Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., when a gentile performs a task on behalf of a Jew, it is not considered as if the Jew performed that task himself.
Note the Mishneh Lamelech, who quotes sources that explain that not only may a gentile not serve as an agent for a Jew, he may not serve as an agent for a gentile. This entire concept applies with regard to the Jewish people.

This verse – translated in a manner that points to the exegesis offered by our Sages (Kiddushin 4lb) – refers to the separation of the Terumah offering from the crops. The word “also,” gam in Hebrew is interpreted as the reference to the concept of agency. Since the Torah has taught us the concept of agency in other sources, this verse is necessary to exclude a gentile from serving in that capacity (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 188:1).

The fact that with regard to certain matters the woman’s husband has control over her financial capacity does not prevent her from acting as an agent on behalf of another man or woman.

As reflected by the explanation given by the Rambam, this refers even to Canaanite servants and maidservants who are not full-fledged members of the Jewish people.

For Canaanite servants and maid-servants are obligated to observe all the negative commandments and all the positive commandments whose observance is not associated with a specific time.

But not with regard to matters involving marriage and divorce, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 3:17 and Hilchot Gerushin 6:6.

A person who is both deaf and mute. A person who has only one of these disabilities is, by contrast, considered intellectually competent.

Although a female minor has an advantage over a male minor and can acquire property by virtue of its presence in her courtyard (Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah 4:9), she does not have the right to appoint an agent.

And gives him a pundeyon, a coin worth two isarim, which the child gives to the storekeeper. This interpretation is based on the Rashbam’s interpretation of Bava Batra 87b, the source for this halachah. We have chosen to use the Rashbam’s interpretation rather than that offered by the Rambam in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 5:9), for the wording in this halachah indicates that the Rambam changed his perception of the situation described. Note, however, the comments of the Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 188), which favors the interpretation of the Rambam in his Commentary on the Mishnah.

I.e., he must reimburse the father for the oil and for the change. Had the child been able to serve as an agent, the storekeeper would have fulfilled his obligation by giving him the oil and the change. Since he is not considered an agent, however, the oil and the money are considered to have remained in the storekeeper’s domain. He must suffer the loss and make restitution to the father.

For the father explicitly stated that he is accepting the risks involved with sending the oil and the money with the child.

Or writes [Chapter 1, Halachah 8, Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 121:1)].

He is not, however, obligated to send it with that person.

This applies even when he does not specify that the person charged with transferring the article is a minor. This is the new concept taught in this halachah, expanding the concepts taught in Halachah 2 (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 188:9).
Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which states that the same laws apply if the person sends the object with a gentile, a deaf-mute or anyone else unfit to serve as an agent.

This qualification is necessary because one might argue that since an entrusted article is always considered to be in the possession of its owner, it could be understood why the sender is no longer liable. A loan, by contrast, becomes the property of the debtor. Hence, the Rambam must emphasize that giving it to the person designated by the creditor is considered repayment.

If, however, the agent chosen is not fit to transfer the article - e.g., he is known to deny having received articles given to him or to take unnecessary risks - the person who sent it acted negligently and is responsible for the destruction of the article. See Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit).

Note the statements of the Siftei Cohen 185:7 (based on the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh on Halachah 6), which interpret this to mean that it is not sufficient for the agent to notify the purchaser or the seller that he is acting as an agent. He must inform the other party of the identity of the principal.

Although meshichah is a kinyan formally effecting the transfer of an article, since the principal’s wishes were violated, the kinyan is considered to have been carried out under false premises and is not binding. Since the other party to the transaction knew that the agent was not purchasing or selling the article himself, but rather acting on behalf of others, he knows that the transaction is dependent on the wishes of the principal, and he cannot claim to have been misled.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 3. See also Halachah 6.

Bava Kama 102b explains that Levi is a person of stature, and people who feel that they have a claim to the field will hesitate to bring the matter to court because of his prestige.

Instead, he must ask Levi to draw up a deed of sale for him.

