Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The measure of “the size of an olive” cannot be determined by measuring an average olive today. Instead,. this refers to a measure established by our Sages and is the subject of debate by later Rabbinic authorities. The Pri Chadash (Drach Chayim 486) states that the Rambam considers an olive as one-third the size of an egg with its shell (17.3 grams according to Shiurei Torah 3:13, 24 grams according to Chazon Ish). Tosafot, Chullin 103a, differs and defines an olive as one-half the size of a shelled egg (25.6 grams according to Shiurei Torah 3:12, 36 grams according to Chazon Ish). In practice, with regard to questions of Scriptural Law, the more stringent opinion should be followed. With regard to questions of Rabbinic Law, one may rely on the more lenient view.

Literally, the soul's being cut off. This involves premature death in this world (before the age of 50, Mo'ed Kattan 28a) and the soul not meriting a portion in the world to come (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1).

Premature death before the age of 60 (Mo’ed Kattan, loc. cit.).

See Hilchat lssurei Bi’ah 1:7.

The punishment given for the violation of Rabbinic commandments or Scriptural Laws for which there is no specific punishment outlined.

Shiurei Torah suggests including slightly more than 3 grams in the measure of an olive-sized portion to compensate for this factor.

Even though it was not swallowed.

This refers to a situation in which the person ate the vomited food a second time shortly after he ate it the first time. To explain: For a person to be liable, he must eat not only a specific amount (an olive-sized portion), but he must eat it within a specific time: k’dai achilas p‘ras, as explained in Halachah 8.

A sacrifice which the priest thought to have its blood or limbs offered on the altar after the time when they should be offered or have its meat eaten after the time it should be eaten (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 13:1).

Sacrificial meat that remained after the time when it is required to be eaten (op cit. 13:3).

As Menachot 54b states, the size of a portion of food at the time one partakes of it determines whether he is liable or not.

For, at the outset, it was the size of an olive.

For its natural size is not an olive.

Chapter 4, Halachot 16 and 17.

For a treifah is the beginning of a nevelah, as stated there.

For they are all grape products, as stated in Hilchot Nazirut 5:3.

Wheat, barley, rye, oats, and spelt. Since they are all grain, they are combined to reach the minimum measure.

See Chapter 10 for a definition of this prohibition.

Chapter 4, Halachah 7.
The Ra’avad qualifies the Rambam’s statement, maintaining that it applies only when the types of produce consumed have a similar taste. The Radbaz, however, justifies the Rambam’s view.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 6:4), the Rambam states that this leniency applies only with regard to an earthly court. God, however, holds the person liable for each forbidden measure he eats.

For the warnings create a distinction between the· food eaten before and afterwards.

Our translation is based on Hilchot Tumat Tzara‘at 16:6.

This is one of the fundamental concepts with regard to the mitzvot and prohibitions concerning eating. Just as there is a minimum amount, a k’zayit (an olive-sized portion), which one must eat for the mitzvah or prohibition to be fulfilled;. so, too, there is a minimum measure of time, k’dei achilat p‘ras, in which that amount of food must be eaten. If one takes a longer time to eat the prohibited food, partaking of the food does not make him liable, like one who eats less than the minimum amount
Rashi (Pesachim 44a) offers a different view and maintains that this measure is defined as the time it takes to eat four eggs. Shiurei Torah mentions several different opinions from between four minutes until nine minutes for this figure.

The standard liquid measure that applies with regard to the Torah's mitzvot and prohibitions.

The commentaries have noted that in Chapter 6, Halachah 1, the Rambam mentioned that the minimum measure for which one is liable for partaking of blood is an olive-sized portion and question why in this context, a revi‘it is mentioned. It is possible to explain that here the subjects are slightly different, for we are not speaking about the minimum amount for which one is liable, but rather the minimum time period. The commentaries, however, do not see this as a significant enough point.

For if one prolongs his drinking over a longer period, his deed is not considered significant.

The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh note that other authorities do not accept the concept of “the time it takes to drink a revi‘it” and even with regard to prohibitions that involve drinking speak of k’dei achilat p‘ras. Indeed, the Rambam himself mentions that measure with regard to drinking within the context of the laws of ritual purity (Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTumah 8:11).
The Radbaz explains the Rambam’s ruling here, stating that with regard to the prohibitions against eating, what is important is that one feels significant satisfaction. If he prolongs his drinking longer than that, he will not feel· satisfaction from it. See also the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Hilchot Shivitat Esor 2:4 which discusses this issue. Both opinions are quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Drach Chayim 612).

When, however, the Torah uses the term “eating,” that implies that one derives satisfaction in the ordinary manner one derives benefit from food (see the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Chapter 8, Halachah 16). Only then is one liable. Needless to say, it is forbidden by Rabbinic Law to partake of a forbidden substance even if one does not derive benefit.

As explained in Chapter 10, Halachah 6, “becom[ing] hallowed” means being “set apart and forbidden.”

Which does not have a pleasant taste.

This concept also applies with regard to wine used as a libation, for Deuteronomy 32:38, the prooftext from which this prohibition is derived, also mentions “eating” [Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 111)].

I.e., even if the unappetizing element of the food is not dependent on them, but on a foreign substance.

This refers to the concept referred to as notein taam lifgam, giving an unfavorable taste. Our Rabbis extend this concept further, explaining that any pot which has not been used for non-kosher food for a day no longer causes the pot to be forbidden according to Scriptural Law, because the forbidden food has already lost its flavor [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 103:5)]. See also Chapter 15, Halachot 28-31.

Generally, a person who violates a transgression without intent is not liable (Shabbat 22a). Here, however, an exception is made, because the person is deriving physical benefit.

Even though he derived pleasure, since he did not act voluntarily and did not desire the forpidden pleasure, he is not held liable.

Although either his desire or hunger causes him pain, he is not considered as if he were compelled to partake of the forbidden food.

As stated in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 5:6, all prohibitions are superceded by danger to life with the exception of idolatry, murder, and forbidden sexual relations.

A pregnant woman may have severe cravings for food with an attractive aroma. Our Sages feared that if she were not given some of the food she desired, she might miscarry and perhaps even her own life would be endangered. See Yoma 82b.

I.e., less than an olive-sized portion as stated in Halachah 1. Since one is not liable unless one partakes of an olive-sized portion within k’dei achilat pras (see Halachah 8), if we do not fear the situation is overly dangerous, the woman can be fed this minimal amount in intervals. See Hilchot Sh ‘vitat Asar 2:9, Shulchan Aruch (Drach Chayim
617:2).

