This is a corollary to the law stated in the beginning of Chapter 18, for having to go to court concerning an object is considered a blemish that destroys its usefulness (Maggid Mishneh).
I.e., if the property is expropriated from the purchaser, the seller is required to reimburse him.
Even though the purchaser will not suffer financial loss, since the time and annoyance that litigation entails is undesirable, it is forbidden to sell him an object that will force him to enter litigation without previously informing him.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 226:5) explains that this refers to a claim that has been lodged in court, and the court considers it worthy of investigation. Mere rumors of a claim, however, are not sufficient to cause a sale to be nullified.
Even if the seller’s claim to ownership is vindicated by the court, the sale is not automatically reinstated. Since it had been nullified, each has the option of retracting [Ramah, (loc. cit.)].
Our Sages (Bava Metzia 14a; Ketubot 92b-93a) maintain that once a person has already derived benefit from property, he would prefer to defend his right to it in court, rather than cede it to a claimant and sue the seller for the return of the payment. It must be emphasized that Rabbenu Asher and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 226) interpret this passage in a totally different fashion. Significantly, their interpretation is not cited by the Ramah. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 226:10.
The Kessef Mishneh states that this applies only when the seller has other property from which the purchaser could seek redress if this property is expropriated from him.
The litigant may also collect half of the article’s increase in value from the purchaser, and the seller is required to reimburse the purchaser for this (Sefer Meirat Einayim 225:2). The Rambam also accepts this law, mentioning it in Hilchot Malveh ULoveh, ch. 21.
I.e., if the litigant can prove that the seller owes him money, he is considered to have a lien on all the landed property that was in the seller’s possession at the time the debt was incurred, and he may expropriate the property from the purchaser (see the following halachah).
[With regard to a servant, if the seller designated him as an apotiki for a debt - i.e., he specifically said that this servant would be given as payment for the debt - the servant is considered to be on lien for the debt.
With regard to other movable property, even if the seller designated it an apotiki, it is never considered to be on lien to a debt. (See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 18:5.)]
Alternatively, if the litigant can prove that the article that was sold belongs to him and was unscrupulously sold, he may expropriate it from the purchaser.
I.e., although the legal document was prepared according to all the laws of contracts, and the clause mentioning the seller’s responsibility was omitted, we do not say that the omission was intentional, and that the purchaser did not require the seller to accept this responsibility (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 225:3).
For it is an accepted presumption that a person will not spend money unless he is certain that his purchase is secure, and he will be able to maintain possession of the article he seeks to purchase (Ibid.:4).
This would allow the seller ample opportunity to defend his claim and ensure that the property had not been expropriated unjustly.
The Maggid Mishneh states that the same law applies even if it was a Jew who expropriated the property unjustly.
The Kessef Mishneh states that if the gentile’s claim would be vindicated by a Rabbinical court, the seller is required to accept the responsibility for the property.
In the Talmudic era, this was unfortunately a frequent occurrence, for the Romans would often seize Jewish property by force. The fact that it is quoted by the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 225:3) indicates that it persisted in later generations as well.
I.e., the gentile seized the field because he claimed that the seller stole it from him. If, however, the gentile seized the field for other reasons, the seller is not liable, for he accepts responsibility only for losses to which he shares some sort of connection (Kessef Mishneh).
Gittin 73a, which is the source for this incident, states that the river was dammed.
In contrast to the situation mentioned in Halachah 3, where a contract did not mention responsibility at all, this contract explicitly stated that the seller would not be held responsible. Seeing such a clause, the purchaser should have realized that something was amiss and taken the proper precautions.
The Kessef Mishneh notes an apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s ruling here and his ruling in Hilchot Edut 16:4, for both are dependent on the same Talmudic passage (Bava Batra 44b).
Since the purchaser accepted the stipulation, the transaction is determined accordingly.
If, however, Reuven gave the field to Shimon as a present, this law does not apply [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 226:1)].
He is not, however, obligated to do this. It is the immediate owner of the property who must handle the litigation, as stated in Halachah 2.
It is preferable for the seller to become involved in the litigation, for he knows the details of the history of the property better than the purchaser does (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Ramban). Alternatively, if the seller designated the property as an apotiki to a creditor, he has the· fight to pay the creditor cash and thus prevent him from expropriating the field [Tur (Choshen Mishpat 226)].
For one who is not an involved party in a transaction may not enter into litigation unless one receives power of attorney.
And therefore, he is considered to be an involved party.
Even though Shimon would be held liable if Shimon had sold it to anyone else and accepted responsibility.
I.e., Reuven inherited the property from his father, Jacob. It was on lien, because of a debt Jacob had incurred, and ultimately that creditor expropriated it because of that debt (Maggid Mishneh).
For there is a difference between his father’s creditor’s expropriating the property and expropriation by his creditor.
