Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

The Rambam counts the prohibition against worshiping false gods as the first of the 365 negative commandments. In these halachot, he does not mention this prohibition in the manner in which he usually introduces one of the 613 mitzvot in this text, because he introduced this prohibition previously in the Mishneh Torah, mentioning it in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 1:6. The inclusion of this mitzvah in those halachot is appropriate, because it is one of the foundations of our faith.

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapters 2 and 3, for a description of these creations

Fire, wind, water, and earth. The Rambam describes the existence and function of these four fundamental elements in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapters 3 and 4.

All the creations of our physical world are created from a combination of these four elements.

As the Rambam mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 1.

And is subject to the punishments mentioned in Chapter 3, Halachah 1.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are some authorities who, using this verse as a proof-text, do not prohibit gentiles from worshiping false gods with this intent. However, all authorities agree that Jews may not worship in this manner.

Obviously, the intent is not that we are forbidden to gaze at the celestial beings (Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 10).

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 3:9, which states that the stars and the spheres are alive and are conscious of God’s existence.

In the first chapters of the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. II, and briefly in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 4:3, the Rambam explains that all the creations of this world are combinations of different elements and will therefore ultimately return to their initial elemental state. In contrast, the existence of the stars and the spheres remains constant.

To “honor those whom God honors,” as mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 1, or to derive benefit from serving them, as mentioned in Halachah 2 of that chapter.

The words “Be very careful” imply a Scriptural prohibition. In Halachah 3, the Rambam describes the prohibition involved in harboring such thoughts.

Note the fifth of the Rambam’s Thirteen Principles of Faith (Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin, Chapter 10):
The fifth fundamental principle is that it is fit to serve God alone... and not the entities which are below Him: the angels, the stars, the spheres, or the fundamental elements.
This is because they all perform their functions because of their inherent nature. They have no control or choice, but merely [fulfill] God’s will. We should not make them intermediaries to reach Him through them, but rather direct all our thoughts to Him, paying no attention to anything else. This is the... prohibition against worshiping false gods

The commentaries have also included studying other books by pagans and nonbelievers in this prohibition.

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 2:17), which states that one may study “the ideas of the gentiles in order to reply to them.” Indeed, from the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. III, Chapters 29 and 30, it appears that the Rambam himself undertook such study. (The Rabbis have, nevertheless, suggested that such study be limited only to certain individuals who have received permission from a rabbinic authority to concern themselves with these issues.)
Note also Chapter 3, Halachah 2, and Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:1, which state that judges must be somewhat familiar with the rites of the pagans in order to judge cases dealing with such questions. There is no source, however, where the Rambam explicitly mentions that one may study about idol worship for this reason. (See Shabbat 75a and Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 179:29.)

The Zohar, Vol. I, 100a, mentions this prohibition together with its rationale, “lest your heart be tempted to this service.”

Note Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 10) and Tosafot (Shabbat 149a), which explain that this prohibition applies only to statues worshiped as idols, in contrast to Rashi (Shabbat, ibid.), who explains that it refers even to statues erected for decorative purposes.

Note the comments of the Sifra on this verse, “If you turn to them, you will make them gods.”

See Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 10), which defines this prohibition as “analytical thought and study concerning the fantasies and empty thoughts of the founders [of idol worship] — i.e., that spiritual nurture can be drawn down from this star in this manner, it is proper to burn incense to this star in this manner....”

I.e., such enquiries are prohibited.

Here, abstract intellectual curiosity is forbidden. The Rambam operates under the premise that there is nothing positive that can be learned from idol worshipers, and there is a danger that one will be attracted to their lifestyle. Therefore, since there is “nothing to gain and everything to lose,” inquiry about such subjects is forbidden.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 10) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 213) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

. E. g., in his curiosity, uncovers an image to see what it looks like (Maharshal) or performs a ceremonial act of idol worship merely as practice (Kessef Mishneh).
The Rambam’s statements here are used as support to negate the opinion of the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 345), which states that lashes are never given for the violation of a prohibition that can be transgressed without performing a deed, even when one violates it by committing a deed.

