Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

When the priests do not serve in the Temple and there is no Sanhedrin to verify their lineage.

I.e., they are regarded as priests by people at large even though there is no definite proof of their lineage.

I.e., in contrast to sacrificial meat which may be eaten only in the Temple courtyard or within the city of Jerusalem, depending on the type of sacrifice involved.

As explained in Halachah 3, in the present age, the mitzvah of terumah has the status of a Rabbinic commandment. As reflected by the commentaries to Hilchot Terumah 2:1, according to the Rambam, Scriptural Law requires us to separate terumah from all types of produce usually eaten by humans. The mitzvah does not apply only to the grain, grapes, and olives singled out by Deuteronomy 18:4.

Note the Maggid Mishneh who elaborates, explaining that although generally, the testimony of one witness is sufficient with regard to issues involving Scriptural prohibitions, an exception is made with regard to terumah.

See the conclusion of the tractate of Middot and Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 6:11, which describes the manner in which the lineage of the priests was checked.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:1.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Bikkurim 5:5,7, in the Biblical era, there was a distinction between the mitzvah of challah as observed in Eretz Yisrael and as observed in the Diaspora. For according to Scriptural Law, the mitzvah applies only in Eretz Yisrael.

The continuation of the verse describes the mitzvah to separate challah.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Terumah 1 :26 and Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6:16, after the conquest of Eretz Yisrael by Assyrians and the Babylonians, the sanctity of the land was nullified and there was no obligation to keep the agricultural laws of Eretz Yisrael. When Ezra led the people back to Eretz Yisrael after the 70 years of the Babylonian exile, the majority of the people did not accompany him. (Moreover, he did not conquer the land.) Hence, his sanctification of Eretz Yisrael was not sufficient to meet the requirements of Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, he and his court ruled that those mitzvot should be observed as a Rabbinic ordinance.
This reflects the Rambam’s view. Although other Rishonim (Ra’avad, Rav Moshe HaCohen) differ and maintain that Ezra’s settlement of the land was sufficient to sanctify it according to Scriptural Law, the Rambam’s approach is accepted by most authorities.

The Rambam maintains that the laws regarding terumah and the tithes are derived from those applying to challah (Kessef Mishneh to Hilchat Terumah I :26).

In the Talmudic era - as is still the practice in certain communities - when a person was given an aliyah, he would read the Torah himself, rather than have it read for him by others.

Although all of these practices are signs of the priesthood, we do not consider them as conclusive evidence of a priest’s lineage.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s words could be interpreted to mean that the child is considered a priest with regard to marriage. Nevertheless, he does not possess the advantage of being considered of established lineage unless testimony is given.

The father’s statement is, however, sufficient to have him considered as a priest with regards to matters applicable in the present age, as stated in Halachah 10.

More precisely, that they are the sons borne him by his deceased wife.

And his daughters fit to marry priests.

And did not pay attention to the fact the person was described as a priest.

E. g., the sheep exchanged in place of a donkey, the first shearing of a sheep, and the like.

This refers even to terumah mandated by Scriptural Law. Ketubot 25b explains that this ruling is based on the principle of miggo. If the priest desired to transgress, he could feed his son terumah without having him declared a priest. See also Halachah 3.

To be given an aliyah first and to bless the people.

For the testimony of one witness is effective.

And there is room to suspect that each is lying on the other’s behalf.

If a Levi did not read after him, the fact that he read first is not significant. For perhaps there were no priests present and an Israelite was called instead or he was given the honor because of his stature as a Torah scholar.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the above are forbidden him, because - as stated in Halachah 9 - when an observer sees a person performing such acts, he may consider that person a priest.
Rav Moshe Cohen and the Rama (Even HaEzer 3:1) maintain that, in the present era, it is customary to accept a person’s word if he claims to be a priest. For the only serious problem with regard to observance is partaking of terumah and we do not separate terumah in the present age. Note the Chelkat Mechokek 3:1 who raises questions regarding the license for this person to recite the Priestly Blessing. See also the Maggid Mishneh who mentions that this custom was also practiced in his era. He strongly protests against it, calling it “an erroneous custom.”

Since he considers himself a priest, it is as if he has taken a vow not to perform these activities.

The commentaries have questioned this statement, for it has not been formally established that the person is a priest. Nevertheless, since he considers himself a priest, as far as he is concerned, the warning given him will be have been of substance and the punishment deserved. Hence he is given the lashes. The woman is not given lashes, for as far as she is concerned, the matter is not definitely established (Maggid Mishneh).

