Avodat Kochavim - Chapter 8

Although generally, it is forbidden to benefit from any entity worshiped as a false deity, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 2, this law does not apply in such instances. Idol worship is a human error. Hence, an object whose existence is not dependent on man cannot become forbidden because of it.

Avodah Zarah 45a derives this concept from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 12:2: “You shall surely destroy all the places where the gentiles... served their gods: on the mountains, on the hills, and under any luxuriant tree.” The Sages explained that the verse indicates that shrines which are “on” the mountains and the hills and “under” the trees must be destroyed, but not the mountains, hills, and trees themselves. Our Sages exclaim: “Must God cause His world to be destroyed because of the fools?”

If, however, the trees were planted with the intent that they be worshiped, they are considered to be an asherah and forbidden, as explained in Halachah 3.

The Rambam’s phraseology leads to the conclusion that a spring which provides water for only one person is forbidden if it is worshiped. The Prishah (Yoreh De’ah 145, based on Avodah Zarah 47a), explains that were an individual to quarry out a spring to worship as a deity, it would be forbidden to benefit from it. Accordingly, when a spring that is worshiped provides water for only one person, we fear that it was quarried out for these purposes. In contrast, when many people benefit from a spring, we do not harbor such suspicions, even when the spring is worshiped.
[In their commentaries on Yoreh De’ah 145:1, the Turei Zahav and the Siftei Cohen reject this premise and maintain that as long as the water is attached to the spring, it is not forbidden, despite its being worshiped. Indeed, the Turei Zahav explains that even the Rambam would accept such a decision. See the Commentary to the following halachah.]

Temurah 29a derives this concept as follows: Our Sages required a special verse from the Tanach to teach us that an animal that was worshiped as a deity may not be offered as a sacrifice. Were such an animal to be forbidden for use by a common person, no verse would be necessary to teach us that it is not fit for sacrificial purposes.

Nevertheless, after the tree has been worshiped, all the fruits which grow on it during the time it is worshiped are forbidden, as explained in Halachah 3.

The Paschal sacrifice offered by our ancestors in Egypt could be used to exemplified this principle. Though the Egyptians worshiped the lamb, our ancestors offered it as a sacrifice to God. Nevertheless, it could be argued that although the Egyptians served the species of the lamb, there is no proof that the lambs offered by the Jews had been worshiped.

But not yet used for that purpose.

As a deity itself.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 15, which explains that anything set aside to be offered to an idol is not forbidden until it has actually been offered.
Temurah 28b cites a striking example of this principle. Judges (Chapter 6) relates that Gideon offered a bull which his father had been fattening for seven years to offer as a sacrifice to Baal as a sacrifice to God.

Temurah 29a gives two examples: One shears the animal for the sake of idol worship or uses it to perform work for an idol. See also Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 4:4.

The term “signs” refers to the windpipe and esophagus, which must both be slit open for ritual slaughter to be acceptable. (See Hilchot Shechitah 1:9.)

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 145:9) do not accept this prohibition and permit the use of an article exchanged for an article that was exchanged for an idol.

According to the Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 145), this leniency does not apply when such actions are performed by a gentile. [In this regard, an apostate Jew is considered like a gentile. See Ra’avad.
Though the halachah follows the Beit Yosef’s opinion, the Or Sameach offers a different interpretation of the Rambam’s words and maintains that neither Jew nor gentile can cause his colleague’s property to become forbidden.

According to the Or Sameach, this is a blanket statement, applying under all circumstances. The Kessef Mishneh, however, cites Hilchot Shechitah 2:21 (which is based on Chulin 41a), where the Rambam clarifies the rationale for this decision, explaining that the person presenting the offering is only performing the act to “cause his colleague discomfort.”
The phrasing of the present halachah appears to indicate that a person has no potential to cause his colleague’s property to become forbidden. From Hilchot Shechitah, however, it appears that were he to desire to sacrifice an animal to an idol, he would cause it to become forbidden. Leniency is granted only because his intent is not to do so, and he appears to do so merely to cause his colleague suffering.
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch 145:8 (based on the passage from Chulin) rule that if a person was warned against offering the sacrifice to an idol and acknowledged the warning, it is forbidden to benefit from the animal. See also Halachah 3 and notes.

