Avodat Kochavim - Chapter 7

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 185) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 436) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The process of destruction is described in Chapter 8, Halachah 6.

Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.) states that the mitzvah is to destroy “every entity which is worshiped and their temples,” from which one might conclude that the destruction of the accessories of idol worship is a Rabbinic injunction. Avodat HaMelech, however, cites Avodah Zarah 51b, which also derives the injunction to destroy the accessories of idol worship from a Biblical proof-text.

Note the Bnei Binyamin, which states that when fulfilling this commandment, we should recite a blessing: “Blessed are You... Who commanded us to eradicate idol worship from our land.” Other commentaries explain that reciting a blessing is inappropriate, based on the principle (Rashba, Vol. I, Responsum 18) that a blessing is not recited for a mitzvah that comes to correct a sin. The Bnei Binyamin, however, maintains that this principle does not apply here, since the transgression was committed by gentiles.

Kin’at Eliyahu questions the purpose of the second proof-text.

Kin’at Eliyahu explains that this obligation has its source in the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael. Because it is God’s holy land, we must rid it of idol worship.

There, the obligation to destroy false deities is of a different nature.

Since these lands are not holy, we are not obligated to eradicate idol worship from them.

Because a false deity may not exist under a Jew’s authority.
In his notes on the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 146:20), the Vilna Gaon explains that the Rambam’s statements appear to mean that whenever the Jews conquer a land, they are obligated to destroy all false deities and their places of worship. These statements may, however, also be interpreted as meaning that whenever an individual finds or takes possession of a false deity, it must be destroyed.

I.e., Eretz Yisrael. The opening verse of the Biblical passage cited states: “These are the statutes... you must heed... in the land that God... is giving you.”

The Bnei Binyamin writes that even according to the opinions which permit gentiles to believe in Christianity, Jews are obligated to destroy their objects of worship and churches. This raises a question regarding the churches that exist in Eretz Yisrael today. Should their existence be tolerated, or are we, as a people, obligated to destroy them?

I.e., statues, trees, or other entities which are worshiped.

The Rambam considers the prohibition against benefiting from wine offered as a libation for false deities as a mitzvah in its own right (negative commandment 194). Therefore, he does not mention the laws governing this prohibition here, but in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot, where he devotes three chapters to the subject.
[The fact that the Rambam associates the prohibition against beneftting from objects offered to idols with a Biblical proof-text appears to indicate that he considers this prohibition as having its roots in the Torah itself. Note Tosafot, Bava Kama 72a, which states that the prohibition is Rabbinic in origin.]

Note the Pri Chadash, who questions whether a person who brings a false deity into his home without benefiting from it also is liable for lashes.

Yad HaMelech contrasts the prohibition against benefiting from false gods with other Torah prohibitions where benefit is forbidden: e.g., non-kosher types of food. In the latter case, though all types of benefit are forbidden, the Torah requires that punishment be administered only for eating the forbidden substances and not for deriving other types of benefit (Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 8:16), while with regard to false deities, punishment is administered for deriving any type of benefit.
The source for this difference is that the Torah uses the expression “Do not eat” or the like when forbidding the other prohibitions. Accordingly, punishment is administered only for eating. In contrast, the verses prohibiting false deities are more inclusive in nature.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 25) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 429) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, Halachah 7, the latter prohibition primarily concerns the property of a condemned city (עיר הנדחת). Nevertheless, since false deities are also described as “condemned,” benefiting from them is also included in the scope of the above prohibition (Megillat Esther, Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 194).
Though the Ramban (Hasagot L’Sefer HaMitzvot) disputes the Rambam’s decision, support for the Rambam’s opinion can be found in several Talmudic sources — e.g., Avodah Zarah 34b, 51b.
The prohibition stated in this halachah and the positive commandment mentioned in the previous one serve as the foundation for all the laws discussed in this and the following chapter.

Because of the prohibition mentioned in the previous halachah. (See also Deuteronomy 32:38.)

The standard published text of the Mishneh Torah states שהקריבוה כולה לעכו"ם — i.e., the phrase “in its entirety” modifies the verb “sacrifices,” leading to the conclusion that were an animal to be consecrated only partially to a false deity different rules would apply. Note the Kessef Mishneh, Avodat HaMelech, and Or Sameach, which discuss this concept.
Authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah, however, read אסורה כולה — i.e., “in its entirety” modifies “forbidden.” According to this version, the explanation is straightforward, when an animal is sacrificed to a false deity, the entire animal is forbidden.

I.e., the prohibition involves not only the animal’s meat, but even these less important elements of its being. Compare to Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 4:18-22.

If the hole is oblong, there is no prohibition (Avodah Zarah 2:3).

When offering sacrifices, they would slit open the animal’s hide and kill it by cutting out the heart (Keter HaMelech, based on Avodah Zarah, loc. cit.).