For this was implied by the stipulation made at the outset.
Bava Kama (op. cit.) adds another particular: Even if Reuven did not make these statements to Shimon himself, but instead told the witnesses in Shimon’s presence, Shimon is obligated to compose a second deed of sale. This situation is also mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 184:2). The commentaries question why the Rambam does not speak of this and surmise that he had a different version of Bava Kama, which did not mention this circumstance.

The Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 185) emphasizes that in Hilchot Mechirah 16:11, the Rambam uses the Hebrew term sarsur, translated here as “broker,” in a different manner, applying to a person who buys from one and sells to another, but owns the merchandise himself and is not merely an agent.
See also Sefer Me’irat Einayim 185:1, which explain that one might think that the broker would be considered a partner. If this were so, he would not be liable for selling the article at a lower price if his business intuition told him that this was the best price he could get for it.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 5, since the profit was made because of the principal’s resources, it rightfully belongs to him.

The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam and maintains that the agent can be required only to take a sh’vuat hesset. His logic is that the owner is asking for the money for his article, and his knowledge of the price comes only from the agent. Hence, there is no claim of which the agent admits only a portion. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the principal attached a certain monetary value to that sale. Since the agent desires to give him only a portion of that, this can be considered a case of admitting a portion of a claim. (Note the Siftei Cohen 185:6, which justifies the Ra’avad’s position, and the Netivot HaMishpat, Be’urim 185:4, which clarifies the Rambam’s position.)

Since the agent already gave him - or is prepared to give him immediately (Kessef Mishneh) - the 50 and denies the entire claim made against him at present, he is not considered to be one who admits a portion of the claim. Hence, according to Scriptural Law, he is not obligated to take an oath. Instead, he is required to take only a less severe oath that is Rabbinic in origin. This situation depends on the concept of heilech described in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:3.

For, as stated in Halachah 4, if the other party to a transaction was not informed that he was dealing with an agent, the transaction is binding, and the agent is responsible for satisfying the demands of the principal.

Note the Kessef Mishneh, which offers two interpretations – one that states that the Rambam’s wording is precise, and the purchaser must know the identity of the principal – and the other, that it is sufficient for the purchaser to know that the broker was only an agent.

As mentioned above, the Siftei Cohen 185:7 states that both particulars are necessary. The purchaser must know that the broker is an agent, and he must know the identity of the principal.

With this statement, the Rambam reiterates the point made in Halachah 4 - that if it is known that the agent is carrying out the transaction on behalf of a principal, the transaction may be nullified. In this halachah, however, he introduces a further point: that even if the agent claims to have carried out the principal’s requests, if the principal denies this, the transaction is nullified.
The agent’s statements are not considered of consequence, for since he is an involved party, his testimony is disqualified (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 185:9).
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam on this point as well, claiming that the article should not be returned. On the contrary, he explains that even if the agent agrees with the principal, it would appear that this is an act of deception contrived by the agent and the principal to nullify the sale. The Rambam’s position is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 185:5), while the Ra’avad’s is cited by the Tur and the Ramah.

He may not, however, require the principal to take an oath- even a sh’vuat hesset – because he cannot issue a definite claim (see Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:7) that the principal agreed to the price of 50 zuz.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam on this point, stating that since the seller did not mention a price, and instead told the agent to sell the article at whatever price he could, it is unfair that he should be able to nullify the transaction because of the price he received.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo discusses the Ra’avad’s ruling, explaining that the Ra’avad is not giving the agent blanket authority to sell the object at whatever price he desires. Instead, his intent is that he may deviate slightly from the market value. If, however, the deviation is extreme, even the Ra’avad agrees that the sale may be nullified.
The Kessef Mishneh continues explaining the Rambam’s position. In an instance where the seller gave the agent an article to sell without specifying the price, the purchaser could assume that the owner desired that the article be sold, but that the owner has a right to veto the transaction if he is unsatisfied with the price. The purchaser does not, however, have the right to retract his commitment. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 185:6). Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Rambam’s view, while the Tur and the Ramah cite that of the Ra’avad.

