Korban Pesach - Chapter 2

The Mechilta and the Mechilta of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai derived this concept from textual associations with other verses. See also Halachah 14 which explains that as long as a sacrificial animal is alive, one can change his mind and switch from one sacrifice to another.

The use of a plural form indicates that more than one person should bring it.

For by eating such a portion, he fulfills the mitzvah, as stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 3.

And thus the lamb will surely be consumed in its entirety.

The commentaries understood this as referring to indecent and lewd conduct.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 8, which speaks of a woman’s obligations vis-à-vis the second Paschal sacrifice.

For a servant’s halachic obligations are the same as a woman’s (Kessef Mishneh).

As part of the process of training them in the observance of mitzvot.

And as a result, they are unable to consecrate the Paschal sacrifice. If, however, they reach the age of 12 and they are intellectually competent, it is possible that their consecration of a sacrifice is effective and a company may be constituted of them (Kessef Mishneh).

The term refers to a person who that day lost their spouse or one of the six relatives for whom they are required to mourn according to Scriptural Law (see Hilchot Evel 2:1). As explained in Chapter 6, Halachah 9, if the relative died in the afternoon, such a person is obligated to partake of the Paschal sacrifice that night. Nevertheless, because of the acute mourning such an individual feels, he will not eat with appetite.

I.e., by leaving until the next morning, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 11.

This is the version in most of the authoritative manuscripts and early printings, following the understanding of the Jerusalem Talmud (Pesachim 8:7), which maintains that converts would not be careful in their observance. Other versions follow the understanding of Rashi (Pesachim 91b) who maintains that the converts will be overly stringent in their observance and cause the sacrifice to be disqualified unnecessarily.

Who is forbidden to partake of the Paschal sacrifice, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 5; Chapter 9, Halachah 8.

Who may not partake of it, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 1.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and equates casting the blood with slaughter. As long as there are some circumcised people to partake of it, he maintains that the sacrifice is acceptable. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling on the basis of his interpretation of Pesachim 61b.

As indicated by Leviticus 17:11: “For the soul of flesh is in the blood and I have given it to you... to gain atonement for your souls,” the fundamental atonement achieved by the sacrifices comes through casting the blood (Rav Yosef Corcus).

I.e., the sacrifice itself is not disqualified.

The commentaries explain that the Rambam’s ruling is based on a different version of Pesachim 61a than is found in the standard printed texts.

To the extent that he could not partake of an olive-sized portion of the sacrifice.

Who do not have any independent authority.

For their consent is of no consequence.

Once they attain majority, they are considered independent and their own decisions are significant. This applies even when they live at home and are financially dependent on their parents (Rav Yosef Corcus).

Who are considered as independent individuals, responsible for their own observance.

Even though a Hebrew maidservant is below majority, she is not dependent on her owner, because it is not his responsibility to educate her. Therefore, it is dependent on her consent.

For she is also independent.

And not by partaking of their own (Pesachim 88a).

They need not make a verbal statement of protest.

And not by partaking of the sacrifice of the husband, father, and or master (ibid.).

The Rambam is speaking about a situation in which the woman did not decide where she wanted to partake of the Paschal sacrifice before it was offered and hence, the sages had to appraise that it could be assumed that her intent was to partake of her husband’s. The rationale is that since he provides her with food throughout the year, it can be assumed that she will desire to partake of his sacrifice (Rav Yosef Corcus).

Since she felt the need to be in her parents’ home, it can be assumed that this was her intent.

For as mentioned above, everything is dependent on her own desires.

If, however, she did not define her intent at the time the animals were slaughtered, she may not partake of either of the sacrifices. As Pesachim 87a emphasizes, we do not say that when afterwards she decides where she would like to partake of the sacrifice, it is considered as if that was his intent at the outset, for the principle of bereirah (retroactive association) does not apply in matters of Scriptural Law.

He may partake of whichever sacrifice he desires.

