Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

The Rambam’s decision is based on the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, Sanhedrin 79a. Rabbi Shimon cites Deuteronomy 19:11, which states: “When a man hates his colleague, lies in wait for him, rises against him and strikes him fatally....” The phrase “lies in wait for him” is seemingly unnecessary. Hence, Rabbi Shimon interprets it as teaching that the murderer must intend to kill his victim. That fact that he intended to kill another person is not sufficient to have him executed as a murderer.
Rabbi Shimon’s view is contested by the Sages. Nevertheless, the Rambam follows his ruling, because it appears to be accepted by the later Sages, as reflected in the continuation of the Talmud’s discussion (Sanhedrin 79b). The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s decision and favors the opinion of the Sages, for generally when the opinion of one Sage is contested by others, the majority view is followed.

I.e., he does not have to pay damages to the victim’s heirs.

He may, however, be killed by the blood redeemer, and is, of course, subject to Divine retribution.

Chapter 6, Halachah 4.

Since his intent was not to deliver a fatal blow, he is not held liable.

The killer is not liable for execution, as explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 1.

Even in the first instance, he is considered to have killed intentionally. For although he did not intend to kill the victim, he did intend to strike him.

As explained by Makkot 7b, Deuteronomy 19:4 speaks of a person striking a colleague “without knowing.” This excludes a person who kills intentionally.

For the killer intended to kill the victim, and the blow was sufficient to bring about that intent. The fact that he did not intend to strike him on that limb is not significant.

Exodus 21:18-19 states: “If men strive together and one strikes his colleague with a stone or a fist, and [the victim] does not die, but falls into infirmity; if he gets up and walks around outside on his own power, the one who struck him is absolved. He shall pay only for his unemployment and provide for medical attention.”
This halachah explains that immediately after the blow is given, an assessment is made whether or not we are dealing with a capital case. Depending on that assessment, either of the courses of action suggested by the Rambam is followed.

The damages for loss of limb, pain, embarrassment, unemployment compensation and medical attention. See Hilchot Chovel UMazik, Chapter 1, where these concepts are explained.

We do not say that the judges who made the original assessment erred, and that the person in fact died because of the blow he received. Instead, we assume that their assessment was correct and attribute the victim’s death to other factors.

Although the Torah does not include imprisonment as one of its punishments, there is no alternative in this instance. If the one who struck the blow is not imprisoned, he will certainly flee to avoid trial.

The fact that the victim survived for a time after receiving the murder blow does not mitigate the punishment to be given to the killer.

As stated in the quote from Exodus mentioned above.

Although the Hebrew word משענת means “support” and sometimes is interpreted as meaning “staff,” that is not the intent in this verse, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

But did not improve to the extent that he could walk on his strength in the market place.

On which basis the killer could be absolved.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that there is a difference of opinion among the Sages concerning this matter in Sanhedrin 79a. The Rambam chooses to follow the majority opinion - that of the Sages - and not the minority view, that of Rabbi Nechemiah.
There is a slight difficulty, because in the standard published text of that passage, the phrase “there is a basis for [the assumption]” - which the Rambam uses to explain the position of the Sages - is attributed to Rabbi Nechemiah.
The commentaries note, however, that in the statement of the passage in the Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 9:3) and in the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, this phrase is attributed to the Sages.

This law applies regardless of whether or not the blows given by each of the attackers are sufficient to kill in their own right.

According to this interpretation, the meaning of the verse would be rendered: “When one strikes the entire soul of a person, he should die.”

Sanhedrin 80a states that this ruling applies when there are only two people in a group, and one of them is a sage esteemed for his refined character. Nevertheless, if an arrow emerges from between them and kills, we do not charge the other person with murder. For a person is never charged with murder on a mere assumption, regardless of how strong the basis for that assumption is.
Kin’at Eliyahu notes that the two laws in this clause are not motivated by the same rationale. The first law stems from the principle developed in the first clause: that a killer must be entirely responsible for the person’s death to be charged with murder. The second law communicates a different principle: that if we cannot pinpoint the identity of the murderer, we do not charge all those under suspicion.

For he alone delivered a blow sufficient to cause the victim’s death.

I.e., the murderer cannot be recognized amid the group.

For the innocent people are not forced to suffer because of the murderer’s deeds.

Even if the entire group of murderers is brought to court together, it is still considered as if the suspected murderer is being tried in absentia. For as long as his identity is not known, testimony is not considered to have been given in his presence.

For they are all murderers and are potentially harmful to society. They are not, however, forced to enter a kipah. (See the following halachah.) Since one of them has not been convicted, the court does not ordain their death.

