Mechirah - Chapter 14

Chapter 13, Halachah 5.

Because the purchaser pays the price willingly.

See Bava Batra 89a, which explains that with regard to basic necessities, our Sages restricted the freedom of the marketplace.
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 231:20) emphasize that this law applies only when the court can enforce its rulings universally. If, however, there are some merchants who cannot be compelled to follow the court’s rulings, the other merchants are not bound by these restrictions. For once the merchants who follow the court’s guidelines finish selling their merchandise, the public will purchase from the other merchants, and thus the court will have caused a loss to the merchants who follow its guidelines.

As stated in Hilchot Geneivah 8:20, the officers should enforce the regulations established by the court by using corporal punishment if necessary.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) declare that the laws stated by the Rambam apply only when the seller sells all his merchandise at one time. If, however, he sells his merchandise bit by bit, he should evaluate his effort and his expenses, add that to the cost of the merchandise and then take a profit of one sixth.

Although slightly redundant, the Rambam includes this phrase to indicate that not only does the court have the responsibility to regulate market prices, but every individual is responsible not to charge a price that will bring him an exorbitant profit.

The Kessef Mishneh states that any type of food is considered to be an “article on which our lives depend.” This conclusion is not, however, reflected in the understanding of the Maggid Mishneh and the Tur. (See also Sefer HaMekach of Rav Hai Gaon, which states that a person should not profit more than a sixth when selling “articles that are necessary.”)
From Halachah 4, it appears that this halachah is speaking of a situation in the diaspora. In Eretz Yisrael, even this measure of profit is not permitted. Note also the contrast to the wording used in Halachah 5. On this basis, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 227:42 states that in the diaspora, one may take a profit of one-sixth even in a community that is predominantly Jewish.

The Hebrew term used by the Rambam literally means “roots.” We have chosen its functional meaning. Many of the herbs used in that age came from the roots of plants.

Herbs that are used in the incense offering.
The Kessef Mishneh recommends making a distinction between the herbs mentioned by the Rambam and spices like pepper, which are frequently used as condiments. He maintains that a limit of a profit of one sixth should also be set for spices. Note the contrast to the wording in Halachah 7.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 231:36 explains that there are three categories: a) foods, in which instance the profit is restricted to one sixth; b) spices, in which instance the profit may be equivalent to the cost; and c) herbs, regarding which no limits are set.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this concept is derived from the rationale given by Bava Batra 90b for the laws stated in Halachah 5, “so that one will not cause the prices to rise without control.” Since herbs are not included in that restriction, as stated in Halachah 7, one may conclude that no curbs need be placed on their pricing.

Bava Batra 91a mentions a restriction with regard to the sale of eggs and offers two interpretations of it. The Rambam’s ruling reflects one interpretation; the other is reflected in the ruling of the Tur. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 231:22) quotes both interpretations, but appears to favor that of the Rambam.

This is an extra measure of consideration shown to the inhabitants of our holy land. The Maharikash explains that this law applies only when Eretz Yisrael is settled primarily by Jews. If it is in the hands of gentiles, this law is not relevant. For this reason, it is not mentioned by the Tur. Significantly, however, it is mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 231:23).

I.e., a wholesaler should not purchase foodstuffs from many farmers to sell at a profit. Instead, each farmer should sell his own produce directly, so that the consumer pays a lower price.

I.e., in this way there is no middleman, and the lower price that the farmer would ask from the wholesaler is passed on to the consumer.

Since oil is abundant, even if it is sold by a wholesaler, a consumer will still be paying a relatively low price.

This is evident from Bava Batra 90a, which exemplifies this principle with stories from sages from Babylon.

I.e., if the produce is abundantly available, it would be wiser from a business perspective to store it temporarily, so that it will be less available and the market prices will remain higher. Nevertheless, our Sages forbade such conduct, so that the prices would fall and the consumers would reap the full benefit of an ample harvest.

I.e., the person may store the produce for his personal use. This is the Rambam’s intent, for, as mentioned in Halachah 4, it is forbidden to do business with produce on which our lives depend (Chasdei David).

A kav is a Talmudic measure equal to 1382 cubic centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, and 2389 cc according to Chazon Ish.
In his gloss, the Maggid Mishneh suggests that the intent is the idiomatic meaning of the term, a small measure. Others imply that the intent is not necessarily a small measure, but any measure that the person could call his own.

It is forbidden to work the land or store produce during the Sabbatical year. It is thus not until the end of the eighth year - when the harvest of that year will be reaped – that new produce will be easily accessible. In order to allow for a supply of food throughout this time, the Sages allowed the harvest of the sixth year to be stored during these three years.

When crops do not grow.

When quoting this law, the She’iltot D’Rav Achai Gaon (She’ilta 32) states that this applies even to storing one’s own produce. Also, the fact that carobs are mentioned indicates that it applies to foodstuffs that are not absolutely necessary elements of our diet.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 231:24) states that in a year of drought one may store enough food to feed one’s household for a year.

