Mechirah - Chapter 21

See Halachah 2 for an illustration of this principle.

See Halachah 3 for an illustration of this principle.

See Chapter 12, Halachot 2-4.

See Chapter 13, Halachah 2.

The agreement is considered an asmachta (see Chapter Eleven) and is not binding. From Hilchot Gezelah 7:6, it would appear that making such a sale is considered robbery by decree of our Sages.

Chapter 7, Halachah 1. See also Chapter 22, Halachot 3-4.

I.e., approximately six square meters. This is an interesting commentary on the socio-economics of Talmudic times. It was common for an entire family to live in a one-room domicile smaller than most bedrooms today.
The point of this halachah is that when an agreement is not specific - as in this and the following halachot, where the dimensions of the property are not specified - the norms that are usually accepted by people at large are followed. Today, although those norms have changed, this governing principle remains the same.

Since the purchaser specified that the house should be large, it must exceed the ordinary limits.

Thus, the height of a small house is approximately seven and a half meters and the height of a large house approximately nine meters (Maggid Mishneh).

These dimensions are slightly larger than a person’s ordinary size, to include space for the coffin.

It is very common for archaeologists to find crypts built in such patterns in Eretz Yisrael.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that an irrigation ditch requires walls. The land on either side of the ditch would be packed tightly to serve this purpose.

The roots of trees, by contrast, penetrate deeply and will not harm the banks of the ditch.

From any place in that field. The rationale is that we do not require the purchaser to transfer earth from another place.

A path leading to a person’s field, where it would be customary for only the owner to travel upon it (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 217:6).

For it is common for a person journeying through a field to travel on (or with) a donkey rather than on a wagon (op. cit.:7).
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ri Migash, the Rambam’s teacher, who states that the above applies when there are no walls on the path, and so the burden being carried by the donkey can project further. If, however, there are walls, a larger width is necessary.
This interpretation enables us to resolve a seeming conflict between the Rambam’s ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 3:3, which states that a path for a single person is four cubits wide.

I.e., a path wide enough for two wagons to pass, one going in one direction and the other in the opposite direction (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 217:7).

This was the width of the public thoroughfare in the Jews’ encampment in the desert. See Hilchot Shabbat 14:1.

For a king has the right to tear down any structure that stands in the way of the passage of his troops. Similarly, a funeral procession need not remain confined to a path, but may spread out beyond the confines of the way, even though this will damage produce growing there. This is allowed as a sign of respect for the departed (Rashbam, Bava Batra 99b).

As in Halachah 3.

The Ra’avad differs with this ruling and maintains that a king has the right to seize property for a road, implying that a sale to a king is binding. As a corollary, the Maggid Mishneh maintains that if a person sells a path to a grave through his field, then the people have the right to pass through the entire field.
It must be noted that the Rambam cites the law concerning a king’s right to requisition property for a road in Hilchot Melachim 5:3. Hence, the Ra’avad’s objections are not in place. For the king’s right to requisition property has no effect on the question whether a sale to a king - when he is not ordering its requisition - is binding or not. The Rambam Le’am interprets the Rambam’s statements here as not referring to a sale to a king at all, but instead applying to a situation when a person tells a colleague: “I am selling you a road for a king,” the transaction is not binding.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 6:7). A more specific explanation of the term ma’amad can be found in Hilchot Eivel 12:4.

The Rashbam (Bava Batra 100b) interprets this to be referring to an area of 40 square cubits.

I.e., the seller drew lines on all four sides of the field, but drew one of the horizontal lines shorter than the other. See the accompanying diagram (diagram a).
One of the horizontal lines delineating the field’s boundaries was
drawn to its full length, and one was drawn only partially.

Since the entire field belonged to one person, the seller extended one line to show how long the other person’s field was, but his intent was to sell him only a portion of his field ending on the shorter line. See the accompanying diagram (diagram b).
The lower horizontal line reflects the boundary line of the neighbor. The closed rectangle the area the seller was willing to sell, and the open rectangle the portion he desired to retain for himself.
The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 219:3). The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that even in such an instance the purchaser acquires a larger portion of land.