Punishment is administered only for the violation of prohibitions by actual deeds. In this instance, the prohibition can be violated by thought alone — in which case no punishment is administered. There are, however, also instances when deed — and thus punishment — is also involved. Eruvin 17b notes that even though the proof-text for this prohibition mentions the word אל rather than לא, it is no different from other Torah prohibitions, and its violation is also punishable by lashes.

Note the Introduction to Sefer HaMitzvot (Shoresh 9), which states that there are mitzvot of thought, of feeling, of speech, and of deed.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 47) defines this mitzvah as follows:
We are forbidden to be freethinking [to the extent that] we accept principles which run contrary to those of the Torah. Rather, we should structure our thoughts, setting for them guidelines, those being the mitzvot of the Torah

See also Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 2:12, 4:11,13, where the Rambam mentions the restrictions placed on the study of deeper spiritual concepts lest one err in his conception.

There are several ways to understand the expression used by the Rambam: “destroy the world.” On the most obvious level, it is a figurative expression, not to be interpreted literally. On a deeper level, it can be seen as a reference to his statements in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:4 that a person should always “see himself and the entire world as equally balanced between merit and sin. If he commits one sin, he tips his balance and that of the entire world to guilt and brings on destruction.” Today, we can appreciate the Rambam’s words in a very literal sense. Society as a whole is plagued by irrational acts of violence and on a global level it is possible for utter destruction to be brought about if a few individuals act irresponsibly.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Introduction to the Tenth Chapter of Sanhedrin), the Rambam lists the oneness of God as the second of his Thirteen Principles of Faith. See also Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 1:7, 2:10.

Chaggigah 11b states: “It would have been better for someone who considers the [following] four matters never to have been created.” The passage continues by mentioning the four questions quoted by the Rambam here.

Our translation is based on Rashi’s interpretation of Chaggigah, ibid.

In Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 7:1, the Rambam states: “It is [one] of the foundations of [our] faith that God communicates by prophecy with man.” Similarly, the Rambam lists the concept of prophecy as the sixth of his Thirteen Principles of Faith

As the eighth of his Thirteen Principles of Faith, the Rambam states: “The Torah which we have was given by Moses our teacher... and emanates — in its entirety — from the Almighty.” He explains that this also applies to the oral law. He reiterates this concept in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah.

The Rambam’s statements should be interpreted, not as a restriction of one’s thinking processes, but rather a call to structure our thoughts according to the guidelines provided for us by the Torah. In this context, it is worthy to refer to Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 4:13: I maintain that it is not proper for a person to stroll in the Pardes (study Torah’s mystic secrets) unless he has filled his belly with bread and meat. “Bread and meat” refer to the knowledge of what is permitted and what is forbidden, and similar matters concerning other mitzvot. Even though the Sages referred to these as “a small matter” — since our Sages said: “‘A great matter,’ this is Ma’aseh Merkavah. ‘A small matter,’ this is the debates of Abbaye and Ravva” — nevertheless, it is fitting for them to be given precedence because they settle a person’s mind. Thus, the Rambam teaches that a person should not embark on the study of deep spiritual questions until he has gained the intellectual maturity which comes from Torah study. Even after a person gains such maturity, there is no need for him to concern himself with the study of idol worship because there is no value which he can derive from such study.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 47) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 387) counts this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Instead, he should follow a structured pattern for intellectual growth and development prescribed by a Torah master

Sifri, Parshas Shelach; see also Berachot 12b.

For a more precise definition of the term minnut, see Halachah 5 and notes.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains:
Their intent in mentioning “immorality” was the pursuit of pleasure and physical desire, [to the extent that] one’s mind is constantly preoccupied with such thoughts.