The commentaries question the Rambam’s addition of this term, because the Rambam writes in Hilchot Sechirut 2:1 that a paid watchman must reimburse the owner if the article is lost or stolen. If, however, a loss beyond his control occurs – e.g., an article is broken – the watchman may free himself from liability by taking an oath.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo resolves this difficulty by explaining that this refers to an instance where the article was broken because the broker did not show the proper care for the article. Significantly, when he quotes this law in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 185:7), he does not use the term “broken.”

The broker is placed in this category because he receives a fee for his services.

And fixes a price for them (Kessef Mishneh, based on Hilchot Mechirah 4:14).

For even if the present is not accepted, he derived benefit from the fact that he appears generous and willing to give presents to his intended (Rashi, Bava Metzia 81a).

And certainly if they were lost or stolen.

The Rambam compares such a person to an agent, for the man is not interested in purchasing the articles for himself, but rather in sending them to his intended. As such, he is considered a borrower, and as a borrower he is liable to pay if the article is destroyed by force beyond his control.
The commentaries refer to Hilchot Mechirah, loc. cit., where the Rambam states that a person who takes utensils from a craftsman in order to inspect them to see whether he will purchase them is liable if they are destroyed by forces beyond his control while in his possession. The rationale is that the articles are considered to have entered his domain at the time he lifted them up, and thus he is considered a purchaser. In the instance described in our halachah, by contrast, the person’s intent is not to acquire them, but to use them to show off his generosity. Thus, he is considered an agent, and his responsibilities are comparable to those of a borrower.

As is the law that applies to a borrower after the term for which he borrowed the article has concluded (Hilchot She’ilah U’Fikadon 3:2). The young man is liable, however, if the article is lost or stolen, for he is considered a paid watchman, since he benefited from sending the article.

The rationale is that since he is still looking for customers on the way home and would sell them the merchandise if possible, the term for which he borrowed the article is not considered to have been concluded (Bava Metzia 91a).
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 186:2) explain that this decision applies only when the article has many potential buyers, and it could easily be sold for the price fixed, but instead the agent tries to sell it at a higher price. For only in such a situation is the agent comparable to a borrower who receives all the benefit himself. If, however, it would be difficult for the agent to sell it, the owner is also hoping to benefit from its presence in the agent’s possession. Hence, the agent is liable only when the object is lost or stolen, but not when it is destroyed by forces beyond his control, as stated in the previous halachah.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 187:1 states that the agent must take the three oaths demanded of a watchman: that the article was destroyed by forces beyond his control, that he did not make use of it for his own purposes and that he was not negligent in its care, as stated in Hilchot She’ilah UFikadon 4:1.

The situation occurred in a public thoroughfare, where many people are present.

This ruling is based on the statements of Issi ben Yehudah (Bava Metzia 83a) who explains: Exodus 22:9-10 states: “If there is no witness, the oath of God will be between them.” Implied is that when the matter could be observed by a witness, such testimony is necessary and we cannot rely on an oath.

The fact that there are no witnesses who know about the matter leads to the conclusion that the claim is false.

The Kessef Mishneh states that from the Rambam’s wording- although it is somewhat difficult to justify such a decision – it appears that if the purchaser had not given the agent funds, but instead told him to purchase the article with his own funds and he would repay him later, the purchaser could refuse to accept the wine.

The purchaser claims that the agent is responsible, for he probably bought wine that was already turning to vinegar. The agent, by contrast, claims not to be responsible, stating that the wine turned to vinegar while in the purchaser’s possession and it is his misfortune.

The commentaries debate whether or not this statement also includes the repayment of money and the return of entrusted articles. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 187:3) quotes the Rambam’s words verbatim. The Tur and the Ramah maintain that these instances are not included for there are people who seek to repay debts privately.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.

E. g., sharecroppers and guardians.

See Hilchot Sechirut 3:1.

Note Halachah 6 – which mentions certain restrictions on exercising power of attorney with regard to movable property, and Halachah 7 – which speaks about situations involving loans of money.

