Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

With regard to crops, see Hilchot Shemitah V’Yovel 13:4.

These are trees with many branches. Bava Batra 2:7 mentions an opinion that states that any non-fruit-bearing tree must be planted more than 50 cubits away from the city. The standard texts of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.) state that the Rambam accepts that opinion. Hence, many commentaries have pointed to this ruling as a change in his position. Rav Kapach, however, has manuscript copies of that text that state that the Rambam rejects that view.

For a city looks much more attractive when it is surrounded by open space.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 155) write that this law applies only in Eretz Yisrael, and only during the time that it is inhabited by Jews. It does not apply in the diaspora, even when a city is inhabited primarily by Jews. It appears that this opinion is also accepted by Rav Yosef Karo, for he did not include this law in his Shulchan Aruch.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam states that the tree may be cut down before the owner is reimbursed.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (based on Bava Batra 24b), the Rambam explains the rationale for this ruling: The tree must be cut down regardless; the question is only with regard to reimbursement. For the owner of the tree to be able to expropriate money from the inhabitants of me city, he must prove his position without question.

I.e., a threshing floor where one must use a winnowing fork; it is impossible to winnow the produce by hand (Maggid Mishneh). If the threshing floor is not significantly large, no separation need be made (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 155:47).

In Chapter 11, Halachah 2, the Rambam speaks of “the chaff.”

For the straw will be like an extra amount of fertilizer for the field and upset its chemistry (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah; Bava Batra 2:8; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 155:52).

See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 365:2), which also mentions the difficulty caused to priests.

Beside the fact that carcasses of animals are found at leather works before the hide is skinned, feces are used in the leather-making process, causing this place to produce an extremely foul odor.

Because of the foul smell that these cause.

Not only is the odor of leather-works very foul, it is damaging to a person’s health. Therefore, this additional restriction is placed upon it. (See Rav Kapach’s notes on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Bava Batra 2:9.)

I.e., even if the leather-works is placed more than 50 cubits outside the city, it must be placed to the east.

This refers to Eretz Yisrael and the lands surrounding it where the desert is to the east. [See Rav Kapach’s translation of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 2:9)].

For the flax spoils the water, which in turn will damage the vegetables (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Bava Batra 2:10).

For the honey takes on some of the flavor of the mustard, making it sharp and pungent (Ibid.).

He must, however, make some separation, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

The Tur differs and maintains that a person must make a separation only with regard to soaking flax – for there is no difference between that situation and an ordinary cistern – but not with regard to leeks or mustard. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 155:31) – and apparently the Ramah – however, accept the Rambam’s view.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 155:4) states that if, however, the problem stems from rain water, the owner of the lower storey is responsible.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 1, which states that the owner of the second storey is responsible for the plaster.

For the damage did not come as a direct result of the activity of the owner of the second storey.

By building an absorbent base for his ceiling.

The Ramah (loc. cit.) differs and maintains that every situation has to be considered within its individual context. If the leak is small and ceases quickly, the owner of the upper storey is not required to correct it. If, however, it is significant, even though he has plaster there, the owner of the upper storey is liable.

I.e., the damage is the direct result of his activity.

There are commentaries that note that the Rambam’s wording appears to imply that this ruling applies bedi’avad, if he “has a tree growing.” At the outset, however, this should not be done. (This is the view of Rashi and Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi.) Nevertheless, from the following halachah, it is clear that it is necessary to separate by only four or two cubits. See also the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 155:32), who state that one is permitted to plant a tree next to a colleague’s field even if the colleague has a cistern near his property line.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 155:73 differentiates between planting a tree and placing down olive wastes, as mentioned in Chapter 9, Halachah 2. Although the damage from the olive wastes will not show immediately, the damage began to take effect from the time the person placed the olive waste there. In this instance, when he planted his tree there was no damage to his colleague’s property at all. Although the roots of his tree will grow, that is no longer a direct result of his activity.

Our Sages (Bava Batra 26b) determined that within a sixteen-cubit radius, roots derive their nurture from the main stem of a tree. Beyond that point, they derive their nurture independently.

Because he is the master of his own property.

Because they derive nurture from his field.

He should not dig deeper than that, because the presence of the roots of Shimon’s tree at that depth will not cause Reuven any loss, and they will benefit Shimon.

This rationale applies with regard to all the laws mentioned in this halachah.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 155:25) cites opinions that maintain that the rules to follow apply only when one plants vines and trees that have already grown, but not when one plants a seed that will grow into a vine or a tree.