Since he is sick, his condition is precarious and we are concerned that his craving may place his life in danger. See Ketubot 61a.

This refers to a state of infirmity that overcomes a person because of lack of nourishment. He becomes dizzy, faint, and unable to focus his eyes.

Out of fear that the delay may be crucial to his life.

Produce from which terumah and the tithes have not been separated.

This applies when the terumot have not been separated from the produce. If the terumot have been separated, but the terumot have not been separated, the prohibition is of the same degree of severity as partaking of a nevelah. See Chapter 10, Halachot 19-20.

Hilchot Shemitah ViYovel 4:2.

I.e., produce grown in the Sabbatical year that remains after the time when it is supposed to be disposed of (Rashi, Yoma 83a).

For the prohibition against eating produce cultivated in the Sabbatical year stems from a positive commandment. This is considered as more lenient than a prohibition stemming from a negative commandment, because there is no punishment involved.

Some interpret this as referring to a situation where there is no one who knows how to separate the terumot present. Rashi (loc. cit.) interprets this as referring to a situation where the sick person must eat the entire amount of produce available. It is preferable not to separate the terumot. For even though he will be eating less of a forbidden substance, the prohibition will be more severe because terumah is sanctified.

Hilchot lssurei Bi’ah 17:8-9.

Chapter 5, Halachah 5, gives an example of this concept. When a person rips a limb from a living animal which causes the animal to become treifah and eats it, he is considered to have transgressed two prohibitions: the prohibition ·against eating flesh from a living animal and the prohibition against partaking of an animal that is treifah, for both prohibitions take effect at the same time.

This concept is exemplified in this and the following halachah. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 2, and Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:9-10.

This concept is exemplified in Chapter 8, Halachah 6: A person who partakes of a gid hanesheh, a sciatic nerve, of an animal which is treifah is liable for two transgressions. Since when the animal became treifah, its entire body became encompassed in the prohibition, that prohibition also encompasses the gid even though it was prohibited beforehand.

Every sacrifice of which we are allowed to partake has a certain time span - a day and a night or two days and a night - in which we are allowed to partake of it. After that time span, it becomes forbidden because of the prohibition referred to as notar (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 18:10).

The Rambam also states this concept in Hilchot Shegagot 6:4. There he emphasizes that to be liable for eating on Yorn Kippur, one must add another small portion of food. For one is not liable for eating on Yorn Kippur unless he consumes a date-sized portion. That additional portion, however, need not involve all these different prohibitions.

Before it became notar.

Because it tastes the same as the permitted substance.

According to Scriptural Law. As stated in Halachot 45, the Rabbis enforced more stringent requirements.

Which is forbidden (Chapter 7, Halachah 5).

By a gentile. (See the notes to Halachah 30 and Chapter 9, Halachah 8 for a discussion of why the gentile’ s word is accepted.)

See Tosafot (Chullin 98b) which mentions a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if the principle “the flavor of an entity is equivalent to its substance” is of Rabbinic or Scriptural origin.

The Rambam shares the perspective of Tosafot (Avodah Zarah 67b) who maintains that if there is more than an olive-sized portion of fat in a portion of food k‘dei achilat p‘ras (the size of three eggs), its substance is considered as present even though it is dissolved and not discemable. Rashi differs and maintains that as long as the fat is dissolved, it is considered as if the substance of the forbidden entity is not present.

Even though he may eat an olive-sized portion of forbidden fat, he will not have eaten it in the required time (the time it takes to eat three eggs, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 8) for one to be held liable. The concentration of the forbidden fat is too small for that to happen.

Which is permitted.

Since both are fat, the mixture is considered as being of the same substance.

For according to Scriptural Law, as long as the majority is kosher, the mixture may be eaten. Indeed, there is no need for there to be twice as much kosher fat as non-kosher fat. A simple majority is sufficient.

With regard to the mixture of fat, there’ is greater reason for leniency, for there is no longer any non-kosher fat that exists as an independent entity, it is all mixed together with the kosher fat. In this instance, the meat from the nevelah exists as an independent entity, it is just that we have no way of detecting which of the pieces it is (Radbaz).

In all instances when forbidden substances are mixed with kosher substances. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 109:1) which rules leniently and allows one to rely on Scriptural Law in certain situations. See the notes to Halachah 20.

In the following halachot.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 5:8), the Rambam cites Deuteronomy 13:18: “No trace of the condemned should cling to your hand” as evidence that even the slightest amount is forbidden. See Chapter 16, Halachah 28, for a leniency that is granted with regard to this restriction.

The terumot and the tithes can be separated from it, causing it to be permitted. See Halachah 10.

Chapter 16, Halachah 28.

I.e., the terumah and tithes that would have been required to have been separated from the tevel originally. In this context, the fact that it became mixed with other wine is not significant.

Hilchot Terumah, Chapter 13.

The Rambam feels it necessary to mention this point, because his source, Avodah Zarah 73b mentions the produce of the Sabbatical year together with the two prohibited substances mentioned above. The Rambam clarifies that the comparison is not entirely correct, because the produce of the Sabbatical year is not forbidden.

The Ra’avad mentions that this concept applies only until the time it is required to destroy the produce of the Sabbatical year. After that time, that produce is forbidden to be eaten and hence, is considered like other forbidden substances.

Hilchot Shemitah ViYovel, chs. 4-7.

I.e., although even the tiniest amount of chametz causes an entire mixture to be forbidden, chametz was not mentioned by Avodah Zarah 73b together with wine poured as a libation and tevel. The reason is that the prohibition of the mixture of chametz is motivated by a different rationale (Kessef Mishneh).

See Hilchot Chametz UMatzah l :5 which states that a mixture of chametz and another substance is permitted after the Pesach holiday.

As explained in the following halachah and notes. See also Halachah 12.

The Radbaz states that the comparison is to tevel and not to chametz on Pesach. For like tevel, if it becomes mixed with a different substance, it is permitted if its flavor cannot be detected. There are special stringencies applied with regard to chametz, as stated in Halachah 12 (Radbaz).

See Chapter 10, Halachah 2.

For they can be redeemed (Radbaz).

For they can be eaten in Jerusalem or their holiness can be transferred to money (Radbaz).

