Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., contractors who were hired to build or renovate buildings. The Rambam mentions the laws involving each of the individuals specified in this and the following halachah in greater detail in the subsequent halachot of this chapter.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 3:5), the Rambam states that it was customary for sharecroppers to receive one half of the produce from the field.

This includes a guardian appointed by the court or by the deceased to take care of an orphan’s property until he comes of age, or a guardian willingly appointed by a person to care for his property, as stated in Halachah 7.

Chapter 9, Halachah 1.

The heads of the Jewish community in Babylon.

Hence, the owner refrains from protesting, because he is afraid that the person in possession will harm him.

These individuals are not able to issue a claim that they purchased the property and that will be honored by a court. It is true that they can own property, but since they cannot acquire property, their claim will be rejected (Maggid Mishneh). Accordingly, the fact that they benefited from the property for three years or more is not significant. For as the Rambam states in Chapter 14, Halachah 12, if a person does not have a claim to the property, his manifestation of ownership is of no consequence.
The Ramban and the Rashba differ with the Rambam and maintain that a minor can establish a claim over property. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 149) explains the Rambam’s position. Since the owner knows that the deeds of a minor are insignificant, he does not trouble himself to issue a protest. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 149:21) quotes the Rambam’s view.

Since these people are mentally incompetent, they are not capable of issuing a protest. Hence, the fact that they did not issue one is not significant.
There are opinions that claim that this phrase refers to all the individuals mentioned in this halachah - i.e., including the exiliarchs, robbers and gentiles. Whether or not this is the intent of the Rambam’s words here, it would appear that he would accept that ruling as mentioned explicitly in Halachah 10 with regard to an exiliarch. See also Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 149:13), which rules that a claim of ownership cannot be established with regard to property originally owned by a robber.

Witnesses who so testify.

I.e., we follow the principle of miggo: Had he desired to lie, he could have told a more effective lie.

This applies even with regard to property that entered his possession before he abandoned his profession (Rambam La’Am).

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 149) explains that such a sharecropper has the right to work on the family’s fields. They may not remove him from the land.

Since he has worked together with that family for years, there is a measure of trust established between them. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 3:5), the Rambam states that we are speaking about a sharecropper trusted by the owner to the extent that he will let him manage a field by himself. Thus he is considered him comparable to a guardian. Even if such a sharecropper takes all the proceeds of the property for three years, the family members will assume that he will give them all the proceeds for the next three years.

Since he had not worked for the family before, we do not presume an atmosphere of trust.

I.e., he made an agreement with other people to work the land, allowing them to retain a percentage of the crops and requiring them to give him the remainder.

I.e., he was able to parcel out the land, not because it belonged to him, but because he was charged with this responsibility by the owner. Since the sharecroppers were already working on the land, giving them more land to till is not out of the question.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 149:29) maintain that a guardian of a portion of a person’s estate may establish a claim of ownership with regard to a portion over which he has no authority.

If the heirs have not come of age, a guardian certainly cannot establish a claim of ownership, because no one can establish a claim of ownership over the property of a minor, as stated in Halachah 2. Even after an heir comes of age, any person must maintain possession for three years from the time the heir comes of age, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 7. After three years such a claim of ownership is, however, accepted. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, there are authorities who differ with the Rambam concerning that ruling. According to those views, it is necessary to mention the exclusion of guardians who were appointed by adults to care for their property (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 149:46).

I.e., the field is small and if it is divided, neither of the partners will receive a share large enough to be used in an ordinary manner. See Hilchot Sh’chenim 1:4, where this subject is discussed.

The other partner could claim: “Since the field is so small, I thought you did not want to divide its produce every year. So I let you benefit from it for several years in the expectation that you would let me benefit from it for several years."

According to the Rambam, this is a point of fundamental importance. For if the partner derived benefit from only a portion of the field, he does not establish a claim of ownership with regard to the entire field. This must be emphasized because Rabbenu Chanan’el maintains that a claim of ownership can also be established over a portion of a field. The Rambam’s view is also echoed by the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 149:2).

