in his Commentary to the Mishnah(Ketubot 9:8) that she is entitled to either 200 or 100 zuz, depending on her status at the time of the wedding.

Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the laws applying to a convert are the same as those applying to a minor. Both opinions are alluded to by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 67:11). (See the Beit Shmuel 67:12, which explains the Rambam’s position: Even if a convert made a commitment of more than 100 zuz to his wife, any sum above 100 zuz is considered to be an addition to the ketubah and is therefore no longer binding when the convert accepts his new status as a Jew.)

I.e., even a woman who was widowed after the wedding, before engaging in relations with her husband. Even though her second husband marries her under the impression that she is a virgin, there is no possibility of issuing such a claim against her.

The obligation to grant a virgin bride a ketubah of 200 zuz is Rabbinic in origin. At the same time that our Sages instituted that obligation, they granted the husband a safeguard: that his word would be accepted with regard to a claim denying the woman’s virginity. In these instances, since the woman was not granted the additional money, the safeguard provided by the Sages also does not apply (Maggid Mishneh).

We suspect that the groom had relations with her and later forgot the matter (Rashi, Ketubot 9b). See also note 30.

As stated in the following halachot, unless there are other factors that support the woman’s position, as will be explained, the husband’s claim is accepted. We assume that the husband would not go to the time and expense of preparing a wedding feast and then mar the celebration by denying his wife’s virginity unless the claim were true (Ketubot 10a).

Unless there are witnesses who can testify that the woman engaged in relations previously, the only question before the court is the amount of the woman’s ketubah. She is permitted to remain married to her husband, because there is no proof that she willingly engaged in intimate relations with another person after she was consecrated. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 18:10.)
An exception to the above is a woman married to a priest. Issuing a claim questioning her virginity places the entire foundation of their marriage in doubt.

I.e., the husband claims that he has entered into a mekach ta’ut, an agreement based on false premises. He had desired to marry a virgin, and he was not prepared to marry a woman who had had relations with another man. Therefore, he desires to have the marriage annulled entirely.

I.e., he is not certain that she had engaged in relations with another man. In all matters of Torah law, whenever one person has a claim that is absolute (bari, in this instance the woman’s claim that her hymen was damaged by factors other than intercourse) and one that is not absolute (shema, the man’s claim), the claim that is absolute is accepted.

Since she was raped against her will, she is not forced to suffer a loss and is entitled to the full amount of the ketubah.

The intent is not that witnesses should observe the couple engaging in relations. This is forbidden, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 16. Instead, the intent is that they should inspect the sheet before and after the couple engage in relations for signs of hymeneal bleeding.

Other authorities (and their opinion is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 68:6) state: ‘‘Maybe you did not enter gently?’’ — i.e., because of the husband’s hurry to complete the intimate act, he did not feel the tightness.
The Rama (loc. cit.) quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that the claim: ‘‘I discovered an open passageway,’’ can be made only by a man who has been married before. If he was not married before, he would not have the experience to know the difference between virginal tightness and a non-virgin’s state.

The Ramban and the Rashba state that the claim that the woman’s vaginal channel was open can be made only in an instance in which the sheet on which the couple had relations was lost. If, however, the sheet is available, it should be inspected. If it has signs of blood, she is considered a virgin; and if not, she is not. This opinion is mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), but does not appear to have been accepted.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 15:2, where the Rambam states that he had available texts of the Talmud that were almost 500 years old. These would have been written approximately 200 years after the time of the Talmud’s composition.

The Rambam’s ruling is substantiated by our text of the Talmud (Ketubot 36b) and the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 68:3). The differing opinion mentioned by the Rambam is that of Rabbenu Chanan’el.

Based on this rationale, the Maggid Mishneh mentions opinions that state that the man’s word is accepted only when he prepared the wedding feast. If he did not, the woman’s word is accepted.

We assume that the couple had relations and he discovered her to be a virgin. The fact that he issued a claim against her afterwards stemmed from discontent for other reasons, without any connection to her personal state.

Although there are authorities (among them Rabbenu Asher) who offer reasons why the husband’s word should be accepted in this instance as well, the prevailing view (and the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 68:8) follows the Rambam’s decision. The rationale is that the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract is a Rabbinic injunction, and the same authority that obligated the husband to meet this requirement rescinded it when he lodged a claim denying her virginity. The additional amount, by contrast, is a present to which the husband voluntarily obligated himself, and that obligation may be nullified only if it is proven that it was made under false premises.

See Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:8, which states that such an oath is administered while the person is holding a Torah scroll. Significantly, the Rambam’s ruling here represents a change of mind from his statements in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 1:3), where he states that in such a situation the woman is required to take merely a sh’vuat hesset, a less severe oath.

I.e., the situation is analogous to a person who holds a promissory note and may be asked to take an oath that it is valid before he can collect it, as explained in Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 14:2-3.

Chapter 10, Halachah 10.