Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The party who receives the extra profit is not required to return it, nor is. the exchange nullified.
The Kessef Mishneh explains the rationale for this ruling. Leviticus 25:14, which mentions the prohibition against ona’ah, speaks about a sale. An exchange of articles or livestock is not described with that term.

Other versions of the Mishneh Torah read “armor.”

Generally, the necklace (armor) and the donkey are considered to be much more valuable.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that if the person is concerned with the value of the article he exchanges (as the Rambam states with regard to the fruit), the laws of ona’ah apply even if he exchanges one animal for another. And if he is not concerned with the article’s value, even if he exchanges one pile of fruit for another the laws of ona’ah do not apply. The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam’s ruling, stating that even if one evaluates articles, the laws of ona’ah do not apply to their exchange.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 3, which explains that although generally the kinyan of chalifin does not apply with regard to coins, an exception is made in such an instance, because rather than deal with them as one would deal with legal tender, the seller dealt with them as mere objects.

I.e., following the guidelines given in Halachot 2 and 3 of the previous chapter.
The Kessef Mishneh states that the wording the purchaser uses is significant. If, as the Rambam says, he states: “Sell your cow to me for these,” the transaction is considered like a sale, and the laws of ona’ah apply. If, however, he states “Exchange your cow,” it is not considered to be a sale, and the laws of ona’ah do not apply.

See Chapter 21, Halachah 2.
The Tur does not accept this ruling, and although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 227:19) quotes the Rambam’s decision, the Ramah cites the view of the Tur.

If, however, a person carries out a small business from his home, it is considered to be an ordinary sale and the laws of ona’ah do apply.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam is speaking only of exorbitant gain acquired by the seller. If the purchaser takes advantage of the seller, the laws of ona’ah do apply.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 227:23) adds two points:
a) Even if the homeowner is in difficult financial straits and thus must sell his personal belongings, he can still be expected to demand a high price for them.
b) This ruling applies only when the purchaser buys the article from the homeowner. If, however, the sale is being conducted by an agent, and the purchaser does not know that he is buying someone’s personal goods, the laws of ona’ah do apply.

For the reasons explained by the Rambam in the next clause.

The amount of unfair gain is not explicitly mentioned.

I.e., the rationale why this condition is not binding is that a person may waive money that is rightfully his. Nevertheless, for such a commitment to be binding, he must know the exact amount that he is forgoing. (See a similar ruling in Chapter 11, Halachah 16.) Otherwise, we assume that the commitment was made facetiously, without sincere intent.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 227:38 maintains that the Rambam [and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 227:21), which quotes his wording] maintain that the transaction is nullified, because the person is making a condition that countermands the Torah’s commandment. The Torah rules that ona’ah applies, and no condition can nullify that truth.
Rashi (in his commentary on Bava Metzia 51a) gives a different rationale: The transaction is being conducted under false pretenses, because the person’s statements are not true. There is unfair gain in this instance.
The difference between these perspectives is not one of theory alone. According to the Rambam, if the article is worth one sixth more than the price paid for it, the transaction is binding and the purchaser must reimburse the seller for the unfair gain. According to Rashi, however, since the transaction was conducted under false pretenses, it is nullified entirely.

In the previous instance, the person is making a condition that the laws of ona’ah do not apply. He has no authority to make such a condition. In this instance, he is saying that “Although the laws of ona’ah apply, and this money is rightfully mine, I am forfeiting my claim to it.”
This is one of the distinctions between cases of financial law and cases involving marriage and divorce. In cases of financial law, should a person individually accept a condition that countermands a commandment of the Torah, as above, the condition is binding.

For he has not stated that the Torah prohibition does not apply, but that despite the Torah prohibition, the purchaser will not hold him liable. And he has defined specifically the amount of money that the purchaser is waiving on his behalf. See, however, Chapter 5, Halachah 11.

100 zuz.

The Siftei Cohen 227:15 quotes an opinion that states that similarly, the transaction is not nullified if the unfair gain is more than a sixth, and that even if the purchaser takes unfair advantage of the seller, the laws of ona’ah do not apply.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that in this instance, the purchaser does not consider the worth of the article, but rather the words used by the seller.

