Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

The Temple treasury is considered the owner of all consecrated property. It is not a human being who can be referred to as “his colleague.”
The Ra’avad mentions that the Rambam’s wording is not exact. A person who steals consecrated property is considered to have misused that property (מעל). He is required to increase the value of the principal by one fifth (i.e., he adds a quarter of the principal, so the amount he adds is one fifth of the new total) and bring a guilt offering as atonement.

The principal must also be returned to a gentile, but the special consideration of receiving double payment is granted the Jewish people alone (see Chapter 3, Halachah 13).

Although a portion of the meat of sacrifices of lesser sanctity is eaten by its owner, the sacrifice is not considered his personal property. Note the Or Sameach, who states that this ruling appears to contradict the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:2.
The Or Sameach explains that there is reason to consider the consecrated animal as the person’s private property, because he is allowed to partake of a portion of its meat. Simultaneously, since he has consecrated it, it is no longer legally his. In the instance at hand, the double payment is a departure from the norm. Hence, the thief is not held liable. With regard to the damages the animal caused, by contrast, the fact that payment is not taken from the animal is a departure from the norm, and therefore the person whose property was damaged is allowed to collect his due after the animal is sacrificed.

When the owner is liable to replace the offering with another one, one might think that the animal is considered to be his private property.

Even when the consecrated animals have not been brought to the Temple, they are considered to belong to the Temple treasury.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 6, which states that a person who steals a servant is not liable for kidnapping.

I.e., all examples of movable property.

The only other references to inheritance in the Torah apply to landed property. The equation between servants and landed property does not refer only to this particular law, but instead encompasses all aspects of Jewish business law.

I.e., a promissory note is a record of a commitment. The note itself is not worth anything. Therefore, it is also excluded by the examples given in the above verse.

Exodus 13:13 states that “every firstling donkey must be redeemed with a sheep. If you do not redeem it, you must decapitate it.”

For as yet, it has not been redeemed.

Produce from which terumah and the tithes have not been separated.

Double restitution, as the Ra’avad notes.

Although tevel (and fats) are forbidden to be eaten and indeed, eating them is punishable by death by God’s hand, they are still the private property of their owner. Hence, one is liable to make restitution for them.

Once the terumah is separated, it is considered to be sacred and is not the private property of the person who separated it.

Thus, he actually pays less than four or five times the price of the animal, for he himself is also granted a share in his father’s estate.

Bava Kama 71b explains this law as follows: At the time of the animal’s sale or slaughter, the thief owned a portion of the animal itself. Therefore, he is not liable to pay four or five times the full worth of the animal. When the Torah said that a thief must pay four or five times the animal’s worth, it meant that he must pay four and five times its entire worth. If that is not required, this penalty is not imposed upon him. He must, however, pay double, for the original theft was forbidden.

This is not a continuation of the above concepts. These rules apply even when one steals from a person other than one’s father.

The consecration is effective and the animal becomes the property of the Temple treasury. Therefore, there is no obligation to pay four or five times its amount, as stated in Halachah 1. The thief must, however, pay double to the owner, because the animal was not consecrated when it was stolen. And he must pay the principal and an addition fifth to the Temple treasury for me’ilah as stated in Halachah 1.
The Ra’avad states that this applies only when one consecrates an animal as an offering, but not when one consecrates it to the Temple treasury. The Maggid Mishneh differs and explains that the Rambam’s ruling applies to all forms of consecration.

Consecrating the animal is equivalent to effecting a business transaction. The Temple treasury thus acquires the animal because its owner has despaired of its return, and the animal has been transferred from one domain to another.

For the animal continues to belong to the owners.

And not four or fives times its worth. The Torah requires such payment only when the animal is “slaughtered,” and killing it in this manner is not considered “slaughtering.”

Although in all these cases, the person either does not desire to eat from the meat or is forbidden to do so, he is considered to have slaughtered the animal and therefore is liable for the higher penalty.

Note the Kessef Mishneh, Hilchot Shechitah 2:3, who explains that according to Scriptural law, it is forbidden to eat the meat of a non-consecrated animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. It is the prohibition against deriving any benefit that is Rabbinic in origin.

For a Rabbinic prohibition cannot supersede an obligation of Scriptural law.