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 12:3, one of the conditions of a marriage is that a husband has the right to benefit from all the property owned by his wife. He may, however, forgo that right, entering into a formal legal agreement to that effect (ibid. 23:3). Even if he does so, however, the fact that he benefits from his wife’s property is not interpreted as a sign that he purchased it. For it is possible that out of her love and respect for her husband, she granted him this privilege despite the fact that he waived the right to it. [See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 3:5).]
In that source, the Rambam explains that this law refers only to nichsei m’log, property that the husband must return intact to his wife. With regard to nichsei tzon barzel, by contrast, different laws apply. For at the outset, the husband commits himself only to returning the financial value of the property, not the property itself. See Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 16, for a discussion of these terms.

A further concession beyond his waiver to derive benefit from the field.

This would seem to manifest his ownership more powerfully than if he were merely to derive benefit from the field. Indeed, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam writes that if a person makes capital improvements or destroys property on the land, he does establish a claim of ownership. Thus, the Rambam’s statements here appear to be a reversal of his thinking. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 149:9; Even HaEzer 87:1) quotes the Rambam’s statements here. The Ramah states that if the husband damages her property, he establishes a claim of ownership. For the woman could not be expected to remain silent when she sees the value of her property depreciated.

We can assume that out of his desire to please his wife, the husband gave her the right to benefit from a field, although he has no obligation to do so.

The fact that despite the fact that another field was designated for her livelihood, she benefited from this field, would appear to indicate that she had acquired the field. For if not, why was she involved with fields that she did not own?

In this situation as well, since the son is deriving his livelihood from his father and is a member of his household, we assume that neither one objects to the other’s use of his property.

For in such a situation, some of the business elements of the marriage - not to mention the love and trust which should characterize one - no longer apply. Her husband no longer has the right to benefit from her property, and neither spouse could be expected to grant the other privileges to which they are not entitled by law.

I.e., a claim of ownership can be established after three years. Since the conditions that led to the special leniency no longer apply, that leniency is revoked.

They were of the Davidic dynasty and exerted almost regal authority over the Jews of Babylonia. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 149) quotes his father, Rabbenu Asher, who writes that these rulings apply only to the exiliarchs. Other Jewish communal leaders, even those favored and empowered by the secular legal authorities, are considered to be ordinary people in this regard, for their authority is not rooted in the Jewish tradition of royalty. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 149:18 states that for this reason, the Shulchan Aruch does not quote this law.

These leaders were not always examples of exemplary moral conduct, and it is possible that they would abuse their authority and seize control of a field when they did not have the right.

The property is then returned to them. This oath is required to appease the claim of the person who was in possession of the property.

And his property is returned to him.

I.e., there are witnesses to that effect; alternatively, that it was proven in a court of law that he stole it, and afterwards he took possession of it again (Maggid Mishneh).

They may, however, establish a claim of ownership over other fields (ibid.).

Even if he himself is not known to conduct himself in that manner, since his ancestors are known to conduct themselves in this manner, it is feared that he will follow their example (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 149:19). A person who is known to kill people for financial gain cannot establish a claim of ownership on any of property.

Bava Batra 47a mentions both of these views. The Rambam understands them to be complementary and not conflicting.

I.e., all the individuals mentioned in the previous chapter.

We do not expect the witnesses to lie on their behalf. Hence, the testimony of the witnesses is accepted even if the person did not benefit from the property for three years.

As explained in the following halachah, the intent is not that the witnesses are lying, but that the seller never willingly acknowledged or agreed to the sale.

Here also, the intent is that although the witnesses may have observed a sale, the woman did not willingly agree to it. She consented merely to appease her husband and maintain peace in her home, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 22:18.

Property for which the husband accepts financial responsibility. He agrees to pay a specific sum for this property regardless of its value at the time the ketubah must be paid. See ibid. 16:1.