In Hilchot Teshuvah 3:8, the Rambam includes among the categories of those who have no portion in the world to come: “nonbelievers, heretics, those who deny the Torah... those who cause the many to sin, and those who depart from the ways of the community.” Following the whims of one’s heart can lead to the transgression of these prohibitions.

Because it does not involve a deed. There is some difficulty with the Rambam’s statements. The transgression of both of the prohibitions mentioned in this halachah involves thought and can also involve deed. Just as the commentaries suggested several deeds which violate the first prohibition, similar acts could be performed which violate the latter prohibition. The Rambam, however, appears to imply that there is no way that the latter prohibition could be transgressed in a manner warranting punishment.

The passage implies that it is speaking about a single sin; nevertheless, the verse specifically mentions “all the mitzvot.”

Sifri, Parshas Shelach and Horiot 8a

I.e., a single prohibition which is equivalent to the violation of the entire Torah.

Note the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 8:1-2, which explain that the essence of the prophetic tradition is linked to the revelation of God on Mount Sinai.

Note Hilchot Melachim 9:1, which states that God commanded Adam concerning the worship of false gods. This statement is based on Bereshit Rabbah 16:6.

The verse states that performance of such an act is a denial of “all that God commanded you through Moses….”

Just as the acceptance of false gods removes one from the entire sphere of Torah practice, denying their existence gives one a point of connection to the revelation of God’s truth.

. Because the foundation for all the mitzvot is that they were commanded by the One God Who desires that we serve Him alone.
Note the Tanya, Chapter 20, which explains that the two mitzvot, the acknowledgement of God and the negation of idol worship, are the foundation of all Torah practice. Therefore, the entire Jewish people heard God proclaim these two mitzvot on Mount Sinai. Every act a person performs can be seen as either the acknowledgement of God or the acknowledgement of a set of values aside from His, equivalent figuratively to the acceptance of another god.

The Turei Even maintains that this applies to a person who serves false gods even once.

I.e., he is denied the privileges offered to our fellow Jews — e.g., the return of a lost article or the granting of interest-free loans. Their ritual slaughter of animals is unacceptable and they are not counted as members of a minyan. Similarly, restrictions are placed with regard to drinking wine which such individuals have touched. Should such a person repent, he is treated as any other Jew.

The violation of other prohibitions, even those so severe as punishable by death, differs from the worship of false gods. A person commits other transgressions because he cannot overcome his desires. By doing so, he does not deny his connection to God. Idol worship, in contrast, represents an abrupt severance of all ties a person has with God and Torah.
[It must be noted that a person who publicly desecrates the Sabbath is considered equivalent to one who worships idols and is also treated like a gentile in all regards (Hilchot Shabbat 30:15).]

Note the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:9: There are two categories of apostates: an apostate with regard to a single mitzvah, and an apostate with regard to the entire Torah. An apostate with regard to a single mitzvah is someone who has made a practice of willfully committing a particular sin [to the point where] he is accustomed to committing it and his deeds are public knowledge. [This applies] even though [the sin] is one of the minor... [but] applies [only] if he [commits the sin] with the intent of angering God. In most aspects of Torah law, there are no differences between these two categories. However, certain distinctions do exist. For example, an apostate with regard to the entire Torah is prevented from bringing sacrifices to the Temple. However, if his apostasy is limited to a particular mitzvah, his sacrifices may be accepted (Chulin 5a, Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:4). Similarly, in Hilchot Shechitah 4:14, the Rambam disqualifies all ritual slaughter performed by an apostate who worships false gods, but accepts slaughter performed by an apostate with regard to a specific mitzvah.

The published texts of the Mishneh Torah use the word apikoros here, rather than min, and continue to do so throughout this halachah. In Hilchot Teshuvah, the Rambam differentiates between the two, explaining that a min is a person who does not believe in God, while an apikoros is one who does not believe in the Torah. The authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah use min.
The Aruch explains that the term min was derived as follows: The early Christians referred to themselves as מאמנים — “the faithful.” As a gesture of derision, the Sages shortened that expression to מינים, literally meaning “sorts” — i.e., all sorts of deviant believers. Later, they expanded the use of the term to apply to others who deny fundamental principles of faith.

