Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., the difference between the value of the eggs and the value of the chicks once they have grown into chickens.

The agreement between the two is an iska arrangement. Half of the eggs are considered a loan, and half are considered an entrusted object. Hence, unless the owner of the eggs pays the chicken farmer a wage, the work that the chicken farmer invests resembles interest. I.e., it appears that he is tending to the half of the eggs given to him as an entrusted object, in consideration of the fact that he was given the others as a loan.
Some manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah also include the phrase “as an unemployed worker” in this clause. With regard to the definition of the term “unemployed worker,” see Chapter 6, Halachah 2.

I.e., the difference between the value of the animals when they were small and their value once they have grown.

For it is not until this time that one will receive a proper price for them.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 4.

I.e., the difference between the value of the animals before they were fattened and their value afterwards.

I.e., this extra amount is considered his wage.

Of the same type. Thus, he is performing the same work for his own animals as he performs for the sake of the animal that was entrusted to him. Therefore, he need not be paid a large amount as a wage.

Note the parallel in Chapter 6, Halachah 2.

Chapter 6, Halachah 3.

Without the owner’s having to pay the caretaker a wage.

And thus, one might say that caring for the portion that is an entrusted article appears as interest.

And this benefit takes the place of his wage.

And thus caring for it appears as interest.

From the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 177:23), it would appear that 18 months is sufficient for cattle.

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) write that the owner may also require the caretaker to keep the animal for the entire duration. For, since the animal is older and eats more, greater effort may be necessary to provide for its upkeep (Turei Zahav 177:30).

For if the division is made before then, the caretaker will have invested a share of work that exceeds the measure of the profits that he could reap.

E. g., sheep or goats.

Who are knowledgeable with regard to such matters. See Chapter 5, Halachah 9.
This applies in an instance when he does not notify his partner. If he notifies his partner, the presence of three people is not necessary (Beit Yosef, Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 177:23).

For it is part of his share of the profits of raising the other animals.

He does not have to be given a wage for caring for his colleague’s share of the animal, since he is already caring for his own portion of that same animal. (See Kessef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh.)

By making the stipulation, the caretaker is concluding their partnership with regard to that animal, and then renewing it on different terms. If, however, he does not make such a stipulation, the original partnership continues. In such an instance, the offspring are considered part of the profits of that partnership and are divided accordingly. Note the parallel in Bava Batra 143b.

I.e., it should be considered an expense of the partnership and borne equally by both partners. If the caretaker carries the merchandise himself, he should be paid this wage (Turei Zahav 177:27).

Because handling an animal is more difficult than handling merchandise. Our translation is based on the commentary of the Lechem Mishneh. Rashi, Bava Metzia 68b and the Ra’avad interpret the phrase s’char behemah as referring to an additional amount paid for carrying the animal. For when an animal is young, there are times when the caretaker is required to carry it from place to place.

For these require even greater care.

As explained on several occasions, when a person enters into a business arrangement, unless it is explicitly stated otherwise, we assume that he agrees to follow the locally accepted norms.

Landed property is considered to remain in the possession of its owner at all times. Hence, there is no concept of a loan involved, and therefore no question of interest. Indeed, the Sages of the Mishnah themselves would employ sharecroppers (Kessef Mishneh).

We assume that the two agreed to divide the profits according to the ratio that prevails throughout the local community.

Witnesses to the agreement or a signed contract.

I.e., is knowledgeable about farming and would till the land himself if he could not find a sharecropper to till it [Rashi (Ketubot 80a)].

For it was the husband who hired them, and their contract is with him (Hilchot Gezelah 10:12).

See Hilchot Gezelah loc cit., which explains that they are considered having tilled a person’s property without permission. Therefore, they are judged at a disadvantage. If they increase the value of the field more than they spend, they are given only their expenses. And if the value of the field has not increased as much as they spent, they are given only the amount of the field’s increase in value. See also Hilchot Ishut 23:9.
The reason for this severe ruling is that the woman could tell the sharecroppers: “These are the conditions that my ex-husband would have had to abide by. Had you not accepted the field, he would have had to till it. Hence, I should not be forced to lose any more than I would if he had tilled it” (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., whether or not she was married, the woman would have hired them. Hence, they are given the advantage in court if the woman desires to have them removed. If they spent more than the increase in the value of the field, they are reimbursed for their expenses. If the field’s increase in value exceeds their expenses, they are reimbursed for the increase in value.

