Avodat Kochavim - Chapter 12

In this chapter, the Rambam describes several prohibitions which comprise rites that do not involve the actual worship of idols. The Torah forbids them, however, because they are connected with ceremonial practices performed by idolaters. Note also the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapter 37, where the Rambam mentions this concept.
The Tur (Yoreh De’ah 181) takes issue with the Rambam’s statements, noting that there is no statement in the Bible, the Mishnah, or the Talmud, which mentions this point. He objects to the association of the mitzvot with any particular rationale. From a halachic perspective, the mitzvot should be fulfilled because they are God’s decrees, independent of any rational explanation.
The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah, ibid.) defends the Rambam’s statements, based on the ending of Hilchot Me’ilah, where the Rambam states:
It is proper for a person to meditate on the judgments of the holy Torah and know their ultimate rationale to the extent of his capacity.
There are other authorities who draw out halachic concepts from the association of these prohibitions with idol worship. For example, based on this connection, the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 251) and Sefer HaKovetz forbid the removal of facial hair even when the prohibition against shaving is not violated, as mentioned in the notes to Halachah 7.

The Torah’s prohibition applies only to shaving. One may cut this hair with scissors, as explained in Halachah 6.

The definition of this term is found in Halachah 6.

Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 251) explains that this is a particularly severe prohibition, since its violation involves making a sign for idolatry on our own bodies.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 43) and Sefer HaChinuch (loc. cit.) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains that although this prohibition involves two different activities (shaving the right corner and shaving the left corner), it is not considered to be two mitzvot, because the Torah’s expression forbidding such shaving includes both sides in the same phrase. Had the Torah mentioned both the right and left sides, it would be considered to be two mitzvot.

As mentioned in Chapter 11, Halachah 1, this style of cutting hair is referred to as a blorit and was practiced by the gentiles.

In which case, he does not resemble the gentiles (Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.).

From this, we see that the mitzvah is not dependent on the rationale mentioned above.

Either his own head or a colleague’s head.

The Ra’avad maintains that this person is not punished, because he did not perform a deed. He is, however, considered to have transgressed the Torah’s prohibition. The Kessef Mishneh differs and maintains that since the person did not perform the deed of shaving, he is not considered to have violated the prohibition at all. This applies even when he specifically ordered the person who shaved him to do so. The Ra’avad’s opinion is, however, supported by the Lechem Mishneh and other authorities.

By moving his head so that it is easier to shave.

A minor below the age of 13.

A child would not be held responsible if he shaved himself, because a child is not held liable for the violation of any of the Torah’s prohibitions until he reaches majority.

Who would be liable if he shaved his own head.

The Kessef Mishneh differentiates between these two instances. With regard to shaving a man’s head, he explains that although a woman is not held liable, she is, nevertheless, forbidden to do so (Halachah 5). With regard to shaving her own head, there is no prohibition whatsoever.

This association also teaches other concepts — among them, that one is liable only when one removes the hair with a razor.

Although Kiddushin 35b mentions several ways to derive this concept through Biblical exegesis, the Rambam chooses to rely on the simple fact of the matter.

Whose performance of mitzvot is generally equated with that of women (Chaggigah 4a).

Had the Rambam derived the above point from the exegesis of a Biblical verse, this conclusion would not be acceptable. Since, however, he derives the concept from logic, the same logic leads to the conclusion that slaves should be held liable for this act (Kessef Mishneh).

Kiddushin 35a derives this concept from Numbers 5:6, “When a man or a woman commits any of the transgressions that men commit....”

The verse prohibiting such contact, Leviticus 21:1, begins, “Speak unto the sons of Aharon....” Kiddushin 35b explains that this expression excludes women.

This refers to mitzvot which are applicable only on certain days — e.g., the blowing of the shofar and taking the lulav and etrog — and also mitzvot that are applicable during the day and not the night — e.g., tefillin.

Through the recitation of kiddush. Since women are obligated by the prohibition against working on the Sabbath, they are also obligated by the positive commandment of sanctifying its holiness (Berachot 20b).
The restriction of this mitzvah to the Sabbath follows the opinion of the Lechem Mishnah, who maintains that the sanctification of the festivals is a Rabbinic injunction. There are, however, other opinions, which consider the mitzvah as applying to the festivals as well.

Since women are obligated by the prohibition against eating chametz, they are also obligated by the positive commandment of eating matzah (Pesachim 43b).

Pesachim 91b explains that the Torah uses the expression (Exodus 12:4): “According to the number of souls [in a household]... individuals should be designated for the lamb,” to include women in the observance of this mitzvah.

The gathering of the entire Jewish people to hear the reading of the Torah by the king which is held every seven years. (See Deuteronomy 31:10-13.) Here, the Torah explicitly mentions that women should attend.

Though in a larger sense this refers to all forms of celebration, in particular it refers to the offering of peace sacrifices in connection with the festival.

