Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Rashi, Bava Metzia 80b, explains that the lender is placed in this category because the lender is considered to be “occupied in the performance of a mitzvah” when he is giving the lender the loan or caring for the security entrusted to him (the responsa of Rabbenu Asher). Since a person occupied in the performance of one mitzvah is not obligated to perform a second mitzvah at that moment, the person giving the loan would not be obligated to give charity to a poor person if asked at this time. The money he thus saves causes him to be considered a paid watchman.

The Ra’avad differs and maintains that if the lender took the security afterwards, he is responsible even if it was destroyed by forces beyond his control. The Rambam’s view is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 72:2), and the Ramah does not object. The Siftei Cohen 72:9 elaborates in support of the Ra’avad’s position.
The Siftei Cohen also notes that from Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 3:4, it would appear that the Rambam rules that a lender is liable for security taken after the loan was given when it was destroyed by factors beyond the lender’s control. Nevertheless, it can be explained that that halachah is speaking about security taken without the borrower’s consent, while our halachah is about security given by him willingly.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

If the security is worth the same amount as the loan, the loan is considered to be repaid. If it is worth more, the lender must pay the borrower the remainder. If it is worth less, the borrower must pay the difference. See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 13:4 for details concerning this situation.

I.e., at the same time.

Hence, the watchman is not liable even if the object was destroyed by the watchman’s negligence, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

To be considered to be working for the watchman, a person must perform services for him at the time he receives the article for safekeeping.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that from a superficial reading of the Rambam’s statements, the difficulty appears that the two are not lending each other the objects at the same time (just like the two must watch the objects for each other at the same time). If, however, two people lent each other articles at the same time, that would be sufficient for the owner to be considered as in the watchman’s employ.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes other opinions that maintain that lending a person an article is not considered sufficient for the borrower to be considered in that person’s employ. For the borrower is not doing anything on behalf of the lender. He maintains that the Rambam could also accept such a premise and could have merely used more general wording in this halachah. He does note that Hilchot She’ilah UFikadon 2:7 appears to support the first interpretation. Nevertheless, even in that source, the other conception could also be acceptable.
The Merkevet HaMishneh notes that, according to the Rambam, as long as the owner is obligated to perform even the slightest activity for the watchman, he is considered to be in his employ. Therefore, the fact that the owner is required to bring the watchman an article to borrow is sufficient to have him considered to be in his employ. See also Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 305:6) and commentaries.

For they each receive a favor in return for taking care of the article belonging to their colleague. In contrast to a watchman who is working for the owner of an article, a paid watchman is responsible when an article is lost or stolen.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 306:1 states that this ruling applies only to a craftsman who works as a contractor. If, however, the craftsman works for an hourly wage, he is not considered to be a paid watchman. The Siftei Cohen 306:1, however, does not accept this distinction and maintains that the same rule applies in both instances.

The craftsman benefits from having the object placed in his care, because only in this manner will he be able to receive a wage for fixing it. This is sufficient to have him considered to be a paid watchman.

His wording indicates that he no longer desires to keep the object in his possession and is doing so solely as a favor for the owner. Hence, he is considered to be an unpaid watchman.

His words indicate that he will hold the object as security until he is paid for his work. This is also a benefit for him and is sufficient for him to be considered a paid watchman.

Even though the employer gave him only wood, he is liable to make restitution for the entire article. For the article was completed before he broke it.

The article always belongs to its owner. Hence, if its value is increased by the craftsman's work, the owner of the article reaps the profit. Certainly, he must pay the craftsman for his work, but the two - the craftsman's wage and the increase in the value of the article - are two unrelated issues.
Moreover, even if the article did not exist previously, all that existed were the raw materials, since those materials belong to the owner and he hired the craftsman to make the article, the completed article belongs solely to the owner. The craftsman does not have a share in it.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 306:2) quotes the Rambam’s view. The Siftei Cohen 306:3, however, cites many Rishonim who rule that a craftsman does acquire a share in the increase in the value of the article. Therefore, he maintains the question should be considered an unresolved point of law. Hence the craftsman is required to pay only the value of the article which he originally received.
See also the Or Sameach, who quotes the Ra’avad, who explains that a craftsman acquires a share in the increase in the value of the article only when he does work at a professional standard. In the instances mentioned in this halachah, the craftsman’s work is not professional. Hence, he does not acquire a share in the article’s increase in value.