The mention of the word “sculptures” is an addition, teaching that the idols must be destroyed whether they have been worshiped or not. Therefore, they are forbidden from the time they were fashioned onward. Note the comments of the Lechem Mishneh, which mentions an apparent contradiction between these statements and Chapter 8, Halachah 8.

When does the curse fall? Not when the idol is made, but when it is placed in a hidden place.

For it is unlikely that a Jew would worship a false deity openly.

Avodah Zarah 51b derives this concept from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 12:2, which states “You shall surely destroy all the places where the gentiles... served their gods.” The gentiles’ places of worship and the other accessories to idol worship are not forbidden until the false deities are “served.”

As stated above, Chapter 3, Halachah 9.

We do not say that the wage is benefit derived from false deities, and is therefore forbidden.

As explained in the previous halachah.

See Shabbat 73a, 75b and commentaries regarding the final hammer-stroke which completes a project.

Avodah Zarah 19b explains that this law is dependent on the following principle of business law: Every moment an artisan works on a project is considered as a separate entity. When he finishes the project, it is considered as if the entire sum of money — with the exception of the value of the final hammerstroke — is owed him from beforehand. Since benefit from the idol is not forbidden until it is completed, the money which is owed him previously is permitted.

There is an apparent contradiction between the laws which follow and Halachah 7, which states that idols found in a scrap metal heap are permitted. Two possible resolutions are offered:
a) According to the version (see our notes to that halachah) which reads “statues” and not “statues of idols,” there is no contradiction.
b) The prohibitions mentioned in this halachah were instituted because of the appearance that might be created if the Jew were to keep the idols he purchased. Accordingly, stricter laws were instituted.

Once the Jew becomes the full legal owner of the idols, he is obligated to destroy them, and cannot nullify the transaction and return them. The question in the following instances is whether the transaction has been completed or not.

We have taken some liberty in translating the word, ומשך. Literally, it means “and drew it after him.” Performing this activity, however, is one of the means of formalizing a business transaction (see Hilchot Mechirah 3:1) and, therefore, the word was translated as above.

Though paying money represents the finalization of a transaction (kinyan) between a Jew and gentile (see Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 1:14), the transaction was made in error, as explained below. Since, in transactions carried out between two Jews, the transaction would not be completed until the recipient takes possession of the article, a Jew can return the idols to the gentile in this instance.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, ibid.

Since, in transactions carried out between two gentiles, the transaction would not be completed until the money was paid, it can be nullified in this instance.

Even though the transaction was carried out in error, since it appears to have been completed, it is forbidden to benefit from the idols because of the impression it may create. Therefore, they must be destroyed (Avodah Zarah 53a, 71b). (See also Siftei Cohen 146:4.)
Our commentary follows the interpretation of Rav Kapach. It must be noted that many of the classic commentaries on the Mishneh Torah have questioned why the Rambam mentions the concept of a transaction made in error only in the case when the Jew took possession and did not pay, but not when he paid and did not take possession. They have offered several possible resolutions, including a sweeping statement by Avodat HaMelech that our Sages nullified the effectiveness of monetary payment as an effective means of finalizing the transfer of property (kinyan), not only with regard to transactions between two Jews (see Hilchot Mechirah 3:1,4-5), but also with regard to transactions between a Jew and a gentile. (Interestingly, though the Rambam’s phraseology has raised such problems, it is quoted verbatim by the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 146:3.)

Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 43b, explain that one need not literally take the idols to the Dead Sea. By using that term, our Sages implied a place where the idols will never benefit man.

The problem in this instance is that it is forbidden to exchange an idol for other property. The problem in this instance is that it is forbidden to exchange an idol for other property.

In which case, the idols have never come into the convert’s possession and, hence, he is not considered to have benefited from their exchange.

Because they are considered to be idols belonging to a Jew. Hence, they must be destroyed.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (D’mai 6:10), the Rambam writes that were a similar situation — an inheritance containing property from which one heir would be allowed to benefit and one would be forbidden — to occur among Jews, the leniencies mentioned above would not be permitted.
The difference between the two cases is that when a Jew inherits property from his father, the transfer of ownership is immediate, and from the moment of his father’s death, the forbidden property belongs to the heir, who must take responsibility for it. In contrast, a convert’s inheritance of his gentile father’s estate is a Rabbinic decree, instituted in consideration of the convert. According to the Torah, once he converts, he has no connection to his natural parents. The Sages extended the leniency they granted in allowing him to acquire the inheritance to include the right to barter these forbidden articles before they actually become his property. (See also Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 146:5.)

I.e., enjoy the artistic talent and/or sell or use as scrap metal.

The Tur (Yoreh De’ah 141) states that these laws apply only to human images. Other authorities (and indeed certain interpretations of the Tur) disagree, and consider the statements as referring to all images. From the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 3:1), it appears that the latter opinion reflects his view.

Note Chapter 3, Halachah 10, with regard to the prohibition against Jews making human images even for these purposes. See our notes to that halachah, with regard to the place of art in Jewish life.