The commentaries have pointed to the apparent contradiction between these statements and the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:14:
When does the statement apply that these individuals [a list of 13 categories including minnim] do not have a portion in the world to come? When they die without having repented. However, if such a person repents from his wicked deeds and dies while a Baal-Teshuvah, he will merit the world to come, for nothing can stand in the way of `.
Even if he denies God’s existence throughout his life and repents in his final moments, he merits a portion in the world to come. Any wicked person, apostate, or the like who repents, whether in an open, revealed manner or in private, will be accepted, as implied by [Jeremiah 3:22]: “Return, faithless children.” [We may infer] that even if one is still faithless, as obvious from the fact that he repents in private and not in public, his Teshuvah will be accepted.
This apparent contradiction was brought to the Rambam’s attention during his lifetime. In one of his Responsa (101), he resolved the issue by explaining that his statements in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim refer to the attitude which should be adopted by the Jewish people. They should never regard such an individual as a Baal-Teshuvah, because it is possible he is merely feigning repentance in order to gain public acceptance. In contrast, in Hilchot Teshuvah, the Rambam is referring to acceptance by God, Who sees the true feelings of every individual. If a person’s repentance is sincere, regardless of the severity of his previous sins, God will accept him. (Note also the commentary of the Lechem Mishneh and the Responsa of the Radbaz, Vol. V, 1518, which offer similar explanations.)
Even with regard to acceptance by men, the Rambam urged tolerance and consideration. At the conclusion of Iggeret HaSh’mad, he writes:
It is not proper to drive away those who profane the Sabbath.... Rather, we must draw them close and urge them to perform mitzvot. Our Sages of blessed memory explained that even if a person voluntarily sinned, when he comes to a synagogue to pray, we should accept him and not deal scornfully with him.

Avodah Zarah 17a questions: Since they will never “repent,” how could they be expected to “regain the paths of life”? The Talmud answers: “Even after they repent, they will not ‘regain the path of life’... — i.e., they will die.”
Rashi interprets the Talmud’s statements simply, that they will die quickly. From the Rambam’s statements quoted above and from the Radbaz’s interpretation of them, it would appear that the Rambam interprets this as referring to spiritual death.

The prohibitions mentioned in Halachah 3.

See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Chulin 1:1), where he also defines the term minnim in a similar manner. In Hilchot Teshuvah 3:7, the Rambam offers a slightly different — and more precise — definition of the term:
Five individuals are described as minnim:
a) one who says there is no God or ruler of the world;
b) one who accepts the concept of a ruler, but maintains that there are two or more;
c) one who accepts that there is one Master [of the world], but maintains that He has a body or form;
d) one who maintains that He was not the sole First Being and Creator of all existence;
e) one who serves a star, constellation, or other entity, so that it will serve as an intermediary between him and the eternal God.
The difference between these two statements caused the Kessef Mishneh to explain that these two definitions do not refer to the same individuals. From the Rambam’s responsa referred to above, however, it would appear that he, himself, did not share that opinion. Even so, it is obvious that this halachah is speaking in much more general terms than in Hilchot Teshuvah, since some of the other categories of people whom Hilchot Teshuvah describe as not having a portion in the world to come — e.g., those who deny the Torah and those who proudly sin — appear to be included in the definition of minnim the Rambam uses here.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avot 2:17), the Rambam notes the apparent contradiction between this advice and the Mishnah’s directive, “Know what to answer an apikoros.” He explains that the latter statement applies when a gentile attempts to persuade a Jew to leave the true faith. In contrast, no answer should be given to a Jewish nonbeliever. We assume that his questions do not reflect a genuine desire to know, but were intended to poke fun at the Torah. Hence, answering him will merely give him the opportunity to add further ridicule.

i.e., he cannot be relied upon to perform an act for the sake of God. Therefore, a Torah scroll which he writes must be burned (Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:8). We assume that when he wrote God’s name, he intended that it refer to his false god.

