Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

As stated in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 11, when a sale is made conditional to a stipulation, if that stipulation is fulfilled, the sale is binding. If not, it is nullified.

See also Hilchot Mechirah 13:17, which states this principle with regard to the laws of ona’ah, deriving an unfair amount of profit from a transaction.

As explained in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 29, a minor, a mentally or emotionally incompetent person and a deaf mute are incapable of buying or selling property. Similarly, as explained in that chapter, a person under the age of 20 may not sell landed property; so, too, he may not rent it out.

This refers to situations where the object being sold has not come into existence or is not in the possession of the seller, as explained in Hilchot Mechirah, 22.

E. g., an instance where a father gives his property to his son “from today and after his death.” As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 12:13, the son becomes the owner of the property, but the father retains the right to benefit from its produce. Therefore, the father may rent out the property, but may not sell it.

The Shitah Mekubetzet quotes a responsum from the Rambam’s teacher, the Ri MiGash, which states that this law applies whether the contract was made in the beginning of the year or the middle of the year. If the contract is made on an annual basis, it runs until the same date the following year. From Hilchot Nedarim 10:4, it would appear that the Rambam follows his teacher’s ruling.

In which an extra month, Adar Bet, is added. See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, Chapter 4.

This is speaking about a situation in the era when the court established the new months based on the testimony of witnesses. In that era, there was no fixed calendar and a leap year could be declared in the middle of the year.
Alternatively, it could also apply in the present era when neither the renter nor the borrower knew that a year was a leap year. This interpretation is supported by the fact that this law is mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 312:15) although we have long since adopted a fixed calendar.

I.e., he is allowed to live in the house for the same price as agreed upon, although another month is added to the year.

The tenant must pay the rent month by month even though he will have paid for thirteen months throughout the year.

And the tenant must pay for the extra month.

Since both months and years are mentioned, a doubt arises and we follow the principle: “When a person desires to expropriate property from its owner, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.”

Despite the fact that the owner rented it out, the ultimate right of possession is his.

Since the land belongs to its owner, he is granted the benefit of the right of possession. The tenant must prove any claims he has against the owner by producing a legal document or witnesses that support his claim.
A different rule applies with regard to movable property. In such an instance, the person who is in actual possession of the property is given the upper hand with regard to most disputes when doubt arises.

I.e., based on the same principle (Maggid Mishneh).

But rather indefinitely, on a month-to-month basis. Hence, the owner does not have the right to force him to move without giving him adequate warning, as the Rambam states in Chapter 6, Halachot 7-8.

He must produce a receipt or witnesses who state that he paid the rent. The rationale for this ruling is that the rent is not due until the conclusion of the rental period. There is a chazzakah, a prevailing assumption, that the tenant did not pay before his rent was due.
The Ra’avad explains that the intent is not necessarily 30 days. Instead, the intent is that the owner’s word is accepted until the conclusion of the rental agreement. The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam would also accept this ruling, and mentions 30 days, because we assume the rental was for such a length of time if no other stipulation was made.

Because of the chazzakah mentioned above, the owner is not required to take an oath before collecting the rent. Nevertheless, in respect of the tenant’s claim, this provisional ban of ostracism is issued.
With regard to a promissory note, [in contrast to the Rambam,] the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 78) rules that even if the debtor claims to have paid the debt before it becomes due, the creditor must take a sh’vuat hesset before collecting the debt. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 317:3 differentiates between the two instances, explaining that there are some people who will repay a loan before it is due, but it is totally out of the ordinary to pay rent before it is due. Siftei Cohen 317:2 accepts the distinction between the two cases, but offers a different rationale.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim (ibid.) states that the tenant may employ both measures: have a ban of ostracism issued and lodge a separate claim.

For Bava Metzia 102b indicates that it is customary for some tenants to pay as soon as the rent is due. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 317:4 states that this law applies even if the owner demanded payment at the beginning of the day.

E. g., witnesses who were with him the entire time and will testify that he did not receive payment.

The last day of the Jewish year.

And the witnesses to the contract have died and no one else is able to clarify the matter [Tur (Choshen Mishpat 317)].

This ruling follows the principle stated in Halachah 2, that the land is considered to be the property of its owner, and he is granted the upper hand when a doubt arises.

With the intent of benefiting from its produce.