Similarly, women are obligated to fulfill most positive commandments whose observance is not associated with a specific time — e.g., the belief in God, mezuzah, and tzedakah. There are, however, several positive commandments whose observance is not associated with a specific time which women are not obligated to fulfill — e.g., Torah study, the redemption of the first born, and the remembrance of Amalek. (See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Kiddushin 1:7.)

The word tumtum has its roots in the word atum, which means “a solid block.” It refers to a person whose genitalia are covered by skin, and it is impossible to determine whether the person is male or female. (See also Hilchot Ishut 2:25.) Should a tumtum undergo an operation and the person’s gender be revealed, that person is bound by the laws which apply to that gender.

Androgynous is a combination of the Greek words meaning “man” and “woman.” It refers to a person who possesses the sexual organs of both genders. (See also Hilchot Ishut 2:24.)

I.e., it is unknown whether they are governed by the laws applying to a man or those applying to a woman. The doubts are, however, different in nature. With regard to a tumtum, there is an unresolved question regarding his gender. With regard to an androgynous, however, the question revolves around the Sages’ failure to define his status.

The obligation to perform all the positive commandments that are associated with time, and the various other commandments which men are obligated to perform, but women are not.

Bikkurim 4:3 explains that this refers to the prohibition against being alone with men (yichud), and the laws of ritual impurity that apply to women.

Punishment is not administered when we are in doubt of the person’s obligation.

As mentioned in Halachah 2.

As stated in that halachah, she is not punished for doing so. The Ra’avad and the Kessef Mishneh maintain that this prohibition is Rabbinic in origin. Other authorities, however, state that the prohibition stems from Scriptural Law.

Though the child himself would not be held liable, an adult is liable for shaving the corners of his head, as stated in Halachah 1. Therefore, even a woman is forbidden to shave the corners of his head. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, based on Nazir 57b, does not accept the Rambam’s view, and maintains that a woman may shave a child’s head.

The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 181:1, defines “corners” as referring to the place where the skull is joined to the jaw. The Beit Lechem Yehudah writes that the area which the Ari zal would leave uncut extended slightly above his ears.

The Tur’s text of the Rambam stated “four” instead of “forty.”

In one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that the forbidden area is about the size of a thumb.

In one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that he would trim the corners of his head. He explains that — in contrast to the law applying to a Nazarite’s hair — there is no positive commandment to allow this hair to grow and no need to do so. In many Jewish communities, however, it is customary to allow this hair to grow. Since its removal involves the violation of a Scriptural prohibition, they consider the growth of this hair as a sign of Jewish identity.

As is explained in the notes to the following halachah, there is a debate among the Rabbinic authorities if it is permissible to remove the hair of the beard using scissors or even using implements whose effectiveness is equivalent to that of a razor.

Note our notes to Halachah 1. In Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 44), the Rambam notes that even in his time, it was customary for Christian monks to shave their faces.

Sefer HaMitzvot (op. cit.) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 252) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 181:11) writes that there are many opinions with regard to the definition of these five “corners.” Therefore, “anyone who fears heaven should fulfill all the opinions and not shave any portion of his beard with a razor.”

As implied by the verse’s mention of “the corners of your beard,” and not merely “your beard” (Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.).

Nevertheless, as explained in the notes to Halachah 1, the prohibition is considered to be a single mitzvah, and not five.

From the Rambam’s expression, it appears that the removal of facial hair with scissors is forbidden. One is not, however, punished for such an act. Many contemporary authorities have explained that growing a beard has been accepted as a sign that a person is God-fearing and precise in his observance of the mitzvot. Accordingly, anyone who desires to be viewed as such should not remove his beard even if he does not use a razor.

Note our notes to Halachah 1.

Since this is not the norm. Kiddushin 35b derives this concept from the exegesis of the verse from Leviticus quoted above.

It is, however, forbidden for her to do so, as explained in Halachah 1.

Mo’ed Katan 18a allows the shaving of this hair because it is not one of the five “corners” of the beard.

This statement reinforces the interpretation mentioned in the previous halachah that the Rambam did not allow one’s facial hair to be removed by means other than shaving.
It must be noted that there are authorities who object to the shaving of the mustache. Rabbenu Chanan’el explained that the corners of the mustache are the two lower “corners” of the beard. Others (among them Rabbenu Yonah and the Bayit Chadash) associate its removal with the prohibitions against following the “ways of gentiles” and adorning oneself as does a woman.

The Rabbis have explained that it is proper manners to remove the hair which interferes with eating. Even some Kabbalists who would not touch their beards at all would trim their mustaches (Ben Ish Chai).

Which are often shaved by women.

As an extension of the prohibition against a man beautifying himself in the same manner as a woman does.

The punishment given for violating any Rabbinic ordinance.