E. g., Bikkurim; see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Bikkurim 2:2).

Our Sages (Beitzah 3b) state it is not nullified when mixed with 1000 times the amount of kosher substances. The Rambam’s wording clarifies that 1000 is not an upper limit. No matter how many times more of the permitted substance there is, the mixture is forbidden.

Hence, this option should be taken rather than relying on the nullification of the forbidden substance.

As explained in Hilchat Sh‘vitat Yam Tov 1:19 states that when a person sets an object aside before the holiday with the intent that he will not use it on the holiday, he may not change his mind and use it on the holiday. This prohibition is referred to as muktzeh.
Halachah 1 :20 states that an egg laid on a holiday following the Sabbath was prepared on the Sabbath, as it were. Therefore it may not be used on the holiday. This prohibition is referred to as nolad. Both of these prohibitions are of Rabbinic origin. Halachah 1 :21 states that if such an egg becomes mixed with other eggs, they are all forbidden.

I.e., a mixture of terumah could be eaten in a permitted manner by a priest. Nevertheless, since there is no way it could be permitted to an ordinary person, our Sages were not stringent (Kessef Mishneh).
Both the Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz ask: It is possible to have terumah permitted by making a statement of regret concerning its separation before a wise man. If so, seemingly, it should be considered as an object that could be eaten in a permitted manner. The Radbaz explains that a wise man who can nullify the separation of terumah may not always be found. The Kessef Mishneh states that since this is not the common practice, a substance may not be considered as an object that could be eaten in a permitted manner for this reason.

This term indicates a conclusion deduced by the Rambam without an explicit prior Rabbinic source. There are others, including Rav Yitzchak Alfasi and Rav Moshe HaCohen, who differ and maintain that since the mixture could be eaten in a permitted manner, the above stringencies apply. The Ra’avad, however, states that this concept is explicitly stated in the Mishnah. He does not, however, mention which mishnah. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh offer different hypotheses as to the Ra’avad’s intent and why the Rambam did not accept it.

By separating the appropriate terumot and tithes.

Halachah 6.

Halachah 9.

The terumah which the Levites offer from the tithes they are given.

Although the prohibition is negated, we are still concerned with the fact that property due the priest is not given to him, as stated in Halachah 15.

I.e., as stated in the conclusion of the halachah, if two of these substances fall into the same accumulation of permitted substances, it is necessary to have 100 times their combined size.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam’s ruling here appears to contradict his ruling in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 6:24 where he states that the showbread is not nullified. He explains that in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim, the Rambam is speaking about pieces of the showbread that are ritually pure. Hence the entire mixture should be eaten by the priests. (Note the Radbaz who questions how the priests ·could eat the mixture.) Here, by contrast, we are speaking about pieces of the showbread that are impure. If the showbread was a significant part of the mixture, the entire mixture would have to be burnt. Since it is not significant, we consider its existence negated.

If, however, the sacred substances are distinct, they must be separated from the ordinary substances.

It does not have to be eaten with attention to the laws of terumah.

This term refers to a mixture of terumah or other sacred substances with ordinary substances. The mixture must be sold to priests (at the price of terumah) with the exception of the original sacred amount (Hilchot Terumah 13:2).

Although they are separate and unrelated prohibitions, since it is forbidden to benefit from both of them and we derive the laws pertaining to one from the laws pertaining to the other, we rule that they may be combined (Orlah 2:1).

As explained in the following halachah, in this instance, one is not causing the priests a loss.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling, objecting to the decision that it is forbidden to benefit from the mixture. (He maintains that although partaking of the mixture is forbidden, one should be able to sell it to a gentile with the exception of the value of the forbidden substance. For, he maintains, it is never forbidden to benefit from a mixture that is not inherently forbidden.) The Radbaz justifies the Rambam’s view.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 11:4).

For the priests will not be concerned about its loss.

Therefore they were treated more stringently. The Radbaz emphasizes that they are compared to terumah and not to other forbidden substances, for the root kodesh is used with regard to them.

For it is one tenth of a tenth.

I.e., “forbidden.”

As the Rambam continues to explain, the Jerusalem Talmud (Orlah 2:1) offers a non-literal interpretation of this phrase, understanding it as meaning “the one who sanctifies it.”

Sifri to the above verse.

With this wording, the Rambam also eliminates those prohibitions of Rabbinic origin, which have a smaller measure as stated in the following halachah.

Although there is not enough of the forbidden substance for a person to be liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law, unless there is 60 times the amount of forbidden fat, the mixture is forbidden according to Scriptural Law (see Chullin 98a).

The prohibitions are considered of the same type, because the taste of the fat is not distinct from that of the meat (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi to Chullin 98a).

As is the law with regard to Rabbinic prohibitions as stated in the following halachah.

Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

As our Sages ruled [Chulin 100a; Chapter 16, Halachah 6; quoted by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 100:1)], a forbidden being which is a creation in its own right is never forbidden. Therefore they ruled more stringently. In this instance, the gid hanesheh itself will be removed. Hence the full stringency of our Sages’ ruling is not applied, nevertheless, in recognition of the serious of the prohibition involved, this stringency is applied.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 6.

Thus instead of requiring 61 times the forbidden substance (60 plus the substance itself), all that is required is 60 (59 and the substance itself).

See Chapter 9, Halachot 12-13. As explained in the notes there, the Ra’avad and the Rashba offer a different rationale for this ruling, explaining that since the meat of the udder is acceptable, we include it in the reckoning of 60. Thus in contrast to other instances where 60 times the amount of the forbidden substance is required, here, we require only 59. According to his view, we cannot extrapolate from this ruling to other Rabbinic prohibitions.

Such an egg is forbidden to be eaten (see Chapter 3, Halachah 8).

I.e., a total of 62.

As stated in the notes to the previous halachah, in this instance, the forbidden substance itself will be removed. Hence the full stringency of our Sages’ ruling concerning an entity that is a creation in its own right is not applied. Nevertheless, in recognition of the severity of the prohibition involved, this stringency is applied. See the notes to the following halachah where a rationale cited by other authorities is mentioned.

Here we are talking about eggs that are cooked in their shells. When an egg contains a chick, the chick will impart its flavor to the entire pot. When, by contrast, eggs are cooked in their shells, they do not impart flavor (Chulin 97b).

For, at times, non-kosher eggs are not distinguishable from kosher eggs (ibid.).