The Maggid Mishneh cites authorities who state that if both of the neighbors come to plant at the same time, each one should distance his vines two cubits from the property line.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 2:12), the Rambam explains that the soil in Eretz Yisrael is rich, and the roots of the vine extend far into the ground. Hence, if one does not leave such a separation, one will be restricting the nurture of one’s colleague’s vine. Other authorities explain that the plows used in the vineyards of Eretz Yisrael were four cubits wide. If such a distance was not left between the vines, it would impede the plowing of his neighbor’s vineyard. (This difference in interpretation may be the source for the objections the Ra’avad registers against the Rambam’s rulings.)

The soil in the diaspora was not as rich, and the roots of the vine would not extend that far. According to the other authorities, smaller plows were used there.

The Ramah (loc. cit.) cites opinions that maintain that one must separate far enough between trees and vines to prevent birds reaching the vines from the trees in one fell swoop.

The Maggid Mishneh maintains that this is a printing error, and with regard to two sets of trees, it is sufficient to separate two cubits in the diaspora. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

The portion of a plow with two metal spikes that spurs and directs a team of oxen when they plow (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Bava Batra 2:13).

For branches this low will prevent him from plowing and restrict his use of his own field. If the branches are higher than that, he should leave them, for their presence does not cause him any loss.

There is an extra measure of severity with regard to these types of trees, because they have very many branches, and the increased shade they will bring will harm the crops growing in the adjoining field.

Which requires irrigation.

Which also requires an added measure of water.

For the neighbor’s trees will prevent the dew - a desired source of water – from reaching the earth.

This does not refer to a permanently established threshing floor, in which instance a person must separate 50 cubits, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 2. Instead, it refers to a threshing floor that the person intends to use on a temporary basis.

One need not, however, be concerned that an abnormal wind will cause damage that could not be foreseen under ordinary circumstances.

Bava Batra 26a states that a person is not liable in such a situation, because without the influence of the wind, the damage would never have been caused.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 5.

This follows the principle that a person is not liable for grama din’zikin, performing an activity in which he is the first cause - but not the only cause - of damage that takes place.
The commentaries question the Rambam’s ruling here, noting that in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon, ch. 14, he rules that a person is liable for the damages caused by a fire which he kindled even when it is spread by the wind. The commentaries (see Siftei Cohen 418:4) explain that although the person’s activity stirs up the dust or chaff, it exists independent of his activity. The fire, by contrast, would not have existed at all, had he not kindled it.

If, however, the courtyard merely shakes, but no objects are made to fall, it is not considered sufficient damage to require him to move (Maggid Mishneh). The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 155:15,36) differ and maintain that as long as a wall shakes slightly, it is considered a damaging factor, and the person performing the activity must move. The Rivash (Responsum 197) goes further and explains that even if the neighbor is prone to headaches and the noise causes him discomfort, the person performing the activity must move.

The Hagahot Maimoniot and the Ramah (loc. cit.:36) emphasize that even if the adjoining courtyard was built after that of the person performing this activity, be is not considered to have established his right to perform this activity. To apply this concept in contemporary terms: If an area is zoned for residential use, the fact that a person performed an activity that is unsuitable for a residential area in that place before homes were built is of no consequence. Once the homes are built, all the privileges that homeowners would expect must be granted to them.

I.e., Chapters 9 and 10.

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 3 and subsequent halachot, the Rambam maintains that waiving one’s right to protest takes effect immediately. The person performing the damaging activity does not have to continue that activity for three years before he establishes his right. As mentioned, the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 155) follows the more stringent view and requires three years to have passed. Both the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 155:35) accept the Rambam’s ruling.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 12, Chapter 7, Halachah 6 and others.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 155:37) state that this refers to smoke that is produced constantly (to cite a contemporary example, a factory that is continually working). If, however, the smoke is produced only from time to time – e.g., by a household oven – if the neighbor does not protest, the activity may be continued.
[There is a difference of opinion (see the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah, Choshen Mishpat 155:37) if, at the outset, a person is required to build a separation for smoke that is not constant.]

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 155:38 quote Rashi (Bava Batra 23a) as explaining that this refers to an open area used as a latrine. If, however, the facility is a covered trench or enclosed in a building, once the facility has been established, a separation is not required, for the odor from the outside will not be excessively offensive.

See also the following halachah.