I.e., preparing the object for sale did not involve paying merely its purchase price, but also these other secondary costs.

If he were permitted to add this amount, he would be taking profit both as a worker and as a seller. This is not considered to be “faithful” conduct.

And a gentile is not considered to be “your brother.”
The Lechem Mishneh notes that the verse uses two terms, amitecha, “your colleague,” and achiv, “his brother.” Bechorot 13b interprets amitecha as excluding a gentile, and achiv as excluding “consecrated property.” (See the following halachah.) He notes that the Rambam switches the proof-texts used by the Talmud.
The rationale for the switch can be explained as follows: When excluding “consecrated property,” the fundamental point is that the verse is referring to a human being. Amitecha, “your colleague,” communicates that concept. The exclusion of a gentile, by contrast, comes because this law is one of the unique dimensions of the bond of brotherhood that exists among the Jewish people. This concept is more appropriately communicated by the term achiv.

See Hilchot Melachim 10:12.

Tosefot Yom Tov notes that although the Rambam’s ruling is quoted from the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 4:9), the Rambam changes the order of the subjects from that listed in the Mishnah. The order employed by the Rambam is more closely related to the explanation of the derivation of these concepts.

Generally, when used without a modifier, this term refers to Canaanite servants. In this instance, as evidenced by Halachah 15, the implication is much broader.

I.e., the Temple treasurer sold consecrated property to enable the funds to be used for the Temple’s purposes; alternatively, a person sold an animal that he had consecrated as a sacrifice, but that was disqualified because of a blemish.
Note Sefer Me’irat Einayim 227:49, which explains that this exclusion applies only to articles consecrated to the Temple or the altar, and does not apply to gifts to charity in the present age.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Metzia 4:9) states that when landed property is sold for more than twice or less than half its value, the transaction is nullified. This opinion is also quoted by several of the later Geonim. By giving this example, the Rambam emphasizes that he does not subscribe to that view.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 227:29) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Tur and the Ramah mention the opinion cited in the Jerusalem Talmud.

Thus, the sale of a promissory note does not involve the transfer of ownership hand to hand. See Chapter 6, Halachah 12 and notes.

For in such sales, one is not dealing with “a colleague.” See the notes on the previous halachah.

I.e., the exclusion of these four entities, and in a more general sense, all the laws of ona’ah.

The rationale is that although a person is usually willing to forgo up to a sixth of the value of an article, that is when he makes the decision himself.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies even to an agent of the court.

For the principal will say: “I charged you with acting for my benefit, not with acting for my harm” (Kiddushin 42b).
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 227:30) states that the above applies when unfair advantage is taken of the agent. If the agent takes unfair advantage of the other party, there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis. Some say the ordinary laws of ona’ah apply, while others say that the transaction is nullified if the slightest amount of unfair gain is taken. [Note, however, the statements of the Bedek HaBayit (Choshen Mishpat 109).]

This expression refers to a law that the Rambam derived through his own logic without an explicit source in previous Rabbinic literature.

See the following halachah. This distinction applies even when the guardian is appointed by the court (Maggid Mishneh).

Note Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh, Chapter 12, where the Rambam mentions the order of announcements that must precede the sale of the property of orphans.

Our translation follows the understanding of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 109), and the commentary of the Meiri on Ketubot 99b. Rabbenu Nissim and others interpret this as meaning that the other party to the transaction desires that the transaction stand.

Since the purchaser could not retract had this transaction been concluded with an ordinary individual (see Halachah 8), he cannot retract when the transaction is concluded by a court.
The Ra’avad differs with this ruling, maintaining that even when a transaction is concluded by the court, the purchaser can retract. The rationale is that a person who enters into a transaction being conducted by a court expects that transaction to have been conducted fairly. The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Ramban, who supports the ruling of the Rambam.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 109:5) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Tur and the Ramah quote that of the Ra’avad.