I.e., the owner of the orchard took a loan and entrusted the orchard to the creditor, with the proviso that the value of the produce reaped each year be deducted from the debt. See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh, 6:7-8.

To the point that it no longer produces fruit before the time of the rental or the security is completed. As stated in Chapter 8, Halachah 4, even though a field becomes dried out, the renter is still required to pay his rent.

Which becomes the property of the owner of the orchard.

The Ra’avad maintains that the prohibition against taking interest is not relevant to this instance, and the prohibition against taking the wood stems from other factors.

Therefore, they must sell the trees and purchase a field, as explained.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the creditor may not take the trees as payment for the debt, because - if he did so - the produce that he reaped until then would be considered to be interest. The debtor - the owner of the orchard - may not take the trees and pay the debt from other sources, for then the creditor's benefit would be considered to be interest. The Maggid Mishneh, however, is not satisfied with the latter explanation.

Literally, the owner of the produce.

Before the owner of the land called him to court.

In this instance, we do not follow the principle that in questions involving landed property, the benefit of the doubt is given to the owner of the land. The rationale is that in this instance, it is possible to clarify to whom the produce belongs through the testimony of the witnesses to the legal document. Accordingly, we do not expropriate the produce from the tenant and award it to the owner. For it is possible that later, when the witnesses come, we will have to expropriate the produce from the owner and award it to the tenant. In order to prevent the possibility of such unnecessary legal procedure, we do not expropriate the produce at the outset (Bava Metzia 110a).
From this explanation, the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 317) concludes that if the witnesses die or in some way would certainly be unable ever to testify, the produce is awarded to the owner of the land.

Who derives benefit from land given to him as security.

Once a person uses a property for three years and derives benefit from it, his word is accepted if he claims to have purchased it from the previous owner (Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 11:2).

And the claims will be verified on the basis of it.

The Rambam’s ruling is based on the principle of miggo - i.e., if the defendant desired to lie, he could have told a more effective lie. Instead of claiming that the property was rented to him for five years, he could have claimed that it was sold to him.
On this basis, the Maggid Mishneh [and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 317:4)] state that this law applies only when there are no witnesses to the original rental agreement or the owner did not tell people that the property had been rented from him within the first three years. If there were witnesses, the principle of miggo does not apply - for the tenant could not claim that he purchased the property. Hence, the decision would be made in favor of the owner, as in other cases of doubt concerning landed property.

Bava Metzia lOlb mentions this principle with regard to an instance where a man asked a woman to rent him a place to store his wine. She refused. He then asked her to marry him. She consented and then allowed him to store the wine. He then returned home and divorced her. She hired porters and ordered them to take the wine to the market place and paid them from the sale of the wine.

He may leave it there in the market place without caring for it. He may not, however, break the containers in which it is held (Chavot Yeir, Responsa 165).

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 319:2 states that the Rambam maintains that after taking the produce out to the market place, the watchman is obligated to notify the owner. If he does not notify him and the owner of the produce suffers a loss, the watchman is liable. According to the Sefer Me’irat Einayim, the Rambam’s opinion is accepted by the other authorities.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 319:1) differs and maintains that according to the Rambam, the watchman is not obligated to notify the owner of the produce at all and is not liable if he suffers a loss. The Ramah maintains, however, that Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the owner of the property must notify the court before removing the produce. All authorities agree that it is pious conduct to notify the owner of the produce first.

And buys bread from a baker rather than makes his own bread from flour. This explanation and the interpretation of the halachah are based on the gloss of Sefer Me'irat Einayim 318:3.

I.e., it is a situation where one person (the owner) benefits - i.e., he receives the rent for his property - and the (the renter) does not lose, for what difference does it make to him whether he is grinding for the owner or for someone else. Accordingly, our Sages required the renter to provide this benefit to the owner.
Not doing so is associated with the people of Sodom. For they were renowned for their selfishness and lack of consideration of others.

According to the Rambam, the owner may terminate the rental contract. According to Rabbenu Asher, by contrast, he does not have this privilege (Sefer Me’irat Einayim, loc. cit.).

I.e., the renter agrees to pay this amount regardless of the amount of produce he harvests from the field that year.

Literally, a recipient - i.e., a sharecropper.

This is the Rambam’s opinion. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 320:3) quote opinions that state that the owner of the field has no responsibilities toward a chocher.