The Meiri states that this concept applies even if the neighbor originally helped a person construct the latrine or the like. Even in such a situation, the builder is not considered to have established the right to perform this activity.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 14. The Maggid Mishneh explains that different principles apply with regard to the invasion of privacy from a window. If the person whose privacy is invaded waives his right to protest, the window may remain, as evident from Chapter 7, Halachah 6.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 14.

The Rambam’s approach represents a mid-point between the opinions of other Torah authorities. There are more lenient opinions that maintain that if the person explicitly agrees to the offending activity, even if he does not confirm this agreement with a kinyan, he cannot retract his consent. It is only when he remains silent that he retains the right to protest afterwards. And there are more stringent views (Rabbenu Tam) that maintain that even if the person confirms his consent with a kinyan, he may retract, explaining that he originally thought that he could bear the offending activity, but now he sees that he cannot.
The Rambam’s view is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 155:36). The Ramah adds that the same laws apply if the person sold or gave his colleague the right to perform the offending activity.

The Rambam’s words appear to imply that only a person who is irritable or sick may protest against this activity. If a person has a reputation for having a short temper, he has the right to protest (Maggid Mishneh). On the basis of this interpretation, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 155:41) rules that whenever there is an activity that is known that a person will not be able to tolerate, even though others could tolerate it, that person is given the right to protest.

I.e., even though the people have a right to protest because of the noise of the customers, they do not have a right to protest against his performing his work (Maggid Mishneh, based on Chapter 6, Halachah 12).

I.e., if in fact it could be proven that his colleague had waived his right to protest, all future protests would be of no consequence.

See Chapter 7, Halachot 1, 6.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.

As reflected in the various examples mentioned in this and the previous chapter.

Since he is exercising this privilege, we assume that he is doing so because he justly acquired the right to that privilege. This can be compared to a situation where a person is known to have lived on a property for three years. The fact that he has lived there is considered evidence in his favor, even if he no longer possesses a deed of sale (Maggid Mishneh).
It must be emphasized that, as mentioned above, there are authorities who maintain that until the person has exercised this privilege for three years, the person whose rights are encroached can demand that he cease.

See Ketzot HaChoshen 153:4, which states that this applies only in instances where it is very likely that the person whose rights were encroached upon became aware of the infringement of his position.

I.e., a Rabbinic oath required of anyone who denies entirely a claim being issued against him.

See Halachot 4 and 5.

Since the exercise of these privileges does not establish a person’s right to them, the person exercising the privilege must bring other proof that he has a right to perform this activity.

I.e., the soil was of the same quality, and they are both equidistant from rivers for irrigation and roads for travel.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 8, which also warns against emulating the traits of Sodom and states: “Similarly, whenever there is a situation where one person will benefit and his colleague will not lose nor be lacking anything, we compel [that person to cooperate].”
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 174) differs and maintains that this privilege need not be granted without charge. Instead, the partner who desires the half near his property must state: “I am prepared to pay such and such for this portion. Either buy it from me at that price or allow me to buy it.”

I.e., ultimately, both portions were of the same value, because the portion of inferior land (- or the portion that was closer to the river -) was larger.

Our translation is based on the authoritative manuscript of the Mishneh Torah, the version possessed by the Maggid Mishneh and others. The standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah contains several redundant words.

Not granting him this request would also be a reflection of the traits of Sodom, for the brother receiving the more valuable portion is not losing anything – indeed, he is gaining, by granting his brother his request The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 174:1).

I.e., the double portion he receives because he is the firstborn. See Hilchot Nachalot 2:1.

This is derived from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 21:18. The Maggid Mishneh and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 174:11 state that this law applies even if the entire property is not of equal value and one share is not the same size as the others. For were this not so and the ruling were to apply only with regard to shares of equal value, there would be no need for a verse; the law would be obvious from Halachah 1. Moreover, according to the Rambam, there would be no reason not to give a yavam both of his shares together. Indeed, not to do so, would be emulating the traits of Sodom.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 174:2) differ (based on the different interpretation of the Tur to Halachah 1) and explain that the verse is necessary to teach that when the shares are of equal value, he should be given one share next to the other. If they are not of equal value, this law does not apply.

In addition to his own share of the estate, a yavam is granted the share of the property that would have been given to his deceased brother whose widow he married (Hilchot Nachalot 3:7) Nevertheless, in contrast to the portion of the firstborn, these two shares are not considered to be a single portion, but as two separate entities.

Which is useful for irrigation.

