Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., this term excludes a guilt-offering and an adjustable guilt-offering.

The Sanhedrin of 71 judges, Israel’s highest court. See Halachah 2.

In contrast to a person who is acting on the basis of his own decision making processes. See Chapter 13, Halachah 5.

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the intent is not that the judges bring the sacrifices, but that the tribes bring the sacrifices on behalf of the judges.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Introduction to tractate Horiot, the Rambam cites Horiot Sa which derives this concept from Numbers 15:22 which states: “If they will err and fail to perform all the mitzvot.” Implied is that one violated a prohibition that is equivalent to all the mitzvot, i.e., the prohibition against worshiping false deities.

Not on the altar, but in a special place outside the city of Jerusalem. See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 7:2.

I.e., to the Sanctuary where it is presented on the curtain dividing the Sanctuary from the Holy of Holies and on the Golden Altar (ibid. 5:11-16). It is not, however, brought into the Holy of Holies.

In this context, the tribes of Efraim and Menasheh are considered as a single entity (see Chapter 13, Halachah 2).

Eretz Yisrael is mentioned, because the concept of a kahal, “congregation,” applies in its complete sense only in our Holy Land (see ibid.).

For example, if there were 600,000 members of the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael, and 400,000 from four tribes transgressed, these offerings must be brought (see ibid.).

Using the above figures, this refers to an instance where 200,000 transgressed, but they comprised seven tribes.

The money to purchase these offerings is collected independently. It is not taken from the funds set aside to purchase communal offerings (Hilchot Shekalim 4:2).

Chapter 14, Halachah 4.

These conditions are explained in greater depth in the following chapters.

The nasi who presides over the Sanhedrin.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin, ch. 2, for a description of the virtues a judge must possess.

When mentioning this point in the following halachah, the Rambam states that even if one judge protests the decision, the court is not obligated to bring a sacrifice. Hence, his words here must be interpreted to mean that the majority of the court supported the ruling, but some of the judges remained silent. Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Loc. cit.), the Rambam states simply that all the judges must join in the ruling.

As opposed to expressing the idea as a theoretical point, as stated in the following chapter.

The court’s ruling need not be heard by the entire people directly.

See Chapter 14, Halachot 1-2.

ibid.:4.

I.e., the Rambam is explaining his statement made at the conclusion of the last chapter. In this and the following chapter, he details the points made there.

I.e., and not the High Court of 71 judges. Although this is the Highest Court for this individual tribe, an offering need not be brought by that court (Rav Yosef Corcus). This applies even if this tribe comprises a majority of the Jewish people.
The concept of there being courts for each tribe is discussed in Hilchot Sanhedrin 5:1 and the commentaries to ibid. 1:1.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Assuorot 7:6 which includes it among the fats that are forbidden.

Which is forbidden as stated in ibid. 6:3.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Horiot 1:4), the Rambam emphasizes that this applies even if he is temporarily replaced by another person so that there are 71 judges ruling. Rav Yosef Corcus explains that if the head of the academy was present, it is possible that the court would not have erred.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:1, 3-6, 9.

Since the prooftext refers to “the entire congregation,” it is referring to a court whose ruling affect the entire people, i.e., the High Court.

With regard to a person who accidentally killed a fellow Jew.

See also Halachah 4. They are not considered to have acted upon the court's ruling, because they protested its error. On the other hand, if they transgressed because they thought it was a mitzvah to heed the directives of the court, they are not considered to have transgressed willfully. Hence, they can atone by bringing a sacrifice.

When determining whether or not the majority of the people transgressed.

One sacrifice is brought for them and one for the tribe of Levi. And if the tribe of Joseph and five other tribes sin, it is not considered as if the majority of the tribes sinned.

Although they received two tribal portions in the division of Eretz Yisrael, in other contexts, they are considered as one tribe (Horiot 6b).

E. g., the population increased, alternatively, many of the transgressors died.

E. g., the population decreased.

According to the standard published text of Horiot 3a, this ruling is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages that is left unresolved. For that reason, the Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling and maintains that both the court and the transgressors should be exempted, for this type of sacrifice should not be brought when there is a question whether or not one is liable.
The Kessef Mishneh maintains that the Rambam had a different version of this Talmudic passage. Rav Yosef Corcus maintains that the Rambam’s intent is not that the court is liable, but only that the transgressors are exempt. He supports that explanation by explaining that in this instance it would be unable to determine which type of offering the court should bring, because the two transgressions mentioned require different offerings.

I.e., the members of one court died and another court arose in its place.

The Rambam elaborates only on the last clause. For this and other reasons, some commentaries maintain that the first clause should be part of Halachah 4 and that Halachah 5 should begin with the second clause.

As explained in Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot 7:6, there are portions of the fat of the stomach that are permitted and portions that are forbidden. This court erred and permitted all of the fat to be eaten.