There would be no need to draw the line longer if the seller did not intend to sell the purchaser additional property on that line.

See the accompanying diagram (diagram c).
The diagonal divides between the portion the seller wishes to retain and that which he is selling.

This will clarify that the seller is selling the entire length and breadth of the area, and not just a portion of it.

According to the Rashbam (Bava Batra 62b), the purchaser does not acquire the row on which the last boundary line would be drawn. According to the Ri Migash, the Rambam’s teacher, the field is divided (as depicted in diagram d) and the purchaser does not acquire the fourth portion.
The conception of the Ri Migash. According to his understanding, the purchaser does not acquired the darkened portion.

I.e., the two boundary lines drawn on either side of the property extend beyond the fourth boundary line. This is the interpretation of the Rashbam. See the accompanying diagram (diagram e).
The horizontal boundary lines extend beyond the vertical one.

If it were designated by a row of palm trees, it would be clear that it is a distinct entity. Since it is not designated in this manner, one may assume that it is part of the field being sold.

If this portion of the field is large enough to have this measure of grain sown within it, it is considered important. (See Hilchot Sh’chenim 1:4.) Thus, one might consider it to be a distinct entity. If it is smaller, one may assume that it is part of the field being sold.

All the three factors mentioned appear to support the purchaser’s position. Therefore, this portion of the field is awarded to him as well.

Even if it is too small to sow nine kabbim of grain in it.

Even if it is designated by a row of palm trees.

Instead, it remains the property of the seller. The rationale is that two of the three factors support the seller’s claim.

In both these instances there is one factor that supports the seller’s claim, and two that support the purchaser’s claim.

I.e., the judges are given the prerogative of deciding according to their intuitive feelings with regard to the intent of the seller (Kessef Mishneh).
This is the Rambam’s (and also the Rashbam’s) interpretation of the Talmudic concept shoda didayanei. Note Tosafot, Bava Batra, loc. cit., who differ and interpret this term as meaning that the judges have the right to award the property to whomever they desire. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpar 219:2) cites the Rambam’s interpretation.
Generally, when there is a doubt with regard to whom property belongs. we follow the principle: “When a person seeks to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.” ln this instance, however, since the evidence appears to support the purchaser’s claim, but the seller has the right of possession, the judges are given the right to determine who is entitled to ownership.

See the accompanying diagram (diagram f).
Although he drew only the diagonals at the quarter, the seller’s intent was the square circumscribed within its boundaries.
There were properties owned by several individuals on every side of the field and at the corners; the properties were owned by different individuals. The question is: Do we say that the seller’s intent was to sell the entire field, or perhaps his intent was merely to sell the corner portions?

See the accompanying diagram (diagram G). Here too, there is a similar question. Was he selling the entire field or only the designated portions?
Although he drew only the L’s, the seller’s intent was the square circumscribed within its boundaries.

In this instance as well, there were properties owned by several individuals on every side of the field, and the seller marked off only some of the properties, leaving empty spaces on each side. See the accompanying diagram (diagram h).
The seller marked the comers of the entire field and also the shaded portions.
The question is: Do we say that the omissions were intentional and the seller intended to sell only those portions of the field that he marked off? Or do we say that it is uncommon to sell select parts of a field, and his intent was to sell the entire field?

From a simple reading, it would appear that the Rambam is concluding with the same ruling as in the previous halachah - i.e., that the decision is reached through shoda didayanei, a decision dependent on the judges’ intuitive feelings with regard to the legitimacy of the litigants’ claims (Maggid Mishneh).
The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam rules in this fashion. Bava Batra 62b, the source for this halachah, concludes teiku, implying that there is an unresolved doubt. Generally, in such a situation, the owner of the property - in this case the seller - is allowed to maintain possession, based on the principle: “When a person seeks to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.” For this reason, the Kessef Mishneh suggests that the Rambam had a different text of that Talmudic passage.
The Siftei Cohen 219:2 explains that the Rambam is not ruling that the case is decided by shoda didayanei. Instead, his intent is that the seller is allowed to keep a certain portion of the property. Nevertheless, since interpreting the seller’s intent when drawing the charts also requires knowledge, this task is assigned to judges.