Even if they are artistic masterpieces. Thus, any benefit from a gentile’s sacramental art is forbidden to us.

The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 141:4) explains that the statements that follow (which are based on Avodah Zarah 41a) reflect the socio-cultural environment in which the Rambam lived. The criteria he mentions are thus not hard and fast rules, and will vary if different conditions prevail in other societies.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah, loc. cit., based on Avodah Zarah 40-41), the Rambam explains that although Rabbi Meir maintained that all gentile images were forbidden because they would be used for different pagan rites, the Sages disagreed and laid down the following general rules.

Simple villagers are not expected to have artistic tastes.

Even if we have no proof to that effect, we follow the general rule that it is forbidden to benefit from an image which is merely suspected of being worshiped as an idol, for we follow the principle that whenever a doubt arises regarding a Scriptural prohibition, we rule stringently,

Even when the circumstances mentioned in the following halachah do not apply.

Since the inhabitants of a metropolis are expected to be cultured and sophisticated, the images found there are not necessarily idols.

A position which implies their authority over the entire city.

All of these are also symbols of authority or sovereignty.

The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 141:1, which frequently quotes the Rambam verbatim, changes the phraseology used in this clause from “we may assume” to “surely.” The Siftei Cohen (141:1) explains that this change is made to clarify that even though it is forbidden to benefit from an image which is merely suspected to have been worshiped as an idol (see Halachah 10), in this instance, we assume that they were not made for purposes of worship.

Our text follows the published texts of the Mishneh Torah. The words “of false deities” and several of the other points in this halachah appear to be printer’s additions, which are not found in the authoritative manuscripts and run contrary to the explanation of these concepts in the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 3:2). Note also the apparent contradiction mentioned in our commentary on Halachah 5.

Avodah Zarah 41a-b explains this law as follows. The Mishnah uses the expression “statues” — i.e., a statue which we do not know has been worshiped. Shmuel, one of the Talmudic sages, adds, however, that the leniency also applies to idols which we know were worshiped.
His decision is based on the principle (cited in Chapter 8, Halachah 8) that if the gentiles who worship an idol no longer consider it a god, the prohibition against benefiting from it is nullified. In this instance, the fact that these statues were found discarded is the clearest proof that their worshipers forsook them.
Afterwards, the Talmud quotes a difference of opinion between Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish, concerning idols which are broken accidentally. In the context of the explanation of that difference of opinion, the Talmud mentions the explanation of the mishnah in question by Rabbi Yochanan (whom the halachah follows, see Chapter 8, Halachah 11). He explains that the pieces of the statues (not idols) are permitted because we are not sure that they were ever worshiped. Even if they had been worshiped, it is possible that they were nullified.
Thus, according to the Talmud, the interpretation of these laws is as follows: If one finds an idol that was obviously purposefully broken (Shmuel’s law), it is permitted to benefit from it. If, however, the idol was not destroyed with an obvious destructive intent, it is forbidden to benefit from it, as Rabbi Yochanan states.

The fact that they were broken would appear to indicate that their worshipers nullified them.

The phrase, “from the form of one of the constellations or celestial signs,” is a printer’s addition, which runs contrary to the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah, ibid. This phrase implies that this clause refers to a limb broken from an idol. The authoritative manuscripts state “should one find a hand... which is the form of a deity.”

Though the fact that it was abandoned in a scrap heap could be considered as an indication that it was nullified,

I.e., the prohibition against its use is firmly established,

I.e., it is established with equal certainty

At which point its use is no longer prohibited, as explained in Chapter 8, Halachah 8.

As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 3, Halachah 11, the Rambam writes in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 3:3:
This does not mean a sphere which represents the sun, or a hemisphere which represents the
moon, but rather the images which the astrologers [i.e., those following Greek mythology]
attribute to the stars... — e.g., Saturn is represented as a dark old man of venerable age, Venus
is represented as a beautiful maiden adorned with gold, and the sun is represented as a king
adorned with a diadem, sitting in a chariot.
The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 141:3) quotes this explanation as halachah.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam describes this image as a fishlike man with fins and many scales, probably referring to the Greek god Neptune. Rashi, Avodah Zarah 42b, and others interpret the form as that of an animal similar to a serpent. Perhaps this term is the source for the word “dragon.”

The question is whether these forms should be considered to be representations of deities (and hence, forbidden).

I.e., objects of great value.

Rings, in addition to their value, also are a symbol of subservience; a slave wears his master’s ring.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 141:3) mentions that even valuable objects are permitted if one is certain that they have never been used as articles of worship.

The Mishnah (Avodah Zarah, ibid.) states the general rule: “If these articles are found on objects of value, they are forbidden. If they are found on articles of little worth, they are permitted.”