See Hilchot Nachalot, Chapter 9, which explains these concepts in greater detail.
From that source and from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Batra 9:4), it appears that the guiding principle is that as long as they do business as a group, they are judged as partners. If, however, one of the brothers or partners invests his own money or effort into a separate enterprise, that is considered a private undertaking.

See Hilchot Nachalot 9:6, which explains that this ruling applies when the person is appointed to this position because of his father - i.e., the king says: "Let us perform a kindness to the orphans." If, however, the king appoints the son because of his own merits - without considering those of his father - he is entitled to the profit himself.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 177:2) rules that before paying for the cure, the partners may elect to dissolve the partnership.

For his sickness is considered an act of God to be borne by all the members of the partnership.

E. g., ate foods that are known to cause sickness (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah).

For in this instance, he himself was the cause of his sickness.
Based on the Ramban and other Rishonim, the Shulchan Aruch (Ibid.) qualifies the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that if the person’s cure has a limited, defined cost, he must bear it himself. If, however, the cost is undefined, it must be borne by the others, even though his illness was due to his own negligence.
The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that when the person is negligent, the others are never liable. Moreover, even when he did not cause his sickness himself, if it has a definite cost, he must bear it alone.

Partners who both invested in the partnership, or partners in an investment arrangement. The Hagahot Maimoniot differ and maintain that the manager of an investment partnership (iska) is not required to take this oath. Both views are cited by the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 93:4) Note, however, Halachah 6.

In contrast to one appointed by the deceased before his passing. The reason for the difference between them can be explained as follows: A guardian appointed by the court is very happy that he was chosen for this appointment and therefore is willing to undertake this responsibility even though he will be required to take an oath. One appointed by a private individual, by contrast, does not derive such satisfaction. Hence, it is possible that he will refrain from accepting the appointment because he will be required to take an oath.

When, however, a woman is charged merely with managing her household expenses, she cannot be required to take an oath [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 97:1)].

Who manages certain household affairs, as stated in Halachah 4.

Despite the fact that this oath was instituted by our Sages, it must be taken while holding a sacred article, as is required when taking an oath mandated by Scriptural Law.

There is a parallel to this in Scriptural Law. A watchman is required to take an oath if he claims that an entrusted article was destroyed in a manner that does not require him to pay, although the owner of that article does not know whether or not his claim is valid. There is, however, a distinction between the oath mentioned in this halachah and an oath taken by a watchman. A watchman is automatically required to take an oath. In this instance, an oath is required only when the plaintiff suspect wrongdoing and demands that the oath be taken.

The plaintiff can require that this oath be administered at any given time. He need not wait until their relationship is terminated [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 93:1)].

For an oath is a serious matter and will not be taken lightly.

I.e., although generally an oath is not required unless the plaintiff has a definite claim against the defendant (see Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:7), an exception is made in this instance, because of the rationale stated by the Rambam.

A me’ah is one sixth of a dinar, and 32 p’rutot.

It would appear that the reference is to Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 3:1. See the following note.

As explained in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an, a person who admits a portion of a claim is not required to take an oath unless the claim against him is for more than two me’ah. Following the principle that the Rabbis structured their rulings in imitation of Scriptural Law, this Rabbinic oath is not required unless there is a claim of two me’ah.
Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an also states that the defendant must admit at least a p’rutah’s worth of the claim against him. If, however, he denies the claim entirely he is not required to take such an oath. There are some authorities who maintain that such a motif is required in the present situation as well. The Rambam, based on the rulings of his teacher, Ri Migash, differs and maintains that in these instances, even if the defendant denies the claim entirely, he is required to take an oath.
This is the interpretation of the Kessef Mishneh. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 93:7 takes issue with the Kessef Mishneh’s interpretation of the Rambam’s ruling, and maintains that the Rambam also requires the defendant to admit a portion of the claim. The Siftei Cohen 93:3 supports the Kessef Mishneh, explaining that this view is also evident from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh’vuot 7:8).