Because the earth cannot be manipulated, nor was it made by man, as above.

From the Rambam’s statements, it appears that if these diggings were carried out for the sake of an idol, they are automatically forbidden. The Tur (loc. cit.) differs and maintains that one must worship the land after the digging is completed. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit., 145:7) quotes the Rambam’s statement.

Avodah Zarah 59a states that since the water was not separated by human activity, it is considered to be attached to its source. Hence, it is governed by the principles mentioned at the beginning of the previous halachah.

It is thus “manipulated by man.”

The Turei Zahav 145:2 explains that this decision applies even when the rocks slid far from the mountain. This decision, however, is not accepted by all authorities.

Hence, the leniencies mentioned in the previous halachah apply.
The Ra’avad objects to this decision, noting that the matter is debated by the Sages in Avodah Zarah 46a, and no decision is reached. Since this is a question of Scriptural law, it would seem appropriate to follow the more stringent view.
The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 145:1) explains that the Rambam’s decision is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Avodah Zarah 3:6), which rules that these rocks are permitted.

Were the scenario to be completed at this point, the brick would not be forbidden, because an object of worship does not become forbidden until it is actually worshiped.

Serving it as a false deity.

The explanation of this law (quoted from Avodah Zarah 46a) depends on the difference of interpretation between the Beit Yosef and the Or Sameach mentioned in the Commentary to Halachah 1.
According to the Or Sameach, who maintains that a gentile cannot cause property belonging to a Jew to become forbidden, this law can be explained as follows: Although the gentile’s actions would not generally cause the brick to become forbidden, since the Jew indicated his desire to worship the brick, we assume that he is pleased with the gentile’s act. Therefore, it becomes forbidden.
According to the Beit Yosef’s opinion (see Yoreh De’ah 145), which maintains that a gentile can cause a Jew’s property to become forbidden, this passage teaches us that the Jew’s act is considered sufficient to cause the brick to become forbidden.
See Sotah 47a, although in some printings it was eliminated by the censor, which states that one of Yehoshua ben Parchia’s students, presumably Yeshu of Nazareth, erected a brick and bowed down to it.

This situation is left as an unresolved question in Avodah Zarah (loc. cit.). Rashi explains that the question is whether standing up an egg is, like standing up a brick, a significant act, or whether, because an egg is much smaller than a brick, standing it up is of no significance. Since the question is left unresolved, the Rambam follows the more severe view.
This and the previous law indicate that for a Jew’s acceptance of idol worship to be significant in this context, it is necessary for him to perform a deed; a verbal statement or thought is of no consequence.

As long as a plant is attached to its source, the fact that it is worshiped does not cause it to be forbidden, as explained in Halachah 1. When, however, it is cut off and worshiped, it becomes forbidden.

The Ra’avad objects to this decision, stating that the principle of considering one object as a “handle” of another applies only with regard to questions of ritual purity, and not regarding the prohibition of articles because of their connection with idol worship.
Though Rashi’s interpretation of Chulin 128a appears to support the Ra’avad’s view, the Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz explain that the passage can also be interpreted according to the Rambam’s perspective.

Although, as stated in Halachah 1, worshiping a tree does not cause it to become forbidden, since at the time the tree was planted it could be “manipulated by man,” idol worship could cause it to become forbidden.

In Exodus 34:13 and in Deuteronomy 7:5 and 12:3. There are many more references in the works of the prophets. See Chapter 6, note 28, which describes the worship of asherot. Note also the statements of the Zohar (Vol. I, 49a), which associate the rites of an asherah with the worship of the moon.

Not for the purpose of idol worship.

Since these branches come about as a result of a human activity carried out for the sake of idol worship, they are forbidden.

Although a deed was carried out with the tree itself, the tree — unlike the animals mentioned in Halachah 1 — does not become forbidden (Avodah Zarah 48a).

All the fruits and branches that are growing on the tree when it is first worshiped are permitted. The prohibition only applies to those which begin growing from the time the tree was worshiped (Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 145:5).

Avodah Zarah (loc. cit.) mentions this law with regard to date palms in Babylon that were set aside for the purpose of making beer for pagan celebrations.