The Jerusalem Talmud (Avodah Zarah 3:3) states that if we are certain that these images were made for the purposes of worship, the article is forbidden even if it is of little value. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes this principle.
The Rama states that since paganism is not common at present, we assume that these forms were made for artistic purposes. Hence, it is not forbidden to benefit from an article even if it contains pagan images. One may not, however, keep such an article in one’s possession. He adds that even at present, certain individuals are stringent with themselves and do not benefit from an article containing the three forms mentioned above.

Avodah Zarah 42b asks rhetorically: “Are these the only forms that are worshiped?” and explains that it is possible that the other forms would also be worshiped, but they are generally not made for that purpose. In contrast, the three forms mentioned above are generally made for the purpose of worship.

Avodah Zarah 29b derives the prohibition against benefiting from wine used by pagans as a libation (yayin nesech) from the prohibition against benefiting from animals sacrificed to idols. Since the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 74a) specifically mentions yayin nesech as forbidden, regardless of the proportion of the mixture involved, the same principle applies to all objects offered to an idol.

As mentioned in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot, Chapter 16, the prohibition against benefiting from different substances can be negated when the substance is accidentally mixed with other substances. For example, the prohibition against eating certain forbidden foods (e.g., non-kosher meat, fats, mixtures of meat and milk) is lifted when these substances become mixed with 60 times their amount of other substances. The prohibitions against terumah (and any other substances which are also called terumah) are lifted when it becomes mixed with 100 times their amount of other substances and similarly, the prohibitions against orlah and kilai hakerem are lifted when these substances are mixed with 200 times their amount of other substances.
Because of the serious nature of the prohibition against idol worship, these principles do not apply and anything connected with it is forbidden, regardless of the proportion of the mixture the forbidden substances make up. (See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 5:8.)

Which are permitted.

I.e., it is forbidden to benefit from them and they must be destroyed.

I.e., an accessory of idol worship.

Needless to say, if one can distinguish between the forbidden goblet and the permitted ones, there is no reason to forbid the use of the permitted ones.

See the following halachah. See also Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 16:10.

The Lechem Mishneh (noting the Rambam’s statements, Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 16:29) questions why in this instance, the Rambam does not suggest that the entire mixture be sold to a gentile, and then, the value of the forbidden article destroyed. This question is discussed by many commentaries; their consensus is that, although such a provision is made regarding closed barrels of yayin nesech, it applies in that specific case alone, but not with regard to other instances.

I.e., a round hole, as mentioned in Halachah 3. This was one of the common practices of idol worship.

I.e., a Jew. Different laws apply regarding a gentile. (See Chapter 9, Halachah 18, Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 132:7, 144:1.)

The sale is forbidden, because it is forbidden to derive any benefit from a false deity. This prohibition is unique; whenever one sells other forbidden substances (with the exception of the produce of the Sabbatical year), the fact that their sale was forbidden does not affect the status of the money received for them. In contrast, when selling anything forbidden because of idol worship, the proceeds are forbidden.

Rather, the money must be destroyed, like the idols themselves. If the proceeds from the sale or exchange of an idol are used to acquire another object, that object is also forbidden. See Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

I.e., the same severe restrictions that would apply to an idol itself, apply to the money received from its sale.

“Do not bring an abomination (an idol) into your house...”

See Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 132:5-7, which elaborates on this concept with regard to the laws pertaining to yayin nesech.

Note the commentary of Mishneh LeMelech, which questions whether the same ruling would be rendered if the purchaser did not know that the article which he acquired is connected with a false deity. Mishneh LeMelech maintains that the transaction is nullified, and the money the seller receives must be returned to the purchaser.

For a definition of the term asherah, see Chapter 6, Halachah 9, and see the following halachah.

Ash was used for certain purposes — e.g., the manufacture of soap.
Although the idol was destroyed, the prohibition that applied to it applies to its ashes as well. (For this reason, our Sages suggested taking idols to the Dead Sea. Since this is a desolate area, there is little likelihood that anyone will ever benefit from the idols.)
Temurah 34a notes that this prohibition differentiates substances associated with idols from other forbidden substances that must be burned.

Is considered to be an accessory of the idol.

To be used for any other purpose.

I.e., it may be used to light another flame.

I.e., there is no entity to which the prohibition can be attached. Although as a safeguard, the Rabbis forbade the use of certain flames, they did not pass such a decree against flames from idol worship. In general, Jews were repelled by any association with idol worship. Hence, the Rabbis did not feel that it was necessary to institute a prohibition (Beitzah 39a).

When there is a doubt regarding whether a substance is prohibited or not, we follow the principle that although according to Scriptural Law (מדאורייתא), the substance is permitted מדרבנן (according to Rabbinic decree), it is forbidden.

The Hebrew, ספק ספקא, implies that there is a doubt whether our original suspicion continues to apply, as illustrated by the examples mentioned in the latter clauses of the halachah. The prohibition against benefiting from an object whose prohibited status is in question is only Rabbinic in nature. Whenever there is a doubt regarding whether a Rabbinic prohibition applies or not, a lenient approach is permitted (ספק דרבנן לקולא).