With regard to landed property, as mentioned above, the laws of ona’ah do not apply, and the division is allowed to stand no matter how unjust it is.

There is an opinion in Bava Metzia 58b that explains that since oxen work in teams and pearls are combined with others in jewelry, there are times when a person will purchase an animal or a pearl for more than its value, because it is appropriate to be combined with others. The Rambam does not accept this view.

There is an opinion (Bava Metzia 58b) that the laws of ona’ah do not apply when one sells a sword or a horse in wartime, because by purchasing them one can save one’s life. The Rambam does not accept this view.

Although the value of a Torah scroll cannot be determined in financial terms alone, it is still considered comparable to other movable property, and the laws of ona’ah apply.

Mentioned in Halachah 8.

I.e., in contrast to a sale carried out by an agent (Halachah 9) or a court (Halachah 10).

Note the contrast to Halachah 18.

This parallels the concept stated in the previous halachah. Just as there is no difference between the sale and the rental of landed property, so too, there is no difference between the purchase of a person’s service for all time and hiring him for a brief period.

As stated in Halachah 8.
There are commentaries that ask how an equation can be drawn between a Canaanite servant, whose physical person is owned by his master, and a Jewish worker, who is his own master, and for that reason has the privilege of terminating his employment at any time.
The Machaneh Efrayim (Sechirut Po’alim 1) explains that although a worker has the above privilege, until he exercises it and actually terminates his employment, his physical person is owned by his employer. (See also Sefer Me’irat Einayim 227:59.)

The Kessef Mishneh explains that instead of the employer agreeing to pay a worker a daily or hourly wage, he contracted him to sow the entire field for a lump sum. As stated in Halachah 18, the laws of ona’ah apply with regard to a contractor, while they do not apply with regard to a worker paid wages (Halachah 15).

Using seeds belonging to the owner of the field.

The intent is not that there is a dispute regarding the quantity of seed used, but that the contractor claims that only a certain number of seeds are necessary, and the witnesses testify that the standard practice is to sow a greater number (Maggid Mishneh, explaining the Rambam’s interpretation of Bava Metzia 56b).

I.e., he is considered as having been contracted for the seeds, which are movable property. Thus, the laws of ona’ah do apply.

I.e., he is considered as having been contracted for the landed property, in which case the laws of ona’ah do not apply.

For, as stated in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 5:1, a person is never required to take an oath required by Scriptural Law with regard to disputes involving landed property.

Hence, just as the laws of ona’ah apply with regard to the sale of these articles, so too, they apply with regard to their rental.

For unlike a purchaser, who has the article in his possession and can show it to a colleague for evaluation, a long time may pass before a renter sees an equivalent article and has the opportunity to have the price for its rental appraised (Maggid Mishneh; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 227:65).

As mentioned previously, this expression indicates a ruling that is not explicitly mentioned in earlier sources, but rather derived by the Rambam through his inductive reasoning. The Rambam distinguishes between a contractor and a worker. (See Halachah 15.) For unlike a worker, the contractor is not selling his time, but rather the product of his efforts.
In this instance, the Ramban and others differ and maintain that just as the laws of ona’ah do not apply with regard to a worker, they do not apply with regard to a contractor.

The intent is that if unfair advantage is taken of either of them, that person may retract. The person who takes unfair advantage may not retract, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 4 (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 227:67).

Just as a seller does not always have the article available so that he can have it appraised (Chapter 12, Halachah 6), so too, in this instance, there is not always an opportunity to appraise the contractor’s efforts.

Chapter 13, Halachah 5.

Because the purchaser pays the price willingly.

See Bava Batra 89a, which explains that with regard to basic necessities, our Sages restricted the freedom of the marketplace.
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 231:20) emphasize that this law applies only when the court can enforce its rulings universally. If, however, there are some merchants who cannot be compelled to follow the court’s rulings, the other merchants are not bound by these restrictions. For once the merchants who follow the court’s guidelines finish selling their merchandise, the public will purchase from the other merchants, and thus the court will have caused a loss to the merchants who follow its guidelines.

