Shegagot - Chapter 7

Of wine or of blood.

Of meat, fat, or incense.

As mentioned in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:3, one is liable for performing these four services to any false deity, even if this is not the way it is ordinarily served.

These are the ways in which these false deities are served (see ibid.:2).

For this is considered as two lapses of awareness. The distinction between different services performed to a false deity are governed by similar laws as the distinction between different labors performed on the Sabbath. Even though one performed them in the same lapse of awareness, they are considered as separate acts (Sanhedrin 62a, Keritot 3a).

Keritot 3a states that one could come to this conclusion, because Exodus 20:20 states: “Do not make with Me gods of silver and gods of gold.”

For there is only one lapse of awareness.

Had he converted while an adult, he would certainly have learned about the Sabbath before conversion. A child who converted under the guidance of the court, by contrast, need not to have been so informed (Kessef Mishneh).

This is the definition of the term tinok shenishba. Since the child grew up among gentiles, we assume that he never was educated about the Sabbath laws. In this instance, our translation for shegagah, "lapse of awareness," is not entirely appropriate. Unlike the former instance, this person did not know about the Sabbath prohibitions and forget; he was never aware of them. Nevertheless, he is required to bring a sacrifice in atonement.

Since he is unaware of the very essence of the Sabbath prohibitions, the different forbidden labors and different Sabbaths are not of consequence.

Our translation follows the version in authoritative manuscripts and early printings. The standard published text follows a different version.

Even if he inadvertently violates several Sabbaths in succession without gaining awareness in the interim, the passage of time between the Sabbaths creates a distinction between them.

This lack of knowledge is sufficient to cause his violation to be considered as “inadvertent.” (See Chapter 2, Halachah 2).

As explained in Hilchot Shabbat, ch. 7, and exemplified with regard to every category of forbidden labor in the chapters that follow: there is a primary category of forbidden labor, i.e., activities of the same type and which share the same purpose as those performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. Thus plowing, digging, and making a groove in the ground are all considered in the same category. Nevertheless, all are considered as primary forbidden labors and not derivatives because they all involve digging in the ground and share a single purpose.
A derivative, by contrast, is an activity that produces a result similar to that produced by a primary forbidden labor, but which differs both in intent and in the nature of the activity [the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2).] In Hilchot Shabbat 7:5, he gives an example: cutting a vegetable into small pieces is a derivative of grinding. Similarly, taking a strip of metal and pulverizing it into powder is considered as a derivative of grinding.

In this instance, his lapse of awareness concerns the labors. Hence he must bring a sin-offering for every category of labor. Moreover, even if he performs this forbidden category of labor on several Sabbaths in succession, the different Sabbaths do not create a distinction. Until he learns what constitutes a forbidden labor, it is all one lapse of awareness (Rav Yosef Corcus).

The Rambam’s actual wording “40 minus 1” is a quote from Shabbat 73a.
The Kessef Mishneh and Rav Yosef Corcus (quoting a responsum of R. Avraham, the Rambam’s son) maintain that this final clause is referring to an instance where he does not know that he is liable for karet for performing the forbidden labors, for if he does not know that all the 39 labors are forbidden, how can it be said that he knows of the Sabbath?!
Alternatively, it could be interpreted as referring to a situation where the person knew that there were certain activities forbidden on the Sabbath, but was not aware of the delineation of the categories of forbidden labor. Since he did not know that all these categories of labor were forbidden, he is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each category.

Although he also had a lapse of awareness with regard to the forbidden labors, since he was not aware that the day was the Sabbath, the latter lapse of awareness is of primary importance (Rav Yosef Corcus, quoting Shabbat 70b).
The commentaries question this ruling, because the question is left unresolved by the Talmud. The commentaries explain that even though, generally, when there is an unresolved question in the Talmud, we rule stringently, in this instance, the person cannot be obligated to bring a sin-offering unless he knows with certainty that he is obligated to bring it. For, otherwise, there is the possibility that he is slaughtering an ordinary animal in the Temple Courtyard and that is a serious transgression.

Since they are in the same category of labor, atonement is secured by the same sin-offering.

I.e., one might think that when one performs the primary labor, the importance of the derivative is dwarfed, and hence, one is not liable for a separate offering. When one does not perform the primary labor, by contrast, there is room to think that each derivative should be considered individually (Rav Yosef Corcus).

The expression “It appears to me” implies a conclusion made by the Rambam on the basis of a deduction for which there exists no prior Rabbinic source. Hence, the use of that phrase here attracted the notice of the commentaries who note that this concept is explicitly stated in Shabbat 96b and Bava Kama 2a. Rav Avraham, the Rambam’s son, offers a rationale which the Kessel Mishneh easily refutes and then says that it is possible that the Talmudic passage slipped his father’s mind while he was composing the Mishneh Torah. Alternatively, Rav Yosef Corcus states that there are some activities that are considered as derivatives of two different forbidden labors. For example, removing dregs from wine could be considered a derivative of borer (separating) or mirakeid (“sifting”). If one person sifted flour and removed dregs from wine, there is a question whether he is liable for one sin-offering or two. Rav Yosef Corcus states that the ruling depends on the warning he was given. If he was warned for sifting, he is liable for one sin-offering, If he was warned for separating, he is liable for two. Rav Yosef Corcus admits, however, that this is a difficult interpretation.

