Me`ilah - Chapter 7

Throughout Torah law, we follow the principle (Kiddushin 42b): “There is no agent for a transgression” and anyone who transgresses must bear the responsibility for his deeds himself. Me’ilah, however, is an exception to this rule and if a person misappropriates an object while acting as an agent for another person, the principal is the one who is liable.

Since he deviated from the principal’s instructions, he is not considered as an agent and is solely responsible for his deeds.

When both the meat and the bread were consecrated for the improvement of the Temple, as stated in Halachah 2.

This is a principle applicable in several contexts of Torah law (Kiddushin 49b; Hilchot Ishut 8:2; Hilchot Sh’vuot 3:3; Hilchot Mechirah 11:9). Even though a person has an intent in his heart, as long as he does not state it explicitly, it is of no consequence.

For they are not considered as responsible for their conduct (see Hilchot Shluchin 2:2).

Since ultimately, the principal’s intent was carried out, we are not concerned who carried it out [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 6:2)].

The agent added to the principal’s instructions and thus there is reason to think that he should no longer be considered as his agent (ibid.:1). Nevertheless, since he also carried them out, that presumption is not made.

The principal violates this prohibition, because his instructions are being carried out. The agent violates the prohibition, because he has taken the initiative and invited the guests to take more.

The agent who was the agent of the principal, and the guests who were the agents of the agent.

The principal and the first agent.

I.e., entities that will be offered on the altar’s pyre.

I.e., in addition to the prohibition against me‘ilah (misappropriating consecrated articles), the person violates the prohibition against partaking of the meat of the burnt-offering. See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 11:1.

The commentaries note that, as the Rambam himself rules (Hilchot Geneivah 2:10, 3:6), a persorr is liable for a four- or five-time payment if he has a stolen animal sold or slaughtered. Thus, me’ilah is not the sole instance when an agent makes a principal liable.

Hence since here another prohibition is also involved, we follow the general principle that a person never becomes liable because of the activity of an agent and obligate the agent not the principal.

I.e., an earthenware vessel in which oil and a wick are placed (Rav Yosef Corcus).

And one must derive a p’rutah’s worth of benefit to be liable for this prohibition.

For half a p’rutah’s worth of his activity was performed in accord with the principal’s instructions.

For he has deviated from the principal’s instructions with regard to an entire p‘rutah. Rav Yosef Corcus explains that we do not say that he is merely suggesting a place to the agent. Instead, we assume that his intent is that he should bring the articles from that specific place.

Since the agent deviated from the principal’s instructions, the principal is not liable. The agent is liable, because, on his own initiative, he used a consecrated p’rutah for ordinary purposes.

The agent is liable because he used a consecrated p’rutah to purchase the pomegranate on his own initiative. The principal is liable, because his desire was fulfilled. The fact that he received the esrog for less than its value is of no consequence. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 6:4).

On the surface - as noted by certain commentaries - the Rambam’s ruling here appears to run contrary to statements of the Mishnah (Me’ilah 6:2). Nevertheless, in his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains his position, showing how there is no contradiction.
The Rambam’s ruling is based on Chagigah 10b which states that it is hard to understand why the agent is liable just because the principal remembered. He did not know at all that the money was consecrated. Seemingly, it is like a transgression due to factors beyond one’s control. Nevertheless, our Sages conclude that the agent is liable.

Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

And since he is not liable, the holiness does not depart from the consecrated article.

For as explained above, a sacrifice is not brought to atone for the willful violation of the prohibition of me’ilah.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (toe. cit.), the Rambam states that this applies when the storekeeper knows that he received a consecrated p’rutah. In that case, the storekeeper would be transferring the holiness of the consecrated p’rutah to a non-consecrated one. Seemingly, the same ruling would also apply if the principal or the agent made the transfer of holiness (see the gloss of Rav Yosef Corcus).

As described in the previous clause.

We do not say that the consecrated coin is betal, insignificant, and therefore considered as if it no longer exists, because a coin is important and is never considered as insignificant (Tosafot, Me’ilah 21b). Alternatively, it is an entity that can become permitted (by having its holiness transferred) and an entity that can become permitted is never beta! because of a mixture (Kessef Mishneh).

And no one is ever liable merely for a possible violation of the prohibition against me’ilah (Rav Yosef Corcus, based on Chapter 1, Halachah 5).

I.e., the person is forbidden to use some of the purses or oxen and needless to say, all of them, because he does not know which one was consecrated. Thus no matter which purse or ox he takes, it is possible that he is taking the consecrated one.

So he will be permitted to use them.

The Sages required that the largest of the oxen or purses be used even though according to the letter of the law, the same proviso would apply were a smaller one used.

Generally, anything less than a p’rutah’s worth is not considered financially significant and one is not liable at all. In this instance, however, Bava Metzia 55a-b uses Biblical exegesis to show that one is liable for restitution.

Although there is no explicit source that teaches this, it is a logical conclusion, since the Scriptural decree did not explicitly include it.

Without telling him that they are consecrated.

See Hilchot Sha’aleh UFikadon 7:8. Since the owner of the money had every reason to assume that the money would not be touched, he is not liable at all for me’ilah.

If, however, they were sealed or closed in this manner, the principles mentioned in the previous halachah would apply, because the storekeeper or money-changer has no right to use the money under such circumstances.

From the obligation to bring a sacrifice and, needless to say, from lashes.

Thus from his point of view, he is acting as the agent of the one who entrusted the money to him. Hence, he is not liable [the Rambam’s Commentary· to the Mishnah (Me’ilah 6:5)].

See Hilchot Sha’aleh UFikadon 7:7.

When a woman is married, all of her property enters her husband’s domain and he is entitled to use all of it at will. Here we are speaking of a situation in which the woman had consecrated articles among her property and her husband used them without being aware that they were consecrated.

The Rambam is emphasizing that the husband is considered to have violated the prohibition and not the wife. There is reason to say that the woman should be held liable and the husband considered as her agent (thus connecting this halachah to the previous ones). Nevertheless, since the woman did not instruct the husband to spend the money, she is not held liable (Rav Yosef Corcus).