As stated in Hilchot Geneivah 8:20, the officers should enforce the regulations established by the court by using corporal punishment if necessary.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) declare that the laws stated by the Rambam apply only when the seller sells all his merchandise at one time. If, however, he sells his merchandise bit by bit, he should evaluate his effort and his expenses, add that to the cost of the merchandise and then take a profit of one sixth.

Although slightly redundant, the Rambam includes this phrase to indicate that not only does the court have the responsibility to regulate market prices, but every individual is responsible not to charge a price that will bring him an exorbitant profit.

The Kessef Mishneh states that any type of food is considered to be an “article on which our lives depend.” This conclusion is not, however, reflected in the understanding of the Maggid Mishneh and the Tur. (See also Sefer HaMekach of Rav Hai Gaon, which states that a person should not profit more than a sixth when selling “articles that are necessary.”)
From Halachah 4, it appears that this halachah is speaking of a situation in the diaspora. In Eretz Yisrael, even this measure of profit is not permitted. Note also the contrast to the wording used in Halachah 5. On this basis, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 227:42 states that in the diaspora, one may take a profit of one-sixth even in a community that is predominantly Jewish.

The Hebrew term used by the Rambam literally means “roots.” We have chosen its functional meaning. Many of the herbs used in that age came from the roots of plants.

Herbs that are used in the incense offering.
The Kessef Mishneh recommends making a distinction between the herbs mentioned by the Rambam and spices like pepper, which are frequently used as condiments. He maintains that a limit of a profit of one sixth should also be set for spices. Note the contrast to the wording in Halachah 7.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 231:36 explains that there are three categories: a) foods, in which instance the profit is restricted to one sixth; b) spices, in which instance the profit may be equivalent to the cost; and c) herbs, regarding which no limits are set.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this concept is derived from the rationale given by Bava Batra 90b for the laws stated in Halachah 5, “so that one will not cause the prices to rise without control.” Since herbs are not included in that restriction, as stated in Halachah 7, one may conclude that no curbs need be placed on their pricing.

Bava Batra 91a mentions a restriction with regard to the sale of eggs and offers two interpretations of it. The Rambam’s ruling reflects one interpretation; the other is reflected in the ruling of the Tur. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 231:22) quotes both interpretations, but appears to favor that of the Rambam.

This is an extra measure of consideration shown to the inhabitants of our holy land. The Maharikash explains that this law applies only when Eretz Yisrael is settled primarily by Jews. If it is in the hands of gentiles, this law is not relevant. For this reason, it is not mentioned by the Tur. Significantly, however, it is mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 231:23).

I.e., a wholesaler should not purchase foodstuffs from many farmers to sell at a profit. Instead, each farmer should sell his own produce directly, so that the consumer pays a lower price.

I.e., in this way there is no middleman, and the lower price that the farmer would ask from the wholesaler is passed on to the consumer.

Since oil is abundant, even if it is sold by a wholesaler, a consumer will still be paying a relatively low price.

This is evident from Bava Batra 90a, which exemplifies this principle with stories from sages from Babylon.

I.e., if the produce is abundantly available, it would be wiser from a business perspective to store it temporarily, so that it will be less available and the market prices will remain higher. Nevertheless, our Sages forbade such conduct, so that the prices would fall and the consumers would reap the full benefit of an ample harvest.

I.e., the person may store the produce for his personal use. This is the Rambam’s intent, for, as mentioned in Halachah 4, it is forbidden to do business with produce on which our lives depend (Chasdei David).

A kav is a Talmudic measure equal to 1382 cubic centimeters according to Shiurei Torah, and 2389 cc according to Chazon Ish.
In his gloss, the Maggid Mishneh suggests that the intent is the idiomatic meaning of the term, a small measure. Others imply that the intent is not necessarily a small measure, but any measure that the person could call his own.

It is forbidden to work the land or store produce during the Sabbatical year. It is thus not until the end of the eighth year - when the harvest of that year will be reaped – that new produce will be easily accessible. In order to allow for a supply of food throughout this time, the Sages allowed the harvest of the sixth year to be stored during these three years.