For the Rabbis did not feel it necessary to institute a decree in such an instance.

I.e., an accessory of idol worship, which is forbidden, as mentioned in the previous halachah.

Since there is a doubt whether each of the goblets is the forbidden one or not, none of them may be used.

This translation follows the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah, which reads כוסות שנים. The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1406) suggests (and indeed, many manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah support this contention) that the text read כוסות שניים, which would be rendered as “other cups.” This version is closer to the text of Zevachim 74a, the Talmudic passage that serves as the source for this law.

Here, there is a doubt whether our original suspicion continues to apply. Perhaps the cup one chooses from the new mixture did not come from the original mixture. Even if it did come from the original mixture, perhaps it is not the cup that was used for idol worship.

The Kessef Mishneh and other commentaries question the Rambam’s decision, noting that the text of Zevachim, loc. cit., appears to indicate that it is necessary for there to be three mixtures. Indeed, in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 16:10, when discussing the prohibitions of a דבר חשוב (a forbidden substance whose importance prevents it from ever being nullified in one mixture), the Rambam himself appears to follow this view, stating:
If one pomegranate from a mixture [containing a forbidden pomegranate] falls into a second
mixture of two other pomegranates... and from these three, one pomegranate falls into other
pomegranates, the latter [mixture] is permitted.
Indeed, on the basis of the statements in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 140) deviates from the Rambam’s opinion and requires three mixtures. This approach, however, is not followed by all commentaries. Rashi and Tosafot (Zevachim, loc. cit.) explain that even with regard to a דבר חשוב, only two mixtures are necessary. These views are quoted as halachah by the Turei Zahav and the Siftei Cohen in their glosses on the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 110:8). Among the suggestions made by the commentaries to resolve the difference between the Rambam’s statements here and those in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot are the following: a) Most people are careful regarding the prohibition against benefiting from any object connected with idol worship. Therefore, there is no need to reinforce the prohibition. In contrast, the prohibition against benefiting from a דבר חשוב is far less known. Hence, the Rabbis added severe safeguards to make sure that it be observed (Kessef Mishneh). b) Here, the Rambam is speaking about a prohibition against benefiting from a forbidden object (איסור הנאה). In contrast, Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot is concerned with partaking of forbidden foods, where the prohibition is more severe (Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 110:52). Even the authorities who permit the second mixture to be used do not allow a single individual to partake of the entire mixture at one time. In such an instance, there would be only a single doubt whether he used the forbidden object or not.

They would thus all be forbidden according to the above principles.

Accidentally. If one intentionally throws one [or more] into the sea, the leniency does not apply (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 110:7).

And are thus lost. If two merely become separated from the group, the others remain prohibited (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.).

The Kessef Mishneh notes that when stating a similar law in Hilchot Terumah 15:2, the Rambam required only a single barrel of wine to be lost. The difference between these two laws can be resolved by taking into account the nature of the prohibited substances: Rings are small, and the loss of a single ring does not make a noticeable difference to the entire group. In contrast, barrels of wine are large, and the loss of even one will attract attention.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 140) limits this leniency, stating that it is forbidden to use a single ring alone, nor may one person benefit from the entire group of rings at once.

I.e., a lesser portion of the mixture.

I.e., a greater portion of the mixture.

The second mixture.

There is a doubt whether the forbidden ring was among the forty. Even if it had been included within that forty, perhaps the ring one chooses from the second mixture is not the forbidden one.
In this instance, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 140) does not quote the Rambam’s view, implying that he would forbid the second mixture. Even according to the Rambam, if foods were involved, it is not permissible to eat the entire second mixture at one time, for then there would be only a single doubt.

Should, however, only a portion of the sixty fall into another mixture, the Rambam (but not the Shulchan Aruch) would permit their use. In such an instance, their status would parallel that of the second mixture of goblets mentioned above.

A tree associated with the worship of false deities.

As mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 3.

As mentioned in Chapter 6, Halachah 9, and Chapter 8, Halachah 4. In such instances, the tree was intended for aesthetic purposes and for offering shade to the worshipers.

Because one will be deriving benefit from a false deity or its accessories.

This decision has been questioned by other authorities, who wonder why the Rambam distinguished between the tree’s trunk and branches. On the surface, the same prohibition should apply to both of them.
The Rambam’s decision is based on his interpretation of Avodah Zarah 48b, which is derived from the Jerusalem Talmud (Avodah Zarah 3:8). The Talmud explains that even though the shade of an asherah is forbidden, צל הצל, literally, “the shade of its shade,” is permitted. The Jerusalem Talmud interprets צל הצל as shade produced by the parts of the tree which would not touch the trunk if they fell.
Rashi offers a different interpretation of Avodah Zarah, loc. cit. His view is accepted by most commentaries. When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 142:9) does not differentiate between the shade produced by the trunk and that of its leaves.