I.e., even though the heirs are unsure of the matter, we advance this claim on their behalf.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo question the Rambam’s statements, explaining that it is possible to say that the law the Rambam quotes as a proof applies only in situations where the heirs suspect that the widow took two silver me’ah.
The Lechem Mishneh supports the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that from Ketubot 87a, the source for the ruling with regard to the widow, it appears that after the death of her husband, his heirs require her to take an oath on the business she conducted during his lifetime. It is highly unlikely that they knew the detail of these affairs to the extent that they could have strong suspicions concerning money that she did or did not take.
In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 93:3), however, Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Rambam’s ruling with regard to a partner. With regard to a widow who served as a guardian, he quotes both views, but appears to favor the opinion stated by the Rambam [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 98:4)].

A Torah scroll or tefillin, as stated in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:2.

The principle of migo means that a person is freed from an obligation because there is another more acceptable claim available to him than the claim he offers. We assume that had he desired to lie he could have told the better lie. For example, if the signatures of the witnesses to a promissory note have not been verified, the defendant’s word would be accepted if he claims that the promissory note is a forgery. Therefore, if he claims that he repaid a loan, his claim is accepted, for had he desired to lie, he could have claimed that the promissory note is a forgery.
Similarly, in the instance at hand, since there are no witnesses, if the person had denied that he was his colleague’s partner or sharecropper, his word would have been accepted. Hence, one might argue that it would be appropriate to free him from the obligation of taking an oath on the principle of migo. For had he desired to lie, he could have claimed that he was not the partner.
The Rambam does not accept this view. Although he agrees that the principle of migo is effective in freeing a person from a financial obligation, he maintains that it cannot be used to free a person from the obligation of taking an oath.
The Turei Zahav (Choshen Mishpat 296:1) explains the Rambam’s logic as follows: Torah law often relies on the principle of chazakah - i.e., since this is the logical probability, we presume that it is indeed the case. Nevertheless, as we see from Pesachim 4a, when it is possible to clarify a situation, we do not rely on a chazakah, and instead require that a clarification be made. Similarly in the present instance - although there are other situations where we rely on the principle of migo. In this instance, since it is possible to clarify the matter by requiring an oath, we make such a requirement.
It must be emphasized that the Rambam’s opinion is not accepted by all authorities. The Maharam of Rutenberg and other Ashkenazic masters maintain that an oath is not required in such a situation. His opinion is quoted by Rabbenu Asher and the Tur. Both the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 93:2) and the Ramah quote the Rambam’s ruling in this instance. In other contexts (see Choshen Mishpat 296:1), the Ramah does mention the view of the Ashkenazic authorities.

Because of his involvement, we fear that he may take leniency with certain matters.

Since he is not involved in the business affairs of the household, there is no suspicion that he will take moneys belonging to the household for himself. Therefore, unless a definite claim is issued against him, he cannot be required to take an oath.

In contrast to one appointed by the court. (See the notes on Halachah 1; see also Hilchot Nachalot 11:5.)

She cannot even be required to take an oath concerning these matters through the principle of gilgul sh’vuah (that while taking an oath concerning one matter, she may be required to take an oath concerning another) [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 98:5)].

I.e., the Rambam is speaking about a situation where money is needed to pay for the burial and funeral, and the woman sells some of the property of the estate to meet these costs. We fear that if she knows that she will be required to take an oath with regard to her business dealing, he will refrain from doing so, and the deceased will remain unburied. In the Talmudic age, when refrigerated morgues did not exist, an extended wait would cause the deceased’s corpse to decompose and become foul-smelling.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that an agent is certainly required to take an oath when he receives a wage for his services. One might, however, think that when the agent performs these services merely as a favor, he cannot be required to take an oath - for then a person might refrain from doing such a favor - and it is therefore necessary to explain that even in such a situation, the person is required to take an oath (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 93:10).
This point is significant, for there are opinions that maintain that the administrator of an investment partnership is not required to take this oath. These opinions maintain that since he is receiving a fee for his services, he will not take the license of taking from the investment’s resources. As mentioned in the notes on Halachah I, the Rambam does not accept this view.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo mentions that the Rambam’s view is not accepted by the Rashba, who maintains that an agent cannot be required to take an oath unless he shares in the profit, or unless he continuously carries out business on behalf of the principal. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 93:4) he quotes both opinions.