Which is necessary for access.
The Division of a Property Surrounded By a River and a Lane
a) The lane
b) The river
c) The portion given to one heir
d) The portion given to the second heir

For the reasons explained in Halachah l. The authorities who differ with the Rambam with regard to that halachah will also differ in this instance.

It would appear that the Rambam is speaking about a situation in which the brothers or the partners have not divided their holdings yet. Nevertheless, even after the holdings are divided, a brother or a partner whose property borders on the sold property has a right to purchase it, as stated in the following halachah.

The Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 175:5) state that this law applies even when the person who buys the share of the estate or partnership is a neighbor.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes the Maharik (Responsum 20) who draws an inference from the Rambam’s choice of wording indicating that this law applies even with regard to a partnership involving movable property. The Kessef Mishneh himself, however, does not accept this conception and explains that no inference can be drawn with regard to movable property, because all these laws concern landed property alone.
Note the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:5) as interpreted by the Siftei Cohen 175:5, which quotes opinions that consider a partner’s right greater than that of a neighbor. Even if a neighbor purchases a property, a partner may displace him.

Neither more or less. See Chapter 14, Halachah 4.

For the brothers or the partners may not prefer dealing with a new person with whom they did not share a business relationship previously.

The Hagahot Maimoniot and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 175:6) emphasize that this law applies even when the seller explicitly told the neighbor that he would not sell the property. Although it appears that he does not desire to sell the property to the neighbor, the neighbor is granted the property against his will.

The Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Chapter 13, Halachah 7, explains that this concept can be derived from the use of the expression (Bava Metzia 108a): “I sent you to improve my position, not to detract from it,” a concept that is often applied with regard to the activity of agents – e.g., Kiddushin 42b).
The Or Sameach states that the description of the purchaser as the neighbor’s agent is not an entirely consistent delineation. The intent is that since, after the fact, the neighbor becomes bound by the terms of the sale that the purchaser negotiated, the purchaser is considered to have acted as the neighbor’s agent.

The literal meaning of the term the Rambam uses is “the person who shares a property boundary.” This is, in fact, the precise intent of the term, for, as stated in the continuation of the halachah, these privileges are not granted to a neighbor whose property does not border on the property sold.

I.e., when for various reasons, with the exception of those mentioned in Halachah 9, the court found it necessary to sell property belonging to a person, either against his will or without his knowledge.

I.e., he owned property near the property he purchased, but not bordering upon it.

As part of the mitzvah of honoring the Torah, Torah scholars are given certain privileges with regard to their business concerns (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:10). Similarly, a scholar, a neighbor and a relative are given certain privileges with regard to the purchase of landed property. (See Chapter 14, Halachah 5.) Nevertheless, the privileges of a person whose property borders on the property being sold are greater.

I.e., the definition of the Torah’s command was left to the Sages.

I.e., From the seller’s standpoint, there is no substantive difference who purchases his land; his interest is merely the income he derives from the sale.

For the neighbor will benefit from purchasing land next to his field, while the other potential purchaser can just as easily find another plot of land to purchase.
Note the comments of the Ramah 175:49, who quotes a difference of opinion among the Rabbis as to the ruling when a purchaser is pressed and sorely needs the property he seeks to acquire, while the neighbor requires the land merely for his profit. There are opinions that maintain that in such a situation, the neighbor is not granted the privilege of acquiring the property.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:11 state that if all four neighbors desire the property it should be divided on diagonals. See diagram.
The Division of a Property Among Four Neighbors

With this phrase, the Rambam is implying that we do not consider the number of neighbors with adjoining properties on each side and divide it accordingly. Instead, it is divided according to the number of neighbors who wish to participate in the purchase.

I.e., the price is divided among them.

See Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:11-12).

For, as the Rambam states in Chapter 14, Halachah 3, a neighbor who is away on a journey does not have the right to exercise his privilege upon his return.

I.e., the other partners cannot force the partner to divide the purchase with the partnership as a whole, as in Halachah 4, for as long as a partner is involved, the other partners cannot complain that a foreign individual with whom they have no experience has been introduced into the partner hip. And with regard to a neighbor, partners share a close relationship. Therefore, a partner has a greater claim to the land than a neighbor.
As mentioned above, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:5) maintains that a neighbor can displace a partner. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 175:88, however, states that just as a neighbor cannot displace a partner from a purchase, a partner cannot displace a neighbor. If a neighbor purchases a landed property, the seller’s partner cannot force the neighbor to sell it to him unless he has a share in that property itself.

And these properties are located in different places.