I.e., the mixture is judged as an ordinary instance in which kosher food becomes mixed with non-kosher food. According to the Rambam, the non-kosher egg is not a creation that is forbidden in its own right.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 86:5) differs and rules that we require 61 kosher eggs in this instance as well. The Ramban explains that the reason is that not all eggs are the same size and by adding an extra egg, we make certain that we have the necessary amount. (He uses this rationale to explain the law stated in the previous halachah as well.) The Siftei Cohen 86:16 offers a different rationale, stating that an egg itself is considered a creation in its own right.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that there are some who would rule that 60 eggs are not necessary, for there are opinions [see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 109:1)] that when kosher and non-kosher entities are intermingled in a dry mixture, we rely on Scriptural Law and require only a simple majority of the kosher substances. As obvious from this ruling, the Rambam does not accept this leniency.

When a Nazirite completes the days of his Nazirite vow, he brings several sacrifices. Among them is a ram brought as a peace offering. The foreleg from this offering is given to the priest and may not be eaten by an ordinary Israelite (see Chullin 98a; Hilchot Nazirut 8:1-4).

I.e., although this portion which is forbidden to an Israelite is cooked together with the entire ram, the Israelite is permitted to partake of the remainder of the ram. Accordingly, our Sages inferred that a similar ratio may be used when other prohibited substances are cooked with permitted substances.

Because there is no significant difference between the taste of fat from the fat tail and fat from the kidneys, as indicated by Halachah 4.

I.e., at that time, it absorbed both the permitted substances and the prohibited substance (Radbaz).
In his Kessef Mishneh and in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 99:4), Rav Yosef Caro follows the view of Rashi and the Tur who maintain that we should measure the prohibited substance and the permitted substances as they are at present, for there is no way of knowing how much the pot absorbed. This stringency applies, however, only with regard to forbidden substances mixed with permitted substances of a different type. (For then the prohibition stems from Scriptural Law.) If they are of the same type (when a simple majority is required according to Scriptural Law), the Shulchan Aruch rules more leniently and accepts the Rambam’s ruling.

It appears that the Rambam considers this prohibition as Rabbinic in origin. This view is shared by most other authorities although there are some who maintain that it is of Rabbinic origin. See Siftei Cohen 99:7.

I.e., after a forbidden substance fell into a mixture, one may not add enough permitted substances so that there would be 60, 100, or 200 times the amount of the forbidden substance.

If, however, a substance forbidden by Rabbinic Law accidentally fell into a mixture, one may add enough permitted substances to nullify the prohibition, as will be stated in Halachah 26.

Because in fact the presence of the forbidden substance has been nullified.

The Siftei Cohen 99:11 explains the reason for this penalty. If we would permit him to benefit from it, we fear that if, in the future, such a situation would recur, he would instruct his servants to nullify the prohibited substances for him.

Or the person whom he intended to serve after nullifying the forbidden substance. Were this not the case, he would benefit from his undesirable act (Kessef Mishneh).

The Rambam’s wording implies that the penalty was imposed only when he willfully nullified the existence of the forbidden substance. If he did so accidentally or inadvertently, no prohibition applies, for our Sages did not impose penalties in such situations [Kessef Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 99:5)].

This point was not accepted by all authorities. The Ashkenazic authorities (as reflected by the ruling of Rabbenu Asher) maintain that even a Rabbinic prohibition should not be nullified as an initial and preferred measure. The Radbaz proposes an intermediate position: that the stringency should be applied only to Rabbinic prohibitions that have a source in Scriptural Law, e.g., milk and fowl, but not those enacted by the Rabbis entirely on their own initiative. This compromise, however, was not accepted. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 99:6) adopts the Rambam’s position, while the Tur and the Rama follow that of Rabbenu Asher.

Halachah 1.

Avodah Zarah 66a derives this concept from the statements of Deuteronomy 14:21 concerning the meat of an animal that died without slaughter: “Give it to the stranger in your gate and he will partake of it.” Implied is that the prohibition applies only to meat that is fit for a non-Jew to partake of. If it is not fit for the non-Jew to eat, it cannot cause a Jew’s food to be forbidden.
See also Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 103:2) which states: “The impairment of the food’s flavor does not have to be complete to the extent that one would be disgusted to eat it. Instead, even if it slightly detracts [from its flavor], it does not cause the mixture to become forbidden.”

Avodah Zarah, loc. cit. states that if initially, the flavor of a substance is improved by the addition of the forbidden substance, it becomes forbidden. The fact that ultimately the addition detracts from the flavor of the permitted substance is not sufficient to cause it to become permitted again. The Rambam draws the conclusion that ultimately if the flavor of the substance will be improved, it is also prohibited (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., since there is a question whether the mixture is forbidden or not.

For he is permitted to partake of terumot.

Chs. 13 and 14.

There is a difficulty with the Rambam’s statements, for generally, we do not rely on the word of a gentile with regard to ritual matters. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 98:1) relies on the opinion of the Rashba quoted by the Tur, that this refers to a situation where the gentile does not know that we are relying on him, but instead makes his statements as a matter of course (masiach lifi tumo).
See also the Turei Zahav 98:2 and the Siftei Cohen 98:2 who quote views which state that an ordinary gentile is not sufficient, but instead, the intent is a gentile chef who is an expert on recognizing flavors. According to some, however, this interpretation leads to a leniency. For since he is a professional, he will not risk his professional reputation by lying to mislead a Jew. Hence, according to these views, his statements can be accepted even if they are made in response to direct questions and not as a matter of course. There are, nevertheless, authorities who differ and require even a chef to make his statements as a matter of course. Moreover, there are authorities (among them, the Radbaz and the Rama) who never accept the statements of a gentile with regard to these matters.
The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 98:1) states that in the present age, we do not rely on the statements of a non-Jew who tasted food to determine whether it is kosher or not.

Halachah 28.

For it is an accepted principle that the taste of a forbidden substance will be nullified in more than 60 times its volume.

This refers to mixtures of terumot, orlah, and mixed species in a vineyard. The ruling is, however, problematic. For if we are speaking about a mixture of these substances together with different substances, then 60 times their volume would be sufficient. For the taste of all substances except spices is nullified in 60 times their volume as stated in the previous note. And if we are speaking about a mixture of substances with their own kind, the taste of the forbidden substance will not be detectable.

Avodah Zarah 68b leaves unresolved the question whether the mouse’s flavor detracts from the flavor of beer and vinegar. Hence we rule stringently.

