Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day
Shvuot - Chapter 3
Shvuot - Chapter 3
He is not liable even for reciting God’s name in vain (Radbaz). Sh ‘vuot 26a derives this concept from the prooftext: “When a soul will take an oath, expressing with his lips.... “The implication is that the oath must come from an expression made by the. person’s free will.
The Siftei Cohen 239:9 interprets the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 239:1) as implying that such an oath must be released before it can be violated. The Siftei Cohen himself differs and maintains that the oath is of no consequence at all.
See Chapter 1, Halachah 10, which speaks of a person who took a false oath because of a memory lapse.
For in all instances, a person is not liable when he is compelled to perform a transgression against his will. See Nedarim 27a.
I.e., at the outset such license is granted.
Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 3:3).
I.e., the type of tax or customs duty collectors described in the following halachah.
During the time the Greeks and the Romans ruled Eretz Yisrael, they would very frequently sell the right to tax the inhabitants of the Holy Land or to collect customs duty to an individuals or a group for a fee and allow that individual or group to tax the people as he pleased, whether the tax was justified or not. Similar practices continued in many of the lands to which the Jews were exiled. If, however, a tax was established according to a just law, one is obligated to pay and may not take a false oath. For “the law of the ruling authority is law” (Nedarim 28a).
Chapter 5, Halachah 11.
As illustrated· in the following halachah.
One might ask, for an oath to be effective, the person’s statements must reflect the intent in his heart, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 10. Why then must the person taking the oath have in mind a permitted situation? Seemingly, the very fact that he does not desire to take the oath should be sufficient to render it invalid. It can be explained that this situation is different, because this oath is being taken based on the·other person’s - the tax collector’s - request. Thus it is bound by the restrictions mentioned above in Chapter 2, Halachah 15.
This is a general principle in Torah Law. See Hilchot Ishut 8:2; Hilchat Me’ilah 7:1; and Hilchot Mechirah 11:9.
I.e., the man of force compelled him to take an oath that if he was evading customs duty, he would be forbidden to eat meat. He should have the intent that he is promising not to eat pig meat.
The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 232:14) emphasizes that the license to take a false oath under compulsion is granted only when the gentile will not know that the oath has been violated. If, however, the gentle will know, license is not granted because this will lead to chillul hashem, the desecration of God’s name. For this reason, King Tzidkiayahu was punished for violating the oath he took to Nebuchadnetzar.
I.e., he is not given lashes, nor is he required to bring a sacrifice for taking such an oath. Needless to say, however, it is forbidden to take such oaths. For by doing so, one takes God’s name in vain. If, however, one does not mention God’s name, it is permitted to make such a statement [Radbaz; see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 239:1)].
See Deuteronomy 1:28 which uses such exaggeration.
One might think that he would be · 1iable for taking an oath in vain, because he is saying something that is obviously not true (as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 4). To refute this supposition, the Rambam explains that in this instance - as opposed to that stated above - the person is speaking facetiously. He knows he is exaggerating and does not intend that his words be taken literally. See also Chapter 5, Halachah 21, and notes.
Chapter 1, Halachot 10, 13. As stated there, it is considered as if he transgressed because of forces beyond his control and hence, he is absolved entirely.
As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 6, one of the types of oaths taken in vain is an oath to neglect the observance of a mitzvah. In this instance, although the person took such an oath intentionally, his violation is considered inadvertent, because he did not know that tefillin are a mitzvah.
I.e., a sh ‘vuat bitui. See Chapter 1, Halachah 6.
For in the situations described in the previous halachah, he is not liable at all.
For if he forgets his oath entirely, he is not liable at all as stated in Halachah 6.
Sh ‘vuot 26a cites Leviticus 5:4: “which a person will express in an oath and it
became concealed from him.” Implied is that the oath becomes concealed and he loses his
awareness of it.
The Rambam LeAm quotes opinions that maintain that if the person violated his oath, knowing it was forbidden to break the oath, but unaware that he is liable for a sacrifice, he is liable for the sacrifice as in the previous halachah. The Rambam, however, mentions another instance, because that situation is very rare.
And as indicated by the above prooftext, it is the oath that must be. concealed and not the article concerning which the oath was taken.
Sh ‘vuot 26a raises a question concerning this situation and leaves it unresolved. Since there is a doubt involved, one is not held liable for the sacrifice.
A person is liable to bring a sacrifice when he would refrain from eating were he to know that the object from which he is partaking is forbidden by oath. In this instance, he did not forget the oath and his knowledge of it did not cause him to refrain from eating.
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