Since he is not obligated in the mitzvot, there is no absolute necessity to have him enumerated on the Paschal sacrifice (Rabbi Yosef Corcus).

See Chapter 3, Halachah 1, and notes.

This addition is necessary, for - as stated in Halachah 8 - a Hebrew servant decides where he eats on his own.

Each one of the owners is wary that the servant will feel more comfortable at the other owner’s household and that will enable the owner to take him entirely as his own (Kessef Mishneh).

Because as stated in Halachah 8, an owner may enumerate a servant on his Paschal sacrifice without the servant’s consent.

In Hilchot Avadim 7:4, the Rambam mentions two possibilities that enable such a situation to arise: An owner releases half of a servant, because of a monetary payment—e.g., he took money for half his worth with the intent of freeing that half. Alternatively, when a servant is owned by two partners, and one frees his half—whether through money or through a legal document—the servant acquires his half, and he is half servant and half free man.

The commentaries have raised difficulties with the Rambam’s ruling, noting that it appears to run contrary to the conclusion of Pesachirn 87a, 88a. There the mishnah states: “One who is half a servant and half a free man, should not partake of his master’s [Paschal sacrifice].” The Talmud questions that statement, noting that the implication is that he may partake of his own and there is an explicit beraita stating that he may not partake of his own Paschal sacrifice either. The Talmud answers that the beraita reflects the first teaching concerning the subject, while the mishnah reflects the ultimate conclusion, as it was taught: “One who is half a servant and half free serves his master for one day and works for himself for one day, as the School of Hillel taught. The School of Shammai say: ‘We compel his master to compose for him a bill of release.’ The School of Hillel recanted and gave the instruction according to the approach of the School of Shammai.”
Seemingly, when applying these concepts to the Paschal sacrifice, it appears that, according to the initial perspective, the servant should not partake of the Paschal sacrifice at all, for there is a part of his being - the side that is a servant - that is not dependent on his own decision. On the other hand, according to the perspective of the School of Shammai, since he ultimately will be freed, we consider it as if he was freed already and enable him to partake of his own Paschal sacrifice. Thus, as the Ra’avad protests, the Rambam’s ruling appears to follow the Talmud’s initial perspective, but not its ultimate one.
Rav Avraham, the Rambam’s son, was asked this question and responded with a different understanding of the passage in Pesachim. According to Rav Avraham, the mishnah reflects the initial understanding. Consideration is granted to the servant and he is allowed to fulfill his obligation. The bereitah reflects the final understanding of the Talmud which puts the emphasis on the attainment of the servant’s freedom. Since allowing him to partake of the Paschal sacrifice may cause this to be delayed, he is not given the opportunity of fulfilling the mitzvah until he is freed. This understanding of the passage is reflected in the Rambam’s ruling here and also in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 8:1).

I.e., how many people can be enumerated on one sacrifice.

For one may not fulfill his obligation by eating less. Initially, however, there should be enough for every person to eat to the point of satisfaction.

If, however, initially, a company was formed that was too large to enable each person to receive an olive-sized portion of meat, none of the members of the company should partake of it (Tosefta, Pesachim, ch. 7).

Although there are situations where a person who is not able to partake of the first Paschal sacrifice is exempt from bringing a second, that ruling is not given here, because in this situation, the person never had the possibility of partaking of the sacrifice.

I.e., the amount of meat he would have received had the division been made among the original people enumerated upon the sacrifice.

The division is made after the sacrificial animal is roasted, because it must be roasted as a single entity (see Chapter 10, Halachah 11).

The members of a company may not take meat from one company to another, nor may one Paschal sacrifice be eaten in two companies, as stated in Chapter 9, Halachot 1,4. In this instance, however, since the members of the company did not invite the other guests, they make this division. Nevertheless, the Rambam’s intent appears to be that the two companies should eat in the same room, without a divider between them. Thus it is not considered as if they actually separated into two companies (Rav Yosef Corcus).

For, as stated above, under ordinary circumstances, a company may not divide itself.