Hence if another priest engages in relations with her, he is not given lashes. Her offspring are also challalim of questionable status and her daughter may not marry into the priesthood (Maggid Mishneh; Chelkat Mechokek 3:3).

He is allowed to partake of terumah mandated by Rabbinic decree, for his statements are given the weight of the testimony of one witness.

This is proof that he was not a servant, for servants are not taught the Torah (Tosafot, Ketubot 26a).

Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi.

Generally, for testimony to be valid, the person observing the matter must be acceptable as a witness. In this instance, however, formal testimony is not required. Hence leniency is shown. (See Hilchot Edut 14:3).

This applies even if there are no rumors that the person’s mother is not acceptable (Maggid Mishneh). The Chelkat Mechokek 3:9 quotes other authorities who are more lenient.

We are not speaking about mere hearsay, but a rumor that is substantiated by the court.

For the testimony of one witness is powerful enough to negate the rumor.

Because the testimony of one witness is of no consequence in the face of the testimony of two witnesses.

The fact that the two witnesses do not testify at the same time is not significant (Hilchot Edut 4:4).

I.e., the intent is that once two witnesses give testimony in court, their statement is given the weight of established fact and needs no further corroboration. Since the statements of the two pairs of witnesses contradict each other, they are both nullified. Nevertheless, the statements of the witnesses who testify that he is acceptable also have the power to nullify the rumor.

The Maggid Mishneh mentions that there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if he is considered acceptable only with regard to terumah mandated by Rabbinic Law or also with regard to terumah mandated by Scriptural Law. The Beit Shmuel 3:14 states that the Rambam is also referring to terumah mandated by Rabbinic Law.

A woman is required to wait for such an interim so that the lineage of her children will be established definitively.

I.e., as infants, the identity of the children became confused and the doubt was never clarified.

They are not given lashes, because it is not certain that they violated a Scriptural commandment. They should, however, be given “stripes for rebellious conduct,” because of their disregard of the restrictions the Rabbis placed upon them [Perisha (Even HaEzer 3)].

This term refers to the state of acute morning that applies immediately after the death of one's close relative. See Hilchot Evel 4:6.

Yevamot 100b notes a difficulty in the use of the plural in both this and the following clause. Since the ordinary way the mother of this priest could have married a second priest is when her first husband died, how is it possible to speak about the son mourning for that first husband or that first husband mourning for him?
The Talmud answers that this is speaking about a situation where the mother thought she was consecrated to the first husband, but in fact was not. This is not considered a licentious relationship warranting the stringencies mentioned in the following halachah. A formal divorce, however, is not required and hence the woman may marry another priest.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that according to the Rambam, one can also interpret the passage as referring to a woman whose father died in her childhood and who was married by Rabbinic decree. Until she attains majority, she may dissolve that marriage through the rite of mi’un. In such an instance, a formal divorce is not required. If she conceives a child, dissolves her marriage, and then marries another priest, the situation mentioned in this halachah may apply.

For perhaps that person is his father. Rashi (Yevamot, loc. cit.) interprets this statement as referring to the restrictions placed upon priests for aninut. Since it is possible that the person who died is his father, he should not risk the violation of a Scriptural commandment. With regard to the customs concerning aninut mentioned in Hilchot Evel (one of them being that one does not perform any of the Torah’s mitzvot), by contrast, Kinat Eliyahu raises a question: Should one refrain from performing a mitzvah because perhaps the person who died was his father?

For perhaps he is their son.

There is a Scriptural prohibition against a priest becoming impure. That prohibition does not apply when one is certain that the person who died is one’s relative. In this instance, however, neither the father nor son is certain.

The priests were divided into 24 watches. Each one would serve in the Temple for a week in a cycle of rotation (Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 4:3). This priest has the right to serve during the week allotted to both of the individuals suspected of being his father.

In this instance, we are speaking of expropriating property (a share in the sacrifices) from the other priests. Hence we follow the principle: When a person seeks to expropriate property, the burden of proof is upon him.

Each priestly watch was divided into seven batei av, family groupings, who would serve in the Temple one day of the seven (Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 4:11).

For he is certainly entitled to one portion.

Yevamot, loc. cit., explains that this interpretation is not of Scriptural origin. Instead, the law is a Rabbinic decree. Our Sages, however, found a Biblical verse that supported their ruling.

Because all the individuals suspected of being his father were priests.

For he is definitely a priest and must observe the prohibitions applicable to them.