The term bayit means “home,” “dwelling,” or “building.” The halachah deals with the question whether the seller sold the entire building or merely one apartment.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 214:32 emphasizes that this applies when the seller is standing in one apartment when he makes the sale and says: “I am selling you this bayit.”

The Maggid Mishneh (based on Bava Batra 61b) explains that this law does not apply in a place where most people refer to a building as a bayit. In such an instance, the purchaser would acquire the entire building. This ruling is cited by the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 214:7).

As stated in Chapter 24, Halachah 14, using such an expression clarifies any questions of doubt that might arise.
Nevertheless, the Maggid Mishneh states that even if the seller includes this expression in the deed of sale, if there are none who refer to a building as a bayit, the purchaser does not acquire the entire building. Since none of the local people use such an expression, we assume that this is not the seller’s intent. This ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 218:22) state that this law applies only when the smaller fields in the valley are clearly divided one from the other. Otherwise, the purchaser acquires the entire valley.

Or states this in a deed of sale.

This principle is also followed in other contexts. The basis for this conclusion is that although the seller’s statement leaves room for doubt, since he is in possession of the land, the purchaser must prove that a larger number of fields were intended.

Three or four is not a limit. Mentioning this number simply illustrates that the intent is not only two. The rationale for the difference is that by stating “all,” the seller indicated that he was selling him more than the minimum number.

For gardens and orchard are not described as fields.

All the seller’s landed property, with the exception of his home, is sold. The commentaries note the contrast between this halachah and Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanalz 11:15, in which the Rambam states:
If a person on his deathbed said: “[Give] my property to so and so,” [the recipient] should take all the movable property, all the landed property, his wardrobe, his servants,... [his] tefillin.”
The Maggid Mishneh cites authorities who differentiate between one who states nechasai (“my property”) and nechasim sheli, which has the same meaning. When the possessive form is used as a suffix. these commentaries explain, the person does not have to state “all,” for all bis property to be included. For the fact that be identifies the property with himself in the same word indicates that he intends to transfer all his property. When, however, the possessive is stated in another word, this intent is lacking and the word “all” must be added for the sale to be that inclusive. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 218) makes such a distinction.
Other authorities differentiate between a sale - the subject of this halachah - where a person is restrictive in what he gives the purchaser, and a bequest - where the dying man is giving generously.

“One” seemingly means “any one,” to be chosen by the seller.

I.e., this is the one that he had sold him, and it died or collapsed after the sale.

I.e., the purchaser.

The seller is in possession of the property. Therefore, to expropriate it from him, the purchaser must be able to demonstrate his claim clearly. For that to be possible, the wording of the deed of sale must clearly prove his contention, and that is not true in this case.

For the same reason mentioned with regard to the previous halachah.

The Ir Sl111sha11 explains that the seller must prove that the second field was purchased from Reuven. Sefer Me’irat Ei11ayim 218:66 differs and explains that he must prove that the field popularly known as Reuven’s never belonged to Reuven.

Since the dimensions of the half of the field are not specified, we divide the field, giving the seller - who has the right of possession - the more select half. We assume that a person would prefer to have a smaller amount of choice property than a larger amount of inferior property (Maggid Mishneh).

This applies to both the above clauses.
The Rashbam differs with the Rambam’s interpretation of Bava Batra 107b (the source for this halachah). [Indeed, it is possible that his version of the Talmud’s text was slightly different.] According to the Rashbam, it is the seller who must provide for the building of the fence. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 218:20) quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Tur and the Ramah cite that of the Rashbam.

He must also build the fence itself.

I.e., a small, but deft carnivorous animal. This is the translation popularly given. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 218:52, however, which interprets the term as referring to an animal that will destroy crops.

This wording implies that he is selling him the entire portion of the field that he owns.

I.e., half of his half.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets this as meaning that he specifies just its northern and southern boundaries.

Specifying also its eastern and western boundaries.

We assume that the reason the seller specified the boundaries of the entire field is that he desired to give the purchaser a significant portion of it.

For this is the minimal size of a field. This is another example of the principle that since the seller has the right of possession, any ambiguity in the deed of sale is interpreted in his favor.