Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

With the inclusion of this phrase, the Rambam emphasizes that we do not assume that the man freed his Canaanite slave so that he could marry her and have relations with her in a permitted manner. In certain contexts, we follow the principle that a person does not enter into licentious sexual relations when he could have carried out the same relations in a permitted fashion. There are some commentaries (e.g., the Ra’avad and Rabbenu Asher) who apply this principle in the context at hand. The Rambam, however, does not accept this view. He states his position forthrightly in Hilchot Gerushin 10:19:
All these matters are far from the [proper] approach to Torah law, and it is improper to rely upon them. Our Sages accepted this presumption only in a situation where a person divorced his wife, [and then entered into relations with her], or when a person consecrated a woman with a stipulation and then engaged in relations without mentioning that stipulation. For in these instances, the woman is his wife. And with regard to a person’s wife, we assume that he will not carry out licentious relations. With regard to other women by contrast, [relations with] any promiscuous woman are considered licentious unless the person explicitly states that he is carrying out the relations for the sake of consecration.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:69) mentions both opinions and also a compromise opinion that considers the maid-servant’s offspring a free man, but does not allow him to marry a Jewish woman until he undergoes a formal conversion. All three of these views are cited without a binding ruling being made.

For a Canaanite maid-servant’s offspring has the same ritual status as she does, as implied by Exodus 21:4: “The woman and her offspring will belong to her master.”

Hence if the master dies, leaving his wife childless, she is obligated to perform the ritual of either yibbum or chalitzah. See Hilchot Yibbum 1:4.

This is the version found in the authoritative manuscript and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The version in the standard printed text is slightly different and appears to be the result of a typesetting error.
As explained in Halachah 5, the definition of a Jew’s ownership of a slave is different from a gentile’s ownership of him. Nevertheless, when a gentile sells a slave to a Jew, the Jew establishes ownership of him according to the definition appropriate for a Jew.

I.e., when a Canaanite maid-servant gives birth, her offspring are considered slaves.
It must be emphasized that the Ra’avad and Rashi (in his commentary on Yevamot 78b) differ and rule directly opposite to the decisions of the Rambam in this instance, maintaining that the nationality of the father determines the status of the offspring. According to the Rambam, it can be explained that although that principle applies with regard to gentiles, a Canaanite maid-servant is no longer considered in that category.

And therefore, the offspring are not given his status.

For as the Rambam rules (Hilchot Gezelah 5:11-15): “The laws of a kingdom are binding.”

Note the contrast to the ruling that applies to a Jew, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 8, and in Hilchot Gezelah 5:16.

As stated in Halachah 2.
Although he offers explanations for the Rambam’s ruling in his Kessef Mishneh, in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:17) Rav Yosef Karo follows the perspective of Tosafot (Yevamot 46a), who rule that the Jew does not acquire any greater rights than the gentile seller possessed.

For below the age of nine, a boy is incapable of engaging in sexual relations.
The commentaries note that a slave who is purchased as a child will ultimately mature and be capable of engaging in relations. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo explains that since the prohibition was instituted only because of a suspicion, we do not extend it this far. Nevertheless, in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:19). he follows the ruling of the Tur, who forbids a woman from purchasing all slaves, even those below the age of nine.

The Kessef Mishneh and others question the inclusion of this term, ‘for seemingly this clause is not connected to the previous one.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 235) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 347) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 17.

See Chapter 6, Halachot 6-7.

The commentaries have questioned: How can a mitzvah of Rabbinic origin supersede the Torah commandment to have one’s slaves work forever? In resolution, the Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Nissim, who explains that the commandment to work with slaves forever stems from the same principle that forbids giving a gentile a present for nothing (see Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, Chapter 10) - i.e., he should not be granted his freedom as a present for him. When, however, his freedom is being granted to fulfill a mitzvah, even if the mitzvah is only Rabbinic in origin, he is not being granted anything as a personal favor. Instead, his freedom is serving a Torah purpose.
As an alternate explanation, the Kessef Mishneh quotes Berachot 47b, which explains that a special dispensation was given in this instance, because communal prayer is a very important mitzvah.

And communal prayer is only a Rabbinic requirement.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:79) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Siftei Cohen 279:100 states that from the wording of the Tur, it appears that only when a woman is half free and half maid-servant is her master compelled to free her (see Chapter 7, Halachah 7), but when the maid-servant is fully owned, the option is totally in the owner’s hands.

But not his Hebrew servant.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:20) quotes the ruling of the Rambam. The Ramah quotes the opinion of the Tur, who rules that this applies only in ordinary years. In a time of drought, however, this does not apply. For we fear that others would not give the slave a sufficient quantity of alms. Even in such a situation, however, the master can tell the slave: “Go work and sustain yourself.”

See Hilchot Nachalot 10:8.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut 16:1, nichsei m’log refers to property belonging to a woman that she brings to the household, for which her husband does not accept responsibility. Instead, it remains in the woman’s possession. The husband may not intentionally do anything to diminish the value of these possessions. As the Rambam proceeds to explain, by not feeding the slaves he will certainly cause them to flee or die, thus diminishing the value of his wife's property.

From the Rambam’s wording, one may conclude that if the slaves were classified as nichsei tzon barzel – i.e., at the time of the marriage, the husband agreed to pay a fixed amount for them, regardless of their worth at the time payment is required – he may choose not to sustain them.

Although this is forbidden with regard to a Jewish servant. See Chapter 1, Halachah 6.

The Rambam mentions both piety and wisdom although in Hilchot De’ot, ch. 1, he distinguishes them as two different character traits. Wisdom reflects an appreciation of the importance of doing what is correct and proper, while piety implies a willingness to go beyond the measure of what is correct. It is possible to explain that the Rambam is implying that once a person makes a commitment based on piety, this will influence the nature of his understanding and give him the insight to appreciate how this conduct is also appropriate according to wisdom (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XXXVII, p. 72ff.).

The commentaries note that the obligation to provide food for one’s animals before one partakes of one’s own meal is specifically mentioned in the Talmud (Berachot 40a, Gittin 62a), but those sources do not mention servants. Also, the prooftext cited by the Talmud differs. These two distinctions are dependent on each other. The Rambam cites a different prooftext because here his focus is on servants not on animals (Likkutei Sichot, loc. cit).
It must be noted that the researchers have found no explicit Talmudic or Midrashic source stating that one should feed one’s servants before one’s own self. As examples of kind conduct to servants, one can point to the Jerusalem Talmud’s description of the conduct of Rabbi Yochanan (Bava Kama 8:4), and the Babylonian Talmud’s description (Ketubot 61a) of the conduct of Avuha bar Ihi and Minimin bar Ihi.

Implied is that we should treat our slaves with mercy and kindness as we expect God to treat us.

In the curse of Canaan (Genesis 9:25).

The uncensored texts of the Mishneh Torah state “among the uncircumcised gentiles.”

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 19:17 and Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 10:2 which explain that such traits are characteristic of the Jewish people and when a person fails to manifest them, there is a question regarding his lineage.
It must, however, be noted that these sources do not mention the fact that God granted us “the goodness of the Torah” or our obligation to emulate God’s qualities. It is possible to explain that a person’s natural tendency to mercy has limitations. Certainly, a merciful person will not be cruel to his servants or animals. Nevertheless, these natural feelings will not necessarily motivate him to be generous to the extent that he would see to their needs before his own. Such a commitment will result only from “the goodness of the Torah” and the emulation of God’s qualities (Likkutei Sichot, loc. cit.).

See Hilchot De’ot 1:6 which explains that man must endeavor to shape his character by emulating the attributes which God manifests.