E. g., a fence and the trench that surrounds the fence. (See Hilchot Mechirah 21:22.)

For when a person rents out a field, it is expected that the field be secure and protected. For without this, it is of no value (Bava Metzia 103b).

These extra measures save the renter the difficulty of laboring to protect his property. Therefore, they are his responsibility (ibid.).

The intent is that the owner is responsible to provide any tools that are absolutely necessary for working the land. See Tur (Choshen Mishpat 320).

For they are merely a convenience, so that the renter will not have to carry water from the well to the crops.

I.e., less than seven. As evident from his statements in Halachah 1, according to the Rambam, these laws also apply with regard to a chocher.
Rashi (Bava Metzia 109a) states that this ruling applies only to a chocher, but not to a sharecropper. For in the case of a sharecropper, the owner will receive a larger profit from the flax and therefore he is willing to tolerate the depletion of his land. Although this view is mentioned by the Tur, it is not mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 325:1) or the Ramah.

As the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 9:9), the roots of the flax plant remain in the land for a long time and deplete it of its nutrients.
The Maggid Mishneh states that this ruling applies only when the renter does not state which crops he will be sowing in the field. If, however, he tells the owner that he will be sowing flax, he may do so despite the fact that this depletes the land.

For the nutrients of the land will be replenished by the time the contract is concluded.

I.e., in Eretz Yisrael, for only there is the seventh year observed.

Thus, he actually receives the land for eight years. The rationale is that his intent in saying seven years is that he has seven years to harvest crops. Therefore, the Sabbatical year is not counted, because it is forbidden to work the land that year.

Because the wording implies that span of time and not the amount of years the owner will actually work the land.

From which every person in the area draws water for their fields.

He must pay the same sum of money or crops, or the same percentage as originally agreed. It is true that the stroke of adversity made the renter’s task much more difficult. Nevertheless, since this difficulty did not affect all the fields in the area, we attribute the hardship to the renter’s lack of good fortune and require him to bear the consequences.
One might think that the renter agreed to pay the price stated because he expected to irrigate his field from the spring. Nevertheless, since he did not explicitly state this condition, he is required to pay the full amount. If, however, the renter made it clear that he was relying on the spring for his water supply, he may reduce his payments if it dries up.

And the sharecropper. One might think that in the case of the sharecropper, there is no need to reduce his payments, for the owner receives a percentage of the crops - and if the entire yield is small, the owner’s share will also be reduced. The Rambam, however, has granted more inclusive consideration to the sharecropper. Since the sharecropper made a large investment of both money and work, it is not appropriate that he should receive the same share of a small crop as a large crop. For then, he will certainly suffer a loss or at the very least, gain a small amount of profit. In order to recompense him for his labor justly, in these specific instances he is granted a larger share than originally agreed upon. (See Merchevet HaMishneh.)
There are, however, authorities (the Ramban and the Rashba) who differ and maintain that this law applies only to a chocher who pays a fixed amount of produce. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 321:1) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Ramah mentions the other opinions.

For in such an instance, the loss cannot be attributed to the individual misfortune of the renter. Even if the field had remained in the hands of the owner, a similar loss would have been suffered.

The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.:2) quote opinions that state that this law does not apply if the stream does not dry up entirely (although its flow is drastically reduced) or if the majority of the trees in an orchard were cut down, but enough remained so that the grove could be called an orchard.

For otherwise, it would not have been necessary for him to say “this field.” Since he was standing in the field, it is clear which field he was referring to.

From the Rambam’s wording, it would appear that the same rulings apply regardless of whether the statement is made by the owner or the renter. The Tur and the Ramah differ, however, and maintain that this ruling applies only if the statement was made by the owner. If the statement was made by the renter, the field must remain in its present condition; otherwise, he may reduce the rental.

As explained above, since the blight is widespread, it is obviously not dependent on the renter’s misfortune alone.

For this is obviously the renter’s individual misfortune.

I.e., even those that were not rented out.

And thus, one could say that it was the bad fortune of the land owner and not the renter that brought the blight. Bava Metzia 106a explains that if the matter involved merely the misfortune of the owner of the fields, it is likely that he would not have suffered a total loss, for even when God executes retribution, He does so with a measure of mercy.

Since all of the renter’s fields were ravaged, we assume that it is his personal misfortune. And we see that since nothing of his remained, he was not worthy of God’s mercies.