Even if the neighbor desires to purchase all the properties involved, he is not given that privilege (Maggid Mishneh). The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 175) explains that it is rare that a person gets a chance to sell all of his property at once. Hence, if the sale would be dependent on the good will of the neighbors, it is possible that in the interim, the purchaser will retract his commitment.

For it is a greater act of kindness to give a person who originally owned a property the right to reacquire it than to give that privilege to a neighbor (Maggid Mishneh). Nevertheless, the original owner is not given the right granted to a neighbor with regard to displacing a purchaser from the property Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 174:37).
The Maggid Mishneh states that the son of the original owner is not given the same privileges as the original owner himself. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:37), however, also cites opinions that grant the son this right.

Bava Metzia 108b explains that the purchaser can tell the neighbor: “I did you a favor by removing the gentile from the property. It is possible that you would not have been able to accomplish that. Therefore, you owe me a favor.”

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:39) states that when a person sells a property to a gentile, the gentile cannot be compelled to sell it to a neighbor as a Jew is.

Even if the neighbor would be held liable for the loss according to secular law (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 175:70).

The Maggid Mishneh quotes Rishonim who state that this clause applies only if the seller in fact accepts responsibility for the loss caused by the gentile. If he does not accept responsibility, although he is acting unfairly, he cannot be compelled to pay. He is only considered a secondary cause of the damage (grama din’zikin). The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 175:40) accepts this ruling.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo offers three interpretations of this statement:
i) An interpretation based on the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh, that if a person rents a property to a colleague and afterwards sells the property to the tenant, the neighbors do not have the right to protest the sale and displace the purchaser [note, however, his gloss on Halachah 12);
ii) An interpretation offered by the Tur, that if a person rents a property to a colleague, a neighbor cannot come and protest, seeking to rent it instead of that person; and
iii) A corollary to that interpretation, that when the property a renter is renting borders on a property that is sold, the renter does not have the right to displace the purchaser (see Halachah 12].
He quotes all three of these interpretations in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:62, 59, 60). With regard to the latter two interpretations, the Ramah quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who equates a rental with a sale, based on our Sages’ statement that a rental is a sale for one day.

It must be emphasized that in Talmudic times, when a property was designated as security, the creditor was given the right to make use of it. See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh, Chapter 6 and 7.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 175:108 explains this ruling, stating that a neighbor borders merely on a portion of the property, while this person uses the property in its entirety.
Although the Maggid Mishneh accepts this ruling, he quotes a difference of opinion among the Rabbis with regard to a person’s right to designate his property as security. There are authorities who maintain that if a person needs to mortgage his property for a loan, the neighbor has the right to give him the loan, so that he will receive the mortgage on the property. Thus, should the person be forced to give up the property in payment of the loan, the neighbor will receive it.
There are, however, other authorities who differ, explaining that the owner of the property can refuse the neighbor’s offer, telling him that he would rather deal with the other lender because he is an easier person to negotiate with [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:58)].
Although a creditor is given this right, he is not considered a neighbor, and does not have the right to displace any purchasers (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Rashba; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 175:57). The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that even if the owner sold the property to a neighbor, the person who received it as security has the right to displace him.

The rationale for all the examples that follow is that the neighbors are not given the right to displace the purchaser if doing so will harm the seller. For this entire privilege is based on the concept of doing what is good and just, and one cannot do good and justice to a neighbor at the expense of the seller (Rashi, Bava Metzia 108b).
We have translated the term ligoal as “to purchase,” although its literal meaning is “to redeem,” i.e., to repurchase property that one has sold to someone else. This term is also used by Bava Metzia 108b. Nevertheless, Rashi in his commentary to that passage and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:42) interpret it as referring to purchasing a new property. It would appear that the Rambam would accept this interpretation. Hence, our translation.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 175:43) states that the same principle applies if a person sells a property to provide for his own living expenses.

For part of the stipulations of the ketubah is that a man’s widow and daughters will be supported by his estate after his death (Hilchot Ishut 12:2).

To cite a parallel, although when the court expropriates property and sells it, a lengthy process of announcing the sale is generally required so that the property is sold at the best price possible. However, when property is sold to support a person’s family, this process is not followed.

With regard to the first two instances, it is possible that in the interim the property that he desires to purchase will be sold to another person. With regard to the payment of the taxes, it is possible that he will incur the wrath of the tax collectors. With regard to the burial expenses, it is a sign of disrespect for the deceased to leave him unburied until the property is sold. And with regard to the widow and the daughters, it is possible that they need their sustenance immediately.