For even the partner who did not do business had the opportunity to take from the goods or the funds of the partnership.

For he has nothing to do with the workings of the partnership.

He may, however, have the court issue a conditional ban of ostracism [Halachah 9; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 93:6)].

Remaining silent at the time of the dissolution of the partnership is tantamount to admitting that he harbors no suspicions against him.

For when one person has a definite claim against a colleague, he can bring the matter to court even though many years have passed since the occurrence of the event on which the claim is based. The fact that two people were once partners does not deprive either of the right to issue such a claim (Kessef Mishneh).

As explained in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:12, whenever a person is required to take an oath, the plaintiff can require him to take an oath concerning any other claim the plaintiff has against him. This is called gilgul sh’vuah. Our halachah introduces a concept that is slightly innovative. For as reflected in the latter clause of the halachah, despite the fact that the plaintiff’s claim - both the claim that requires the first oath and the claim concerning which the second oath must be taken - is not definite, the defendant may still be required to take an oath (Kessef Mishneh).

Even a sh’vuat hesset, which is a more lenient oath than other Rabbinic oaths, as evident from Chapter 10, Halachot 1-2.

Thus, the debts are also considered as if they have already been divided.

For no evaluation is necessary. All that is required is that each partner come and take his share, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 9. This ruling applies even if the partners do not know the exact amount of cash remaining.

For ultimately that article will be returned. See Chapter 5, Halachah 9, with regard to the manner in which produce must be divided.

For once it is weighed, it is known how it will be divided.

Halachah 7.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, Halacbah 11, in Hilchot Gezeilah 4:8, and in other sources, in the post-Talmudic period, the Geonim ordained that as a measure of protection against false claims, a conditional ban of ostracism could be issued against anyone who performs the wrong one litigant alleges that the other is committing. Although the litigant's name is not mentioned, the Geonim felt that the ban might frighten him and cause him to admit his guilt.

The commentaries have noted somewhat of a difficulty with the Rambam’s statements, because the defendant appears to be admitting a portion of the plaintiff’s claim. In such an instance, he would seemingly not be considered a kofer bakol, one who denies a claim entirely, and who is required to take merely a sh’vuat hesset. Instead, he would be considered a modeh b’miktzat, one who admits a portion of the claim, and would seemingly be required to take an oath according to Scriptural Law.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 93:21 explains that this refers to a situation in which the plaintiff maintains that 100 zuz. were due to him by virtue of the stipulation, and that he received only 50. The defendant, by contrast, claims that the stipulation entitled the plaintiff to only 50 zuz, and that – as the plaintiff admits – those 50 were already paid. Thus, the defendant denies entirely the claim that the plaintiff is making at present.

See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:14, which states that when a person makes two claims against a colleague and two oaths are required of the defendant – one severe and one lenient – the defendant is not required to take both oaths. Instead, the defendant is required to take the more severe oath, and to include the other claim through the convention of gilgul sh’vuah.

I.e., claims that the defendant denies entirely.

As required of any person who denies a claim entirely.
There are two advantages to requiring the partner to take a lesser oath:
a) As stated in Chapter 9, Halachah 2, the oath concerning partnership is required only when the partner suspects his colleague of taking two silver me’ah. A sh’vuat hesset can be required even for a lesser amount.
b) If the lesser oath is required, the focus will be on the specific claim the plaintiff is making. His hope is that rather than deny a specific claim under oath, the defendant will admit his guilt (Or Sameach).

Using the convention of gilgul sh’vuah.