The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 60b) states: “One who accepts it as a god is liable for execution” — i.e., the verbal acceptance of another entity as a God is sufficient to make one liable for execution. See Chapter 3, Halachah 4, and Hilchot Shegagot 1:2.

This passage — as explained in Halachah 4 — refers to idol worship

In conscious defiance of God.

In Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:6-7, the Rambam mentions that it is a positive commandment to hang a blasphemer and an idolater. (These are the only individuals who are hanged.) They are not executed by hanging. Rather, after the condemned is stoned to death, his corpse is hung for a fleeting second.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:1-2.

Although they are two different prohibitions, the conceptual similarity they share causes them to be grouped together in the Mishneh Torah.

The Rambam also mentions this expression with regard to idolatry in Hilchot Yesodei Torah 1:6. Its source is Sanhedrin 45b.

Sanhedrin 60a states that the term, “God’s four-lettered name,” is used to exclude the name, י–ה. Blaspheming this name does not warrant execution.

In Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:2, when mentioning the names of God which are forbidden to be erased, the Rambam begins with, “The name which is written י–ה–ו–ה. This is [referred to as] [God’s] explicit name and is [also] written א–ד–נ–י.” He considers the two a single name. Hence, though it is a matter of controversy, as will be explained, the Rambam maintains that blaspheming the name א–ד–נ–י is sufficient for a person to be condemned to death.

I.e., the person must say: May ---- curse ----, mentioning one of God's names first and either the name א-ד-נ-י or the name י-ה-ו-ה last.

Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah (ibid.) mentions seven names of God which are forbidden to be erased, the names י–ה–ו–ה and א–ד–נ–י which, as mentioned above, are considered as one and the names Eil, Elo’ah, Elohim, Elohai, Shaddai, and Tz’vaot.
The above follows the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah. The commentaries on that halachah mention various different versions of the text.

Sanhedrin 56a explains that since the verse mentions the blaspheming of God’s name twice, we can derive that in order to be deserving of punishment, one must curse God’s name with another one of His names.

The name א–ד–נ–י or the name י–ה–ו–ה.

The Hebrew term used, כינוים, does not refer only to the seven names mentioned above, but to any term used to describe God.

But is not executed by the court.

And, indeed, the verse from the Torah uses the name י–ה–ו–ה.

The Rambam mentions himself in the first person only when stating an opinion which he feels lacks adequate support from previous sources.

I.e., for blaspheming both the name א–ד–נ–י and the name י–ה–ו–ה. This is based on the Rambam’s conception of the two as a single name, as Kiddushin 71a states: “I am not referred to as [My name] is written. My name is written י–ה–ו–ה and it is pronounced א–ד–נ–י.”

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 60) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 71) consider this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. (Note also Hilchot Melachim 9:1, which includes blaspheming God’s name as one of the seven universal prohibitions forbidden to gentiles as well as to Jews.) Leviticus, Chapter 24, relates an instance in which God’s name was blasphemed. Moses asked God how to punish the offender and was told that he, and similarly, any future blasphemers, should be executed. This passage, however, does not contain a specific verse forbidding such blasphemy. (See also I Kings, Chapter 21, which relates how Navot was stoned to death — albeit on a trumped-up charge — for blaspheming God’s name.)

Although this verse is the source for another prohibition, which forbids cursing a judge (Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 315), blasphemy is considered to be a prohibition in its own right.

So that the curse against God’s name need not be constantly repeated.

The Hebrew name יוסי is used by the witnesses instead of God's name because it has four letters, as does God's unique name. Also, its numerical equivalent is 86, the numerical equivalent of God's name, אלהים (Rashi, San. 56a).

After the examination of the witnesses has been completed and the judges are prepared to issue a verdict

To minimize the desecration of God’s name.