The laws that follow are the source for the contemporary Torah laws governing relationships between lawyers and their clients. For the lawyer is an agent charged with expropriating money from a defendant.

Employing a kinyan sudar (Kessef Mishneh, gloss on Halachah 7). The Siftei Cohen 122:13 differs and requires a kinyan agav when transferring money.

I.e., wording that implies that the agent acquires the property.

I.e., a deed with such wording (Kessef Mishneh).

For he is an agent, riot a partner.

The Ra’avad states that if the principal mentions that he is granting the agent a fraction of the entire amount, he may enter into litigation concerning the entire amount. If, however, the principal mentions a specific sum, the agent may enter into litigation with regard to that sum alone. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 122:5) quotes the Rambam’s wording, but also cites the Ra’avad’s view.

In one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that this applies only when the partners are plaintiffs. If they are defendants, they must defend their interests together, or every partner must enter into litigation regarding his own share. There is no concept of a defendant granting another person power of attorney. See also Sefer Me’irat Einayim 122:18.

This refers to nichsei m’log – property that belongs to the woman and is returned as is, in the event of the husband’s death or divorce. Though the husband has the right to use the property, he is not the owner. As long as the suit concerns the property itself, the woman must be the one who brings it.
Different laws apply to property that is nichsei tzon barzel – property that the wife brought to the household, but for which the husband agreed that he (or his estate) would pay a specific sum in the event of divorce or death. In such an instance, the husband is considered to be the owner of the property (Beit Shmuel 85:8).

According to the Rambam, the husband is given the right to protest the sale only when there is actually produce in the field. According to Rabbenu Asher (Gittin 48b), since ultimately the field will bring forth produce, and that will belong to the husband, even though there is no produce growing on the field at the time, the husband may sue concerning the produce. And since he is suing concerning the produce, he may also sue concerning the field itself.
This difference of opinion has been perpetuated in later generations. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 122:16 quotes Rabbenu Asher’s view, while the Siftei Cohen 122:33 follows that of the Rambam.

As explained in Halachah 7, the laws that apply to money are different from those that apply to other forms of property, with regard to its collection by a person who is granted power of attorney. No such distinction applies with regard to a person appointed as an agent.

The witnesses are not necessary if the principal tells the defendant to send the object or the money with the agent (Siftei Cohen 122:2). This law applies even if the principal did not tell the debtor directly. See Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 121:2).

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 122:1) explains that the rationale is that if the principal dies before the agent is given the funds or the article, and then the funds or the article is taken from the agent by forces beyond his control, the debtor is responsible. For the heirs did not appoint the agent in that capacity.

Whether it was lost or stolen, or destroyed by factors beyond the person’s control.

For the agent is considered in place of the principal.

This does not apply with regard to money, as stated in Halachah 7.

Rashi, in his commentary on Sh’vuot 31a, explains that the Talmud applies such a pejorative because the person becomes involved with a dispute to which he has no connection. Had the agent not pursued the claim, perhaps the defendant would have been able to come to an understanding with the principal, and the anguish of legal proceeding could have been avoided. (See also Hilchot De’ot 5:13.)
The Ra’avad qualifies the Rambam’s statement, explaining that it applies only when the principal and the defendant both live in the same city. For in this instance, the principal should really prosecute his claim himself. If, however, the principal and the defendant live in different cities, the agent is doing the principal a service, and he is considered to be one who saves his colleague’s money.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo extends this concept, stating that it also applies when the defendant is a difficult person to deal with, and the principal is incapable of securing his property himself. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 123:15), he quotes only the Ra’avad’s view.
The Ramah (basing himself on the statements of Rav Yosef Karo in his Beit Yosef, but extending them further) states that the intentions and the character of the person securing power of attorney is the determining factor. If he is a generous person, whose intent is to help the principal, he is considered to have performed a mitzvah. If, however, he is a strong-willed person, who is seeking to enter a dispute in which he is not involved, the words of censure cited by the Rambam apply.
See also the Be’er Heitev (Choshen Mishpat 123:24) who states that when a person exercises power of attorney for a set fee, the negative statements made above do not apply.

