Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Kinah usually has the connotation of jealousy. There are, however, instances where it hasthe meaning ‘‘warning,’’ as in Joel 2:18.

The intent in all these examples is that it is unlikely that the woman would engage inadultery with such a man: the father and the brother because of the family connection, thegentile or the servant because we assume that a modest Jewish woman would not associate with such people, and the impotent man because of his physical condition. By citing suchexamples, the Rambam implies that surely such a warning can be given with regard to anyordinary man.

These can be the same two witnesses in whose presence the warning was administered(Hilchot Edut 21:5).

We suspect that she committed adultery.

As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 11:14, a woman who commits adultery is forbidden to herhusband. Since we suspect that this woman committed adultery, she is forbidden until herfaithfulness is proven.

For it is her immodest behavior that caused her to become forbidden (Hilchot Ishut 24:24).

Even though in general a woman is allowed to enter into privacy with two men of estab-lished moral standing, in this instance, since the husband expressed his disapproval, suchan act warrants drinking the bitter water.

Entering into privacy (yichud) with another man is forbidden (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, ch. 22). Nevertheless, Kiddushin 81a states that as long as a warning was not given, such an act is not sufficient cause for a woman to be forbidden to her husband.

Implied is that the warning is effective after a boy reaches the age of nine, for a boy is fitto engage in sexual relations from the age of nine, as explained in Hilchot Ishut 11:3. RavOvadiah of Bertinoro (Sotah 4:4) differs and maintains that a youth must attain majoritybefore a warning is effective. There are several Midrashic sources for the Rambam’s ruling.

And she must drink the bitter water. The rationale for this ruling is that as long as the woman has not entered into privacy with the other man, the husband’s warning has not been reinforced by her conduct. Accordingly, since he has authority over his warning, he can withdraw it. When, however, she has already entered into privacy with the other man, she is already required by the Torah to drink the bitter water. Her husband has no authority over the Torah’s requirement, and thus, he can no longer withdraw his warning (Likkutei Sichos, Vol. IV). See also the gloss of the Tzafnat Paneach to this halachah.

In this instance, the husband is required to pay his wife the money due her by virtue ofher ketubah because, although he is bound by the evidence of his own eyes, it is not suf-ficient to require his wife to drink the bitter water. For that, the testimony of two witnessesis necessary.

The Rambam is speaking about an instance when, despite the gossip generated about the woman, there is no (or only one) witness who can testify about her entering into privacy with the man involved. Hence, because of her immodest conduct, he must divorce her. He must, however, pay the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, because, as stated in Sotah 6b, the bitter water will not test the chastity of a woman whose immodest conduct has become public knowledge.

Since the testimony of one witness is not sufficient to require her to drink the bitterwater, and yet the husband relies on the testimony of the witness, she is forbidden to thehusband, but he must bear the financial burden of the prohibition. (See Hilchot Ishut24:17.)

For a woman does not become forbidden until two witnesses testify that she enteredinto privacy with the man in question.

For that is possible only when a warning was administered by the husband, as stated inthe following halachah.

Since the men in question are incapable of acting on their own, the court takes theinitiative on their behalf. The court’s action has two objectives: to maintain the moralstandard of the Jewish people, and if that fails, to protect the husband’s interest and causea woman who acts immodestly to pay the penalty for her conduct.

From the commentaries, it appears that he is required to do so; he does not have anoption.

In this instance as well, entering into privacy with the man is considered an immodestact, sufficient cause for the woman to forfeit the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

Even if she desires to in an attempt to prove her innocence.

If, however, the other witness who saw the man and the woman enter into privacy saysthat they did not engage in relations, the woman does not forfeit the money due her byvirtue of her ketubah (Beit Shmuel 178:12).

Implied is that even if there is one witness, she is not to be tested by the bitter water. Generally, the Torah requires two witnesses. In this case, an exception was made because there is an indication of immodesty.

All the individuals mentioned are normally not accepted as witnesses. Nevertheless, anexception is made in this instance, as the Rambam explains. The testimony of witnesseswho have violated prohibitions of Scriptural origin is not accepted, because we suspectthat they will lie.

As stated in Hilchot Gerushin 12:16, these women are the woman’s mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her husband’s other wife, her yevamah and her husband’s daughter from another marriage.

The Rambam’s wording refers to the following concept. Generally, because of the badfeelings that characterize the relationship between these pairs, testimony is also disqualifiedin the reverse of the above situations. For example, if the husband of the daughter of a woman’s husband is missing, the woman may not testify about the matter, although she hasno natural reason to hate the other woman.

The testimony of these women is accepted because through it, the woman is granted themoney due her by virtue of her ketubah. We assume that these women would desire todiscredit her entirely and cause her to forfeit this money. Since without their testimony, thewoman is forbidden to her husband until she drinks the bitter water and forfeits the moneydue her by virtue of her ketubah, their testimony abets her position rather than harms it.(Indeed, note the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who questions why the testimony of thesewomen is accepted at all.)

In most instances, when the statements of one witness are countered by the statementsof another, the two are considered to be of equal weight, and thus the statements of thefirst witness are no longer considered.

This principle applies not only with regard to a sotah, but with regard to all instances inwhich one witness’s testimony is considered equivalent to that of two witnesses (Sotah 31b)— e.g., testimony regarding the death of a woman’s husband (Hilchot Gerushin 12:18).

I.e., one testified directly after the other.

Since the testimony of the first witness was never established, it is not given more weight than it would ordinarily. Since the woman’s fidelity is in doubt, she is required to drink the bitter water. The principles in this and the following halachot are paralleled in Hilchot Gerushin, Chapter 12.

In this instance, the testimony of the pair of witnesses balances the testimony of thewitness who said that she committed adultery, even if that witness’s testimony had alreadybeen established in court.

Compare to Hilchot Rotzeach USh’mirat HaNefesh 9:16.

Since the woman’s fidelity remains in doubt, she must drink the waters to clarify thesituation.

See Halachah 14.