See the Sifri, Shoftim which states that one must heed the rulings of the Sages even if they say that right is left. See also the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Horiot 1:1).

As above, he is not considered to have sinned because of the court’s ruling, because he knew that it was erroneous. Nevertheless, since he transgressed because he thought it was a mitzvah to heed the directives of the court, he is not considered to have transgressed willfully. Hence, he can atone by bringing a sacrifice.

And thus if the question whether there is a majority of the people who sinned because of the ruling depends on him, it is considered as if the lesser portion sinned and the court is not required to bring an offering.

Since he is not a scholar, he knows that he is lacking in knowledge and he is not certain about the matter.

I.e., he maintained that he was an expert and independently, he made the same error that the court did.

I.e., they willfully caused the people to transgress.

And sin-offerings are brought only when one transgresses inadvertently. This principle applies not only to the offerings of an individual, but also to these communal sin-offerings.

Although in the previous halachah, the Rambam stated that the knowledge of a common person is not considered significant, in this instance, since we are speaking about the entire people, we can be certain that their knowledge has a basis in tradition and hence, is worthy of consideration (Rav Yosef Corcus).

I.e., in contrast to the individuals mentioned in the previous halachah who thought that they should heed the rulings of the court, these individuals knew that it was improper to do so.

And, as stated above, sin-offerings are brought only when one transgresses inadvertently.

To refer to the examples used by the Rambam in the previous chapter: There the court did not nullify any of the Torah’s prohibitions entirely. Its error involved a particular aspect of one prohibition. This and the following halachot are speaking of an instance where the court totally lost awareness of one of the Torah’s prohibitions. See Halachah 2 for extended elaboration.

Since the community is not obligated to bring an offering, every person must atone for himself individually.

Horiot 4a explains that, the mem, the final letter of the Hebrew term vene’elam, translated as ‘‘lapse,” can be read together with the term devar, translated as “matter,” producing the term meidevar, meaning “from the matter.” I.e., for the court to be liable, the lapse must be “from the matter,” and not the entire matter.

For if the matter is explicitly stated in the Torah, the entire people, even school children will know the error. Horiot 4a refers to such matters as “matters which the Sadducees [who follow only the Written Law, but not the Oral Law] accept.”

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 6:7 for a description of this prohibition.

For the sacrifice was instituted to atone for the court’s unintentional error. When a court makes a gross error of this nature, they are considered to have transgressed voluntarily, for they should have made themselves knowledgeable about such matters (Rashi, Horiot, foe. cit.).

Although the literal meaning - and also, the halachic meaning (see Hilchot Shabbat 27:1) - of the verse is that a person should not leave the place where he is on the Sabbath. Our Sages (Eruvin 17b) interpret the verse as meaning that one should not transfer articles from one domain to another.
Significantly, the passage in Horiot cites another prooftext. The Rambam, however, chooses this one, because it employs an explicit verse.

See Hilchot Shabbat 12:0, 13:18, which describes these prohibitions. With such a ruling, the person will have maintained the fundamental dimension of the prohibition against transferring from one domain to another, but will have eliminated one of its particulars.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat, ch. 7, there are 39 primary categories of labor forbidden on the Sabbath. If the judges rule that one of these categories is permitted, they will have preserved the fundamental dimension of the prohibition against work on the Sabbath, but will have eliminated a particular aspect.

For this is the meaning of the term hishtachavayah, lying flat on the ground in total submission (see Horiot, foe. cit.; see also Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 6:8).

Thus the fundamental prohibition is preserved, but a particular dimension, is overlooked.

I.e., erring by thinking that relations with her could become permitted at night, rather than the next day.

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 4:11; above, Chapter 5, Halachah 6, of these halachot. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Horiot 2:5). His interpretation of that mishnah differs from that of Rashi.

Hilchot Ma’achalot Assuorot 6:3; above Chapter 13, Halachah 1.

I.e., even when, as a result of their error, the majority of the people, performed forbidden labor on the Sabbath, the court is not obligated to bring a sacrifice. The rationale is that the Torah’s provision for the court to bring a sacrifice applies when they made an error in the interpretation of the law, not when they made an error regarding actual fact.

I.e., their intimacy violated the prohibition against adultery and requires atonement. The commentaries question why the Rambam quotes this ruling here, for the subject of these halachot is the offering brought by the court. Previously, in Chapter 13, Halachah 1, the Rambam ruled that when one person acts on the basis of an erroneous ruling, he - and not the court - must bring a sacrifice.

This refers to a situation when, even after the people inform them, the judges themselves do not remember exactly which ruling they issued. If, however, they recall after being informed, it is as if they recalled on their own initiative.

This is speaking about a situation where the majority of the people acted according to the court’s erroneous ruling.

This offering is brought instead of a sin-offering for the reason the Rambam proceeds to explain.

For such a person’s attention is already diverted and he will not have the presence of mind to inquire about the court’s rulings. It is as if he has already made the distant journey [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Horiot 1:2)].