Property that the husband returns as is at the time the ketubah must be paid (ibid.).

Hilchot Ishut 22:17. As stated there, in this instance the woman cannot rationalize her consent, saying that she merely intended to appease her husband. Since this property itself belongs to her, there is no reason for her husband to become upset if she does not want to sell it to him.

I.e., the robber admits that he originally took possession of the field through robbery, but then purchased it legally from its owner.

Ordinarily, this would be sufficient for the sale to be considered binding. Nevertheless, an exception is made, for the reasons the Rambam continues to explain.

Despite the fact that the owner admitted receiving money, we pay no attention to his statement.

See Hilchot Gezelah 9:14-15. The rationale is that a sale carried out against the seller’s will is not binding (Hilchot Mechirah 10:1). The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 151:3) state that the owner must, however, issue a protest beforehand. Although ordinarily, the Rambam would also agree that such a protest be issued, he makes an exception in this case. The rationale is that since it has been established that this person seeks to obtain possession of this property through robbery, it is taken for granted that he will use compulsion to achieve his goals. Hence, there is no need to issue a protest beforehand. [See Tur, D’rishah (Choshen Mishpat 151).]

I.e., the son of a building contractor.

For despite his relationship with this person’s father, when the owner saw the son using the property for an extended period, he should have protested.

Since their claim is based on their father’s, it is no stronger than his would be. Just as his claim would not be accepted; so, too, their claim is rejected.
Similarly, if the grandson of these people claims to have inherited property that his father acquired, his word is accepted. If, however, he claims that the property was acquired by his grandfather, his claim is not accepted [Tur; Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 152:1)].

As indicated by Halachah 1. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that this concept is self-evident and hence favors a different version of Bava Batra 47a, the source for this halachah. His opinion is cited by the Tur and the Ramah (ibid.).

I.e., witnesses who testify.

Halachah 2. If, however, the son claims to have acquired the field himself, he may establish a claim of ownership (Maggid Mishneh).

The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.) maintain that if witnesses testify that the owner acknowledged to the grandson that he sold the property to his grandfather - the robber - the acknowledgment is accepted. They maintain that it is unlikely that the fear of the robber would have motivated such an admission.

The rationale is that a gentile is considered likely to take property by force, and a Jewish owner will fear him as he fears a thief. The Rambam La’Am questions whether such a law would apply in the present age, when civil law prevents outrages of such nature. There are those who claim that, at present, the entire question is academic, because the legal owner of property can easily be identified since landed property is always registered in the deeds office. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that properties which Jews originally owned and which were taken away from them by force - but not by conquest - legally belong to them and must be returned even though hundreds of years have passed. Note, however, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 149:22, which quotes several Rishonim who state that if a gentile maintains possession of a property for 40 years, he establishes a claim of ownership.

If, however, he brings a deed of sale, his claim is accepted even when it is not supported by a claim of continued ownership. Although there are opinions that a robber cannot establish a claim to a property even if he brings a bill of sale, a distinction can be made between a person who is known to be a robber, and a gentile, who is merely suspected of being such.

According to Scriptural Law, such an oath is not required. This extra consideration for the plaintiff is granted only to a Jew.

I.e., he claims: “I purchased it from a gentile who claims to have purchased it from you.”

According to the Rambam, even a sh’vu’at hesset is not required, because the Jew does not have a definite claim - in contrast to the instance mentioned in the following halachah. His statements are based only on the claim of the gentile (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ra’avad differs and maintains that since the claimant is a Jew, a sh’vu’at hesset is required. The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Ra’avad’s argument is based on his approach (Chapter 1, Halachah 7) that when a person says “My father told me...”, it is considered to be a definite claim. Significantly, although with regard to that issue, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 75:21) mentions both views without clarifying which one should be followed, in this instance the Shulchan Aruch mentions only the Rambam’s view.
The Siftei Cohen 149:13 differs with the rationale of the Maggid Mishneh, but disqualifies the statements of the gentile because he has a vested interest in the matter.