Thus, we see that its worship also involved Bacchanalian rites, wild revelry in honor of the god of wine.

Although we generally do not accept a gentile’s word, we accept his statements in this instance, since the circumstances attest to their genuineness.

See also Chapter 7, Halachah 11, which explains (based on Avodah Zarah 48a) that such a tree is also considered to be an asherah.

Rabbenu Nissim explains that this prohibition applies only when the tree was originally planted for this purpose. Otherwise, as in an instance when the tree itself is worshiped (see Halachah 1), it is not forbidden.
Tosafot (Avodah Zarah 47b) do not accept this view. They explain that, although according to Scriptural Law, the tree is permitted, the Rabbis forbade deriving benefit from it as long as the false deity is located under it.
From the Rambam’s inclusion of this law in this halachah, it would appear that he subscribes to the latter view. Though the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 145:6) quotes this law without specifying that the tree must be planted for this intent, the Siftei Cohen (145:19) mentions this factor.

The Rambam’s phraseology differs slightly from his source, Avodah Zarah (loc. cit.), which states, “when it (the deity) is negated.”

The Kessef Mishneh explains that, in contrast to the previous halachah, in this instance, even the branches of the tree which grew while the deity was located under the tree are permitted

The Rambam mentions a gentile in this instance because, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 4, a false deity made by a gentile is prohibited immediately. In contrast, if it was made by a Jew, it is not forbidden until it was worshiped.

Although a building that has already been constructed is connected to the earth, and thus cannot be “manipulated by man,” it can still become forbidden. Avodah Zarah 47b explains that since the building materials were originally separate from the earth, the fact that they were later attached to the earth does not change the ruling applying to them.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1492) and other authorities note that in other places in the Mishneh Torah — e.g., Hilchot Me’ilah 5:5 — the Rambam considers a house, like a mountain or a tree, to be an article which is attached to the earth and beyond man’s control. The Radbaz explains that the more stringent position was adopted in our particular instance because of the serious nature of the prohibition against the worship of false deities.

With artistic forms (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 3:7).

This also refers to an instance where the building itself is worshiped, and not where it is merely serving as a shrine for the worship of other deities.

If the house belonged to a gentile, it is unnecessary for all the additions to be removed. After making minor changes to nullify the house’s connection with worship, benefiting from it is permissible (Turei Zahav, Yoreh De’ah 145:8).

If these “improvements” were made by a Jew, his intent is not taken into consideration and the prohibition takes effect only if the building is actually worshiped.

Since it was not constructed with a forbidden intent.

Although the house was not originally constructed to be a shrine, as long as it serves this purpose, it is forbidden to benefit from it.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 145:3) relates that if the house was originally constructed to be a shrine for a false deity, the removal of the idol is not sufficient to cause it to become permitted. Rather, the connection it shares with idol worship must be nullified. Furthermore, such nullification is effective only when the house is owned by a gentile. If it is owned by a Jew, the nullification is of no consequence.

Note the differences in the laws involving Jews and gentiles mentioned above.

I.e., the substance of the stone was itself carved and shaped.

A Jew, see above regarding a gentile.

Since it was hewn from the ground without a forbidden intent.

Even though it was not originally hewn out with this intention.

In this case as well, we must assume that the stone was not originally hewn out with this intention. Otherwise, the prohibition would continue even after the idol was removed.

Rashi, Avodah Zarah 47a, states that this refers to a house which is itself worshiped.

The commentaries explain that this is referring to an instance where the person’s house and the shrine share a single wall. The wall is located, however, on property belonging to the shrine.

To its former boundaries. By rebuilding the wall, the person completes the construction of the idol’s shrine.

The Rambam’s text of the source of this halachah, the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 3:6, does not mention “four cubits,” nor is this phrase included in many manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The intent appears to be that he should move the wall entirely onto his own property. Other authorities, however, include this phrase in the mishnah. According to their view (which is accepted by the Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 143:2), one must leave open a space of four cubits.

Avodah Zarah 47b states that the space should be used “as an outhouse for children.”

I.e., the space upon which the wall originally stood belonged to both. The Rambam is speaking about an instance where the property lines are being redrawn.

This is the common practice when a wall falls. (See Bava Batra 1:1.)