Since they may not have punishment administered unless they hear explicit testimony that God’s name was, in fact, cursed (Rashi, ibid.).

As he heard it, thus cursing God’s name himself.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 7:8) states that the witnesses do not repeat the curse explicitly. The Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 60a), however, interprets the judges’ rending of their garments as associated with the acts required when hearing actual blasphemy. Whenever there is a difference of opinion between the two Talmuds, the Babylonian Talmud’s view is accepted. Accordingly, the Rambam states that the witnesses repeat the actual curse.

As a gesture of respect for God’s name.

As a sign of mourning, as required in Halachah 10.

One may mend garments torn in mourning for any relative except one’s parents. In the latter instance — and for other sources of bereavement — e.g., the death of one’s teacher, the burning of a Torah scroll, witnessing the cities of Eretz Yisrael and the Temple in destruction — the tear may never be mended (Hilchot Eivel 9:1-2).

Sanhedrin 60a explains that, according to Torah law, both witnesses are not required to state all the particulars of a case. It is sufficient for one witness to make a statement and for the other to say, “I observed the same act.” With regard to other transgressions, the Sages enforced the stringency of requiring both witnesses to make complete statements. In this instance, they did not require more than the Torah itself obligates to prevent unnecessary repetition of the curse

Although the statements of two witnesses are sufficient to convict the offender, the testimony of a third witness is significant, because if his testimony is negated, the entire case may be nullified (Rashi, Sanhedrin 60a).

Wishes to retract the curse he uttered

Directly after uttering it. The phrase, תוך כדי דיבור, rendered as “in the midst of speaking,” has a specific halachic meaning: “the time it takes to recite the words, שלום עליך רבי, Shalom Alecha, rabbi, (Peace unto you, my teacher).”

Generally, when a person retracts a statement in such a short time, his retraction is accepted and no attention is paid to his initial statements. This provision is granted in consideration of the possibility that a person may speak casually and, without knowing, make an error. No such leniency is granted with regard to blasphemy. We assume that blasphemy will never be uttered casually, and that a person who curses God does so in full awareness of the seriousness of his act. Other exceptions to the above rule are the worship of false gods, marriage, and divorce. In these instances as well, a person is considered to be aware of the seriousness of his statements and is not given the opportunity to retract (Nedarim 87a).

Based on the premise mentioned previously, the Kessef Mishneh maintains that blasphemy is a unique instance, and the “presence of witnesses” alone is sufficient to warrant punishment. Generally, before an offender can be punished for a transgression, he must receive a warning from the witnesses, advising him that the deed he is about to perform is forbidden and he is liable for punishment for performing it (Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2). Because of the obvious severity associated with blasphemy, there is no requirement for such a warning.
[The Kessef Mishneh also cites the transgression of bearing false testimony. In that context, the Rambam writes (Hilchot Edut 20:4), that since there is no deed connected with the transgression of giving false testimony, there is no need for a warning. The same concept also applies regarding a blasphemer, who is punished even though he did not commit a deed.] The Kessef Mishneh himself questions this rationale. Other authorities (Avodat HaMelech) reject it and require that the witnesses issue a warning for a blasphemer as well.

Any one of the seven names which may not be erased

I.e., “May false god X strike God.”

Pious men who will react to a breach of Torah practice with fervor.

The classic case of a “zealous” person slaying an offender is Pinchas’ slaughter of Zimri for having relations with a Midianite woman (Numbers, Chapter 25). There are a number of sins which, according to Torah law, are not punishable by death. The nature of the offence, however, is so serious that anyone who takes the law into his own hands and slays them is not punished for his act (Sanhedrin 81b).

Immediately. They must act directly after his blasphemy. If not, slaying the blasphemer is judged as murder. (Compare to Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:5.)

I.e., because his statements, however irreverent, are not punishable by death according to Torah law. Note Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah (ibid.), which states that if a zealous person asks a court whether to slay the offender, the court should not instruct him to do so. Thus, we see that the Torah is not granting license to kill. Rather, it is absolving someone who does so out of a spontaneous, gut-felt appreciation that this is what is necessary, from being punished for his act.