Different rules apply with regard to landed property. Even if the defendant has denied that the property belongs to the principal, power of attorney can be granted, for landed property can never be stolen. Instead, from a legal perspective, the land always remains in the possession of its owner. Ownership of it can be transferred when power of attorney is granted, and thus the denial is not of substance [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 123:1); Sefer Me’irat Einayim 123:1].

I.e., the person denied the obligation before the power of attorney was granted. The laws that apply if he denies the obligation after the power of attorney was granted are discussed in Halachah 11 (Ra’avad, gloss on Halachah 11).

Rabbenu Tam differs with this approach and states that we are not concerned with the fact that the person appears to be making false statements and allows power of attorney to be granted in such a situation. (See also the notes at the conclusion of the following halachah.)

The Siftei Cohen 123:12 explains that according to the opinion of Rabbenu Tam (see the notes at the conclusion of the following halachah), which is accepted by the Ashkenazic authorities, power of attorney can be granted to have an oath administered.

I.e., the responsibility to take an oath.

See Hilchot Mechirah, the conclusion of Chapter 5, where the Rambam explains that a kinyan must be associated with an object of substance. Since a kinyan is necessary to grant power of attorney – otherwise the defendant can tell the agent, “You have no connection to the case” (Halachah 1) – there must be an article of substance involved.

Which is the ordinary manner of formalizing business arrangements.

See Hilchot Mechirah 6:1; see also Chapter 4, Halachah 1.

For a kinyan agav is effective regardless of the size of the parcel of land involved.

See Hilchot Mechirah 6:7.

Note, however, the conclusion of the halachah, which mentions the ruling introduced by the Geonim that allows such a practice.

In contrast to an entrusted object that is given for safekeeping.

All that exists is a debt. This applies even if the money was not actually spent. See Hilchot Ishut 5:13.

For a kinyan must involve an article of substance.

See Hilchot Mechirah 6:8.

See Ibid.: 11.

Even according to these authorities, a kinyan chalifin is not effective, and a kinyan agav must be employed, enabling the agent to acquire the debt by virtue of his acquisition of the land. Since the principal does not have land in his possession, he may rely on his portion of land in Eretz Yisrael.

For according to our Sages, every Jew owns at least four cubits of land in Eretz Yisrael.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that this refers to the concept stated immediately beforehand: that even if a person does not possess land, he may rely on his portion of land in Eretz Yisrael. It does not apply to the first statement, that power of attorney can be given to collect a loan.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s intent is that perhaps the person is descended from converts, who do not have an ancestral heritage in Eretz Yisrael.

And therefore, he cannot transfer ownership of it to others.

See Halachah 5.

This applies to a situation where the principal cannot – e.g., the note is not in his possession – or does not desire to transfer ownership of the promissory note by writing a deed transferring ownership of it, and giving it to the agent. See Ra’avad.

Since these two halachic institutions create a lien on the debtor’s landed property, the denial of such a debt is considered equivalent to a denial of a claim against landed property, against which power of attorney is effective.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 123:1)] state that power of attorney can be granted in such an instance even according to Talmudic Law (i.e., doing so is not merely an ordinance of the Geonim).
The Siftei Cohen 123:7, however, states that there is not a difference of opinion between the Rambam and the Tur on this matter. When the principal is willing to give the agent the actual promissory note, it is possible to compose a deed granting him power of attorney according to Talmudic Law. And when he is not willing to – or cannot – give him the note, he can grant him power of attorney according to the ordinance of the Geonim.

The rationale is that in most instances a person will seek to protect the money he lends and have the loan supported by the testimony of witnesses or by a promissory note. Indeed, Jewish law requires that such precautions be taken. (see Hilchot Malveh ULoveh 2:7). Our Rabbis did not institute ordinances for abnormal circumstances. Thus, the law remains that power of attorney cannot be granted, as stated in Halachah 6 (Sefer Einayim 123:5).
The Tur differs and quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Tam, who maintains that power of attorney can be granted concerning all obligations. Rabbenu Tam differs with regard to the very foundation of the Rambam’s logic – that power of attorney can be granted only when one transfers ownership of the article. According to Rabbenu Tam, granting power of attorney is like conveying any other agency. Therefore, all the restrictions mentioned by the Rambam do not apply.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 123:1) quotes this view and the Rambam’s view, and the Ramah states that it is customary to follow the Tur’s ruling.