Though he must leave an open space between the wall he builds and the wall of the shrine, he may include his portion of the area from the fallen wall as part of this space (Beit Yosef, Yoreh De’ah 143).

And cannot be included in the open space.

Our translation follows Rashi’s commentary. Rabbenu Nissim maintains that if the wall was built jointly by the two parties, the Jew is entitled to half of the building materials. Nevertheless, even though he follows this view in principle, in practice, he forbids the Jew from using any of the building materials which he does not recognize as his own. The Rama (Yoreh De’ah, loc. cit.) quotes Rabbenu Nissim’s view.

The placement of this halachah appears problematic. On the surface, it would have been more appropriate to relate it after Chapter 7, Halachah 1, which mentions the commandment to destroy idol worship, or after the following halachah, which completes the description of the types of articles that are forbidden because of their association with idol worship.
Perhaps, since the prohibition against benefiting from the coating of an idol is considered to be a mitzvah in its own right, the Rambam concludes his discussion of the mitzvah to destroy prohibited articles before entering that subject (Kin’at Eliyahu).

See Chapter 7, Halachot 2 and 9.

The Sages objected to this opinion, maintaining that the dust will serve as fertilizer, and thus benefit man. This objection is not accepted, since the fertilizer is not the only factor causing the crops to grow (see the notes to Chapter 7, Halachah 14, which describes the concept of זה וזה גורם), and it was not intentionally used for this purpose (Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 43a).

See the notes to Chapter 7, Halachah 5, which explains why the Dead Sea is mentioned.
The Merkevat HaMishneh cites Hilchot Chametz UMatzah 11:3, which states: “How must chametz be destroyed? It may be burned, crumbled and tossed to the wind, or thrown to the sea.” On this basis, he explains that there are three options when destroying a false deity: grinding it and tossing the dust to the wind, burning it (when the article must be destroyed), and throwing it into the Dead Sea. Since the Dead Sea is a barren place, which is not frequented by ships, the article need not be destroyed. Even if it is left whole, we assume that no benefit will come from it to man.
This interpretation is not accepted by all authorities. Tosafot (loc. cit.) maintains that even an idol tossed into the Dead Sea must be destroyed first.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 146:14) mentions letting an idol sink “in the sea” (not “the Dead Sea”), without requiring that it be destroyed first. The Siftei Cohen (146:13) and the Turei Zahav (146:11), however, require an idol to be destroyed before it is deposited in a river.

Halachah 1.

Since they are considered to be an accessory of idol worship. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 22) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 428) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The commentaries note that in Chapter 7, Halachah 2, the Rambam states that a person who benefits from an idol or its accessories is liable for two measures of lashes. Thus, one might assume that for this transgression, one is liable for two or three measures of lashes. (See the Ramban, Hasagot LiSefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 194.)

Although, literally, the subject of the Biblical proof-text is “the statues of their gods,” the interpretation quoted by the Rambam has its source in Avodah Zarah 45a.

Though the verse mentions only silver and gold, any substance which was intended to adorn an entity worshiped as a false deity is forbidden.

But not one belonging to a Jew, as explained in the following halachah. That halachah also states that the gentile must be an idolater. If he does not worship idols, different rules apply.

By performing one of the deeds mentioned in Halachah 10.

But not by Jews (see the following halachah).

But not after, (see the following halachah).

Avodah Zarah 52a notes that the root פסל can mean both “statue” and “nullify.” Thus, it comments, “Which is the source from where we learn that a gentile can nullify his deity? ‘You must burn the statues of their gods.’
K’nesset HaGedolah notes a difficulty in this halachah, based on the principle that two new concepts cannot be derived from the same verse. Avodah Zarah, loc. cit., mentions that the same phrase is quoted as the source for both this concept and the law stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 4. It therefore seeks to derive one of these laws from a different source. The Rambam, however, quotes the same phrase as the proof-text for both laws.
K’nesset HaGedolah and the Lechem Mishneh explain — using this as an example for a principle that applies throughout the Mishneh Torah — that the Rambam’s goal was to present the laws in the manner which it could be most easily appreciated by a reader, even if in doing so he did not follow all the principles of Biblical exegesis accepted by the Talmud.