For in its present state, the wool is of no value, and it was the dyer’s negligence that caused the loss.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 9:4), the Rambam explains that this refers to an instance where everyone would agree that the fabric is dyed the desired color, but the color appears unattractive and no one would desire to purchase such an article.

Rashi, Bava Metzia 117b, interprets this as including the price of the fuel for the fire, the raw materials of the dye and the price for his time as a common laborer, not as a skilled craftsman.

Since the craftsman deviated from the owner’s instructions, he does not receive his full wage.
Instead, he is given slight compensation for his expenses.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains the situation in detail: Originally, the garment was worth a dinar. After it is dyed, it is worth a dinar and a half. It cost the dyer one fourth of a dinar to dye it. The owner is liable to pay the dyer only a fourth of a dinar.

For example, in the above situation, if it cost the dyer three fourths of a dinar to dye the article, he should be paid only half a dinar.
The Rambam’s ruling resembles those applying to a person who sows a colleague’s field without permission (Hilchot Gezeilah V’Avedah 10:4). It would appear that the reason for the comparison is that the craftsman has no permission to perform work below the standards of his craft. Hence, he is considered to be working with a person’s article without his permission.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’ s ruling, maintaining that if the owner is willing to accept the value of the original article, there is no reason why his request should not be heeded. [Significantly, in the first edition of his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam also states this view. When rewriting that text, he altered his interpretation, however, to match his ruling here.]
From the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, it appears that the Rambam’s intent is that the owner cannot compel the craftsman to pay for the wool and accept the article. Needless to say, if both parties are willing, such an agreement is acceptable.

Although he is an expert, we do not say that the difficulty is considered to be a factor beyond his control - in which instance, as a paid watchman, he would not be held liable. For with an extra measure of care, the difficulty would not have occurred. Since he is receiving payment, he is required to take that extra measure of care.

Before wheat is ground, the kernels should be soaked in water so that the outer shell will be easily removed when the kernels are crushed. This technique will produce refined flour.

Our translation is based on Rashi’s commentary on Bava Kama 99b.

I.e., he slaughtered it in a manner that violated the laws of ritual slaughter, causing it to be unacceptable as food for a Jew.

The Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 306:5) state that when there is a halachic question whether the slaughter is acceptable or not, even when it is customary to rule that the meat is forbidden, we do not require the slaughterer to make restitution. Since there is a doubt involved, we do not expropriate money from its owner.

The same laws apply to a miller, a baker or other professionals (Maggid Mishneh).

Since he is not receiving payment, he is not required to take extra care. And since he is an expert, we consider making an error to be a factor caused by forces beyond his control. Therefore, he is not held liable.

For since he is not an expert, it his likely he will not perform the slaughter - or other professional skill - in an acceptable manner. Hence, taking the initiative to perform that activity is considered to be negligence, for which he is liable.

I.e., the person was not sure if a coin was genuine and therefore consulted a money changer for his opinion. The money changer told him the coin was of value, and later it was discovered that he erred, for the ruling authorities had disqualified this currency.

Bava Kama, loc. cit., does not mention a distinction between whether a money changer charges for his services or not. The Rambam, nevertheless, makes such a distinction, based on the comparison to a ritual slaughterer.
The Rashba and others, however, do not extend the comparison to these details and do not differentiate between a money changer who charges and one who does not. An expert money changer is always released from responsibility. The Rashba’s rationale is that slaughtering requires extra effort and care, and this cannot be required of the slaughterer unless he is paid. Evaluating a coin, by contrast, is a question of knowledge, and either the person knows or does not. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 306:6) cites the Rambam’s view.

For otherwise the money changer may look at the coin merely superficially, without paying careful attention.

E. g., they were about to conclude the transaction and asked the money changer’s opinion. After hearing his advice, they consummated the deal.

Since the damage that he performed is obvious, he must prove his claim if he wants to absolve himself of responsibility.

This - like a ritual slaughterer or money changer - is considered to be a profession that requires expertise.