When crops do not grow.

When quoting this law, the She’iltot D’Rav Achai Gaon (She’ilta 32) states that this applies even to storing one’s own produce. Also, the fact that carobs are mentioned indicates that it applies to foodstuffs that are not absolutely necessary elements of our diet.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 231:24) states that in a year of drought one may store enough food to feed one’s household for a year.

I.e., storing produce causes prices to skyrocket.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Terumah 1:3, the term Syria refers to the lands to the northeast of Eretz Yisrael, which King David conquered before conquering the holy land in its entirety. Because these lands were conquered before Eretz Yisrael, they did not become an integral part of the holy land.
This law is an indication of the special importance held for settling Eretz Yisrael and does not apply even in predominantly Jewish areas of the diaspora. For this reason, it is omitted by the Tur. It is, however, mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 231:26).

For example, in the times of the First Temple, when Israel was split into two kingdoms. The Maggid Mishneh cites other opinions that differ with the Rambam on this law.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that if the townspeople accept these provisions, they are binding even if they are established when a sage is not present to approve them. See the notes on Halachah II.

Although bread and meat are considered articles on which our lives depend, the members of a community can establish a standard price that all must pay.
Bava Batra 8b states that the inhabitants may also set minimum and maximum limits for wages.

If a financial penalty is involved, violation of the provision creates a binding obligation.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 231:28) state that for these provisions to be binding, they must be accepted by all the craftsmen of that particular profession. If it is accepted only by a few, they are not bound by it.

This halachah gives us insight into Judaism’s conception of a sage. His mission is not merely to study by himself, or even to help teach others, but to involve himself in his people’s lives and show concern even for their material welfare.

And he has been appointed to this position by the people (Ri MiGash).

We have worded the phrasing in the brackets so that it would be accepted by all authorities. Rav Moshe Alascer explains that the Rambam’s intent is that only a stipulation proposed by craftsmen is subject to the approval of the local sage. One proposed by the inhabitants of a city, by contrast, is not dependent on his consent. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 231:28), by contrast, state that stipulations made by both the townspeople and craftsmen are subject to the consent of the local sage.

I.e., who violates (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., if the stipulation was that if a craftsman sells merchandise below a certain price, his merchandise should be destroyed, and one of the members of this professional guild destroyed a person’s merchandise because of that stipulation, the person who destroyed the merchandise is liable to pay for the damages that he caused.

The Nimukei Yosef and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 228:1) quote an opinion that explains that “your colleague” refers to “one who joins with you in the observance of the mitzvot.” Note the Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 228), which derives this concept from a comparison to the following halachah. Thus, according to this view, the prohibition against verbal abuse applies only to abuse of God-fearing individuals.

See the exegesis of this verse in Halachah 18.
Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 251) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 338) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., remember that you committed sins. The intent is not that the person embarrasses the penitent in public. That would involve the transgression of other sins. Rather, he makes the statement to him in private, when no one else is listening. Nevertheless, since hearing such a statement will cause the penitent person anguish, making such a statement is considered a sin.
It might be added that there are many who violate this transgression without even thinking of doing so. For when a person speaks to a baal-teshuvah and with the best intentions tells him or her, “You’ve progressed so far after coming from such a background,” he has verbally abused that person.

I.e., implying that his misfortunes are coming as punishment for his misdeeds.

In this instance, he is subjecting both the donkey drivers and the person to whom he directed them to embarrassing difficulty.

Even if this is not done in public, the unlearned person is made very uncomfortable by having his lack of knowledge exposed.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 252) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 63) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 253) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 64) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Halachah 17, which explains why a person violates three negative prohibitions although only two involve verbal abuse.

This prohibition applies to all Jews, native-born Israelites and converts alike.

See Halachah 18, which explains why a person violates three negative prohibitions although only two involve taking unfair financial advantage.

