Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

By mentioning “[animals] consecrated for the altar,” the Rambam deviated from his source, Me’ilah 12a which mentioned merely “consecrated animals that died.” It would appear that the implication is that animals consecrated for the improvement of the Temple may be redeemed after their death. This conclusion, however, runs contrary to the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Arachin 5:12, there he writes:
Whenever a person consecrates an animal in its lifetime - whether a kosher animal or a non-kosher one, whether it was consecrated for the sake of the Temple treasury, it was consecrated to be offered on the altar and it became blemished, or it is an unblemished animal which is fit to be offered as a sacrifice as will be explained, it must be brought to stand [before the court] for evaluation, as implied by the phrase: “You shall have the animal stand [before the priest....]” Therefore, if the animal died before it is evaluated and redeemed, it should not be redeemed. Instead, it should be buried.
The implication is that there is no difference between an animal consecrated for the improvement of the Temple or one consecrated as an offering, if the animal is disqualified, the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply to them. The rationale is as follows. They are not fit for any purpose, because they may not be redeemed, since an animal can be redeemed only if is brought to “stand before the priest” and this is impossible when the animal has died (Temura 32b). Alternatively, there is a general principle that consecrated animals should not be redeemed in order to be fed to the dogs and in this instance, that would be the only reason for redeeming such an animal, since it is forbidden to a Jew (Pesachim 29a).
On the basis of the Kessef Mishneh’s gloss to Hilchot Arachin, it is possible to say that here the Rambam is excluding animals that were physically blemished before they were consecrated, for in such an instance, there is no need to have them stand before a priest to be evaluated. Alternatively, as the Kessef Mishneh states here, the Rambam’s words were not intended to serve as an exclusion. He mentions animals consecrated for the altar, for that is his present subject of discussion.

This follows the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan (Me’ilah Sa). Although there is another view, that of Chizkiyah who understands that the matter depends on whether or not it was fit to cast the blood on the altar, since the Talmud brings support for Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion, it is accepted by the Rambam (Kessef Mishneh).

Excluding burnt-offerings which are not intended to be eaten.

Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

Instead of in the northern portion, as required by Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 5:2. The blood of these types of sacrifices must also be received in that portion of the Temple Courtyard (ibid.).

According to law, the sacrifices must be slaughtered during the day and the blood presented on the altar at that time.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim, ch. 13 and onward.

Either of these acts would disqualify the sacrifice and prevent its blood from being cast on the altar.

Which would disqualify them.

These acts would also disqualify the meat.

In Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 6:3, the Rambam defines this term as “blood that flows out [from the animal] when it is slaughtered, killed, or decapitated, as long as it is tinted red.” See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 5:1).

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 1:28.

In cases when the majority of the priests are impure, in which instance the communal sacrifices are offered by impure priests (Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 4:9). The Rambam mentions communal service, because individual offerings are never offered in a state of ritual impurity.

Chapter 2, Halachah 1.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 13:1.

The Kessef Mishneh and Rav YosefCorcus note that Me’ilah 3b appears to reject this teaching. Nevertheless, from a careful reading of the text, that conclusion need not be accepted.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1.

See ibid., ch. 4, which mentions several instances where this ruling is given.

See ibid. 4:3.

I.e., by two separate priests (Rashi, Me’ilah 7b).

For there was no time when the blood of the second animal could be cast on the altar. Hence, the prohibition of me'ilah always applies to it.

This refers to the place on the altar where the blood should be presented. The blood of burnt-offerings of fowl should be presented on the upper half of the altar and the blood of the sin-offerings must be presented on the lower half. If one did the opposite, the sacrifice is disqualified. See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 6:20; 7:6.

And they are required to bring another burnt-offering (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 15:1).

Since portions of a sin-offering may be eaten, the prohibition against me'ilah does not apply to it as stated above. Accordingly, that prohibition does not apply to a fowl offered in this manner even though it was originally consecrated as a burnt-offering.

Either of these actions would disqualify the meal-offering.