I.e., the person plants the trees and cares for them year after year, in return for half of the produce the land yields.

It appears to be the Rambam's intent is that he did not realize a profit; the trees did not bear enough fruit to yield a viable profit margin.

I.e., the lack of income that was caused by his unsuccessful planting.

A stipulation made facetiously, which the planter never intended to keep. As explained in Hilchot Mechirah 11:6, such a stipulation is not binding.

Who does not plant the trees, but merely takes care of an existing orchard.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 330:3) states that the planter may not terminate the relationship without the consent of the owner of the land. The Siftei Cohen 330:1, however, questions the Ramah’s ruling, maintaining that if the planter agrees to the division of profits stated by the Rambam, he should be allowed to quit whenever he desires.

The Ra’avad and the Tur maintain that this law applies not only to professionals employed by the community in these capacities, but also to those employed by individuals. From the conclusion of the Rambam’s statements, “for they were appointed by the community,” it would appear that there is a difference of opinion concerning the matter. Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 306:8) quotes the Rambam’s decision, while the Ramah mentions the view of the Ra’avad and the Tur.

The Magid Mishneh explains that even when the slaughterer is paid for his services and thus must reimburse the people for the loss, he still should be removed from his position, because although the people did not suffer financial loss, they did not have meat when they needed it. That is a communal problem sufficient to warrant his removal.

I.e., he wrote it in a manner that did not conform to law.

The Ramah (loc. cit.) quotes the opinion of the Mordechai, who maintains that this decision applies even if the teacher failed to instruct them for only one day. The time during which he did not teach them or taught them incorrectly is a loss that can never be corrected.

The Maggid Mishneh states that if the teacher himself knows the correct interpretation and the students alone were the ones that erred, the teacher need not be removed.
See Hilchot Talmud Torah 2:3, which speaks about the care a teacher must take in teaching his students correctly. See also the severe consequences suffered by Joab’s teacher for causing him to come to a misunderstanding of a verse in the Torah.

The Maggid Mishneh [and the Ramah (loc. cit.)] quote the Rashba, who states that although a warning is not necessary, it must be an established fact that the individuals in fact err in the execution of their responsibilities, or they must be warned.

Since they are involved in a profession where the risk of an error that cannot be corrected is a constant factor, they have a constant warning to perform their work professionally (Bava Metzia 109a).

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 200) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 588) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 238) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 230) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The commentaries note that the prohibition can be derived from another proof-text (Leviticus 19:13): “Do not hold the wage of a worker overnight.” (See the following halachah.) The repetition of the prohibition points to the severity of the transgression. It is not, however, considered to be a separate negative commandment.

Thus, this is a prohibition that can be corrected by the payment of money. In such an instance, lashes are not given (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2). The Chacham Tzvi (Responsum 26) emphasizes that aside from this factor, lashes are given only when one violates a transgression by performing a deed. In this instance, there is no deed involved.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 339) quotes the Ramah, who maintains that a person who delays his payment of rent for a property does not violate this prohibition.

A gentile who has formally accepted the observance of the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants. This term is given because such a gentile is allowed to live in Eretz Yisrael. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6, Hilchot lssurei Bi'ah 14:7 and Hilchot Melachim, the conclusion of Chapter 8.
The commentaries note that in his Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam uses the term “gentile” and not “resident alien.” Some, however, suggest that this was a change made by the censor.

For when Leviticus 19:13 mentions the prohibition against delaying the payment of a worker, it uses the term re’acha, “your colleague,” which is interpreted as referring to a fellow Jew.

Without ever intending to pay him.

Bava Metzia 112a offers two interpretations of the proof-text:
a) by withholding the worker’s wage, it is as if the employer kills him;
b) by withholding the worker’s wage, it is as if he kills his own self.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that a person transgresses these two prohibitions only when he thinks of withholding the worker’s wage entirely. If he plans to pay him, but merely desires to delay, he transgresses only the commandments mentioned in the first halachah. This is also reflected by the Rambam’s wording in Halachah 5.