Even according to the Rambam, who requires that ownership of the article be transferred, a person who is granted power of attorney is primarily an agent. And the agency granted to an agent can be retracted. (See also Halachah 10, which also mentions the nullification of power of attorney.)

See Hilchot Sechirut 1:4, where this argument is employed in a different context.

I.e., the principal gave the agent power of attorney to expropriate an article, and the agent sold it to the person holding it (Radbaz).

Since the person granted power of attorney is an agent, this principle, stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 2, applies.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

If, however, the defendant knows that the agency was nullified, he does not have to give him the article (Siftei Cohen 123:14).

As stated in Halachah 5.

He denies the claim after the power of attorney was issued. The laws governing a denial beforehand are mentioned in Halachah 6, as noted by the Ra’avad and the Kessef Mishneh.

There are two possible explanations to Levi’s demand:
i) The debt was supported only by a verbal commitment. Thus, the defendant is required to take a sh’vuat hesset, and then he is freed of his obligation. He may, however, reverse the obligation and give the plaintiff the option of taking an oath and collecting his claim (Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:6).
ii) The debt was supported by a promissory note. For the defendant can require a person collecting a promissory note to take an oath before collecting (Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 14:2).

We fear that Levi is requiring the oath merely to postpone the settlement of the claim and keep the money in his possession. We hope that by requiring him to relinquish possession of the article, we will motivate him to deal with the agent and negotiate a satisfactory arrangement (Kessef Mishneh).

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 123:8) states that we should establish a time limit in which the plaintiff must appear in court. If he does not appear before the end of the time set, the money is returned to the defendant.

As explained in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:11, as a safeguard for the defendant, the Geonim ordained that whenever a person is required to take an oath, he may have a ban of ostracism issued, warning the plaintiff against requiring him to take an unnecessary oath.

The situation mentioned in the first clause revolves around a requirement mentioned by the Talmud itself. Therefore, the money is held in court until Shimon satisfies Levi’s demands. The situation involved in this clause, by contrast, involves an ordinance of the Geonim, which is of far less legal power.

As stated in Hilchot Mechirah 5, a verbal agreement to perform a particular act is considered insubstantial and is not binding. To make the partnership a binding agreement, each partner must perform a kinyan to acquire a share formally in the assets contributed by his colleague. Note, however, the Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 176), which quotes the opinion of the Mordechai, who maintains that a verbal agreement is sufficient to establish a partnership.

The Kessef Mishneh and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 176:5 quote the opinion of the Tur, which states that it is sufficient for each one to lift up the money belonging to his colleague.

I.e., the document was merely a description of their agreement. If, however, they intended to establish their partnership with a legal document, the partnership is binding (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 176:4).

See Hilchot Mechirah 6:1.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam’s statements, stating that mixing produce together is not a kinyan. He therefore explains that after the produce was mixed together, each of the partners lifted it up. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 176:8, however, differs and maintains that mixing the produce itself is considered a kinyan. For generally a person keeps his own property separate; by mixing it together with a colleague’s, he indicates that he is granting the colleague a share. (The commentaries have questioned the argument of Sefer Me’irat Einayim, noting that if so, the same concept should apply with regard to the money mentioned in the first clause.)

For in this instance, the produce is acquired by virtue of its presence in the person’s property. (See Hilchot Mechirah 3:7.)
Ketzot HaChoshen 176:1 notes that when Bava Batra 84b states that a person cannot acquire property belonging to a neighbor by virtue of its presence in a courtyard whose ownership he shares with him, this is speaking about a situation where a person desires to acquire property for his own self. This ruling, however, does not represent a contradiction, for the situations are different. In Bava Batra, the intent is that the article in question should leave the domain of the previous owner and enter the domain of the new owner. For this to be accomplished, it must leave the domain of the previous owner entirely. In the present instance, by contrast, the partner is not seeking to acquire the property entirely for himself. On the contrary, he is seeking to enter into a partnership. Therefore, placing the produce in a property purchased for the partnership is sufficient (Netivot HaMishpat, Be’urim 176:2).