To reach his desired destination. This restriction applies when the alternate route is no longer than the one which passes under the asherah. If the alternate route is longer, the person is not required to deviate from the path leading under the asherah (Yoreh De’ah, ibid.).

This prohibition appears to have been instituted lest one benefit from the tree's shade. Note, however, the Ramah's statements (Yoreh De'ah, 142:9), which permit one to pass under the asherah's shade, though not under the tree itself. According to his opinion, the prohibition stems from the impurity of idol worship.

Avodah Zarah (loc. cit.) relates that Rav Sheshet would run when he passed under an asherah. This Talmudic passage mentions the requirement to run only with regard to a person of distinction. Nevertheless, since there is no great difficulty in running for this short distance, the Rambam imposes this stringency on all people (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., which can fly on their own.

Even though these chicks are permitted, Me’ilah 14a does not allow one to climb up the tree and take them in a normal manner. Rather, one must knock the chicks down with a stave, and then collect them. The Hagahot Maimoniot (and the Turei Zahav, Yoreh De’ah 142:12) explain that climbing on the tree or using it as support for a ladder would involve deriving benefit from the forbidden tree.
The Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Me’ilah 3:9, suggests a different interpretation. There, the Rambam specifically writes that when taking the nest — as stated in the final clause of this halachah — it permissible to climb up the tree in the normal manner. Therefore, it appears that one should knock down the chicks to see if they are capable of flying on their own or not. This explanation also clarifies why the Rambam does not mention in this halachah the need to knock down the chicks. By stating that only those which do not need their mother are permitted, he implies that one must determine whether or not the chicks need their mother (Rav Kapach).

Avodah Zarah 42b explains that this is a Rabbinic decree imposed lest the people desire to benefit from the asherah itself. Since these chicks and eggs require the asherah, they are prohibited, as the asherah is.

And the wood from which it is composed may be used for other purposes

Were the wood, however, to come from the asherah itself, it would be forbidden even though it had been separated from it already, as is obvious from Chapter 8, Halachah 3.
The Ra’avad states that one must explicitly know that the birds built their nest from other wood. Avodat HaMelech explains that the Rambam does not require such knowledge, because of the following Talmud principle: When there is a question whether a substance came from the most probable source (רוב) or the closest source (קרוב), we presume it came from the most probable source.

I.e., from an asherah.
Even though the wood has been separated from the tree itself, it is forbidden to benefit from the wood. (See Chapter 8, Halachot 1, 3, and 4 for additional explanations regarding the nature of this prohibition.)

And thus seek to benefit from the forbidden wood, he is not permitted to use the oven.

Note the contrast between the Rambam’s statements here and those in Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 16:22, where the Rambam states that if an oven is heated with the shells or peels of forbidden fruit (i. e fruit that is either orlah or kil’ei hakerem), it is sufficient to remove the wood which is burning. The coals and the heat produced by the initial fire, however, are not forbidden and one may bake with them. He does not make such statements here, because, as stated in Halachah 10, even the coals and ashes of an asherah are forbidden.
[Curiously, when mentioning these laws in the Shulchan Aruch (142:4), Rav Yosef Caro quotes the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot, substituting forbidden wood for orlah, without distinguishing between the different prohibitions. Accordingly the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch (Turei Zahav 145:5, Siftei Cohen 145:10) object to his decision.]

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 3:9), the Rambam explains that the above decision applies whether the oven is new or old.
The mishnah states that if such wood is used in a new oven, the oven may never be used again. In Talmudic times, the ovens were made of clay and the clay would not harden sufficiently until the oven was kindled once. Thus, since kindling the oven for the first time prepared it to be used on all subsequent occasions, some Rabbis forbade its use when this first kindling was made with a forbidden substance. This opinion is, nevertheless, not accepted as halachah. The Rambam’s view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah, loc. cit. (See the explanation of זה וזה גורם in the following halachah.)

Even if, afterwards, he added permitted wood. The rationale is that the beneficial effect of the forbidden wood preceded the influence of the permitted wood.

The entire mixture is forbidden. He can, however, cause that prohibition to be lifted if he carries out the following instructions.
[This mixture of bread can be differentiated from the mixtures mentioned in Halachah 10. Those mixtures involved objects which were themselves used as accessories for idol worship, while here the loaf itself was never used for such purposes. Hence, the severe laws mentioned there do not apply in this instance.]

Even if it is more valuable than the wood (Siftei Cohen 142:9).

Or destroy it in another way (see the notes on Halachah 5).

This mixture of bread can be differentiated from the mixtures mentioned in Halachah 10. Those mixtures involved objects which were themselves used as accessories for idol worship, while here the loaf itself was never used for such purposes. Hence, the severe laws mentioned there do not apply in this instance.

Even to be eaten. In other similar situations, one is permitted to benefit from a forbidden mixture (e.g., sell it to a gentile), but partaking of it oneself is prohibited. (See Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 16:29.) Here, one is allowed to partake of the bread itself (Siftei Cohen 142:10).