Since the renter deviated from the stipulation, he is required to bear the loss. Although the majority of the fields were affected, it is possible that if he had done his part, his crops would have succeeded.

Everything depends on the local conditions. There are no universal rules.

With a scythe, leaving the roots in the ground.

Pulling the roots out of the ground entirely.

If the custom is to cut down the crops, the owner can prevent the renter from uprooting them, arguing that he desires that the roots be left in the ground to serve as fertilizer for his field. If the owner desires that the crops be uprooted, the renter can protest, explaining that cutting them down involves far less work than uprooting them.
If the custom is to uproot the crops, the owner can prevent the renter from cutting them down, arguing that he is not concerned with fertilizing his field and desires that it be left clean entirely. If the owner desires that the crops be cut down, the renter can protest, explaining that he desires the roots to use as food for his livestock (Bava Metzia 103b).

To clean the field of any weeds. Even if the renter weeded the field while the crops were growing, he must plow it to destroy any roots of the weeds that might be left (ibid.)..

And the renter may benefit from their fruit, although caring for the trees requires a minimal amount of effort (Maggid Mishneh).

We do not accept the owner’s claim that he took a lower price because he retained the right to the trees [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 320:5)]. For him to retain such a right, he would have to state so explicitly.

We do not accept the renter’s claim that he paid a higher price to include the trees.

As mentioned on several occasions, this is a fundamental principle in Jewish business law. An explicit stipulation is necessary to deviate from these norms.

This applies to both a chocher, a person who rents a field for a specific amount of produce and a mekabel, a sharecropper. The chocher would have to purchase crops from the market place if the field did not produce the sum agreed upon. Nevertheless, as long as the field does produce grain, the owner is obligated to accept it (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., the grain produce was of lower quality than usual.

Although by doing so, the owner will be suffering a loss, for the wheat he receives will be of a lower quality than expected.

Even though doing so will bring the owner a greater profit.
This is the positive and the negative side of sharecropping. The owner of the field is paid with the produce of the field itself.

Even though they became sour. As long as the produce comes from the field, the owner must accept it even though it is of lower quality. He cannot claim that it is the chocher’s fault that the quality was reduced.

For the grapes were removed from the field to make wine. Therefore, the responsibility for the entire loss is the renter's. For we say that it occurred because of his bad fortune (Sefer Me'irat Einayim 323:3).

The Aramaic term used by the Rambam is aspasta. According to the Maggid Mishneh, the translation would be cattle fodder. Others translate it as “clover,” but that does not appear to be the intent here.

Cattle fodder grows faster than grain, requiring only one month.

Which is of lower quality. The renter is required to purchase other fodder, because the owner did not expect him to sow the field with another crop first.

When a field is not weeded, it produces fewer crops, because the soil’s nutrients are sapped by the weeds. Nevertheless, the renter argues that he - and not the owner - will bear the loss. For he is required to pay the owner a fixed amount, regardless of how much grain the field produces.

When the renter finally leaves the field, the owner will suffer a loss, because the value of his field will have deteriorated.
As the Maggid Mishneh states, this ruling applies in a place where it is customary for a renter to weed the field. If that is not the local custom, the renter is not obligated to undertake that effort.

I.e., at the termination of my contract.

And thus remove the weeds.

For the weeds will already have produced seeds that will grow the following year even if the plants and their roots are destroyed.

Rashi (Bava Metzia 106b) states that this ruling applies only to a chocher, but not to a sharecropper. The Maggid Mishneh maintains that the Rambam would not accept this ruling. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 324:1) quotes both views without stating which the halachah follows. See also the notes on Halachah 3.

This follows the version of Bava Metzia 9:8 cited by Rabbi Yitzchak Alfasi. The standard printed text of the Talmud reverses the subjects of these two clauses. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat, loc. cit.) follows the Rambam’s ruling, while the Ramah cites the standard text of the Talmud.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam sums up the general principle: “If the renter agreed to plow the land and sow a particular crop, he may sow another crop that damages the field less, but not one that damages it more. [To determine this,] we go to the experts who know the nature of the land of that particular place.”

I.e., less than seven, as obvious from the second clause.

The Ramban and others maintain that this ruling applies only to a sharecropper and not to a chocher. Rashi, however, does not accept this conception; see the notes to Halachah 3.

