Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day
Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter 11
Hilchot Nizkei Mamon - Chapter 11
The antecedent of the pronoun “his” is a matter of debate among our Sages (Bava Kama 40a), who debated whether it refers to the soul of the owner or that of the person who was killed. According to the Rambam, there are dimensions of both opinions that are relevant. As evident from the previous chapter, by paying the atonement fine the owner of the ox is “ransoming” his own soul. On the other hand, as the Rambam states in this halachah and in Chapter 10, Halachah 4, the atonement fine is for “the person killed,” and the amount is determined according to the worth of the person who was killed.
See Exodus 21:32. A sela is equivalent to four dinarim (zuzim).
I.e., pure silver.
10,000 zuz.
E. g., a servant who has been declared ownerless by his master, or one whom his master caused to lose one of the limbs that require his release.
A woman’s property is inherited by her husband. He, however, is entitled only to the property that she possesses at the time of her death, but not property that will accrue to her afterwards. For this reason, he is not entitled to the atonement fine. Needless to say, if the woman has already borne children, the atonement fine is given to them.
E. g., a servant was owned by two partners, and one of them freed him while the other did not.
Note the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh, who states that this law applies only to a maid-servant, but not to a male servant. The Radbaz (Volume VI, Responsum 2249), however, justifies the Rambam’s view.
For the half-servant is dead, and he or she has· no heirs. Even if he or she bore children as a servant, they are not considered as the half-servant’s sons or daughters.
Exodus 21:22 speaks about men fighting together, and one of them causing a woman to miscarry.
As mentioned at the conclusion of the previous chapter, servants are considered in certain contexts to be no more than their master’s chattel.
Our Sages note that there are two elements lost with the miscarriage: a) the fetus, which would otherwise become the owner’s property, and b) the fact that while pregnant, a woman looks larger and healthier (Bava Kama 49a).
I.e., if the ox was mu’ad, the owner must pay the entire difference. If it is tam, he must pay half the difference.
See Halachah 1. No extra renumeration is made in consideration of the miscarriage.
Chapter 10, Halachah 9.
Our Sages explain that one might think that although the owner is liable if his ox damages another ox in this manner, he would not be liable for injuring a man. The rationale is that an animal does not have a spiritual source protecting it, while a person does. If injury occurs despite that spiritual protection, one might think that it is willed by God, and therefore the owner of the ox is not liable. (See Bava Kama 2b.)
See Chapter 7, Halachah 3.
To a man or to another animal.
For the payment for the damages caused by an ox that is tam must come from the body of the ox itself. In this instance, since the ox must be stoned to death, we are forbidden to benefit from its carcass. Thus, there is no source from which this obligation can be met.
They must pay from·resources other than the body of the ox.
I.e., the ox is hired out by the court to work for different people. When enough money accrues to pay for the damages, it is executed.
The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s position as follows. It is clear to the Rambam that once an animal is sentenced to be executed, it is no longer considered the property of its owner, and the owner is not considered responsible for the damages, even if the damages took place before the death sentence was delivered. (It appears that the Rambam considers that the obligation for the damages takes place only after the matter is taken to court.) For this reason, the Rambam maintains that the ox itself should be made to work for the damages.
For this reason, the ox will not be executed immediately after being sentenced. Although it is not proper to delay the execution of a human, there is no such principle with regard to the execution of an ox. There are other authorities who differ with several elements of the Maggid Mishneh‘s interpretation.
I.e., the ox. Rashi interprets Bava Kama 91a, the source of this halachah, as referring to the flight of the owner of the ox.
For the ox is not present to be hired out to work.
Once an ox has been sentenced to death, it is no longer considered to be the property of its former owner.
And the watchman must reimburse the owner for his ox, for he is responsible for it.
See Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 4:22, Hilchot Issurei Mizbe’ach 4:2 and other sources.
The purchaser should slaughter the ox immediately. Otherwise, its meat will become forbidden.
Although the ox will be sentenced to death, the watchman is considered to have fulfilled his obligation, for the owners have the option of slaughtering the ox before it is sentenced to death.
And since the ox cannot be identified, that is not possible.
The animal is not considered to become bateil b’rov, insignificant because it is mixed with a larger quantity of permitted substances. Indeed, even when it becomes mixed with a far larger number of oxen, its identity is never considered insignificant. The rationale is that a live animal is important. And an important entity is never considered to be insignificant (Zevachim 72a; Sanhedrin 79b-80a).
See Hilchot Ma‘achalot Asurot 16:7 and Hilchot Pesulei Hamukdashim 19:11.
This apparently refers to an animal used by a human for sodomy, which must be executed, as stated in Leviticus 20:15. For no other sin is an animal executed.
This follows the principle stated in the next halachah: “A fetus is considered to be an extension of its mother.”
For it was not part of its mother’s body, neither at the time of the killing, nor at the time of the sentence.
Literally “the thigh.”
And so, just as the sentence caused the mother to become forbidden, it also caused the calf to become forbidden. The calf is not executed, however. Instead, it is left to die.
In this instance as well, all the calves need not be executed. It is, however, forbidden to benefit from them, because the presence of a live animal in a mixture is never considered to be insignificant.
Since the owner of the ox does not know whether or not the ox gored, he is dependent on the testimony of the witnesses. Once their testimony establishes that the ox gored, the owner assumes that it will be executed and despairs of retaining ownership. After he has made such a decision, even in error, anyone has the right to take possession of the ox. A parallel ruling is delivered in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 4:8.
Thus performing the kinyan of meshichah, a formal act of acquisition.
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