The piece of the loom which passes the woof through the threads of the warp.

Because it is prohibited to use anything made from idol worship.

Note the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 3:9), where he explains why it is necessary to state both cases (the bread and the garment).

As explained in the previous halachah. (See also Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 142:3.)

Even לכתחילה (a priori).

And thus, one will receive direct benefit from the asherah.

When the influence of the asherah is less felt.

This principle is employed in many other areas of Torah law. In most instances, however, the leniency is generally granted only בדיעבד (after the fact). In this situation, however, the leniency is granted a priori, because the person does not receive any benefit when he sows the field and, afterwards, the benefit comes in and of itself (Rabbenu Nissim).

Because the crop growth also depends on the earth, which is not forbidden. At the outset, however, it is forbidden to use such fertilizer (Siftei Cohen 142:26).

The Hebrew term כרשינים refers to “vetch,” a species of bean commonly used for animal fodder.

Because its growth was also influenced by the permitted food it ate. If, however, it was raised solely on forbidden food, different rules apply (Turei Zahav 142:17).
[Significantly, in Hilchot Issurei Mizbe’ach 3:9, the Rambam feels it necessary to give a different reason why a cow that was given such a diet might be used as a sacrifice. The Sages, however, always ruled more stringently with regard to sacrifices than with regard to food consumed by private individuals.]

This law reflects a contrast to the Temple offerings. Once a person dedicated an animal to be offered as a sacrifice, or an article to be donated to the Temple treasury, it became consecrated (הקדש) and may no longer be used for mundane purposes. This principle does not apply with regard to articles designated to be used as offerings for idols, as explained in Chapter 8, Halachah 1.

However, as is obvious from the latter clause of this halachah, an object found in a temple of a false deity is forbidden, unless we have explicit knowledge that it was not brought as an offering. We assume that it was used for this forbidden purpose.

Avodat HaMelech interprets this as a reference to Chapter 8, Halachah 9, where the Rambam states that the prohibition against using an offering brought to an idol can never be nullified. Although the prohibition against using an idol itself can be nullified, more stringent rules apply with regard to an offering.

The change in their location does not effect a change in status.

Not merely Rabbinic decree.

See the following halachah (with regard to “even water or salt”). There are differences between the Rambam’s approach and that of the other authorities; see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 139:3 and Siftei Cohen 139:3.

Note Halachah 2, where the Rambam states that a person who benefits from offerings brought to a false deity receives a double measure of lashes. Apparently, the Rambam is not explicit here because he is relying on his previous statement.

Avodah Zarah 51b states that the prohibition applies only when the articles are placed on the idol itself. The fact that they are positioned near the idol is not sufficient to have them forbidden.

Because the manner in which they are placed indicates that they were not intended as adornment or service for the idol.

Avodah Zarah, ibid., derives this concept from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 29:16: “You saw their abominations (their idols)... the gold and silver which is with them,” explaining that “anything which is ‘with them’ is ‘abominable,’ forbidden as the idols are. Since these are articles that are used to adorn an idol, they are prohibited.

The position of the article indicates that it was not placed there with the intent of adorning the idol. On the contrary, placing these articles on an idol in such a fashion reflects one’s contempt for it. Therefore, there is no reason for the article to be forbidden.

This includes the animals used as sacrifices, wine, flour, or oil. Avodah Zarah 51b notes that this prohibition includes even water, which is used for the water libation on Sukkot, and salt, which is added to all the sacrifices offered on the altar.

The fact that these articles are used as offerings in the Temple leads to the conclusion that they were presented to the idol for a similar purpose.

Distinction between a deferential and a derisive position.

The fact that the article was brought into the idol’s temple indicates that it was used in its service.

Even if it is not placed upon the idol itself.

The Rambam’s mention of these articles is somewhat problematic. Since they were offered on the Temple altar, as explained above, they are forbidden even if they are not found within the temple of an idol. The commentaries explain that since these articles are of little consequence and are not generally themselves brought as offerings to an idol, we would not think that they were forbidden. Therefore, it is necessary to mention them explicitly.

Note Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 6:7, where the Rambam states that the forbidden nature of foods offered to idols can never be negated. When, however, utensils are offered, the prohibition against using them can be negated, as explained in Chapter 8, Halachah 8.

See the description of the service of these deities in Chapter 3, Halachah 2.

Since these deities are served in a derisive manner, no distinction is made between the manner in which articles placed upon them are found. Even when an article is found in a derisive position, it is forbidden.

Since a shrine to this deity consists of stones piled on each other, we assume that any stone found in proximity to it was once part of such a pile.

Since a shrine to this deity consists of stones piled on each other, we assume that any-stone found in proximity to it was once part of such a pile.

We have rendered טובה as “appreciation” because, as evident from the final clause of the halachah, the benefit mentioned by the Rambam is not monetary or even goods that can be exchanged for money (Kessef Mishneh).
[Thus, the Rambam’s interpretation differs from that of Rashi, who, in his commentary to Avodah Zarah 51b, understands טובה as referring to monetary payment.]