A worker’s wages are not due until he completes his work (Bava Metzia 83b). Therefore, the employer is given the following portion of the day to pay him his due.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 339:3) states that this applied only in Talmudic times when a worker would work until sunset. Today, it is customary that when a worker completes his work before nightfall, he should be paid that day.

There are some who explain that as long as the owner does not have the benefit of the worker’s activity in his possession, the prohibition does not apply to him. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 339:10 adds another point: the craftsman has the owner’s article in his possession that he can keep as collateral.

Or for that matter, a longer period of time.

The Kessef Mishneh and others question the wording employed by. the Rambam. Seemingly, instead of referring to the verse from Leviticus cited in Halachah 2 (which deals with delaying payment overnight), he should have cited the verse from Deuteronomy (which deals with delaying payment passed nightfall).

This relates to the question discussed in Chapter 10, Halachah 4, whether or not a craftsman acquires a share in the increase in the value of the article he works with. According to the view espoused by the Rambam, that the craftsman does not acquire a share in the article’s increase in value, there is no difference between a craftsman and an ordinary worker. Both are due a wage.
According to the view that a craftsman acquires a share of the increase, the payment to the craftsman is not a wage, but a sale. If the owner takes the article without paying him, it is as if he has borrowed money from the craftsman and owes him a debt. In such an instance, the prohibition against delaying a worker’s wage does not apply. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 339:12.

Although the employer does not violate the Scriptural prohibition, he does violate the Rabbinic prohibition mentioned in the following verse.

In such an instance, the agent is responsible for the workers’ wages. Hence, he is held culpable for this transgression.

Our translation follows the interpretation the Kessef Mishneh feels is most appropriate. Others interpret this as meaning that the worker must agree to accept payment from the other person. See similar rulings in Hilchot Mechirah 6:9 and Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 16:4.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 339:10) rules that even if the third party does not owe the employer anything, if he accepts the responsibility of paying the worker, his commitment is binding. The Shulchan Aruch also states that this arrangement is dependent on the acceptance of the worker. Even after he agreed to accept payment from the third party, the worker may change his mind and seek payment from the employer.

He may not say: "Since I have already violated these commandments, I will delay payment indefinitely."
Bava Metzia 110b explains that these transgressions are not ongoing. The person is considered to have violated them only once.

Although the directive comes from the Bible, since it does not stem from a verse from the Torah, it does not have the status of a Scriptural commandment.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 89:3) state that in addition to having been hired in the presence of witnesses, the witnesses must also see that the worker actually performed labor on behalf of the employer.

A Torah scroll, or in certain instances tefillin (Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:1).

Had our Sages not instituted this special ordinance in consideration of the worker, the employer would be required to take a sh’vuat hesset if he denied the worker’s oath entirely or a Scriptural oath, if he admitted owing a portion of the debt. Our Sages removed the responsibility of the oath from the employer and placed it on the worker for the reasons explained by Rambam.

See Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:2.

Therefore, he may think that he paid the worker even though he did not. Even if the employer is dealing with only one worker, since he has many responsibilities to deal with, we fear that he may make such an error. [See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh’vuot 7:1).]

The Ra’avad protests this ruling, stating that the oath taken by a minor is never considered a matter of consequence. The Maggid Mishneh supports the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that our Sages felt that the worker should receive his wage and were willing to grant it to him without an oath. The oath was required only to satisfy the feelings of the employer. Hence, even if the worker was a minor, this is acceptable.
It must be emphasized that although the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah follows this version, there are other versions [see Tur (Choshen Mishpat 89); Migdal Oz, Rav Kapach] who maintain the text should read: “Even if the employer is a minor, the worker may take this oath and collect his wage.” The intent is that generally a minor may not be sued for payment of a debt. Nevertheless, in this instance, in consideration of the rights of the worker, our Sages made an exception and gave the worker the right to collect his wage. This interpretation is supported by the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 5:11.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 89:2) follows the latter interpretation. The Ramah (based on the Ra’avad) states that if the worker is a minor, the burden of the oath is placed on the employer.

This depends on the principle of miggo - i.e., if the employer desired to lie, he could have told a more effective lie. Instead of merely denying that he owed the worker his wages, he could have denied hiring him.