I.e., using the type of kinyan appropriate for that type of property.

The Ra’avad and the Tur differ with the Rambam with regard to this view and maintain that a person may obligate his person with a kinyan as a servant does. In a similar manner, we find that a person may say: “May [the work of] my hands be consecrated to their Maker.”
The Hagahot Maimoniot quotes a more lenient view, stating that even if the partners did not perform a kinyan, when they make a sincere commitment to each other, their word is binding. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 176:3) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Ramah mentions the other views.

See Hilchot Mechirah 22:1.

As explained in the previous halachah.

100 zuz.

If, however, one partner is not involved in the work of the partnership and just invests, different laws apply, as the Rambam states in Chapter 6.

In contrast to the latter clauses of the Halachah, which speak of instances where the money remains intact.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 176:15 explains one rationale for this ruling. Since the partners did not make a stipulation at the outset, one may assume that the partner investing the larger sum of money thought that the other partner’s business acumen was greater than his, and it was worth granting him an equal share because of it. However, that this approach does not fit the Rambam’s logic. According to the Rambam, the reason is that while the bull is alive, all of its organs are necessary for it to continue living, thus the profit comes from all of the partner’s shares together. Hence, it should be divided among them equally (Sefer Me’irat Einayim).
According to the Rambam, he explains, the reason is that while the bull is alive, all of its organs are necessary for it to continue living, thus the profit comes from all of the partner’s shares together. Hence, it should be divided among them equally.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, stating that although his ruling does apply when one hires out a bull for work (i.e., with regard to profit), if one sells the bull and there is a loss, that loss should be divided according to the ratio of the investments made by the partners. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 176:5), however, quotes the Rambam’s ruling.

For even if the money had remained in the possession of its original owner, its price would have risen or fallen accordingly. The fact that he entered into the partnership is of no consequence in this regard (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 176:16).

Certainly, this ruling applies if a partnership was established with regard to produce, and before the produce was sold the partners decided to dissolve the partnership. Each one is given a share according to the degree of money he invested [Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 176:5)].

Because of his superior business acumen.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 176:15) states that even if one of the partners has been negligent in dealing with the partnership’s assets, the other partners may not arbitrarily dissolve the partnership. See Chapter 5, Halachah 9, with regard to how the assets are divided.

From Bava Metzia 31b, 69a, it is apparent that one partner can decide to dissolve the partnership without even notifying the other.

E. g., an animal that would die if divided, or an article that would lose its value if divided. See Hilchot Sh’chenim 1:4.

The Siftei Cohen 176:29 states that if either of the partners desires, instead of selling the merchandise to another person, they can tell the other partner: gud o iggud, “Either purchase [my share at this price] or I will purchase it from you.” (See Hilchot Sh’chenim 1:2 and notes.)

It is local custom to sell a particular type of merchandise at a given time.

Note, however, the Netivot HaMishpat, Biurim 176:1 who states that the Ram bam is speaking about debts that have already become due. If the debts have not become due, the partnership may not be divided. See, however, the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 176:20), who writes that the promissory notes can be divided by the evaluation of the court or through the principle of gud o iggud.

I.e., the terms of the loan specify that each of the partners is personally responsible for only half the loan. See Hilchot Mechirah 25:9.

Since the debts are owed by the partners individually, neither one is responsible to the other.

The commentaries on Bava Metzia 105a explain that the intent is that the fortunes of one individual will not succeed to the same degree as the fortunes of two people.

Although a worker can quit in the middle of the day (Hilchot Sechirut, Chapter 9). Similarly, a person who manages the investment in a heter iska may quit whenever he desires [Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 176:23)].

As explained in the previous halachah.