Our translation follows the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah. The manuscript versions read: “provided one does not offer benefit to its priests.” This version is supported by the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:3). If the benefit is offered to the idol’s worshipers and not to its priests, one may make use of the bathhouse or garden even if it is necessary to pay a fee (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 143:3).

The Kessef Mishneh explains that this prohibition was instituted lest a person develop close feelings towards the priests who serve a false deity.

Rashi, Avodah Zarah 50a states that all stones within a cubit of the deity are forbidden. Stones which are further removed are permitted. Tosafot maintains that any stones found within a radius of four cubits are forbidden.

We have rendered טובה as “appreciation” because, as evident from the final clause of the halachah, the benefit mentioned by the Rambam is not monetary or even goods that can be exchanged for money (Kessef Mishneh).
[Thus, the Rambam’s interpretation differs from that of Rashi, who, in his commentary to Avodah Zarah 51b, understands טובה as referring to monetary payment.]

Our translation follows the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah. The manuscript versions read: “provided one does not offer benefit to its priests.” This version is supported by the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:3). If the benefit is offered to the idol’s worshipers and not to its priests, one may make use of the bathhouse or garden even if it is necessary to pay a fee (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 143:3).

This halachah is based on the Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 3:4, which relates:
Rabban Gamliel was bathing in the bathhouse of Aphrodite (the Greek goddess of beauty) in
Akko, and Praclus ben Paluslus asked him: “Why are you bathing in Aphrodite’s bathhouse?
Does your Torah not command: ‘Let nothing which is condemned cling to your hand’?
He responded: “One does not reply in a bathhouse.” After he had departed, he told him, “I did
not come into her territory, she came into mine. One does not say, ‘This bathhouse is
becoming to Aphrodite.’ One says, ‘Aphrodite is becoming to the bathhouse.’ Furthermore, no
matter how much money you were offered, you would not enter your idol’s temple naked...
and urinate before it.” (The mishnah continues, mentioning the interpretation of Deuteronomy
12:2 quoted by the Rambam.)
[Significantly, Rashi (Avodah Zarah 44b) interprets the mishnah differently from the Rambam. They explain that rather than the idol being located within the bathhouse, the bathhouse was located within premises belonging to the idol.]

This is the Rambam’s interpretation of Rabban Gamliel’s first point. He did not enter a place where the statue was served (Aphrodite’s territory). Rather, he entered a bathhouse (his territory) where a statue had been placed as an adornment.

When describing the commandment to nullify idol worship.

Avodah Zarah 44b clarifies that the performance of a humiliating act before an idol does not necessarily nullify its forbidden character. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 10.) Nevertheless, since an idol placed in a bathhouse is constantly subjected to deprecating situations, we can assume that the gentiles do not regard it as a god.

As explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 2, there are some idols which are worshiped in a deprecatory manner — e.g., Pe’or, whose worshipers would defecate before it.

As explained in Chapter 3, Halachah 5, even when a person performs these activities with the intent of humiliating the idol, since this is its mode of worship, he is considered to have inadvertently violated the commandment against idol worship, and is obligated to bring a sin offering for atonement.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets the Rambam’s phraseology as implying that although, after the fact, the meat is not forbidden, at the outset (לכתחילה), it is forbidden to slaughter an animal with such a knife. Other authorities, however, do not share this opinion, and maintain that there is no prohibition against using such a knife. (See Rama, Yoreh De’ah 142:2 and the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah, 10:1, which accept the latter view as halachah.)

Chulin 8b clarifies that we are speaking about an instance where the knife has already been kashered, and thus, the only question involves benefiting from an accessory of idol worship. In Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 17:7, the Rambam discusses the process of kashering the knife and what must be done if the knife was used without being kashered. (See also Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah, loc. cit.)

While an animal is alive, it can be used for work and for breeding, and is therefore of greater value.

If the animal dies naturally, a Jew will not be permitted to eat its meat. Thus, the animal’s slaughter enhances its value.

Hence, it is forbidden, as stated in Halachah 2. The Kessef Mishneh states that, based on Halachot 12 and 13, it would appear that the Rambam maintains that all the meat from the animal is forbidden, and there is no way one may benefit from it. The Kessef Mishneh does not accept that view, and argues that it is sufficient to destroy an amount of meat equivalent to the value of the knife.

I.e., cut large pieces of meat into smaller ones.

Making it fit to be sold or cooked. The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 142:6) relates that if one cut pieces of meat with such a knife, even the Rambam would not forbid use of the meat entirely. It would be necessary, however, to destroy an amount of meat equivalent to the value added because of the knife.

E. g., cut pieces which are of a size fit for cooking into smaller ones, which would be less attractive. See Chulin 8b.

Because no benefit was derived from an accessory of an idol. On the contrary, a loss was caused.