I.e., he does not receive any share at all. Even in places where he is entitled to reap the produce of the trees (see Halachah 6), he is not granted a share of the wood.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’ s Commentary on the Mishnah (Demai 1:1). The figs grown on such trees are usually not of high quality.
It takes seven years for the boughs of these trees to become thick enough to be used for lumber. Thus, if the renter cut down some of the boughs during his rental period, he would not be returning the trees in the same condition as he rented them.

I.e., without being planted or cultivated.

When renting the field, the renter had one objective - to sow crops in the field and reap the profits. Therefore, he is not granted a share in these profits that come about without his efforts.

And the amount of rent he is required to pay is reduced accordingly.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 325:1) quote the opinion of Tosafot, who maintain that the Rambam’ s ruling applies only in a place where the sharecropper would have preferred to have planted his crops. If, however, he would have willingly planted trees there, he is given a share of the trees.

E. g., a rocky or a sandy area.

For the growth of the trees did not cause him any loss.

For during the period of his rental, boughs large enough to be cut down have grown.

I.e., they need to ripen in the ground for a little longer.

I.e., he is given the same share of their worth as he would be given if they were sold.

According to the same percentages.

For that is useful for animal fodder and other purposes.

They are used to lift up the vines, so that the clusters of grapes will not lie on the ground and be spoiled.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 9:1), the Rambam states that the cost of these rods should be evenly divided between the sharecropper and the owner.

This represents the version of Bava Batra 95a possessed by the Rambam and his teacher, the Ri Migash. The standard printed text of that passage reads “ten from me’ah (one hundred)” and not “ten from a se’ah.” The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 330:1) quotes the Rambam’s text, while the Tur and the Ramah quote the standard version.

I.e., an area 50 cubits by 50 cubits. It is logical to assume that such a percentage of the crop will not be viable.

Since a larger than ordinary percentage of the crop was not viable, we assume that the loss came about because of the sharecropper’s negligence. Therefore, we make a further assumption and postulate that, had he not been negligent, the entire crop would have been good (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 330:2).

This law does not apply with regard to a chocher. Since he is required to pay the owner a fixed amount regardless of the yield of the field, the prerogative is his. He may choose to work or not.

Against his will. Even if he personally desires to save himself the effort and refrain from tending to the crop and harvesting it, he is required to do so.

In his gloss on the following halachah, the Maggid Mishneh states that even if the statement the Rambam refers to is not explicitly stated in the contract, it is considered as if it were, for this is the standard sharecropping agreement. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 328:1) quotes that comment in his gloss on this law.

Less than two se’ah is not sufficient to make a grain heap. Hence, he is not bound by the original agreement (Maggid Mishneh).

Through a kinyan that establishes a binding commitment that he cannot retract.

As mentioned, the Maggid Mishneh states that even if this statement is not explicitly stated in the contract, it is considered as if it were, for this is the standard sharecropping agreement.

I.e., seemingly his commitment is an asmachta, a stipulation that the sharecropper made without expecting to fulfill. As the Rambam writes in Hilchot Mechirah 11:6:
All the conditions that people establish between themselves, even when confirmed by witnesses and a legal document- [e.g.,] “If such and such will take place...” or “If you do such and such, I will give you a maneh,” or “... I will transfer ownership of this house to you, but if this does not take place...” or “if you do not do [such and such], I will not transfer ownership,” or “... I will not give you,” [are considered to be asmachta’ot].
Even though [the potential recipient] performs the [desired] action, or the event takes place, he does not acquire [the promised article]. For his opinion is [undefined, being] dependent on whether or not the stipulation will be met.

For he did not have in mind to make such a payment.

For this is a fair agreement, recompensing the owner for the loss that he might suffer.

I.e., an amount far above the loss that the owner might suffer.

For he is not seriously committing himself to making such a payment.

For as mentioned above, whether or not this condition is stated, it is an unspoken rule of sharecropping agreements (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 328:3).

Which is less valuable than sesame seeds.

I.e., he may have desired the sesame seeds, and therefore, he will have complaints against the renter for changing his mind. Nevertheless, since he received the same monetary value as he would have received, the renter is not under any financial obligation.

To begin work at sunrise.

To work until after sunset.