And may be used for whatever purposes a Jew desires. It appears, however, that they are forbidden to be used for the Temple’s purposes, even after they were nullified.

Since a Jew’s sin of idol worship is more severe than a gentile’s, it is forbidden to derive benefit from the object of that worship forever.

Avodah Zarah 53a explains that we consider the Jew to have worshiped the idol through his own process of choice, and not merely as a result of the gentile’s influence. Therefore, even though the gentile nullifies his portion, the idol is still forbidden because of the Jew.

Avodah Zarah 52a derives this from Deuteronomy 27:15: “Cursed be the man who makes an idol... and places it in a secret place.” We can infer: What must be done with an idol made by a Jew? It must be placed in a “secret place” — i.e., entombed.
The Kessef Mishneh and others question why a Jew’s idol should be entombed instead of destroyed, as required in Halachah 6. [Note that Tosafot, Avodah Zarah, loc. cit., interpret the Hebrew גניזה to mean “destruction,” rather than entombment, in this instance.]
Avodat HaMelech explains that since the concept is derived from a Biblical proof-text, there is no difficulty. It is all a matter of Divine decree. In one instance, God desires that the false deities be destroyed, while in another instance He desires that they be entombed.

Note that the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 146:2) distinguishes between a false deity itself and its accessories and adornments, stating that the latter may be nullified by a gentile even after they have been acquired by a Jew.

The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 146) explains that this is a Rabbinic decree.

Therefore, whenever a Jew wants to take possession of a false deity, he must have it nullified by a gentile before he assumes ownership of it.

An idol can be nullified as a divinity only by a person who once attached importance to it. Since a Jew is, in essence, a believer in the true God, his attachment to idols is merely superficial. Hence, his acts can have no effect upon them.

Both the concept of the false deity being in the gentile’s possession and him giving hls permission for its nullification are implied by the Hebrew term reshut.

Avodah Zarah 43a relates the following narrative:
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi related: Once I was following Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Great on
a road. He found a ring with the imprint of a d’rakon (see Chapter 7, Halachah 8) on it. He
passed a gentile child without saying anything to him. Afterwards, he met a gentile adult and
asked him to nullify it. He refused. Rabbi Elazar struck him and he nullified it.
We learn from this three things: a) a gentile can nullify an idol whether it belongs to him or to
his colleague; b) a gentile who is knowledgeable about idol worship can nullify it, while one
who is not knowledgeable cannot nullify it; c) a gentile’s nullification of idol worship is
effective even if he is compelled to do so.
Neither a minor nor one who is intellectually or emotionally compromised is considered “knowledgeable about idol worship.” Hence, their nullification is not acceptable.

It does not, however, matter whether the idolater worships the particular idol he nullifies or not. For example, a worshiper of Pe’or can nullify a shrine of Marculis (Avodah Zarah 64b).

Avodah Zarah (ibid.) states that a ger toshav — a gentile who accepts the observance of the seven universal laws given to Noach and his descendants — cannot nullify an idol.
As stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 6, a ger toshav must formalize his acceptance of these laws before a Rabbinic court. Also, the laws of a ger toshav apply only during the era when the Jubilee year is observed. Nevertheless, from Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 11:7 and 13:11, it appears that even a gentile who observes the seven Noachide laws cannot nullify an idol in the present era. There, the Rambam explains that the Moslems are not considered to be idolaters regarding the laws of yayin nesech. Thus, it can be assumed that their nullification of idol worship would not be of consequence.
See also the statements of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 124:2) and the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 124:5), which appear to accept this decision.

And it becomes permitted to benefit from them. The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 146:13) states that this law applies even if a Jew had already taken possession of the accessories, so long as the false deity remained in the possession of the gentile.

On the contrary, the fact that the gentile did not nullify the false deity itself indicates that he still has some reverence for it.

Whether it was brought by a Jew or gentile.

From Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 6:7, it may appear that this decision applies only to foods which were offered to a false deity. If other articles were brought as offerings, different laws apply. Nevertheless, perhaps a distinction can be made between the impurity imparted by false deities which is a Rabbinic stringency and the prohibition against benefitting from a false deity which is of Scriptural origin.

By a gentile, as mentioned in Halachah 8.

