Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

A woman who does not have female physical characteristics and cannot conceive children.

See Chapter 15, Halachah 7.

The Rambam does not explicitly mention that the woman is not entitled to receive her sustenance during her husband’s lifetime. This is taken for granted. Since their marriage is forbidden, our Sages did not bind their relationship by any of the guidelines they instituted to preserve harmony and peace in marriage. Even after his lifetime, she is not entitled to receive her sustenance.

In contrast to the previous and subsequent halachot, the Rambam does not mention divorce in this instance. The Noda B’Yhudah (Even HaEzer, Vol. II, Responsum 80) explains that the Rambam’s wording leads to the following hypothesis: Since the husband was not aware of the woman’s physical condition (if she was an aylonit), or the prohibition forbidding relations (if she was forbidden to him), he entered the marriage under mistaken premises. Hence, the marriage is not binding at all and no divorce is necessary. The couple must, however, be forced to separate.
The Noda B’Yhudah, however, rejects this hypothesis and maintains that the kiddushinare binding in such instances and a divorce is required.

Even though her husband is not obligated to redeem her from captivity — and the right to benefit from the produce is associated with that obligation — he is not required to return the produce. This is a penalty that our Sages imposed upon the woman (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 115:1).

A woman with whom he is forbidden to engage in relations because of Rabbinic decree. (See Chapter 1, Halachah 6.)

For the relationship is undesirable and our Sages wish that it be terminated.

This extra amount is granted by the husband on his own volition because of the satisfaction generated by physical intimacy. It is not a requirement of the Sages (Rashi, Ketubot 101a).

Note the contrast to Halachah 6.

During the husband’s lifetime, however, they are not entitled to support, for the court desires that the relationship be terminated (Maggid Mishneh).

The Rambam’s rationale is that although the husband is not liable for his wife’s support while the couple are living together, this is only because the Sages desired to rend apart the couple’s relationship. In principle, he should be liable, for she is entitled to a ketubah and the conditions of the ketubah. Therefore, in an instance where the couple are separating, and the woman demands payment for her support while her husband was abroad, he should be held liable.

This point is also the subject of a difference of opinion among the Rabbis and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) follows the view of the authorities who differ with the Rambam and do not hold the husband liable.

Our Sages instituted the marriage of a minor for her own benefit. If she does not desire to continue the marriage, it is she who suffers the consequences.

This additional amount was granted to the woman in consideration of the physical pleasure she gives her husband. Since he received that pleasure and knew that the woman had the right to terminate the relationship, he is liable for this amount.

For at the time, he had permission to use her property and benefit from it.

Even if the entire dowry is not intact, the woman takes the part that is intact. The remaining laws apply only to that portion of the dowry that no longer exists or that is unfit for use.

The rationale for this ruling is that, with the exception of the sh’niyot, the women mentioned in this halachah are all entitled to a ketubah. As a result, the same laws that apply to other women with regard to their dowries apply to them as well. With regard to a sh’niyah, even though she is not entitled to a ketubah, our Sages imposed penalties on both her and her husband and required them to suffer a loss (Commentary to the Mishnah, Yevamot 9:3).

Although he accepted responsibility for them, his acceptance was made under false premises. Hence, just as the marriage contract is not binding, so too, his acceptance of responsibility is not binding.

Therefore, he is held responsible for any loss that took place.

The rationale is that the court gave him the right to use this property and according to the conditions they established, he is liable only if he divorces her.

Even if an object was lost because of the husband’s negligence, he is not held liable (Chelkat Mechokek 115:20).

See the following halachah for a definition of this term.

See Halachah 12 for a definition of this term.

See Halachah 15 for a definition of this term.

Numbers 5:18 states that as part of the process of causing a sotah distress, her hair is uncovered. From this, Ketubot 72a derives the concept that a married Jewish woman’s hair should always be covered. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 21:2) prohibits a married woman from walking in the public domain with uncovered hair.
Although this custom was not practiced conscientiously in many European communities even within the religious population, our Torah authorities have always called for its observance. The failure of a woman to cover her hair is considered adequate grounds for divorce.
It must, however, be emphasized that a husband who married a woman who he knew would not cover her hair cannot later divorce her on the grounds that she fails to do so, without making full settlement of his obligations according to the marriage contract.

I.e., prohibitions of Rabbinic origin as well as those explicit in the Torah.

E. g., she wore clothes customarily worn when she was a niddah. In the present age, it is not customary for women to wear special clothes while they are in the niddah state.

The previous halachah spoke of her going out to a public place with her hair totally uncovered. This halachah mentioned the covering of her hair, but not according to the accepted norms of modesty.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Ketubot 7:4), the Rambam mentions wearing a rose or perfume in the same manner as worn by wanton gentile women.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 115:4) states that this applies when she does so frequently, implying that if she did so on one particular occasion, she is not placed in this category. (See Beit Shmuel 115:11.)