Since he cannot issue a definite claim against the owner, his claim is considered to be without foundation. It is as if he has squatted on the property for years without a claim of ownership, as stated in Halachah 12.

Since he is asserting that he saw the transaction himself, his claim is definite. It makes no difference whether the other person involved is a Jew or a gentile.

I.e., we follow the principle of miggo. Had he desired to lie, he could have done so more effectively.

The Lechem Mishneh (in his gloss on Chapter 13, Halachah 7) elaborates on the derivation of this law, explaining that the Rambam’s approach differs from that of the other commentaries. To explain: Bava Metzia 39a concludes from the statement that a relative should not be appointed as a guardian for a minor, that a claim of ownership cannot be established over the fields of a minor.
What is the logic? Other commentaries explain that we fear that the guardian will claim the field as his own. Now on the surface, even a non-relative who takes care of the field for three years can ordinarily claim the field as his own because he has established a claim of ownership. From this we conclude that, in this instance, such a claim cannot be established. Because the owner is a minor, one cannot establish a claim of ownership.
The Rambam (Chapter 13, Halachah 7), by contrast, explains that a guardian cannot establish a claim of residence for a different reason, because the guardian had permission to use the field. How then does the Rambam derive that a claim of ownership cannot be established over property belonging to a minor?
The Lechem Mishneh explains that from the passage in Bava Metzia, the Rambam derives two principles:
a) there is a possibility that people will try to obtain the property of a minor by deception; also
b) the minor might not know that the relative was not entitled to inherit the field and may not know of the necessity to protest.
Because of the combination of both these factors, the Rambam maintains that a claim of ownership cannot be established over a minor’s property.

This point is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Rabbis. The Rambam’s approach is based on that of his teacher, Rav Yosef MiGash. However, the Ra’avad, the Ramban, the Rashbam, Rabbenu Asher and others differ and explain that even if the person maintains possession for three years after the child attains majority, he cannot establish a claim of ownership. Their rationale is the minor might not become aware that the property belonged to him until many years after he attains majority, for it is possible that he was not familiar with the details of his father’s estate. This was the reason he did not protest the other person’s use of the field. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 149:19) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Ramah follows the other views.

I.e., property that he admits belongs to a minor, but is not publicly known to have belonged to the minor or his father.

Rav Yosef MiGash, the Rambam’s teacher, states that this applies even if the person did not maintain possession for three years during the lifetime of the minor’s father. Note the contrast to the following halachah.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh, Chapter 6, which explains that in Talmudic times, it was customary to designate land as security for a loan. Unlike the situation at present, the land designated as security was actually given to the lender, who would benefit from its produce and reduce the debt by a set amount each year.

I.e., he was owed the money by the orphan’s father.

I.e., he can benefit from the produce according to the agreement he claims was made. As evident from the following halachah, there is no need for him to take an oath to this effect.

I.e., people at large mention that the person in possession is not the owner of the property, but rather received it as security. Since the person in possession did not establish a claim of ownership in the father’s lifetime, the fact that the property is reputed to belong to the child can nullify his claim.
The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam’s view, maintaining that even if the person in possession benefited from the field for three years while it was in the possession of the orphan’s father, the fact that the property is reputed to have belonged to the father and come into this person’s possession as security is sufficient to prevent him from establishing a claim of ownership.
The Kessef Mishneh and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 149) quote the statements of Rav Hai Gaon, who rules that if the person in possession benefited from the field for three years during the lifetime of the orphan’s father, before it was reputed that the field belonged to the father, he establishes a claim of ownership. If, however, the report of the father’s ownership spreads before the three years are completed, he does not establish such a claim. The rationale is that since the report was spread before the three years were concluded, if the person in possession in fact purchased the field, upon hearing the report, he should have taken care to preserve his deed of acquisition. This view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 149:20).