The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that seemingly the person who oppresses the convert should be considered to be violating only two prohibitions on either count. Significantly, in his Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 9), the Rambam himself makes statements that echo those of the Maggid Mishneh. (See also Hilchot Avadim 8:11.)
The Or Sameach attempts to justify the Rambam’s words in this halachah, explaining that since a convert is from another nation, when a person denigrates him verbally the convert will lose his self-esteem and hesitate before entering into business dealings with other Jews. Since this verbal abuse will be translated into financial loss, the Jew who abused the convert is considered to have violated the prohibition against financial abuse.
Similarly, when a person abuses a convert financially, the convert will assume that the reason that the Jew took unfair advantage of him is that he looks down on him, and thus the convert will appreciate it as a personal slur. Hence, the Jew is considered to have violated the prohibition against verbal abuse.

I.e., whether or not a person intended to hurt another person’s feelings is not a cut and dry matter that can be added up on paper, but a point of emotional sensitivity. Indeed, there is always a way a person can rationalize - to others and even to himself - why he made such statements. Nevertheless, although mortal man has no way of appreciating such feelings, God sees into the heart and understands the person’s intent.

A phrase that is interpreted in other contexts as implying that He “will certainly exact retribution.” See Bava Metzia 59a, which states that “all the heavenly gates are closed except those associated with abuse.” And with regard to a similar instance, Bava Kama 93a states that God exacts retribution for verbal abuse whether or not the abused cries out. Nevertheless, if he cries out, the retribution is exacted more speedily.

As implied by the following halachah, the Rambam’s intent is that the seller must provide the purchaser with the missing merchandise (Maggid Mishneh). Only when that is impossible (e.g., he sold him land), may the purchaser retract and nullify the agreement (Kessef Mishneh).
The Ra’avad differs with this ruling and maintains that if the purchaser was not aware that the seller was giving him a lesser amount than that to which he agreed, he may retract and nullify the transaction even when the seller wishes to add to the amount he gave and fulfill his original commitment. Only when the purchaser knew that he is receiving a lesser amount than was agreed to, is he bound to uphold the agreement.
In his Beit Yosef, Rav Yosef Karo supports the Ra’avad. Nevertheless, in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 232:1) he quotes the Rambam’s ruling. Significantly, although the Tur mentions the Ra’avad’s view, the Ramah does not comment on the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:4.

It is as if the seller is holding property entrusted to him by the purchaser (Ri MiGash). Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:3 explains that this resembles the return of a stolen article, which must be returned no matter how long a time has passed.

Thus, even if the unfair gain the seller received because of the error was far less than one sixth - the measure of ona’ah - the purchaser has the option of seeking redress.

Similarly, in this instance the Ra’avad maintains that the entire transaction can be nullified if the seller desires.

As the Rambam proceeds to explain, the purchaser has not received the article that he desired to acquire, and he therefore has the right to retract.

In contrast to the laws of ona’ah, regarding which limits are set on the time given for a purchaser to realize that the article he received is not worth the amount paid for it (see Chapter 12, Halachah 5), in this instance the person is given an unlimited amount of time to retract (Maggid Mishneh).
The following distinction can be made. The value of an article can be appreciated by an expert immediately. A blemish, by contrast, may not be noticed until a given situation arises. For that reason, if the blemish is readily apparent, and we can assume that the purchaser saw it, the purchaser does not have the right to retract.

The fact that he continued using the article implies that he did not desire to retract.

A coin of intermediate value, which was worth 1/24th the value of a dinar.

Here also we see a contrast to the laws of ona’ah. With regard to ona’ah, if the difference in value was less than a sixth, the transaction is allowed to stand.
The distinction between the two cases can be explained as follows: With regard to ona’ah, the purchaser is receiving the article he desired; he has merely overpaid. And we assume that he is willing to forgo a difference up to one sixth the value of the article. In this instance, as the Rambam continues to explain, the purchaser is not receiving the object he desired, for he desired a perfect article. Therefore, the transaction is considered as having been concluded under an erroneous premise and is nullified (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:11).

Since the transaction is considered to have been concluded under an erroneous premise, it is nullified, and the seller is under no obligation to the purchaser. Therefore, the seller may propose the choice mentioned by the Rambam.