This term is used to refer to activities that so closely resemble the activities that constitute the primary categories of labor that they are considered as primary labors and not as derivatives.

By replanting the head of one of the branches of the vine in the ground where it takes root, one provides the vine with an added source of nurture. This was a commonly practiced agricultural technique in the Talmudic era.

All these are considered as primary labors in the category of planting.

Hilchot Shabbat, chs. 7-12.

As described in the second paragraph of this halachah.

As described in the following halachah.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 3:10), the Rambam compares this to a situation where a man is intimate with several women who are all forbidden to him because of the same prohibition, e.g., two married women. There is no question that he is liable for a sin-offering for every woman.
The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam’s statements, because he infers that if the person performed the same forbidden activity on three successive Sabbaths, e.g., he sowed, without knowing that sowing was forbidden, according to the Rambam, he would be liable for only one sin-offering. He objects to this decision and maintains that even in such a situation, each Sabbath is considered as a distinct entity and the person should be liable for three sin-offerings.
The Kessef Mishneh ‘s interpretation of the Rambam’s intent is reflected by the changes in the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Keritot 3:9). Initially, the Rambam spoke about a person kindling a fire on successive Sabbaths. (This version is preserved in the standard published text of his Commentary.) Afterwards, he amended the text to read as stated here. (See Rav Kapach’s translation.).
Rav Yosef Corcus maintains that the Rambam would also rule that one who performs the same forbidden activity on several Sabbaths is liable for a sin-offering for every Sabbath. He speaks of sowing, extending, and planting, only because his source, Keritot, op. cit., uses the wording melachot... me’ayn melachah achat, “activities comprising a single category of forbidden labor,” and he is being true to his source.

Even though all of these activities are in the same category of forbidden labor.

The minimum measure for which he is liable (Hilchot Shabbat 8:3, 15).

As stated in the latter clause of Halachah 2.

And did not become aware of the harvesting and grinding performed while aware that it is Sabbath, but not aware that these labors are forbidden.

The intent is that, since at this time, he is unaware of the harvesting and grinding performed while aware that it was the Sabbath, and he is bringing a sin-offering to atone for performing these labors, the sacrifice has a more inclusive effect and atones for the other forbidden labors as well. Were he to have become aware of the later transgressions before he set aside the sin-offering for the first, they would not be included in it.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that Shabbat 71a states that, according to this logic, atonement would be granted for all the transgressions in the following situation. A person partook of two olive-sized portions of forbidden fat and then became aware of eating one of them. He then partook of another olive-sized portion while he was unaware of the second transgression and then brought a sin-offering to atone for the first transgression. In Chapter 6, Halachah 11, the Rambam rules that, in such a situation, atonement is granted for only the first two transgressions.
Among the resolutions he cites is one offered by Rav Yosef Corcus who explains that the passage in Shabbat follows the opinion that becoming aware of the transgression does not create a distinction between the transgressions. The Rambam follows the opinion that a distinction is created and, hence, requires a sacrifice in this instance.

The harvesting and grinding performed without being aware that it is Sabbath, but knowing that these labors are forbidden.

I.e., since he was not aware of performing the forbidden labors before he brought the sacrifice, the atonement for harvesting includes the harvesting performed when he is not aware that it is the Sabbath. And since grinding was performed together with that harvesting, atonement is granted for the grinding as well. A further extension to include the second grinding is, however, not possible (Shabbat 71a).

To make him liable for a sin offering. Thus if when combined, the measure he harvested is the size of a dried fig, he is liable.
The Ra’avad differs and maintains that the concept of considering the two labors as being performed together applies only with regard to granting atonement and not with regard to establishing liability. The Kessef Mishneh explains that, according to the Rambam, it is considered as if the two activities were performed in the same lapse of awareness. Hence, they should be combined in all instances.

Which does not constitute a forbidden labor.

And thus unintentionally. performed the forbidden labor of harvesting on the Sabbath. See Hilchot Shabbat 1:8.

Chapter 2, Halachah 7; Hilchot Shabbat 1:9.

Although his intent was not to ignite the coals, since they were ignited through his activity, he is liable. He is considered to be acting willfully, because he knows that stirring the coals will ignite them. There is a slight error in the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah.

In Hilchot Shabbat 1:7, the Rambam gives another example of this principle: a person who extinguishes a lamp, because he desires the oil. In both instances, the person is intentionally performing an activity that constitutes a forbidden labor. Even though he does not desire the usual object of that activity, since he consciously desired to perform that activity, he is liable.
As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Shabbat, the Rambam’s opinion is not accepted by all authorities. Tosafot, Zevachim 92a, differs and exempts a person in such an instance and this view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 278:1; 334:12). It must be emphasized that even according to the more lenient view, there is a Rabbinic prohibition against performing such activities.