As stated in the previous halachah.

I.e., he will call them to court and produce evidence of the debt that he is owed.

See the notes on the previous halachah.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling based on the law (stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 3) that a person in possession of security must take an oath before taking possession of the security. The Maggid Mishneh supports the Rambam’s position, explaining that an oath is not required in this instance, because a severe oath is never taken with regard to landed property. And a sh’vu’at hesset is not required because the minor does not have a definite claim. (See Chapter 1, Halachah 7.) Note, however, the opinion of Rabbenu Asher [cited by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 150:6)], who maintains that since the orphans’ father could have required the person in possession to take an oath, the orphans are given the same privilege despite the fact that they do not have a definite claim.

Because of his concern for his life, he may not be able to take interest in what is happening with his property. Moreover, by protesting, he will make his whereabouts known to the king, who is seeking to kill him.

We assume that even if his creditors discover his whereabouts, they will not harm him, for doing so will not enable him to pay his debt any faster.

Who is entitled to benefit from property belonging to his wife and would have the responsibility of lodging a protest had someone benefited from it unjustly.

When the woman is herself responsible for her property.

Both the husband and the wife would have to agree to the sale. For since the husband is entitled to benefit from the land, his consent is necessary. And since the woman is the owner of the land, she must also consent.

I.e., we follow the principle of miggo. Had he desired to lie, he would have told a more effective lie.

We do not combine the two periods, because a woman relies on her husband to protest and does not concern herself with her property. Hence, the three years do not begin until after his death [Tur (Even HaEzer 87)].

As the Rambam proceeds to explain, the establishment of a claim of ownership is not “squatter’s rights.” Instead, the person in possession must claim to have purchased the land.

For since the field does not belong to him, he does not have the right to benefit from it either. That benefit is considered to have been stolen from the rightful owner and must be returned to him.

The owner is not required to take an oath, even ash’vu’at hesset, because the person in possession of the field cannot lodge a definite claim against him (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 146:18; Siftei Cohen 146:5). The Tur, however, requires that such an oath be taken.

If the squatter lodged such a claim, his word would be accepted, because he used the field long enough to establish a claim of ownership.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that even if he makes such a claim after first saying: “I don’t know whose field this was,” his claim is accepted, despite the fact that it is a reversal of his initial position. See Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:9).

For the person in possession has no basis for his claim to the land.

Similar laws apply to a person who claims to have purchased a property or obtained it from a debtor and afterwards, used it for the amount of time necessary to establish a claim of ownership. To retain possession of the property, he is required to produce proof that the person from whom he claims to have obtained it possessed it for one day [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:10); see also the conclusion of the following halachah].

He does not have to bring proof - or even offer an explanation - of how his father acquired it (Maggid Mishneh).

Alternatively, his claim is also recognized if his father benefited for the field for three years, even though he himself did not benefit from it at all [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:10)].

For the owner should not have sit idly by and allowed another person to use his field without protesting. The person in possession does not have to bring proof that he is in fact the heir of the person he claims to be his father or that he purchased it as stated in the following halachah. Since he maintained possession for the required time, his word alone is accepted (Ramban, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh).

For he has not substantiated his claim of ownership. Hence, not only the field, but all the benefit he received must be returned to the original owner.

In a manner that did not manifest his ownership.

Rabbenu Asher maintains that the law that follows applies even if the person in possession does not know that the field belonged to the protester, except on the basis of the statements of the person who sold it to him. The Siftei Cohen 146:9 differs and maintains that the person must be aware of the protester’s prior ownership in the basis of his own knowledge.

I.e., he took the field from me by robbery, and did not have any right to sell it to you.