Which is the more severe oath.

In which instance, he could not compel him to take the oath required of partners, as stated in Chapter 9, Halachah 7.

The law requiring a partner to take an oath is a Rabbinic ordinance enacted to protect the interests of the partners. Nevertheless, the Rabbis gave a partner these rights only when we are certain that the partnership is still viable. If, as in the situation described above, that is in question, the defendant is not required to take this oath.

And the defendant denies agreeing to such a stipulation.

In which instances, the assets of the partnership are considered to be divided, and an oath can no longer be required.

For the testimony of the witnesses does not contribute any information that is unknown to us.

As in this instance, where if the defendant admitted the plaintiff’s claim, he would be obligated to take only the oath required of partners.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 93:17 differs with this ruling, explaining that the principle stated by the Rambam applies only in a situation when the plaintiff claims that the defendant did not take an oath that he had been obligated by the court to take, and the defendant claims that he already took it. In this situation, however, the defendant had not yet been required to take an oath and could be required if he admits the plaintiff’s claim.
The Siftei Cohen 93:11 rejects the argument advanced by Sefer Me’irat Einayim. He explains that the basic principle is that the oath required of a partner by the Sages is a form of assistance granted to the plaintiff, and a sh’vuat hesset or including an oath through the convention of gilgul sh’vuah is a second measure of assistance, and two measures of assistance are not granted concerning the same claim.

This is a definite claim, and requires a sh’vuat hesset if denied by the defendant.

Similarly, the plaintiff can compel the defendant to include in the oath that he does not owe him anything from the profits of the partnership (Siftei Cohen 93:13).

In the previous halachah.

Since witnesses refuted his statements, we assume that he is trying to lie and avoid taking the oath. Therefore, we do not accept any further claims from him in this regard. Moreover, there is a contradiction implied in his own statement, for by stating that he was not the plaintiff partner, he admits that he never divided the assets of the partnership. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 93:20.

We do not, however, assume that he will lie under oath. Since a false oath is a very severe matter, we believe that even a person who might lie about other matters will not take a false oath.

As the Rambam writes in Chapter 4, Halachah 3, although they did not invest equal amounts, they share evenly in the profits and the losses. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the loss should be shared by the partners according to the ratio of their investment.

In that way, the loss of 500 dinarim would be shared equally.

He should not, however, take an oath that the partnership lost 500 dinarim. Since Shimon will not be required to pay the amount required as a consequence of such an oath, it is not proper that Reuven mention this figure (Kessef Mishneh).

100 dinarim.

And Shimon does not admit the loss. Reuven is not given the opportunity to support his claim with an oath for the reason stated by the Rambam at the conclusion of the halachah.

If, however, Reuven is uncertain whether or not Shimon knows of the loss, he cannot require him to take an oath, as stated in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:12.

And therefore should share in it equally.

Alternatively, Reuven may have him take a sh’vuat hesset that he does not know of the loss and compel him to take the oath required of partners through the convention of gilgul sh’vuah (Kessef Mishneh).

Since the convention of gilgul sh’vuah is involved, Reuven need not have a definite claim that Shimon knows of the loss (Kessef Mishneh).

In which instance, Shimon cannot be required to take the oath required of partners, as stated in Chapter 9, Halachah 6.

And Shimon does not admit to knowing of the loss.

And Reuven would thus suffer an even greater loss, losing 350 of the 500 dinarim.

The rationale is that since he had the money in his possession, if he had wanted to deceive Reuven, he could have given the money to Shimon without acknowledging the debt.

Hence Levi is not obligated to pay Reuven anything. The Ra’avad states that this applies only when the promissory note is in Shimon’s hands. If, however, the promissory note states that the money is owed to the partnership and it is in Reuven’s possession, Levi is excused from liability only for the share owed to Shimon. The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam would accept this law. It is cited by the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 93:14)

That the debt was paid or that Reuven agreed to extend credit for the longer period.

I.e., if he claimed that credit was extended for a longer time. If, however, he claimed that the debt was paid, he may not demand payment from Levi (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 93:31).