These substances are not mentioned by the Talmud, loc. cit., but it is common knowledge that the mouse’s flavor will detract from their own, as the Rambam explains (Kessef Mishneh).

These are prohibited by Scriptural Law.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Y osef Caro states that, according to the Rambam, one may partake of the meat as it is. He need not scrape off or cut away its surface (kelipah or netilah). In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 105:5), however, he rules according to the perspective of Rabbenu Asher, the Rashba, the Ran, and the Tur who maintain that the outer layer of the meat next to the fat itself must be cut away. The difference between these two views stems from the interpretation of Chullin 96b, the source for this halachah.
See also the ruling of the Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah, loc. cit.) that at present, we are not capable of differentiating which fat is considered succulent and which is considered lean. Hence, we require 60 times the amount of forbidden fat in all instances.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that the leniency mentioned by the Rambam applies only when the animal is roasted with its gid or with the forbidden tissues. If it is cooked, more stringent rules apply.

Although the fat of the gid hanesheh is prohibited, there is not enough fat to cause the other limbs of the animal to become prohibited (Kessef Mishneh). Nevertheless, one must cut away the outer layer of the meat next to the gid.

In this instance as well, there is not a significant enough quantity of fat to cause the meat to become forbidden.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 108:1) quotes the Rambam’s ruling forbidding roasting the two in the same oven, but allows for certain leniencies, e.g., the oven is very large or the substances are covered. The Rama gives weight to the ruling of Rabbenu Tam who maintains that the vapors from forbidden food can cause kosher food to become forbidden. Hence, at the outset, the two should not be roasted in the same oven.

It appears that the kosher meat was unsalted. If, however, it were salted, it would not absorb the juices of the non-kosher meat, as indicated by the principle: “One that is involved in discharging its own juices does not absorb from another” (Radbaz).
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro differs and maintains that both were salted. This is also reflected in the rulings of his [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 105:79)].

The commentaries note an apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s here and his rulings in Chapter 7, Halachot 17-19. The Radbaz explains that there, both the forbidden and the kosher substances were salted, while here the kosher meat was not. The Kessef Mishneh explains that here the two pieces of meat are mixed together, while there the substances were merely near each other.

In this halachah, the Rambam is communicating the principle stated by Chullin 11 1b et al that meat which is salted is considered as if it is burning hot. It emits concentrated juices which are absorbed by other meat.

I.e., no matter what the ratio of the kosher meat to the non-kosher meat, removing its outer surface is not sufficient. Instead, the entire mixture becomes forbidden unless there is the amount of kosher meat is 60 times that of the non-kosher meat (Kessef Mishneh).
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 70:3-4) follow the more lenient views of Rabbenu Asher, the Rashba, and the Ran who maintain that only the external surface of the kosher meat becomes forbidden. Once it is peeled off, the meat is permitted.

For pickling is considered equivalent to cooking. Fish brine is considered as very powerful. Hence it requires a much larger measure than ordinary non-kosher substances. See Rav Kapach's notes to the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Terumot 10:8) where he writes that the Rambam changed his mind three times on this issue, twice stating more stringent views than the one stated here, before writing this view as his final conclusion.

I.e., it does not become mixed with the forbidden substances into a single blend, nevertheless, it cannot be distinguished from the kosher substances.

The presence of the forbidden substance is never nullified no matter how great the ratio between it and the permitted substances. Needless to say, this stringency was instituted by Rabbinic degree. As mentioned above, according to Scriptural Law, a simple majority is sufficient to nullify the presence of an entity.

If, however, there is not enough to cause the dough to leaven, it is not considered a leavening agent and its presence can be nullified [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 2:6-7)].

And must be sold to a priest at the price of terumah.

If, however, they do not contain the same substance, according to the Rambam (loc. cit.), we see if their flavor can be detected or not. If it cannot be detected, the mixture is permitted.

Perach and Baden are names of places. These and the following terms are defined in the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 3:8).

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 134:2) states that this applies only when the barrels are large and therefore important. A small barrel is not important and its presence can be nullified by a simple majority.

In contrast to those baked by a baker.

I.e., all the pomegranates are considered as if they are the pomegranate that is orlah.
The Radbaz mentions opinions that state that one may throw away the value of the forbidden pomegranate, and then benefit from the entire mixture. He, however, brings support for the Rambam’s position.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 101:1) appears to support the Rambam’s ruling. Note, however, the comments of the Siftei Cohen 110:2 who writes that even though a Jew may not benefit from any one of the forbidden pomegranates himself, he may sell the entire mixture to a gentile, minus the price of the forbidden pomegranate. See also the notes to Halachah 7.

This refers to an instance when the forbidden piece of meat was cooked with the other pieces.

If its form changes, different rules apply, as apparent from Halachah 11.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De‘ah 101 :3) state that if a piece of meat is not of the type that will bring a person respect by serving it to guests, the stringency mentioned in this halachah does. not apply.
Tosafot (Chullin 100a) explains that even though in practice, the piece of meat will not bring honor to the person - because since it is forbidden, he cannot serve it - it is placed in this category, for were it not to be forbidden, it would bring him honor.

There is an important insight associated with this ruling. The stringency relating to a piece of meat from which one receives honor applies only when the meat is inherently forbidden. When, however, a piece of kosher meat falls into a stew of non-kosher meat, it is not considered a piece of meat from which one receives honor, for it is not inherently forbidden. What is forbidden is the flavor of the non-kosher meat and that flavor is not a substance from which one receives honor.
This does not apply with regard to milk and meat. Although it is absorbing the milk that causes the meat to be considered forbidden, once it absorbs that milk, it becomes inherently forbidden. For although both of the substances are themselves permitted, it is their mixture that is forbidden by the Torah (Radbaz).

I.e., this stringency is applied even though we are speaking only about a Rabbinic prohibition (Kessef Mishneh).

Chapter 2, Halachah 3.

The Lechem Mishneh states that this is speaking about a situation when the gid hanesheh was cooked without its fat. Otherwise, 60 times its volume is required, for the fat does impart flavor.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 100:1) gives the following criteria for a creation in its own right: It must be alive, in contrast to a kernel of wheat. It must be inherently forbidden, in contrast to a kosher fowl that was slaughtered improperly. It must be a complete entity to the extent that were it to be divided it would no longer be referred to with that name in contrast to non-kosher fat. And it must actually be whole, in contrast to a gid hanesheh that was cut in half.