For the person in possession has no proof, nor even a definite claim, that the person from whom he purchased the field ever owned it. He is relying on the word of the person who sold it to him alone.
The Maggid Mishneh relates that there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if the person from whom the field was expropriated sues the person who sold it to him. Some maintain that he is entitled to receive his money. Others (and the Maggid Mishneh favors their opinion) maintain that the seller can tell him: “The field was taken from you only because you admitted it belong to the protester. You must suffer the consequences of your admission.” The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 146:13) mentions only the latter view.

Since the person in possession admits that the field in question belongs to its original owner, there is no need for that fact to be established by witnesses.

As in the previous halachah.

Even if there are no witnesses who corroborate these statements (Tur).
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 146:14) states that this point does not have to be stated at the outset, but can even be raised in the course of the debate in court.

I.e., we follow the principle of miggo; had he desired to lie, he would have told a more effective lie. (See, however, the notes of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who maintains that it is because of the strength of the claim of ownership, and not because of the principle of miggo that he is granted the property.)

Validating the deed establishes conclusively that the field was purchased. Witnesses who testify to the establishment of a claim of ownership do not prove conclusively that the field belongs to the person in possession. Instead, their testimony creates a reasonable doubt that he is the owner. Hence, if the protester cannot damage the credibility of the claim, he is allowed to retain possession. Nevertheless, at the outset, we try to validate a claim in the most conclusive manner possible.

I.e., validate the signature of the witnesses through one of the means stated in Hilchot Edut, Chapter 6.

When the person in possession produces a valid deed of sale attesting to his ownership, he is allowed to retain possession. He is not required to support his claim with an oath. If, however, the deed is proven to be a forgery, he is required to return the land and its produce, despite having established a claim of ownership.

Because the witnesses are no longer available and no one recognizes their signatures. If, however, the witnesses to the deed are alive and in the city, they must come and testify for the claim to be validated [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 140:4)].

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 145) states that if one witness states that the person in possession sowed grain and the other says he sowed beans, their testimony is not accepted for there is a clear and obvious difference between these two species. Although Rav Yosef Karo disputes this ruling in his Bedek HaBayit, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 145:1 and the Siftei Cohen 145:1 support it.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this is speaking about a field located in a place where it is common to plant the fields one year and leave them fallow the following year. Thus, although both witnesses testify that he used the field according to the local custom, their testimonies cannot be combined. In a place where it is customary to sow a field year after year, such testimony would not be effective, because both witnesses testify that the owner left it fallow in between. (See Chapter 12, Halachah 4.)

Each element of the argument must be established by the testimony of two witnesses. Hence, it is necessary that two witnesses testify concerning each of the years.
Tosafot (Bava Batra 56b) state that the law quoted by the Rambam applies only when the witnesses explicitly contradict the testimony of the other - e.g., one says “he benefited in the first year, but not in the second,” and the other says, “he benefited in the second year, but not in the first.” The rationale offered by the Rambam indicates that he maintains that this law applies even when there is no explicit contradiction. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 145:2) follows the Rambam’s position.

The commentaries [see Tur (loc. cit.); Lechem Mishneh] have questioned the Rambam’s ruling. Why is he required to return the produce? Two witnesses do not state that he benefited from the produce at any time. Nor should he be held liable because of his own statements, since he maintains that he benefited from his own land.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam’s wording. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 145:3 takes the Tur’s objections into consideration and states that the term “produce” refers to the produce presently growing in the field.
Kin’at Eliyahu explains that the Rambam’s ruling reflects his edict (Chapter 16, Halachah 6) that when witnesses - or even one witness - testify that a person benefited from a field for less than the time necessary to establish a claim of ownership, he is obligated to return the field and all its produce. Here, too, each of the witnesses is in fact testifying that the claimant did not benefit from the land for a period long enough to establish a claim of ownership.

E. g., the first was a third cousin, while the second was a second cousin. Originally, people were not aware of the existence of the second cousin. When they became aware, they granted him the property.