Since the two did not see the entire murder together, their testimony is not acceptable, as explained in Hilchot Edut 4:1.

And without a warning, punishment cannot be imposed upon a person by the court (Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 12).

We have translated this clause somewhat loosely. Bedikot, translated as “the fine points of the testimony,” refer to questions that a judge may ask a witness to verify secondary matters in his account of a crime - e.g., what type of clothes was the killer wearing, what color were they? Once a judge even asked: What color were the figs of the tree under which a murder was committed? Did the figs have long stems or shorter ones? (Hilchot Edut 1:6).
Chakirot, translated as “the fundamental questions,” refer to the questions asked to determine what crime took place, when it took place, and where it took place (Ibid.:5).
If the witnesses contradict each other with regard to either the chakirot or the bedikot, their testimony is not accepted (Ibid. 2:1-2). Nevertheless, in the present halachah, the Rambam is saying that if the testimony of the witnesses is disqualified only because of minor bedikot, and the judges are certain that the defendant in fact committed the murder, they may not execute him formally, but they may put him to death using a kipah, as will be explained.

A small arch-shaped room the size of a person’s body (Sanhedrin 81b). See also Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:4.

As explained in the following halachah, this punishment is meted out because of the seriousness of the crime of murder. Since it has been established that the defendant did commit a murder, this measure is taken.

As reflected by the fact that they are punishable by execution by stoning or being bumed to death, which are considered more severe forms of execution than beheading (the punishment given for murder).

A metaphor for Gehinnom, Hell (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:4).

As I Kings, Chapter 21, relates, Navot possessed a vineyard that Ach’av coveted. When Navot refused to sell it to him, Ach’av - through the intervention of his wife Izevel - framed him for blasphemy and had him executed. After this murder, Elijah the prophet came to Ach’av and foretold his death.

Sanhedrin 102b.

In the previous halachah, the Rambam explained the severity of the sin of murder. In this halachah, he explains that notwithstanding all that was said, because of the desire to preserve the spiritual wellbeing of our society, it is desirable to kill certain individuals. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:1, which states that these individuals should be destroyed, because “they cause difficulty to the Jewish people and sway the people away from God.”

For the sake of clarity, we have restructured the wording of this halachah from that in the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah. Also, the definitions of the terms minim and apikorsim are taken from the authoritative manuscripts and early printings; they reverse the order and differ slightly from those of the standard text.

The Aruch explains the derivation of the word min as follows. The early Christians described themselves as ma’aminim. As a term of derision, our Sages shortened the name to minim, meaning “types,” and used it to refer to many types of deviant beliefs.
In Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7, the Rambam describes a min as a person who does not believe in God, or whose belief in Him differs fundamentally from the Jewish conception. See also Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:5.

I.e., this does not refer to a person who transgresses because he cannot overcome his desires, but rather to one who violates a prohibition with a deliberate desire to flaunt God’s commands.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10:1), the Rambam defines apikoros as “An Aramaic term implying the lack of appreciation of authority, the scorning of the Torah or its students.” Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro (Avot 2:14) continues that line of thinking by explaining that the term apikoros is derived from the Hebrew hefker, meaning “ownerless” - i.e., one who rejects authority. The Aruch associates the term apikoros with a Greek philosopher of a similar, phonetically coincident name Epicurus, who did not believe in the eternity of the soul.
In Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7, the Rambam describes an apikoros as one who denies prophecy or who disputes the prophecy of Moses - i.e., it refers to a person who contests, not the existence of God, but His communication with mankind.

As evident from the following halachah, these shepherds would continually pasture their flocks in fields belonging to others, thus violating the prohibition against robbery.

Nor, needless to say, may we kill them outright.

See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:2, which states that it is even forbidden to administer medical treatment to a gentile idolater. Nevertheless, if one fears that refusing to do so will endanger one’s safety or will create dangerous animosity between Jews and gentiles, one rnay administer medical treatment, provided one charges for one’s services.

As stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 11, this verse is a commandment, enjoining us to save a colleague’s life.

The Rambam mentions that these shepherds repeatedly violate the prohibition, and their conduct would be excused if they transgressed merely occasionally, since they are doing so for financial gain, as the Rambam continues to explain. Nevertheless, the fact that they continually violate these prohibitions indicates that they have no respect for the property rights of others. This lack of awareness of the basis for human relations is sufficient to warrant the severe measures suggested by the Rambam.

I.e., they are included in the scope of the commandment (Chapter 2, Halachah 11) that enjoins us to save a colleague’s life.