This principle applies with regard to all entities that are creations in their own right. Until they are removed, the mixture is forbidden regardless of the ratio of kosher to non-kosher substances. Once they are removed, the ratio must be 60:1 (ibid. :2). This applies when the mixture is cooked. If we are speaking about a dry mixture, it is permitted as long as the majority of the mixture was kosher.

An ox sentenced to execution for goring a human being. See Chapter 4, Halachah 22.

This calf is an atonement offering brought by the elders of a city when there is an unresolved murder.

Tzara‘at refers to a unique affliction of the skin resembling leprosy that afflicted a person because he spoke lashon hora, unfavorable gossip. When the physical signs of his affliction have disappeared, the person must bring two doves as sacrifices. One is slaughtered and one is sent away, as stated in Hilchot Tumat Tzara‘at 11:1. It is forbidden to benefit from the one that is slaughtered.

A firstborn donkey must either be either exchanged for a lamb and the lamb given to a priest, or the donkey’s neck must be broken (Exodus 13:13; Hilchot Bikkurim, ch. 12).

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, stating that all that is necessary is to destroy the benefit one would receive from one of the forbidden entities. The benefit from the remainder is permitted. The Kessef Mishneh points to Halachah 29 as indication that the Rambam would also accept the ruling stated by the Ra’ avad. The Migdal Oz differs and maintains that the Rambam would not accept that ruling. As mentioned above, the Siftei Cohen 110:2 defends the position of the Kessef Mishneh, stating that the Rambam would allow one to sell the entire mixture to a· gentile, minus the price of the forbidden article.

The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 110:1) cite the view of other Rishonim who state that whenever an article is always sold by number, not by a package, its presence is never nullified.

I.e., what is an example of an article that is sold by number being nullified.

For according to Scriptural Law, a s_ubstance mixed with substances of the same type are permitted when there is a majority of the permitted substance. When mixed with substances of a different type, they are nullified when the taste can no longer be detected.

I.e., according to Scriptural Law; according to Rabbinic Law, both the first and the ·second mixtures are forbidden.

For our Sages ordained stringency with regard to each of the pomegranates in the second mixture, ruling that it should be considered as if there is a question if it is forbidden by Scriptural Law or not (Radbaz).
The Radbaz notes that the Rambam’ s ruling here appears to contradict his ruling in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 7:10 where the Rambam rules that if a goblet used for idol worship becomes mixed with other goblets and then one from the first mixture falls into a second mixture, one may use the goblets of the second mixture. The Radbaz maintains that with this ruling, the Rambam changed his mind and adopted a more stringent position.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam rules more stringently in this instance than with regard to idol worship because the prohibition against idol worship is universally known. The prohibition against benefiting from a significant entity, by contrast, is less recognized. Therefore there is need for greater stringency. Alternatively, here the Rambam is speaking about partaking of the forbidden mixture, while in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, he is speaking about benefiting from the mixture. Obviously, there is greater reason to prohibit a substance from which one partakes.
The position followed by the Rambam in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim is followed by other Rishonim even with regard to a significant entity. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De‘ah 110:8) quotes the Rambam’s view and the Rama adds further stringencies. The Turei Zahav 110:10 and the Siftei Cohen 110:50 mention the more lenient views.

For our Sages ordained that we show concern that perhaps the pomegranate that fell from the first mixture into the second mixture was not forbidden by Scriptural Law. Even if it was forbidden, perhaps the pomegranate that fell from the second mixture was not forbidden by Scriptural Law. Thus there is a multiple doubt if an entity forbidden by Scriptural Law is present.

As required with regard to the prohibitions of orlah and mixed species in a vineyard. I.e., the stringency of a significant article no longer applies, because the entities are no longer whole and in their present form, they are not significant.

Which would be forbidden because one derives honor from serving it as stated in Halachah 5. Once it has been minced, the meat is no longer a piece from which one would derive honor [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De‘ah 1O1 :6)].

The commentaries question the Rambam’s statement, noting that in Chapter 15, Halachah 26, the Rambam states that we may nullify the presence of a substance forbidden by Rabbinic Law. Since the prohibition against these mixtures is Rabbinic in origin, seemingly, it would be possible to nullify their presence.
It is possible to explain that in this instance, the prohibition is Scriptural in origin; it is only because of the mixture that its status is Rabbinic. Alternatively, the stringency imposed by the Sages was imposed on the mixture as a whole, as well as on all its components.

See Chapter 15, Halachah 25.

As mentioned in Halachah 1, if an entity is sufficient to cause a dough to leaven or to spice a pot, its presence can never be nullified. Although neither forbidden entity on its own is large enough to bring about this change, when the two are combined, this result is achieved. Therefore an Israelite is forbidden to partake of the dough or the pot. With regard to a priest, by contrast, since terumah is not forbidden to him, we do not say that an article forbidden to him brought about this change. For the mixed species alone is not of sufficient size. Hence, he is permitted to partake of the bread or the cooked food.

If the combined flavor is not that of wheat, the dough does not become forbidden, because the yeast is considered as giving a different flavor to the dough. Hence the dough is forbidden only if that flavor is detectable.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, offering a different interpretation of Avodah Zarah 65a, the Rambam’s source. Significantly, their disagreement is mirrored by similar difference in interpretation by Rashi and Tosafot. Rashi and the Rambam follow one approach and Tosafot and the Ra’avad, the other.

Although in actual fact the forbidden yeast or spices did not have an effect, because the dough leavened and the pot was spiced without them. Nevertheless, since they could have had an effect, they are not insignificant and cause the dish to become forbidden.
Avodah Zarah 68a notes that when dough is already leavened, adding yeast will spoil its flavor. Hence, seemingly, it should not be forbidden. Nevertheless, an exception is made with regard to dough, for when extra yeast is added to dough, that dough is then used to cause other dough to leaven. Hence, it is not considered to have spoiled.
The Ra’avad vad understands the emphasis of the passage from Avodah Zarah differently and objects to the Rambam’s ruling. He notes that Avodah Zarah does not mention spices; the Rambam added those on the basis of his logic. And the Ra’avad argues, that logic can be disputed. For the addition of yeast to the dough has an effect as explained. The addition of the spices, by contrast, has no effect - for the pot was already spiced. Why then do they cause the pot to be forbidden?
The Lechem Mishneh answers, that even according to the Ra’avad’s understanding, the Rambam’ s logic can be defended, for the food from the heavily spiced pot could be used to spice other pots.