Generally, when one witness testifies in support of a plaintiff’s claim, the defendant is obligated to take a Scriptural oath to free himself of liability. In this instance, however, the witness is not supporting the worker’s claim that the employer owes him money - he is merely testifying that he was hired.
The Maggid Mishneh, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 89:3) cite opinions that maintain that when one witness testifies that the employer hired the worker, the employer must take a Rabbinic oath that resembles a Scriptural oath.

According to the principles stated in Halachah 2.

The rationale is that usually a worker will seek to be paid immediately. If a worker does not seek to be paid, that weakens his argument that he is in fact due money. Moreover, we are loath to suspect that the employer transgressed a Torah prohibition (Bava Metzia 113a, b).

Our translation is close to a literal translation of the Rambam’s words and reflects the ruling of the Ir Shushan, who explains that the worker must continually come and demand his wage. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 89:12, however, states that it is sufficient for him to come when his wage is due and for witnesses to see the employer told him to come back at a later date.

For we assume that he was paid on Tuesday.

Similarly, as long as the worker continues to demand his wage, he is given the right to take an oath to support his claim (Kessef Mishneh).

The rationale is that the employer will remember the amount of money he promised the worker. This is not a fact that his preoccupation with his affairs will cause him to forget (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 89:14).

I.e., he must bring witnesses who testify that the employer hired him at the wage he mentioned.

When a person admits a portion of the claim made by a plaintiff, he is considered a modeh b’miktzat and is required to take a Scriptural oath. This applies, however, only when the debt is outstanding. If the defendant has already paid the portion he admits owing or is ready to pay it immediately - he is considered as having denied the claim made against him entirely. Thus, according to Scriptural law, he is not required to take an oath at all, and even according to Rabbinic Law, he is required to take only a sh’vuat hesset. Nevertheless, in this instance, in consideration of the worker’s feelings, our Sages required the employer to take a more severe oath.
(Note, however, the Siftei Cohen 89:9, who supports the view advanced by certain Rishonim that if the employer does not admit a portion of the worker’s claim, he is required to take only a sh’vuat hesset. The rationale is that generally a Rabbinic oath that requires one to hold a sacred article is taken to expropriate property and not to maintain possession.)

I.e., not only was he not paid, the employer was not required to take a severe oath.

Which is a far more lenient oath.
The rationale for this leniency is that the laws pertaining to this dispute - in which the employer’s position is favored - should certainly not be more stringent that those mentioned in the previous halachah. Since the employer is required only to take a sh’vuat hesset when he denies owing the worker anything in these situations, he is not required to take a more severe oath when there is a question regarding the amount promised (Maggid Mishneh, quoting the Ri MiGash).

This applies in a situation where the garment is not seen. Had the tailor stated that he returned the garment, his word would be accepted. Hence, based on the principle of miggo, we would also accept his word if he claims to have purchased it. This applies even if witnesses observed the garment being given to the tailor (Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 9:2).
In this halachah, the Rambam takes this logic a step further and gives the tailor the option of taking an oath to support his claim regarding his wage. The rationale is again based on the principle of miggo. We assume that if he wanted to lie and take unfair advantage of the employer, he would have claimed to have purchased the article and kept it as his own.

Had the tailor claimed that he had purchased the article, he would have been required to take only a sh’vuat hesset. Here, he is required to take a more severe oath. The distinction between the two instances can be explained based on the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 13:2.
When he is claiming that an article is his own, he is required to take an oath to maintain possession of the article. Hence, a sh’vuat hesset is acceptable. When, by contrast, he is claiming his wage, he seeks to expropriate from another person by virtue of his oath. This is possible only when he takes a severe oath, resembling one required by Scriptural Law. (Note, however, the Siftei Cohen 89:10, who differs with the Rambam and states that only a sh’vuat hesset is required.)

He cannot, however, claim more than the article’s worth, for then the principle of miggo would not apply. For he has no support for his claim to such an amount.

E. g., he has returned it to its owner.

E. g., the garment is visible, in which instance the tailor does not have a miggo to say he returned it (Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an, loc. cit.)..

I.e., witnesses who testify to the veracity of his statements.

But not a more severe oath, as would be required of an employer.