I.e., he must prove that the property was sold for ordinary reasons, and not because of any of the special factors mentioned in the previous halachah. The burden of proof is placed on the neighbor, because according to Scriptural Law, the purchaser has the right to the property. He is thus considered the owner, and the neighbor is considered one who desires to expropriate property from an owner. And in such situations, we follow the principle: “When a person desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.”

This is the ruling whenever a person denies entirely a claim issued against him.

Our translation is based on Sefer Me’irat Einayim 175:79, which explains that the purchaser does not know why the seller sold the field; he merely suggests the possibility that he sold it to pay the head tax or for any of the other reasons mentioned in Halachah 9.

The commentaries compare this to a case where a person claims that a colleague owes him a maneh, and the defendant replies: “I do not know if I ever was obligated to you.” In that situation, the Rambam rules (Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:8) that the defendant is not liable.

I.e., because the purchaser is considered to have the right of possession (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 175:80).

I.e., the purchaser claims that the alleged neighbor does not, in fact, own the field reputed to be his own.

And not the owner.

See Halachah 8.

I.e., the neighbor must produce either the deed of title showing that the property is his or bring witnesses that testify that he has used the property for three consecutive years. If he cannot bring proof of this type, the property remains in the possession of the purchaser. And the purchaser is not even required to support his claim with a Rabbinic oath.

The Siftei Cohen 175:43 states that this law applies even when the orphans have a guardian who watches over their business affairs.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 175:47) state that this ruling applies only in situations where both of these factors apply: the purchaser is a orphan and below the age of majority. If only one applies – the purchaser is either a orphan or below the age of majority – the neighbor has the right to displace the purchaser.

And, as stated in Halachah 5, the rationale for granting a neighbor this privilege is the charge: “And you shall do what is just and good.”

For consideration should be given to an orphan’s position of distress.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 175:47) state that this law applies when a woman is known to have resources of her own, or she is a widow. Otherwise, we suspect that she is employing a ruse, and purchasing the property on behalf of her husband.

A person whose genital area is covered with flesh, and it cannot be determined whether he is male or female.

A person who has both male and female sexual organs.

Our translation is based on authentic manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah, the version possessed by the Maggid Mishneh, and the statement of the law in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:47). It is also supported by the logic explained in the following note. The standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, however, states “a neighbor is given the right.”

The gender – or the halachic status vis-a-vis gender – of these individuals is a matter of question, and it is possible that they are [or are considered to be] women. As reflected by Halachah 11, the property is considered in the possession of the purchaser and the burden of proof is on the neighbor. Hence, in this instance, the neighbor must prove that the purchaser is not considered a woman halachically. Since that is not possible, the purchaser is allowed to retain possession of the property.
From this and the above concepts, we can derive another concept: That whenever there is a halachic question concerning the status of a situation, the purchaser is considered to have the right of possession, and the neighbor’s claim is not heeded.

See Hilchot Mechirah 24:1,8, which give some examples in which the owner of trees has rights with regard to the land on which his trees are located.

When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:51) adds: “even if the purchaser is a neighbor.” Sefer Me’irat Einayim 175:93 explains that this follows the understanding (see Halachah 5 and notes) that a partner has a closer relationship with the principal than does a neighbor.

See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 175:94, which explains that the Rambam’s wording appears to imply that if the owner of the tree or the building cannot expel the owner of the tree or building, they are considered partners. Rabbenu Asher and the Tur, however, do not share this understanding.

Note the Maggid Mishneh, which explains that based on this ruling, there are authorities who maintain that the rights of a neighbor do not apply with regard to houses, for the wall – a building – interposes between them. Others refute this conclusion, explaining that a building in a field is not likely to be tom down. Hence, the two fields are separate from each other. A wall between two homes, by contrast, may quite well be torn down if the same person owns them both.
From Chapter 13, Halachah 4, which speaks about the rights of a neighbor with regard to a courtyard, it would appear that the Rambam maintains that the rights of a neighbor apply with regard to houses. This conclusion is also evident from the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 175:53), which states that the rights of a neighbor apply with regard to all landed property.

Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi offers both these explanations – a building and a ditch – for the Aramaic term mishunita mentioned by Bava Metzia 108b. The Rambam maintains that both interpretations are halachically correct.

There is no continuity between the two fields. Hence, the owner is not considered to be one whose property borders on the property being sold.