This is a general principle that governs many aspects of business dealings.

As a source, the commentaries point to Ketubot 57b, which states that if a man consecrates a woman and then discovers that she has physical blemishes, the consecration is not binding. For we assume that he desires a woman without any blemishes.

See Chapter 13, Halachot 3 and 4. The Kessef Mishneh also points to Chapter 11, Halachah 16, which states that when a person transfers ownership of an entity to a colleague, he must transfer a specific and defined entity. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 232:16, which derives a difference in law between these two approaches.

So that if it is later discovered that the cow is not as valuable as the purchaser thought originally, he could console himself by saying that the seller told him that it was much worse.

The first two are considered to be obvious blemishes; the second two, blemishes that are not immediately evident.

When the purchaser saw that the cow possessed those blemishes it was reputed to have, he should have taken the seller’s word seriously and assumed that it possessed all the blemishes he mentioned.

Since the cow possessed some of the blemishes that were mentioned, the purchaser should have assumed that it possessed at least some of the others, and he should have taken the necessary precautions.

Some of them being openly evident blemishes and others blemishes that are not openly evident.

The standard text of the Mishneh Torah speaks of “plainly evident blemishes.” Our translation is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, as well as the quotation of the law in the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Clzoshen Mislzpat 232:9).

For the seller warned the purchaser of the blemishes the animal possessed. Note that Rashi (Bava Metzia 80a) offers a different understanding of this passage.

I.e., the blemishes that are evident (Kessef Mislzneh).

For having seen that she did not possess any of the obvious blemishes the seller mentioned, the purchaser assumed that she had no blemishes whatsoever.

And it was obviously worth far more than that.

The Rambam is saying that since the person knew that the amount of unfair gain mentioned by the seller was grossly exaggerated, he did not think that there was an unfair gain involved in the sale at all and did not willingly waive the money involved. (See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 227:41.)

I.e., if the seller wanted to be on the safe side and therefore mildly exaggerated the amount of unfair gain involved in the purchase. See Chapter 27, Halachah 5.

As mentioned previously, for a waiver of money to be binding the party involved must know how much he is waiving.

The fact that he did not protest at that time indicates his acceptance.

We have made this addition because if the blemish was never evident, it would not be of concern to the master.

Blemishes of this nature make a person unattractive. Therefore, if a person were choosing a marriage partner, they would be considered significant. (Compare to Hilchot Ishut 7:7.) With regard to a servant, however, they are not of consequence.

Even though some of these conditions do not totally prevent a servant from working - since his productivity will not equal that of an ordinary servant, the sale is considered to have been carried out under an erroneous conception.

A Biblical illness that resembles, but is not identical with, leprosy.

Thus, the blemish prevents him from working.
Kin’ at Eliyahu explains that tzara’at is likely to spread. We can thus assume that at the outset, the servant had only a small blemish, and therefore it was not noticed at the time of sale. Nevertheless, since the blemish will spread throughout his entire body and make him detestable, it causes the sale to be nullified.

On the basis of Kiddushin 11a and Bava Batra 92b, the Ra’avad offers an alternative interpretation of this passage: If the servant was wanted as a criminal, the matter would be public knowledge. Therefore, the purchaser could be expected to have known this at the time of purchase. If he proceeded with the purchase regardless, he should suffer the loss himself.
The Maggid Mishneh, however, quotes the Tosefta (Bava Batra 4:4), which substantiates the Rambam’s interpretation. His interpretation is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 232:10) and the later authorities.

The difference between these two examples and those that are mentioned in the following clause can be explained as follows. A master should expect to find unsavory qualities among his servants and must take responsibility for controlling them. Nevertheless, in this and the previous example, the difficulty with the servant is not one that the master can control, for the ruling authorities will have the servant either executed or conscripted for labor. There is nothing the master can do.

This is the Rambam’s interpretation of the term kubiostos used in Bava Batra 92b. Others [Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 232:10)] interpret this term to refer to a gambler. According to that interpretation, if the servant is a kidnapper, he can be returned to the seller for he is liable to be executed by the court.