Which is prohibited, as mentioned in the following halachah.

The Prisha (Yoreh De’ah 182) states that the word “men” refers even to gentiles. Even if gentile men follow this practice, a Jew is not punished for doing so.

The expression, “one is not given stripes,” and the contrasting statement, “It is permitted,” lead to the conclusion that, even in these communities, it is forbidden for men to remove this hair.

But not with a razor (Siftei Cohen 182:3).

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 39) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 542) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. Curiously, with regard to this and the following prohibition, the Rambam departs from his usual custom and does not mention the Biblical proof-text, Deuteronomy 22:5, for these prohibitions.

Needless to say, a hat that was styled for women is permitted.

Many sources (e.g., Nazir 59a; Targum Onkelos on Deuteronomy, loc. cit.) directly associate this prohibition with a woman’s donning armor or carrying weapons. Significantly, in the listing of mitzvot which precedes these halachot, the Rambam defines the mitzvah as prohibiting a woman from wearing “armament or a man’s apparel.”

I.e., a woman’s coiffure may not resemble a man’s. The Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah read תגלה, “reveal,” instead of תגלח, “cut.” According to that version, the Rambam is saying that when a woman goes out without covering her head, in addition to violating the basic laws of modesty (see Hilchot Ishut 24:11-12; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:17), she is also transgressing this Scriptural prohibition.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 40) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 543) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam mentions two rationales for this and the previous prohibition:
a) Such behavior would lead to licentiousness;
b) The pagans would often dress in this manner for their rituals.

Accordingly, the definition of the pertinent rulings changes according to the norms of the society. Garments which might have been forbidden for men or women in one era may be permitted in another, depending on the standards set by the particular society.

Note the Rama’s statements, Orach Chayim 696:8, which state that on Purim or at a wedding, this prohibition may be waived for the sake of adding to the festive mood of the celebration. The Bayit Chadash and others, however, do not accept this leniency.

To prevent the process of aging from being detected.

For violating this prohibition. The Ra’avad (see also Sho’el UMeshiv, Vol. I, Responsum 210) differs, and maintains that such an act violates only a Rabbinic prohibition. His opinion, however, is not accepted by the later authorities (Darchei Teshuvah 182:15).

Women are accustomed — and therefore, allowed — to hide their age, but not men.

The prohibition applies only when one attempts to look younger. Dyeing one’s hair grey is not forbidden (Turei Zahav 182:7).

Whose status with regard to gender is doubtful, as explained in Halachah 4.

As the Rambam states in that halachah, “the stringencies of both a man and a woman are applied to them.” Hence, they are not allowed to clothe themselves in a manner which is distinct to either a man or a woman.
According to the Yemenite manuscripts mentioned above which substitute תגלה, “reveal,” for תגלח, “cut,” this clause also must be amended accordingly.

Because we are unsure of their gender. Accordingly, it cannot be definitely said that a prohibition has been violated.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 41) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 253) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 253) states that the order mentioned by the Rambam is significant. If it is reversed and the ink is placed on the skin before an incision is made, one is not held liable. The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 180:1), however, does not accept this view.

Branding themselves as the deity’s servants, as it were.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam states that certain sects in Egypt followed these practices in his time as well.

The Tosefta (Makkot 3:9) adds that one must have the intent that the inscription is made for the sake of idol worship. This point, however, is not accepted by the halachic authorities.

The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 180:4, states that one is not held liable for branding a servant. The Rama, however, explains that it is, nevertheless, forbidden to do so.

By cutting into his flesh.

For punishment.

The two words “dyed inscription” imply that both activities must be performed for the person to be held liable.

On himself or on a colleague.

The Kessef Mishneh compares this to the prohibition against shaving the corners of one’s head (Halachah 1). Based on this comparison, there are authorities who maintain that although punishment is not administered — because punishment is administered only when a person commits a deed which violates a prohibition — the person who is tattooed is still considered to have transgressed this Scriptural prohibition.

The prohibition applies only when a person makes such gouges as a sign of bereavement over the dead. Even when he gouges himself as an expression of grief for other matters, he is not liable, as stated in Halachah 16. Nevertheless, as stated in the following halachah, one is also liable for gashing or gouging oneself for idols.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 45) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 467) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Though Leviticus 21:5 specifically forbids the priests from expressing their grief in this manner, that injunction is not considered to be a separate commandment. This prohibition applies to both men and women.

Makkot 20b and the Sifra derive this concept through the exegesis of the verse from Leviticus cited above. Although he performs only a single activity, the verse teaches us that he is held responsible for each person he has in mind.

Each separate act warrants punishment.

Note Halachah 15, which explains an instance where one is liable for five measures of lashes even though only a single warning is given, Seemingly, the same law would apply in this instance (Turei Even).

Based on Makkot 21a, it appears that gashing is done with an instrument, and gouging with one’s bare hands.