The mixture is, however, forbidden to Israelites and permitted only to priests, for the presence of the terumah is not nullified.

This and the following halachah represent the Rambam’s interpretation of Orlah 2:2 which is based on the Jerusalem Talmud.

I.e., the presence of the orlah or the mixed species from the vineyard are nullified.

This example is the product of the Rambam’s own deduction. Although the simple interpretation of Orlah, Loe. cit., would imply that the concept stated in this halachah could also be derived from the situation described in the previous halachah, it does not work out mathematically. Hence, the Rambam had to find a new example.

The prohibition is thus nullified because the ratio of permitted to forbidden substances is 200:1.
The Ra’avad criticizes the Rambam, questioning why he uses extremely large numbers. The Radbaz explains that the Rambam’s figures enable all the calculations to be made without fractions.

I.e., after it was discovered that the forbidden substance had fallen into the permitted substances. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Terumot 5:8).

Thus despite the fact that it contains produce that was originally forbidden, the entire quantity may be used to nullify the presence of the second measure of forbidden produce that falls in.
From this, we see that the Rambam is not concerned that afterwards, the quantity of the forbidden substances will in fact be large enough to be halachicly significant (chozair vini ‘ur). The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 99:6) differ and maintain that in such an instance, the mixture becomes forbidden. The Siftei Cohen 99:21 supports the Rambam’s view.
The rationale for this leniency is that according to Scriptural Law, the entire measure is permitted when there is a simple majority of forbidden substances.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1 :8), the Rambam quotes the Sifra (Parshat Kedoshim) which teaches that since it is forbidden to benefit from Orlah, it is also forbidden to use it as a dye. The Rambam emphasizes that this applies, not only to fruit which is orlah, but also to the shells from which dye is made. In his notes to the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Rav Kapach cites a responsa from the Rambam from which it appears that this applies only to shells because they serve a fruit. It is not forbidden to make dye from the wood or the bark of a tree that is orlah. See Halachah 24 and notes.

Since the substance from which the dye comes is forbidden, the entire article becomes forbidden.

The Rambam’s wording - and hence, our translation - implies that one may cause the presence of the forbidden garment to be nullified by adding 200 other garments to it. The Radbaz explains that the mixture is forbidden only according to Rabbinic Law. As stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 26, as an initial and preferred option, one may add a sufficient quantity of permitted substances to nullify the presence of a substance forbidden by Rabbinic Law. Note, however, the glosses of the Tosafot Yam Tov and Rav Kapach to Orlah 3:1, that do not accept this interpretation and state that one may not nullify the prohibition as an initial and preferred option.

See Halachah 22.

In his notes to the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 3:2), Rav Kapach elaborates on the definition of this term, concluding that it is equal to two thumb-breadths.

I.e., if the entire garment is not 201 times the size of the portion dyed with the forbidden dye. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that this law teaches us that if even a small portion of a garment is dyed with forbidden dye, the entire garment may become forbidden.

The Radbaz explains that a more lenient ruling is issued in this instance, because: a) Here there is no substance that is forbidden, it is only the color that comes from the forbidden dye that is problematic. A differentiation can be made between this instance and the previous laws, for in those instances, the forbidden dye has already become permanently associated with a substance. b) In this instance, the majority of the dyeing will result from the permitted dye. The effect of the prohibited dye is secondary.

If so, it is then permitted to use even a new oven. Heating a new oven with the shells of orlah completes the task of fashioning the oven. Thus there is reason to say that since it was completed in a forbidden manner, the oven itself would be forbidden. Nevertheless, when permitted fuel is used even for such an oven, the products are permitted. The rationale is that they are produced by two substances: the oven which is forbidden and the fuel which is permitted. Whenever there are two factors involved, one permitted and one forbidden, the result is permitted to be used (Pesachim 26b). We do not require the oven to be destroyed, for the oven is not inherently forbidden (Kessef Mishneh).
One might ask: If so, why is an oven that is heated with shells that are orlah forbidden to be used? Here also there are two factors involved, the oven which is permitted and the fuel which is forbidden. It is possible to explain that the leniency of allowing to use the yield produced by a forbidden and a permitted substance applies only after the fact. In this instance, cooling the oven provides an easy alternative (Radbaz).

One might ask, since the oven is permitted, even though the fuel is forbidden, there is both a permitted and a forbidden factor producing this result. Why, then, is the food forbidden? It is possible to explain that since the fire which is forbidden is evident and apparent, we rule stringently (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

As indicated by the Halachah 24, this applies even if there are still glowing coals in the oven.

One might ask: In the case of a new oven, since both factors - the oven and the fuel - are forbidden, why is leniency granted? Nevertheless, it appears that according to the Rambam, removing the fire is sufficient for the food to be permitted. For the oven itself is not inherently forbidden, it was only completed in a forbidden manner (Kessef Mishneh).

Since the fuel used to fire the kitchenware is the primary element in completing them, they are forbidden. The Turei Zahav 142:7 explains that here we are speaking about kitchenware on which food is served cold. Since the kitchenware was made in a forbidden manner, it is forbidden to benefit from it. If, however, a pot was fired with forbidden fuel and then used to cook kosher food, that food would be permitted as is the law concerning a new oven. The Meiri (in his gloss to Pesachim 26b), however, explains that if one cooks food with a pot forbidden because of these factors, the food is forbidden.

The Radbaz emphasizes that here, too, we are speaking about shells from fruit that is orlah. The wood of a tree never becomes forbidden as orlah

For once the wood is consumed by fire, it is no longer considered forbidden. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:13 which states that it is permitted to benefit from the ashes of substances that are forbidden and required to be burnt.

As evident from the continuation of the Rambam’s statements, this applies when the permitted fuel was added after the forbidden fuel. Implied is that were the two fuels mixed together at the outset, the dish would be permitted.

The Kessef Mishneh gives two interpretations for this halachah. Our translation follows the first interpretation. The Kessef Mishneh, however, questions that interpretation, stating that seemingly, the fact that the pot in which the food was cooked was permitted would add another permitted factor and thus the food was never cooked in a totally forbidden setting. He therefore offers another interpretation, stating that here the Rambam is speaking about firing the pot in which the food was cooked. First it was fired with forbidden fuel, then it was fired with permitted fuel, and then food was cooked in it with permitted fuel. Since it was originally fired with forbidden fuel, it becomes forbidden and any food cooked in it is likewise prohibited. The Turei Zahav 142:9 favors the first interpretation, explaining that the situation resembles food cooked in an oven with forbidden fuel.