The authorities explain that one can make a distinction between a worker who works for a daily wage and requires that for his livelihood, and a craftsman who contracts out his work and is not as dependent on the immediate payment of his wage.
It must, however, be noted that in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 9:2, the Rambam writes: “The employer takes an oath while holding a sacred article [because of the craftsman’s claim], as we explained in Hilchot Sechirut.” The Maggid Mishneh suggests that possibly there is a printing error in either this halachah or Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an, or our halachah is talking about an instance when the tailor demanded payment after the time it was due.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 89:5) relies on the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an and requires the employer to take an oath while holding a sacred article. The Siftei Cohen 89:11 maintains that a sh’vuat hesset is sufficient.

In contrast to other situations, where a person is encouraged to refrain from taking the oath (see Hilchot Sh’vuot, Chapter 11), no such statements are made to a worker.

See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:12, which explains that once a person is required to take one oath for a colleague, he may be required to include in the oath a denial of any other claim a colleague will make against him. This privilege is not granted with regard to the oaths taken by a worker.
The rationale for both these leniencies is that our Sages felt that if they were not granted, the worker would become intimidated and would refrain from taking the oath.

Since the prohibition against taking a false oath is very severe, it is possible that the worker will have misgivings before taking the oath. Therefore, we reassure him.

Anything less than a p'rutah is not considered significant and cannot be expropriated through legal practice (Maggid Mishneh).

The commentaries note the apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s statements here and those of Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 3:7:
My masters ruled that all those who take oaths and collect their due need not make a claim of two silver [me’in, as is required with regard to oaths required by Scriptural Law]. I, however, differ and maintain that the defendant must deny [at least] two me’in. Only then may the plaintiff take an oath as ordained by the Sages and collect his due.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that either here the Rambam wrote his masters’ ruling without mentioning his own, or he made a distinction between a worker and other claimants, because the worker is dependent on his wage.
The Kessef Mishneh offers some explanation for the Maggid Mishneh’s first interpretation, stating perhaps the intent is that although the Rambam differed with his masters, that difference was theoretical. He was not willing actually to rule against their opinion in an actual court decision. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 89:2) quotes the Rambam’s ruling here. Note the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch, which offer other resolutions of the apparent contradiction.

This excludes people working with milk products, as stated in Halachah 4.

I.e., the produce is not considered to be ready to eat, and therefore, the mitzvot of ma'aser (tithes) or challah do not apply with regard to it, as stated in Halachah 5.

E. g., weeders or watchmen, as explained in Halachah 4.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 201) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 576) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Bava Metzia 87b states that this mitzvah applies in a field belonging to a private person, but not a field belonging to the Temple treasury. For the Temple treasury is not “your colleague.” The Siftei Cohen 337:1 states that for this same reason, this law does not apply to a person employed in a field belonging to a gentile. Instead, this measure is a special privilege granted because of the bond that one Jew shares with another.

I.e., both verses give the person the right to partake of his colleague’s produce.

Trespassing in a person’s property without his permission is forbidden. And taking his produce is considered to be theft.
The Babylonian Talmud (Bava Metzia, loc. cit.) derives this concept because of an association with the prohibition against muzzling an ox. The Rambam chooses to ignore that pattern of exegesis and instead [based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Ma’aserot 2:6),] offer a straightforward and logical explanation of the basis for the prohibition.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the expression “the work associated with it has been completed” means that the person has yet to bring the tithes (ma’aser) or separate challah.

Here the Rambam speaks of “his work” - i.e., the worker’s labor [in contrast to the previous sentence, where the emphasis was on the work necessary for the produce to be ritually acceptable]. He may not eat until he has completed harvesting or reaping. Once he has completed one phase of work - e.g., the basket is filled - he may not be compelled to start working again until he desires to do so.
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 337) differs with the Rambam, stating:
I do not understand why they should not eat while they are harvesting and reaping, for the Torah forbade a person from eating produce only when the work on it was not completed. When, however, a person is working with produce whose work is completed, he may eat as long as he is involved with it.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 337:2) follows the Tur’s conception. The difference between these conceptions depends on the interpretation of the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 7:2), which states that a person who works with produce attached to the earth may eat at the time work is completed, but he is forbidden to eat when he has not completed his work. In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam interprets this as meaning: “While you are placing produce in the containers of the employer, you may not eat.” Rashi (Bava Metzia 87a), by contrast, interprets that phrase as referring to labor that brings about the completion of a task - e.g., harvesting, in contrast to pruning.