Thus, regardless of how one performs the act, if one mutilates oneself in grief over the dead, one is held liable. There are opinions (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 180:7), however, which allow one to beat one’s flesh in grief until blood flows.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that this mutilation was not part of the rites used to worship the false deity — for if so, a violator would be executed — but rather a voluntary act, intended to attract the deity’s attention.

The verse refers to the prophets of the Baal who engaged in the confrontation with the prophet Elijah at Mount Carmel.

This implies that this was not an isolated occurrence, but rather the routine followed by the Baal’s priests.

This injunction is not considered to be a separate commandment, but rather a further explanation of the mitzvah stated previously.

Since that is the normal practice, as the verse from Kings continues: “With their swords and lances.”

Doing so is, nevertheless, forbidden (Tzemach Tzedek).

In Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 45), the Rambam explains that the interpretation which follows is an allegory, and the simple meaning of the verse is to prohibit gashing oneself in grief. Nevertheless, it is significant that the Rambam includes this “allegory” in a text which is, as he states in his introduction, “halachot, halachot.” Thus, he emphasizes how important unity is to the Jewish people.
There is an important halachic dimension to the Rambam’s explanation in Sefer HaMitzvot. One of the principles of Torah law is that punishment is never administered for the violation of a לאו שבכללות (“a prohibition which includes within it several different injunctions”; see Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3). If this allegorical interpretation of the mitzvah were considered to be included in the simple meaning of the mitzvah, this principle would also apply regarding this mitzvah, and lashes might not be administered when one gashed oneself in mourning (Kessef Mishneh).

This decision has been the subject of much discussion among the Rabbis, because it appears to run contrary to one of the accepted principles of halachah.
The Rabbis concluded that whenever there is a difference in opinion between Abbaye and Ravva, the halachah follows Ravva, with the exception of six specific instances (יעל קגם). In the present case, the Rambam quotes Abbaye’s opinion even though Ravva differs, stating that the prohibition applies only when one follows a divergent opinion without the support of a formal Rabbinical court (Yevamot 14a). When, however, there is a Rabbinical court which advocates each of the differing opinions — e.g., the differences of opinion between the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel — there is no prohibition against following either view until the halachah is determined by the supreme Sanhedrin.
Many authorities have advanced different explanations for the Rambam’s decision. The most straightforward is that of the Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1384), who explains that the Rambam favored Abbaye’s view because of the emphasis on unity. Furthermore, selecting it over Ravva’s in this instance does not represent a break with the accepted tradition, since the difference of opinion here does not center on positions adopted by Abbaye and Ravva independently, but rather on their interpretation of Resh Lakish’s statements.

The Hebrew גדד means both “gash” and “group.”

It must be noted that the Shulchan Aruch does not quote this halachah as law. It would appear that while many of the subsequent Rabbis appreciate the ideal of unity this halachah espouses, they felt that compelling people to conform to a uniform standard would create more strife than would result from the existence of different views.
One of the practical applications of the issues under discussion is the issue of differences between Sephardic and Ashkenazic religious practices (and similarly, the variety of different approaches that exist within these two major groupings). All of the contemporary authorities agree that it is desirable for each group to adhere to its native customs without change. This plurality of halachic perspectives is an expression — and not a negation — of the all-encompassing unity that permeates Torah Judaism. (See Ezrat Cohen, Responsum 103.)

Even today, we find the colloquialism, “tear out his hair in grief.”

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 171) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 468) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Menachot 37b explains that here the intent is not the area which is literally “between the eyes,” but rather the center of the head.

Although, Leviticus 21:5 states specifically that a priest may not create a bald spot on his head, that verse should not be understood to be a separate commandment, but rather a further explanation of this prohibition.

As explained in Halachah 12. If, however, he creates a single bald spot for five individuals, he receives only a single measure of lashes. In contrast, were he to gouge himself once for each of these individuals, he would receive a commensurate number of measures of lashes.

Pulling his hair out

That removes the hair chemically.

Because it is considered as if he performed five different activities.

As mentioned in the verse from Deuteronomy quoted above.

Although the subject of the verse is the priests, Makkot 20b explains that this verse is used to define the scope of the prohibition for everyone, both priests and Israelites.

Nega’im 6:1 defines a gris as an area which encompasses 36 hairs as they stand naturally on one’s head.

Rabbenu Asher disagrees and maintains that one is liable even if he removes two hairs. Furthermore, even the removal of a single hair is forbidden. (See Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 180:9; Gilyon HaMaharsha.)

Though it is forbidden to do, punishment is not administered.

As mentioned in the Biblical proof-texts.

As explained in Halachah 13.

As explained above, the person who performs these activities is held liable. In contrast, the person to whom these acts are done is held liable only if he assists in the performance of the deed.

Each is held liable as if he performed the prohibition himself in its entirety.