As explained in Halachah 7. There is some difficulty with the Rambam’s statements. In this halachah, he appears to use the expression “unique names” in reference to all seven names which may not be erased, while in Halachah 7 the expression “unique name” refers only to the names י–ה–ו–ה and א–ד–נ–י.

The Hebrew ברכת ה’, literally means “the blessing of God’s name,” is a euphemism used through the Talmudic literature to refer to blasphemy

As a sign of mourning. (See Hilchot Eivel 9:1-2.)

I.e., this applies not only to the names י–ה–ו–ה, א–ד–נ–י or to one of the seven names for God which may not be erased, but to any term — e.g., “Merciful One” or “Gracious One” — which is used to refer to Him.

Sanhedrin 60a mentions this as a point of controversy between Shmuel (who maintains that one is obligated to rend one’s garments only over the blasphemy of God’s explicit name) and Rav Chiyya (whose opinion is quoted by the Rambam).

As Elyakim and Shevna did in the narrative cited below.

Isaiah 37:1 relates that when Elyakim and Shevna related Ravshakeh's blasphemy to King Hezekiah, he also rent his garments. Note Halachah 8, which mentions that the judges must rend their garments when the witnesses to blasphemy repeat it in court. [Note Hilchat Eivel 9:8, which states that the witnesses themselves need not rend their garments, because they did so when they heard the blasphemy uttered originally.]

Sanhedrin (loc. cit.) mentions that this point is also debated by the same Sages. Shmuel’s opinion is the one quoted by the Rambam, while Rav Chiyya maintains that — in Biblical times, though not during the Talmudic period — one is obligated to rend one’s garments over blasphemy uttered by a gentile.
The Kessef Mishneh and others raise the question why the Rambam accepted Rav Chiyya’s view on one issue and Shmuel’s view on the other. Since the Talmud mentions the two issues together, it would seem appropriate for the Rambam to follow one of the authorities on both questions. Among those who attempted to resolve this difficulty is the Radbaz (Vol. VI, Responsum 2157). He attacks the basic premise for the question. The Rambam, he explains, accepted Rav Chiyya’s original statement, since the blasphemy of any term used for God generates a chilul HaShem great enough to warrant rending one’s garments. In contrast, he does not consider blasphemy uttered by a gentile as chilul HaShem, since the gentile is unaware of the holiness connected with God’s name.

Isaiah, Chapters 36 and 37, relates how Sancheriv, King of Assyria, laid siege to Jerusalem and sent Ravshakeh as head of the siege party. Hezekiah, the king of Judah, sent Elyakim and Shevna to negotiate with Ravshakeh, who responded with arrogance, demanding outright surrender and blaspheming God. Hezekiah responded to his blasphemy by praying to God, who wrought an awesome miracle, slaying 185,000 of Sancheriv's troops. (See also II Kings, Chapters 18 and 19.) The thesis that Ravshakeh was an apostate Jew is accepted without question by the Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 60a), although there is a debate to that effect in the Jerusalem Talmud. The only apparent allusion to this thesis in the Biblical narrative is his ability to speak Hebrew.

The obligation of the judges to place their hands on the blasphemer’s head is derived from the inclusion of the word “all” in the proof-text quoted below (Sifra, Emor). Were the intent that only the witnesses should do so, it would have been sufficient to say: “And those who hear shall....”

Individually. It is not sufficient that one individual act as the agent of the others (Kessef Mishneh).

Thus, this placing of the hands — as the washing of the hands of the elders on an eglah arufah, Deuteronomy 21:7, represents a statement of absolution of responsibility.

Perhaps the Torah requires the performance of this act in this instance because, in the course of the trial, the witnesses repeated the blasphemy and the judges caused them to do so. Hence, a special measure is required to absolve them from blame for the sin of blasphemy (Kin’at Eliyahu).