For offering the handful of meal on the altar causes the remainder of the offering to be permitted to be eaten, like casting the blood of a sacrifice causes its meat to be permitted (see the gloss of Rav Yosef Corcus).

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 11:19.

Rav Yosef Corcus explained that this ruling applies only when a portion of the rema inder was taken out of the Temple Courtyard. If, however, the entire remainder was taken out of the Temple Courtyard, the prohibition against me’ilah applies. This parallels the law stated in Halachah 1 with regard to sacrificial meat, that if a portion of the meat was taken out of the Courtyard, the prohibition against me’ilah does not apply, but if all the meat was taken out, it does apply. For, as reflected in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 1:30, 11:20, the laws applying to the remainder of a meal-offering parallel those applying to the meat of animal sacrifices.
The Kessef Mishneh raises a question, noting that the Rambam’s ruling here appears to contradict his ruling in Chapter 2, Halachah 7, where he states that there is an unresolved doubt whether they were disqualified. Har Hamoriah explains that it is possible that there the Rambam is referring to meal-offerings disqualified for a different reason, e.g., they became worm-infested.

All of these entities are offered on the altar’s pyre and the prohibition against me’ilah applies to them.

More precisely, the benefit he received and the additional fifth he is obligated to pay due to the violation of the prohibition against me’ilah (Rashi, Meilah 9b).

The Rambam appears to be stating that the money should be used to purchase communal burnt-offerings that are offered when the altar is free. See the explanation of the term kayitz lemizbeiach in Hilchot Shekalim 4:9. This follows the interpretation of Tosafot, Me’ilah, loc. cit. Rashi offers a different interpretation.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets this as referring to the Temple treasury, where the funds will be used for the maintenance of the Temple. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 4.
The Kessef Mishneh also notes that the Rambam’s ruling is the direct opposite of the popularly accepted text of the conclusion of the Tosefta, tractate Me’ilah. He suggests that perhaps the Rarnbam had a different version of that text.

Rashi, Me’ilah 10a. states that certainly this applies after the casting of the blood.

Me’ilah, loc. cit., explains that in this instance, he is exempt because he does not cause any loss to the altar, for the entities are unfit for offering on the altar’s pyre, nor may they be eaten by an ordinary individual. Even though they must be burnt by the priests, this burning is not an element of the Temple service. If they became impure after the casting of the blood, there would have been a time when the meat of the sacrifice would have been permitted to be eaten and from that time onward, the prohibition against me’ilah would not apply. Since the sacrifices have become impure, they are no longer called “entities consecrated unto God” and the prohibition against me’ilah no longer applies.

This addition was made so that the Rambam’s ruling here does not contradict his ruling in Chapter 2, Halachah 1, where it states that the prohibition against me’ilah applies until after the ash of a sacrifice was taken out to the ashheap. Here, however, that rule does not apply, because there is no fundamental obligation to bum these fats and organs (Rambam LeAm).

In which instance, the ruling is that since they have become “the food of the altar,” they should not be brought down from the altar (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 3:12).

Because the mitzvah involved in offering them is complete. Even though the priests are still required to tum them over on the altar so that they are consumed completely, that is not an integral part of the offering (Me’ilah, loc. cit.).

The prohibition against me’ilah does not apply because the milk and the eggs are not fit to be offered on the altar. Note the contrast to the following halachah.

I.e., because the mother’s milk is consecrated and cannot be used for ordinary purposes.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 3:7), the Rambam adds another point. It is forbidden to benefit from this animal’s milk, just as it is forbidden to shear it or work with it. Rambam LeAm explains that this point is significant, because, based on this logic, even an animal born after its mother was consecrated is forbidden to nurse from it.

The Ra’avad explains that he should not consecrate the milk - because then, even the consecrated animals would not be permitted to nurse from it but rather should state that it is set aside for them. The Kessef Mishneh explains that perhaps this was also the Rambam’s intent. Alternatively, he explains that since the person specified the purpose for the consecration of the milk while consecrating it, the young animals are permitted to benefit from it.

Because anything produced by a consecrated entity is itself consecrated. See Chapter 5, Halachot 6 and 13.