I.e., it was known that one plant or row was forbidden, but one was not able to identify the forbidden plant. It is somewhat difficult to conceive how a row of crops could not be recognized as mixed species growing in a vineyard. The Jerusalem Talmud explains that we are referring to an instance in which wheat growing in a flower pot with holes had been carried through a vineyard, but we are unsure through which row.

Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1:6), the Rambam rules that at the outset, it is forbidden to gather this produce. The leniency stated in this halachah applies only after the fact. The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam changed his mind, because the more lenient opinion is mentioned in the Talmud (Gittin 54b).

I.e., perhaps we should ordain a decree, forbidding benefit from the entire field, lest one intentionally mix a forbidden orlah plant into his vineyard.

Hence we do not fear that he will introduce a forbidden plant into the vineyard.

I.e., we do not fear that he left the orlah plant intentionally.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Orlah 1:7), the Rambam states that it is common to use the white syrup that drips from underdeveloped figs as a catalyst to cause cheese to harden.

I.e., using the rennin as a catalyst.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 13. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 2:5), the Rambam writes that the laws applying to a catalyst used to be make cheese are more severe than those applying to spices and yeast (Halachah 1, since the latter can be nullified when they fall into a substance of another type) for the reason explained above. As the Radbaz explains, even without yeast a dough would be able to be baked and a dish could be served without spices, but without a catalyst, milk would never harden into cheese.

Kiddushin 56b derives this from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 22:9, pen tikdash, “lest it become hallowed,” interpreting it as pen tukad eish, “lest it be consigned to fire.”

Chapter 15, Halachot 6-7.

The Siftei Cohen 134:1 quotes Rishonim’ who rule that if a quantity of permitted wine that is 60 times the volume of the forbidden wine falls into the forbidden wine at the same time, the presence of the forbidden wine is nullified. The stringency mentioned by the Rambam applies only when the kosher wine is poured into the forbidden wine little by little. The Siftei Cohen rules that if a severe loss is involved, one may rely on this leniency.

I.e., a bottle from which the wine is poured one drop at a time.

The Radbaz states that this applies even if there is less than 60 times the quantity of the forbidden wine, as long as the majority of the mixture comes from the permitted wine. Since each drop was nullified, the entire quantity is permitted. The Siftei Cohen 134:4 differs and requires that the permitted wine be 60 times the volume of the forbidden wine.
According to the Rambam, it is even permitted to drink the wine of the mixture. Rashi (Avodah Zarah 73a) rules that it is permitted to. benefit from the wine, drinking it, however, is forbidden. The Ra’avad goes further and rules that it is forbidden even to benefit from it. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 134:1) quotes the Rambam’s ruling.

I.e., a container with a large opening.

The Rama (Yoreh De ‘ah 134:2) rules leniently, stating that in the present era, since it is no longer customary to pour wine as libations to false divinities, one may be lenient and pennit the mixture if there is 60 times more kosher wine than forbidden wine, provided the kosher wine is not poured into the forbidden wine in one column.

I.e., cast into a place where one will not benefit from it.

One may not, however, destroy one jug and then benefit from the others - e.g., to use the wine as a dye - for it is possible that one will be benefiting directly from the forbidden wine. The advice suggested by the Rambam, by contrast, allows the Jew to benefit from the remainder of the wine without any possibility of benefiting directly from the forbidden wine.
The advice suggested applies only to jugs, for each jug is a separate entity. It does not apply when wine becomes mixed with wine, as indicated by the previous halachah (Avodah Zarah 74a).

See the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 134:2) who explains that this applies only when the jugs are large and therefore important as mentioned in Halachah 3. Otherwise, the presence of the forbidden jug can be nullified by a simple majority.

Seemingly, this ruling is obvious. The Kessef Mishneh states that it was added to emphasize the stringency that one must destroy the value of the forbidden jug.

As stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 6.

See Halachah 28.
Rav Moshe HaCohen questions how the presence of the forbidden entity can be nullified, since its flavor can be detected. Indeed, when quoting this law, Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 134:3) states this leniency applies only when the taste of the forbidden substance cannot be detected.

Avodah Zarah 73a emphasizes that the leniency mentioned in this halachah applies only when the water falls into the wine before the forbidden wine. If the forbidden wine falls in first, the permitted wine becomes prohibited.

And thus it is not automatically forbidden.

I.e., the water alone. The permitted wine is not considered, for any amount of the forbidden wine mixed into it would cause the permitted wine to be prohibited.

For the forbidden wine will not have entered them.

And thus the forbidden wine could enter.

They may, however, be sold to a gentile, minus the increase in their value produced by the forbidden wine [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De ‘ah 134:8)].

Avodah Zarah 66a emphasizes that even if the fresh wine has the same flavor as the grapes, the grapes are not forbidden. For the wine is considered as a different type of substance.

Hence even if it imparts its flavor, the figs are not forbidden. Although the version of Avodah Zarah 5:2 which the Rambam relies on differs from the standard published text of the Mishnah, the Rambam’s ruling is accepted as halachah by Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 134:9).

This is permitted, for the gentile is paying for the bread alone. He is not paying for the wine at all.

If, however, the Jew saw a fellow Jew selling bread to the gentile, he might purchase it from him.

Chapter 17, Halachah 9. A Jew will have no way of knowing that this bread was not baked by the gentile. Hence he will refrain from purchasing it from him. In a place where it is customary to purchase bread from gentiles, there is no way of benefiting from the wheat [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 134:11)].

As Avodah Zarah 65b states, the kernels of wheat are cracked and this causes them to absorb the wine (Lechem Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

The Radbaz emphasizes that the taste of the wine :i, ecomes blended in with the taste of the wheat to the extent that it cannot be detected. Nevertheless, it definitely has an effect on the taste of the wheat and therefore it is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

The vinegar is forbidden, as the wine was.

The fact that originally one was wine and one was beer is not significant.

If it does, the mixture is forbidden. If not, it is permitted. Even if the vinegar originally came from wine, it is considered as a different substance.

It is not automatically permitted, because vinegar impairs the flavor of wine, for there are some who prefer vinegar to wine (Rashba, as quoted by Turei Zahav B4:8).