By doing so, one mars its appearance and thus reveals that he no longer regards it with reverence.

Our translation follows the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:4). Others (see Rashi, Avodah Zarah 53a) render it as “smashes its face.”

Once the face of an idol is no longer recognizable, the idol is obviously not considered to be a deity.

By doing so, the gentile implies his willingness to have the Jew smelt down the idol to its precious metal value. Thus, he obviously no longer considers it to be a god.

Note the Rama’s decision (Yoreh De’ah 146:7) that making a verbal statement is sufficient to nullify it as an idol in most cases. A deed such as those mentioned above is necessary only when a gentile is compelled to nullify it.

Even a jeweler.

In these instances, although the gentile used the idol for business purposes, it is still possible that he sold it with the intent that the purchaser use the idol as a god. Hence, we cannot be certain that it was nullified by the seller.

Such acts appear to indicate that the gentile has little reverence for his idol. (Why should he? Once he sees that the idol cannot save itself, why should he think that it will benefit him?) Nevertheless, as long as he does not do anything that explicitly clarifies that he no longer reveres it, it is not nullified.

The bracketed additions are based on Rashi’s commentary (Avodah Zarah, loc. cit.).

Although these acts are irreverent in nature, they could be interpreted as temporary expressions of anger rather than a sincere nullification of the idol’s divinity.

Avodah Zarah 53a derives this from the exegesis of Isaiah 8:21-22, which implies that though temporarily the people may “curse their king and god (idol) and look upward (to the true God),” shortly afterwards they will return and “look to the earth” (worship their idol again).

Were they still to worship it, they would not have abandoned it. Note Avodah Zarah 53b, which applies these principles to the Tower of Babel.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 146:10) which states that if the gentiles could return to the idol but do not, it is considered to have been nullified.

Avodah Zarah 41b quotes a difference of opinion on this matter between Resh Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Resh Lakish maintains that we can assume that the gentiles nullified their worship of the idol. If it could not save itself, surely it cannot save them.
Rabbi Yochanan does not accept this opinion and maintains that even when an idol is broken it is revered. Avodah Zarah 49b states that the gentiles would even worship the broken pieces of an idol. (See also the Jerusalem Talmud, Avodah Zarah 3:3.)

Avodah Zarah 41b explains that although the possibility exists that the idol was nullified, we must still regard it as forbidden. Since it is recognized as an idol, the prohibition against using it becomes an established fact, which cannot be changed until we are certain that it has been nullified as an object of worship. (See also the notes to Chapter 7, Halachah 7.)

The fact that it is broken is not of consequence. Indeed, the laws which govern it are more stringent than if it remained whole.

For each is considered to be a separate entity.

Since the idol is broken and cannot be reassembled by an ordinary person, it is treated more leniently, and if one part of it is nullified, the entire idol becomes permitted.

Avodah Zarah 54a cites an allusion to this law in Isaiah 27:9: “All the stones of the altar will be as chalkstones that are cracked open.”

As stated in Halachah 9, the nullification of false deities must be performed by gentiles.

Avodah Zarah 53b relates that since a platform consists of only a single stone, if it is damaged another one will be brought to replace it.

Rather than differentiate between them because of the functions they serve, explaining that a platform is used to place idols upon, and an altar, to bring sacrifices, the Rambam (based on Avodah Zarah, loc. cit.,) considers size the determinant.

As mentioned, a shrine to Marculis consists of three stones placed one on top of the other two.

Avodah Zarah 50a relates that even Rabbi Menachem b’Rabbi Simai, who was called the son of the holy, because he would not look at the image of a coin, lest it carry the form of an idol, would walk on such roads.

A tree which is worshiped or one which offers shade for an idol.

Our translation is based on the text of the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 3:10) and the Rambam’s commentary. A printing error appears has crept into the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah, which read זרק rather than זרד. CHECK HEBREW

These actions indicate a lack of reverence for the tree. Hence, they are sufficient to nullify it.

To improve its appearance or to prune it so that it will grow better.

These actions are no indication of a lack of reverence.

Since they are not worshiped.

Even by a gentile.

Even though the shavings will not be worshiped, since they come from a false deity that was not nullified, they also cannot be nullified.

As stated in Halachah 10.