I.e., storing produce causes prices to skyrocket.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Terumah 1:3, the term Syria refers to the lands to the northeast of Eretz Yisrael, which King David conquered before conquering the holy land in its entirety. Because these lands were conquered before Eretz Yisrael, they did not become an integral part of the holy land.
This law is an indication of the special importance held for settling Eretz Yisrael and does not apply even in predominantly Jewish areas of the diaspora. For this reason, it is omitted by the Tur. It is, however, mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 231:26).

For example, in the times of the First Temple, when Israel was split into two kingdoms. The Maggid Mishneh cites other opinions that differ with the Rambam on this law.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that if the townspeople accept these provisions, they are binding even if they are established when a sage is not present to approve them. See the notes on Halachah II.

Although bread and meat are considered articles on which our lives depend, the members of a community can establish a standard price that all must pay.
Bava Batra 8b states that the inhabitants may also set minimum and maximum limits for wages.

If a financial penalty is involved, violation of the provision creates a binding obligation.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 231:28) state that for these provisions to be binding, they must be accepted by all the craftsmen of that particular profession. If it is accepted only by a few, they are not bound by it.

This halachah gives us insight into Judaism’s conception of a sage. His mission is not merely to study by himself, or even to help teach others, but to involve himself in his people’s lives and show concern even for their material welfare.

And he has been appointed to this position by the people (Ri MiGash).

We have worded the phrasing in the brackets so that it would be accepted by all authorities. Rav Moshe Alascer explains that the Rambam’s intent is that only a stipulation proposed by craftsmen is subject to the approval of the local sage. One proposed by the inhabitants of a city, by contrast, is not dependent on his consent. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 231:28), by contrast, state that stipulations made by both the townspeople and craftsmen are subject to the consent of the local sage.

I.e., who violates (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., if the stipulation was that if a craftsman sells merchandise below a certain price, his merchandise should be destroyed, and one of the members of this professional guild destroyed a person’s merchandise because of that stipulation, the person who destroyed the merchandise is liable to pay for the damages that he caused.

The Nimukei Yosef and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 228:1) quote an opinion that explains that “your colleague” refers to “one who joins with you in the observance of the mitzvot.” Note the Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 228), which derives this concept from a comparison to the following halachah. Thus, according to this view, the prohibition against verbal abuse applies only to abuse of God-fearing individuals.

See the exegesis of this verse in Halachah 18.
Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 251) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 338) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., remember that you committed sins. The intent is not that the person embarrasses the penitent in public. That would involve the transgression of other sins. Rather, he makes the statement to him in private, when no one else is listening. Nevertheless, since hearing such a statement will cause the penitent person anguish, making such a statement is considered a sin.
It might be added that there are many who violate this transgression without even thinking of doing so. For when a person speaks to a baal-teshuvah and with the best intentions tells him or her, “You’ve progressed so far after coming from such a background,” he has verbally abused that person.

I.e., implying that his misfortunes are coming as punishment for his misdeeds.

In this instance, he is subjecting both the donkey drivers and the person to whom he directed them to embarrassing difficulty.

Even if this is not done in public, the unlearned person is made very uncomfortable by having his lack of knowledge exposed.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 252) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 63) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 253) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 64) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Halachah 17, which explains why a person violates three negative prohibitions although only two involve verbal abuse.

This prohibition applies to all Jews, native-born Israelites and converts alike.

See Halachah 18, which explains why a person violates three negative prohibitions although only two involve taking unfair financial advantage.

The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that seemingly the person who oppresses the convert should be considered to be violating only two prohibitions on either count. Significantly, in his Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 9), the Rambam himself makes statements that echo those of the Maggid Mishneh. (See also Hilchot Avadim 8:11.)
The Or Sameach attempts to justify the Rambam’s words in this halachah, explaining that since a convert is from another nation, when a person denigrates him verbally the convert will lose his self-esteem and hesitate before entering into business dealings with other Jews. Since this verbal abuse will be translated into financial loss, the Jew who abused the convert is considered to have violated the prohibition against financial abuse.
Similarly, when a person abuses a convert financially, the convert will assume that the reason that the Jew took unfair advantage of him is that he looks down on him, and thus the convert will appreciate it as a personal slur. Hence, the Jew is considered to have violated the prohibition against verbal abuse.

I.e., whether or not a person intended to hurt another person’s feelings is not a cut and dry matter that can be added up on paper, but a point of emotional sensitivity. Indeed, there is always a way a person can rationalize - to others and even to himself - why he made such statements. Nevertheless, although mortal man has no way of appreciating such feelings, God sees into the heart and understands the person’s intent.

A phrase that is interpreted in other contexts as implying that He “will certainly exact retribution.” See Bava Metzia 59a, which states that “all the heavenly gates are closed except those associated with abuse.” And with regard to a similar instance, Bava Kama 93a states that God exacts retribution for verbal abuse whether or not the abused cries out. Nevertheless, if he cries out, the retribution is exacted more speedily.