I.e., if the workers were prevented from eating until then, they would take an extended break in order to eat and would not return to work quickly. Our Sages assumed that the employer would be willing to grant them other times when they may eat so that they will not take long breaks.

I.e., takes a very extended break to eat. Although the Rambam allows a worker to take a break after filling the employer's basket, he may not take advantage of his employer and prolong his break beyond accepted norms (Lechem Mishneh).

According to the Rambam, this refers to a person who eats before the employer’s container is filled, as explained in the previous halachah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 267) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 578) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam with regard to the definition of this prohibition, stating that it involves cutting down crops with a sickle with the intent of eating them - i.e., the worker should not make his eating as important a purpose as his employer’s work. The Ramban also differs with the Rambam and maintains that the prohibition forbids people who are hoeing or pruning from eating. As mentioned above, the Tur also does not accept the Rambam’s view. See Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 337:18), which appears to follow the position of the Tur.

I.e., when reaping with other utensils and when harvesting other crops.

See Halachah 13.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 268) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 577) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 337:38 adds that when doing so, the person also transgresses the prohibition against stealing.

For a person who is obligated to make financial restitution is not punished with lashes for the same transgression.

The license granted by the Torah applies only to substances that resemble those explicitly mentioned in the verses - i.e., produce that grows in the ground.

To enable the larger onions space to grow.

Thus, for the small onions, he can be considered to have completed the work, for he harvests them for his employer.

I.e., the primary intent is to facilitate the growth of the larger heads, and the worker’s activity does not complete that task.

See also Halachah 9.

Not only are they not entitled to partake of the produce according to Scriptural Law, the Rabbis also did not grant them this prerogative. Thus, although watchmen of detached produce may partake of it (Halachah 9), watchman of produce attached to the ground may not.

In order to store figs and dates for longer periods, they would be dried out and crushed together as cakes. Once, they are crushed and smoothed out or placed in a container, the owner is obligated to tithe them (Hilchot Ma'aser 3:16.). In this instance, the worker is hired to break apart the stored fruit so that it can be served.

I.e., the other four species of grain in which there is a further ritual obligation after tithing. Aside from these species, a worker may no longer partake of produce once the obligation to tithe applies.
See also Sefer Me’irat Einayim 337:13, which states that we generally assume that barley and oats will be used as animal fodder or for beer. Hence, unless they are set aside for the purpose of being used for bread, once the obligation to tithe them has been established, it is forbidden for a worker to partake of them.

Our translation follows the version found in many early printings and authentic manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The version found in the standard printed text is difficult to understand.

For once a dough is made - i.e., flour and water are mixed together - a person is obligated to separate challah (Hilchot Bikkurim 8:4).

It must be noted that the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that even with regard to grain, once it has become obligated to be tithed, a worker is no longer given permission to partake of it. Although the Rambam’s ruling is based on Bava Metzia 89a (and Rashi also interprets that passage in a similar way), the Ra’avad maintains that the passage mentions challah indiscriminately, without intent. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 337:3) follows the Rambam’s understanding.

I.e., the owner hires the worker to press the figs back into cakes, to seal the wine barrels, or to perform any other activity necessary to preserve the produce.

Untithed produce, of which it is forbidden to partake.
See also the Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 576), which states that although the Torah gave a worker permission to partake of crops, it did not grant him permission to partake of food that is forbidden.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this law does not apply when the employer hires the workers without specifying what task they would perform. In such a situation, he is not obligated to give them work in which they would be allowed to partake of produce. If, however, he told them that their job would be to make fig cakes, but did not inform them of his predicament, it would be as if he were misleading them if he does not allow them to partake of the produce. For workers who make fig cakes are generally entitled to partake of the produce with which they are working, and we assume that the workers had this intent in mind when they accepted the job. Hence, if the owner does not give them the opportunity to partake of the produce, he will be taking unfair advantage of them.