The Rambam’s decision is based on Bava Batra 33a. Because the law as stated by the Rambam is rather obvious, when stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 139:4) follows Tosafot’s understanding of Rabbenu Chanan’el’s interpretation which is slightly different.

This is speaking about a situation where neither is in physical control of the field at the time the matter is brought to court [Bedek HaBayit (Choshen Mishpat 146)].

I.e., when the proof supplied by the two claimants is of the same legal power, the law is the same as when they have no proof at all (Maggid Mishneh).

For if they do not testify concerning the same time period, we grant the field to the person whose witnesses testified that he possessed the field last (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., is able to overpower his colleague physically.

I.e., if the party who is overpowered can produce proof of his ownership, the field is given to him. Until he does so, however, the person who is strong enough to take control is considered to be the legal owner.

Since it is not determined who is the owner of the property, one might think that the law would not require that it be expropriated from a robber. Hence, it is necessary to emphasize that it does.

His claim is stronger, because the witnesses he brings testify to a point that is not disputed: that his ancestors also owned the land.

Bava Batra 32a states that this teaches that even though rescinding its original decision will cause the reputation of the court to be disparaged slightly, the court takes that step to benefit the litigants.

This is speaking about a situation where neither of the claimants was in possession of the field at the time the question was brought to court. If the field was in the possession of either of the claimants, it is returned to him [Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:23)].

I.e., since it was proven that the field had once belonged to the other claimant’s ancestors, this claimant would have to claim that he purchased the field from them. Since he does not make such a statement, we consider his claim that it belonged to him (and his ancestors) baseless, and accordingly require him to return the produce as well.

I.e., a claim that he acquired it from them.

As stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 13.
Bava Batra 33b questions: Seemingly, we should accept the person’s claim based on the principle of miggo. Since he has witnesses who state that he possessed the land long enough to establish a claim of ownership, he could have claimed to have purchased the field from the other claimant. Now had he desired to lie, he could have made such a claim. Since he did not do so, but instead claimed that the field belonged to his ancestors, his testimony should be accepted.
The Talmud does not accept this argument, explaining that since this claim contradicts the testimony of witnesses (the witnesses who testify that the field belonged to the other claimant’s ancestors), it is not accepted. This concept is accepted as a general principle in business law. Whenever a claim that could be advanced on the principle of miggo contradicts the testimony of witnesses, it is not accepted.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 5, which states that as long as a person’s final statements can be interpreted as a clarification of his initial statements, they are accepted by the court. As stated there, this applies provided that he did not leave the court. If, however, he left the court and then came back and offered this explanation, his statement is not accepted, because we fear that someone else suggested that he lie in this manner [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 146:24)].

The commentaries question: Why isn’t this very claim advanced on the claimant’s behalf by the court? As stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 3, the court advances claims on behalf of an heir. [Note the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:24), who maintain that in fact the court should advance this claims on behalf of the heir.]
Tosafot (Bava Batra 31 a) explain that his statement: “It belonged to my ancestors,” appears to imply that it was always theirs. Although the interpretation offered here is not considered a new statement, it is not the obvious meaning of his words. Hence, the court does not offer such a claim.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that, as stated in Chapter 14, Halachah 13, the claim that his ancestors purchased it would be acceptable only if witnesses testify that they used it for at least one day. Since such testimony is not available, the court does not advance such a claim. Alternatively, the court advances a claim on behalf of an heir only when he does not advance a definite claim himself. In this instance, however, he already advanced a definite claim.

This applies provided he brings witnesses who testify that his ancestors used it for at least one day, as stated above (Siftei Cohen 146:21).

Because it is a totally new statement and not merely a clarification of his original claim.

Implied in Reuven’s statements is that he is no longer in possession of his deed of purchase.

Apparently, Shimon’s claim would begin before Reuven’s, for a claim of ownership is three years.

Three years is the minimum amount of time necessary to establish a claim of ownership. Nevertheless, his statement could easily be interpreted as meaning the amount of time necessary to establish a claim of ownership and more. This would not be considered a reversal of his initial statements.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 8.