The Rama (loc. cit.) follows more stringent opinions that state that even if she curses his father outside her husband’s presence, or if she curses her husband himself to his face, she is placed in this category.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Shabbat 10:4). Rashi (Bava Kama 72b) interprets this term as referring to underwear. Based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Megillah 4:1), which explains that this practice was instituted after a woman was raped by a monkey, it would appear that the intent is a chastity belt.

And he is therefore not required to pay her ketubah.

See Halachah 16.

Why would wet spittle be found on the canopy? Obviously, someone was lying face up on the bed and could not turn to either side. This indicates that the woman had just been involved in sexual relations (Rashi, Yevamot 24b).

Our translation is based on the additions of the Rama (Even HaEzer 11:1).

A woman who acts in this manner is considered to have committed adultery, and there is no need for a warning in such an instance.

As mentioned in Halachah 18, the court does not compel a man to divorce his wife unless two witnesses testify that she willingly committed adultery. Nevertheless, in the situations mentioned above, it is clear that our Sages desired that the woman be divorced. Moreover, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 115:4) states that it is a mitzvah to divorce such a woman.
The Rama adds that even though in most cases we follow the enactment of Rabbenu Gershom, who forbade divorcing a woman against her will, in this instance an exception is made. Even if the woman does not consent to the divorce, her husband may divorce her.

Nor is she entitled to any of the provisions of the ketubah while they remain married, as stated above (Halachah 10). Note, however, the Chelkat Mechokek 115:18, who states that if the couple remain married, and afterwards the woman repents and begins conducting herself modestly, her husband is obligated to write a new ketubah for her.

When a married woman has committed adultery, she is forbidden to engage in sexual relations with her husband in the future. (Similarly, she is forbidden to engage in relations with the adulterer.) Since her husband either saw the matter himself or heard it from a person upon whom he relies, he is bound by this prohibition.

Since he has no binding evidence that she committed adultery that will be accepted by a court, she cannot be forced to forgo her claim for the money he is obligated to pay her.

The Rambam compares this to a situation in which a creditor desires to collect a debt supported by a promissory note, and the debtor states: ‘‘I have paid the note.’’ Although the creditor is allowed to collect the debt, he must take an oath first.

I.e., his claim is not definite.

I.e., if she is obligated to take another oath before collecting the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, her husband may also require her to take the oath concerning adultery.

The husband need not divorce her, and he may continue engaging in marital relations with her without worrying that he is transgressing the prohibition mentioned in the previous halachah.

In cases of monetary law, we follow the principle that the statements of the principal himself are equal to those of 100 witnesses. Since she admitted committing adultery, she must suffer the financial consequences.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 11:12), the Rambam explains that when the husband says, ‘‘I do not believe her,’’ he is still permitted to engage in relations with her. We do not, however, say: ‘‘If you believe her, pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah,’’ for we divide his statements (palg’nin dibburo), and apply them in one context, but not in another. This explanation has, however, aroused questions in certain commentaries.

E. g., two couples were married at the same time and the women unwittingly went into the wrong marriage chambers, and each thought that she was with her own spouse (Yevamot 33b).

Ketubot 51b relates that in Babylonia there was a time when robber bands would frequently abduct women from their homes.

Chapter 17, Halachot 1 and 7; Chapter 18, Halachah 1. This prohibition is a result of the extra dimension of sanctity conveyed upon a priest and is not a reflection of the woman’s lack of virtue.

With regard to the priest’s prohibition against relations with these women, Leviticus 21:8 states: ‘‘And you shall make him holy.’’ Yevamot 88b implies that the intent is that he should be forced to make himself holy, even if that involves compelling him against his will.

See the explanation in Halachah 18. The reason this woman is entitled to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is that she did not commit adultery willingly.

Hilchot Sotah 1:2 explains this as the amount of time it takes to roast an egg and swallowit. In quantitative terms, the more stringent of the contemporary authorities have estimated this as 35 seconds.

This phrase is borrowed from Numbers 5:18. Hilchot Sotah 3:10 explains that the term is used because a bitter-flavored substance was added to the water.

Chapter 1, Halachah 2. Although there is no evidence that the woman actually committed adultery, since she was warned by her husband and violated his warning, the burden of proof is upon her. It is only through drinking the waters given a sotah that she can vindicate herself.

The Rambam is explaining why the woman is forced to forfeit her ketubah, although there is no conclusive proof of adultery. She knew about the prohibition against entering into privacy with the said individual and violated it willingly. Hence, she is required to suffer the consequences.

The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam mentions ‘‘the present age.’’ Seemingly, in the time of the Temple as well, a similar problem would arise — if the warning was not given in the presence of witnesses, the waters given a sotah could not be used to test the woman’s faithfulness.

See Halachah 17 and notes.