The Temple treasury is not “your colleague” and is under no obligation to the worker.

Neta reva'i is produce that grows in the fourth year of a tree's life. It must be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there, with the same restrictions as apply to Ma'aser Sheni, "the second tithe." See Hilchot Ma'aser Sheni 9:1.

For this produce may not be eaten outside of Jerusalem.

As stated in Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 9:6, a person may redeem produce that is neta reva’i for its value in silver and take that money to Jerusalem to buy food with it.

For the same rationale as explained with regard to the previous halachah.

See Halachah 12.

For with the exception of the separation of unwanted matter, all these tasks are necessary to be performed before the owner is obligated to tithe his crops. And the separation of unwanted matter is necessary before one is obligated to separate challah.

Since they are not performing work with the produce itself, they are not given the right to eat from it according to Scriptural Law. Our Sages nevertheless noticed that it had become an accepted practice to allow watchmen to partake of produce that had been reaped (in contrast to unreaped produce, Halachah 4). Hence, they made it a binding obligation to grant a watchman this privilege.

I.e., a porter who carries produce on his shoulders.

Even if a worker was hired to perform work with both figs and grapes, while he is working with grapes he may not partake of figs, and while he is working with figs he may not partake of grapes [Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 337:9)].

I.e., the worker may partake of only the type of produce with which he is working.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Maaserot 2:7) derives this law as follows: Why does the verse say: “When you enter the vineyard of your colleague, you may eat grapes”? What else would you eat in a vineyard? Thus, the intent is a restriction. When you are working with grapes, all you may eat is grapes.”

In these instances, he will eat more grapes than usual.

Since the worker was limited to a specific amount of produce, he is considered as if he purchased the produce and is required to tithe it, as stated in Hilchot Ma’aser 5:11. Similarly, produce that is salted or eaten with bread must be tithed.

For, regardless, he may not eat more than the limit that was set.

I.e., to suck out the juice and leave the skins and dregs.

I.e., the entire grape. This also appears to be a safeguard against the worker’s partaking of more grapes than usual. For in this way, he will consume far more grapes than if he were to eat them in the ordinary manner (Kin’at Eliyahu).

Needless to say, the worker may not do this himself, for he will be wasting time that he should be working (Maggid Mishneh).

To improve their flavor.

Although the verse grants a worker license, it also implies a limit. Once a worker is satisfied, he should not eat more.

Thus, he will be eating more of the higher quality produce than he would if he had not refrained from eating the lower quality.

Which is worth one sixth the value of a dinar.
The Sifri states that the amount a worker eats is determined by his appetite, and not his wage.

I.e., if he eats like a glutton, the chances are that the employer - and others - will not hire him again.

See Halachah 9.

Rashi (Bava Metzia 93a) states that this is speaking about a situation where the watchman is employed by several farmers, each with his own grain-heap. As a courtesy, it is proper for the worker to partake equally from each of the different grain-heaps, so that all the farmers will share equally in providing him with his food.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 337:9) clarifies the Rambam’s wording, stating: “It is not apparent that they are working with wine.”

For, as stated in Halachah 10, a worker may partake only of the produce with which he is working (ibid.).

See Hilchot Ma’aser 5:9, which explains the laws that apply when the employer - although he is under no obligation to do so - agrees to allow a worker’s sons to partake of the produce.

This shows that the worker does not acquire any rights of ownership over the produce. It is in no way his, and he therefore may not give it away. The Torah gave him a unique privilege and allowed him to partake of the produce while working with it. That privilege, however, cannot be extended beyond its prescribed limits (Bava Metzia 92 93a).

Who is forbidden to partake of grapes or wine.

I.e., Canaanite slaves (Maggid Mishneh).

When financial matters are involved, a person has the right to forgo a privilege granted to him by the Torah. Hence, if a worker - and the members of his household [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 337:17)] - agree to the employer’s stipulation, they are bound by it.

Because a minor is below majority, there are certain business matters - including the right to waive privileges that are granted him - which are not in his capacity. Therefore, he may not forgo his privilege to eat himself. Certainly, his father may not forgo it for him, for - as the Rambam states - nothing belongs to the father.