The commentaries question: Why is it necessary for Reuven to benefit from the field for more than three years? Why isn’t a claim of ownership established in three years, as is the ordinary practice?
The Maggid Mishneh explains that ordinarily a person must renew his protest after three years. Otherwise, we assume that he willingly granted the property to the person who took possession. When, however, the person sold the property, it is no longer his and he need not renew his protest. For once he has sold it, he has no right to rescind his commitment and retract the sale.
Nevertheless, a question can still be raised: Why don’t we believe his claim because of the principle of miggo? I.e., had he desired to lie, he could have claimed to have purchased the field from the owner three years ago.
The Maggid Mishneh answers that originally, when Reuven claimed that he had purchased the field from Levi, he did know that Shimon had a deed of sale attesting to his purchase of the field. Hence, we cannot say that he should have thought to say that he purchased from him.

Hence, since the testimony of the witnesses establishes the field as belonging to the other claimant, the claimant who stated that he consumed the produce is liable because of his own admission. We do not accept his claim that the produce belonged to him on the principle of miggo. Had he desired to lie, he would have denied partaking of the produce entirely. The rationale is that there are witnesses who testify to the opposite. Hence, the principle of miggo cannot be applied, as stated in the notes on Halachah 6 [Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 146)].

Had he desires to lie, he would have maintained that the deed of sale is valid.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 146:67 and the Siftei Cohen 146:28 state that this law applies even if the person in possession had not maintained possession of the field for three years.

See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 14:6, which quotes an exactly similar situation with regard to a promissory note. In that instance, the Rambam rules that the promissory note is not considered valid and the debt is nullified, while here we follow according to the deed of sale. The commentaries explain that the same rationale is applied in both instances: the property or the money is allowed to remain in the hands of the person who is presently in possession of it (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 146:68).

The Rambam’s wording seems to imply that this law applies in all instances, even when travel and communication routes are not disturbed. The Ramban and the Rashba question this interpretation, for since the person in possession benefited from the field for more than three years, he establishes a valid claim of ownership. Why then should the former owner be able to raise a protest afterwards?
For this reason, these commentaries interpret the law as applying only in situations when there is a war or other factor disrupting travel and communication. (See Chapter 11, Halachah 2.) For in times of peace, even if the owner was not in the city, he could have conducted the sale via an agent [Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 146:12)]. If there was no sale, the owner should have protested the other person’s use of his field.
The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling partially, explaining that it could be speaking about a situation when it was reputed that the owner was not in the city at the time the person in possession claims to have purchased the field. Similarly, Rav Yehudah of Barcelona explains that it applies only in an instance when at the outset, the person in possession mentions the date when the sale took place. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 146:11-12) mentions all three perspectives, without stating which one should be followed.

I.e., the field was surrounded by four other fields with no known outlet to a road or public thoroughfare. Originally, his field included an access path, but he - or those coming on his behalf - do not know where that path was.

I.e., the surrounding fields were owned by four different people, even though they had all purchased them from the same person.

I.e., at whatever price they ask.

I.e., if he is not willing to purchase a path, he is not allowed to pass through another colleague’s property to reach his own.

I.e., retract from the sale.

Hence, just as you could not compel any one of them to provide you with a path; so, too, you cannot compel me to do so. The Siftei Cohen 148:2 states that if the four people from whom he purchased the fields died, he is obligated to provide the claimant with a path.

Or one person originally owned all the fields, and he sold all of them to one other person (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 148:3).

For at the outset he had a path, and that path passed through the neighbor’s property.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies only in an instance when he maintained possession of the path for three years. Otherwise, the owner of the property has the right to protest. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Y osef Karo differs and maintains that since the claimant owned a path and claims that he recognizes it, he is given rights to it. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 148:2), Rav Karo follows his understanding, while the Ramah quotes the perspective of the Maggid Mishneh.