Bava Kama 77b derives this from the exegesis of a Biblical verse.

Although such an animal is taref and cannot be eaten, ritual slaughter prevents it from imparting the ritual impurity associated with a dead animal.

One might think that since he did not slaughter or sell a whole animal, he would not be held liable (Rashi, Bava Kama 78b).

This indicates that giving a present is considered equivalent to making a sale.

In general, we follow the principle that “One cannot charge an agent with performing a sin,” and whenever a person commits a misdeed, he himself is liable for the consequences. In this instance, an exception is made, and the person who sells or slaughters the animal is considered to be an agent of the thief, causing the thief to be liable for the more severe penalty.
The Mishneh Lamelech (gloss on Chapter 3, Halachah 6) notes that in Hilchot Me’ilah 7:2, the Rambam states that only with regard to the prohibition of me’ilah, making personal use of a consecrated article, is a principal liable for an agent’s actions.
The Or Sameach resolves this difficulty by stating that in selling and slaughtering a stolen animal - and similarly with regard to misappropriating an article for a watchman - the agent is acting on behalf of the principal and not for his own benefit. With regard to me’ilah, by contrast, the agent is himself benefiting from partaking of the consecrated object; he is not acting for the sake of the principal. Nevertheless, he is considered the agent of the principal, and the principal is held liable because of his actions. There is no other like instance in the Torah. (See also the Noda Biy’hudah, Even HaEzer, Responsum 75.)

Without receiving the money for the sale.

Although these are not ordinary types of sales, the animal is still considered to have been sold.

For the animal was returned before the sale became effective. If the thief was apprehended after 30 days had passed, there are opinions which maintain that he is not liable for the more severe payment, but most authorities differ.

On one hand, one might think that the thief would be required to make the extra payment, because he sold the animal. Nevertheless, since he retained ownership of a certain portion, the sale is not complete and there is reason to suppose that he should not be required to pay the extra amount.

Bava Kama 78b leaves unresolved the question whether in these instances the sale is considered completed, or whether the thief is still considered to have a share in the animal.

Since he has a share in the animal, the sale is not entirely forbidden.

As mentioned above with regard to the sale and slaughter of a stolen animal, a person can act as an agent for a colleague. In this instance, the person who sold or slaughtered the animal is liable for his share, and since his partner consented to his actions, he is considered to be his agent, causing him to be liable for the second share.

The thief who did not consent is not liable, because he had no part in the sale or the slaughter. The thief who did sell or slaughter the animal is not liable, because the entire responsibility for the stolen animal is not his.

“Go and pay him” is a clear cut ruling, obligating the thief to pay. If he ignores this ruling and does not pay, he is considered a robber (gazlan), and a robber is not liable to pay four and five times an animal’s worth (Bava Kama 68b).

Since the ruling was not issued in a definitive manner (see Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 7:6), the original theft is not concluded, and therefore he is liable for the additional payment.

Needless to say, he must return the stolen article itself if it is intact.
As the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 7:6), this teaching shows that a thief must perform a formal act of acquisition (kinyan) before he becomes liable for the stolen property.

He need not even pay for the lamb that died (Rashi, Bava Kama 79a).

Lifting the animal above the ground constitutes the kinyan of hagbahah. This is an effective means of transfer even if performed in the owner’s domain. Drawing it out of the owner’s domain constitutes the kinyan of meshichah. This formal transfer causes the thief to become liable for the stolen article.

In lieu of the five silver pieces required by Exodus 13:13 and Numbers 18:16.

Here too, since the animal was not formally acquired by the recipient, he is not liable.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam is speaking about an instance in which the recipient knew that the thief had stolen the animal. Although generally a person who receives stolen property from the thief is not liable for the double payment (see Chapter 1, Halachah 17), since the original thief did not ever formally acquire the stolen article, it is the recipient who is actually considered the thief.
The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam and offers a different interpretation of the source of this halachah, Bava Kama, loc. cit. (significantly, one that fits the Rambam’s own interpretation in his Commentary on the Mishnah).

For prodding it to move is considered an act of meshichah.

He is liable for the additional payments although he never took the stolen animal into his own domain.

Once the thief removes the animal from the owner’s domain, it makes no difference where he slaughters it.