This applies even if he paid them higher wages than normal [Bava Metzia 83a; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 331:1)]. Instead, as the Rambam states at the conclusion of the halachah, the local custom must be followed.
This applies if the employer did not make a stipulation when hiring the workers. If, however, the employer made a stipulation that the workers must work these extra hours and they agreed, they must honor their commitment (Kessef Mishneh).

Desert or side-dishes to accompany their meals.

Instead of negotiating a set wage.

We do not, however, calculate the average wage in the city. For example, if some workers are paid 19, some 17 and some 12, he is paid 15 and 1/2 and not 16 (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 331:5).

For each worker.

Even though the accepted wage for this type of work is three.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 332:1) state that if the accepted wage for such work was four zuz, the agent would be entitled to complete reimbursement from the employer. As evident from Halachah 9, the Rambam might also accept such a ruling (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 332:2).

I.e., he told them that he was only an agent and would not be making the actual payments to them. From Chapter 11, Halachah 4, it appears that as long as the agent does not explicitly say that the employer is responsible for the workers’ wages, the agent is held personally responsible.

I.e., if the ordinary wage paid for such work is three, he may pay them three. If the ordinary wage is four, he must pay them four. The rationale is that since the agent deviated from the employer’s instructions, he concluded his agency. Hence, we consider it as if the workers performed work for the employer without any prior contractual agreement. In such an instance, they are to be paid according to local custom.

For unless stipulated otherwise, we assume that they accepted the lower wage. Even though the agent agreed to pay them four, since he told them that the employer was responsible for their wages, they should have checked with the employer before beginning their work (Sefer Me'irat Einayim 332:3).

But no financial claim.

Their complaints are justified because there are places in that city where people are hired for four zuz. Therefore, if he had not promised them that wage, they would have looked until they found someone willing to pay it (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 332:4).

That they may be paid the lower wage.

Bava Metzia 76a, the source for this halachah, defines this as referring, not only to a situation where it is obvious that they had not invested extra effort in their work, but also to a situation where it is impossible to determine whether their work was worth four - e.g., they were hired to dig a trench around a field and before their work was evaluated, the trench became filled with water. Even in such an instance, the employer is not obligated to pay more than the lower amount.
The rationale for the ruling is the principle: “A person who desires to expropriate money from a colleague must substantiate his claim.” The workers desire to expropriate the extra zuz from the employer. Unless they can prove that their work is worth the extra amount, the matter is left to the employer’s will.

This applies whether the agent accepted the responsibility for paying them or told them that the employer was responsible [Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 232:2).

For it was unnecessary for the agent to minimize the owner’s generosity. To such a situation is applied the adage (Proverbs 3:27): “Do not withhold good from its rightful owner.”

I.e., since their statements cannot be interpreted as an acceptance of the employer's statements, it is as if they are working without a contract. If the workers in that place are usually paid four zuz, they should receive four. If there is no standard wage, we evaluate their work and pay them accordingly (Maggid Mishneh).

There is room to say that the workers are entitled to four, because their statement implied that they expected to receive more than what the agent promised them. On the other hand, it is possible to say that their statement indicated an acceptance of the agent’s words. Since this question is left unresolved by Bava Metzia, loc. cit., the workers are not able to claim the extra money from the employer.

I.e., they do not come to work.

He does not provide them with work.

The workers have complaints against the employer because he did not provide them with the work he promised, thus causing them to lose other opportunities. Similarly, the employer has complaints against the workers, for they have prevented him from having necessary work performed. Neither, however, has a financial claim against the other. The rationale is that in most instances, causing someone to lose profit is not considered to have caused him a loss.
The Ramban and the Rashba maintain that if the workers could have found other employment originally, but cannot find employment after the employer terminates the agreement, the employer is obligated to pay them as he pays a worker who does not actually perform labor. For he caused them an actual loss. This view is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 333:2). The Shulchan Aruch (see also the Maggid Mishneh) continues, stating that if the workers could hire themselves out for less, they are obligated to do so, but the original employer is required to make up the difference.

Once the workers reach the place of employment, the employer is under obligation to them.

The difficulty is considered to be caused by factors beyond his control, and he is not held responsible.

He was willing to take the risk and he must bear its consequences.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 333) and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 333:6 emphasize that the employer is obligated in such an instance even if the workers could not have found other employment.

I.e., the employer does not have to pay the worker a full wage, because the worker is not actually performing labor. He must, however, compensate the worker for the time he promised to employ him.
If the worker can find work at a lower wage, he is obligated to accept it, and the original employer is obligated to pay the difference between the two figures (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

I.e., when do we say that the worker is not obligated to the employer and the employer is not obligated to the worker?

I.e., the Jews have no binding commitment to any being other than God. Hence, any worker may terminate the contracts at will.
In his responsa (182), the Maharik states that this law applies even when the worker has been paid an advance by the employer and does not have the money to return the advance. Rav Yosef Karo quotes this ruling in his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 333:3).

I.e., if he performed half the work for which he was hired, he is paid half of his wage, even if the price of labor increased. The Tur and the Ramah add that this law applies only when the worker does not quit because he could earn more money.
If the price of labor decreased, it would appear that the Rambam would not require that the worker be paid more than the appropriate percentage of his original wage. This is also the opinion of the Siftei Cohen 333:19. Sefer Me’irat Einayim, however, differs and requires that the worker be given the advantage of the fluctuation in the price of labor.

The term “worker” refers to a person hired to work for a particular amount of time. The term “contractor” refers to a person hired to perform a particular task (Maggid Mishneh).

The contractor is paid the amount originally agreed upon minus the amount necessary to complete the task.

And was raised afterwards, so that the workers hired afterwards will be paid proportionately more.

Thus, the workers hired afterwards will be paid proportionately less.

A sela is worth four dinarim.

Which is worth two dinarim. Similarly, if the price of work doubled, the contractor is not paid anything at all. He is not held responsible if the price of labor increases beyond that measure and is never required to pay from his own resources.

And receiving the eight dinarim.

Thus, according to the Rambam the owner profits, for he is not required to pay the entire amount to which he originally committed himself. The Rambam maintains that although a contractor has the right to quit in the middle of the day, he is always given the lower hand and the employer benefits. The Ra’avad differs with this approach and maintains that the contractor should be paid only two dinarim, for that is the present value of his work (Siftei Cohen 333:22).

And if they leave it there, it will spoil.

In which instances if the flutes were not brought on time, there is no point in bringing them later.

In such an instance, the employer must compensate the worker for the work he did even though he did not finish the entire task [Tur, Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 333:5)].

In which case the worker is not held responsible, for he has no alternative but to care for his own concerns.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as stating that this ruling applies only when originally it would have been possible for the employer to have found other workers at that wage. For otherwise, the workers will not have caused the employer a loss. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 333:5) quotes this ruling.

We allow him to speak less than truthfully so that he will not suffer a loss.

I.e., the second workers can be hired to complete the task for the entire amount promised to the original workers. Hence, the original workers will not receive anything for their efforts.

E. g., tools that had been entrusted to him for safekeeping.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as stating that if the workers have left their property in the employer’s possession, he may use it to hire other workers even when their failure to work would not cause him an immediate loss. The Ramah quotes this ruling (Choshen Mishpat 333:1).

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 333:26 interprets this as meaning “a sum an employer would pay so that his work would not be lost.” Hence, in every place and every situation, a different sum applies.

Note the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 333:6), who quotes a difference of opinion between the Rabbis whether the employer is entitled to sue the workers if he was not able to hire workers and hence suffered a loss.

That the employer has the right to deceive the original workers or hire other workers on their account.

But no financial claim.

Even though he may desire to work for his employer, he is unable to do so because he is obligated to perform the king's service.

The fact that the worker was taken is considered a factor beyond the employer’s control; he is not liable for paying the worker for the remainder of the day.
With regard to an animal that was requisitioned by a king for his service while it was being rented, the Rambam rules (Chapter 5, Halachah 1) that the renter of an animal must pay the entire rental fee. For we say that it was the renter’s misfortune that caused the animal to be taken. Similarly, one might say that the employer should be required to pay the worker his entire wage, for it is the employer’s misfortune that the worker was called to the king’s service.
The Lechem Mishneh distinguishes between the two laws as follows: With regard to the animal, had the renter not taken it out to work, it would not have been seen and taken by the king. Therefore, the renter is responsible. With regard to the worker, by contrast, whether or not he went out to work, he would have been called to the king’s service. Therefore, it is considered to be a factor beyond the employer’s control.
The Rambam LeAm offers a different distinction. An animal has no fortune of its own; its fate is dependent on the person in possession of it at the moment. Since the renter was in possession of the animal at the time it was taken, we attribute its being taken to his misfortune. Every person, by contrast, has a fortune of his own. No man is totally dependent on another. Thus, we say that it is the worker’s own misfortune that he lost a portion of his work day.

For its drying up is considered to be a matter beyond the employer’s control, and he is not held responsible.

Hence, since they did not make an explicit stipulation otherwise, they must suffer the consequences.

The commentaries question why this instance is any different from the one mentioned in the previous clause. Since the workers know the pattern of the river, what difference does it make if it dries up naturally or because it was dammed up by the local residents?
Based on the authentic manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah (and this is also evident from Bava Metzia 77a), the previous clause is interpreted as referring to local workers who know the river's pattern, and this clause as referring to workers who come from another place and who are unaware of its way. When workers know the pattern of the river, they must bear the consequences of the vicissitudes of fate as the owner does. When, however, they do not know the pattern of the river, it is the owner's responsibility to inform them. If he fails to do so, he must bear the consequences alone.

The Maggid Mishneh clarifies that they need not actually be paid for a full day’s work, for they did not work the entire day. Instead, for the portion of the day that they did not work, they should be paid as “an idle worker.” (See the notes on Halachah 4.) This interpretation is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 334:1).

Of the possibility of the river drying up.

For the workers did not have to perform the labor, and the rain came as a factor beyond the employer’s control.

And thus all the worker has to do is direct the flow of the water through the irrigation channels.

For they did perform some work. It is only that because of the river’s rising, it was easier.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as explaining that if the river rises to the extent that no work at all is necessary, the workers need not be paid. There is no difference between the river rising and rain descending. Perhaps this is alluded to by the Rambam’s words, “From heaven, they were granted help” - i.e., although they were granted help in accomplishing their work, they still had to work themselves.

I.e., the sharecropper is being given a larger share in consideration of the additional effort he undertakes. The owner of the land is prepared to pay this extra amount in the expectation that the additional water will produce a better crop.

Thus, as long as the objective is accomplished, the sharecropper receives the extra portion of the harvest. The rationale is that the owner must pay the worker regardless of whether or not the crops produce a good yield. Hence, the worker is paid only according to his labor. A sharecropper, by contrast, is paid according to the ultimate yield of the field. Therefore, he is considered to be a partner and receives the benefit of the good fortune visited upon the field (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 334:11).

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as explaining that this law applies only when the employer specified the type of work for which he was hiring the worker at the outset. Since he told him he was being hired for one type of work, he cannot be compelled to perform a more difficult task at the same wage. If, however, the employer made no specification at the outset, he can change the worker’s tasks at will.

See Halachah 4 and notes.

For remaining idle is not considered to be an advantage for such a person.

Rav Kapach states that the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah state “fruit,” rather than cabbage or prunes (as stated in Bava Kama 117b, the source for this halachah), because according to the Rambam’s medical research, these species are not beneficial for a sick person to eat.

Although the fruit may be worth more than the wage, the worker may desire the money. (See Halachah 10.) He deserves his entire wage because he fulfilled the mission with which he was charged. The fact that by the time he returned, the fruit was no longer necessary is not his responsibility.

For the worker fulfilled everything demanded of him.

E. g., if there are some workers who would perform these tasks for three zuz, that is all the owner of the field is required to pay. If the person who hired the worker paid more, he must bear the loss himself.

To clear them from a field.

This law applies even when the straw was worth the same amount as the worker's wage. The Maggid Mishneh derives from this law the concept that an employer must pay his workers in cash. He may not tell him: “Here is movable property. Sell it and take payment.”

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 336:2) clarify that this law applies only when the worker took possession of the straw through a formal kinyan, e.g., meshichah (pulling the article after him) or hagba’ah (lifting it up).

The owner may, however, deduct from the worker’s wage, payment for the time it takes to collect the lost object.

In which case, the employer’s words could be interpreted as meaning: “Perform any task for me, including collecting lost objects.”

In which instance, collecting a lost object is definitely not included in the task for which he was hired.

For he hired himself out to collect lost objects - and this wallet falls into that category - on behalf of the employer.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 270:3) state that this law applies even when the person is hired without specific instructions, and afterwards the employer instructs him to collect ownerless objects.
Kin’ at Eliyahu notes that the worker has the right to quit working for the employer when he sees the wallet and then take the wallet for himself. This, however, is not considered as ethical behavior.