Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Mu’ad literally means “forewarned” - i.e., the animal is prone to perform such acts, and the owner should be forewarned.

From two acceptable witnesses.

For it is possible that the animal was disturbed by certain factors on that day, and its conduct is not indicative of its ordinary pattern.

I.e., that it gored three other animals on three days (Ra’avad, Maggid Mishneh).

Hilchot Sanhedrin 5:12 states that this refers to a court of three judges who received semichah. For this reason, ever since this semichah was nullified, animals were no longer placed into the category of mu’ad. Accordingly, these laws do not apply in the present age.

All the first three people are considered to be mentally incompetent and are not held responsible for their conduct.

I.e., the Rambam explains that the ox gored another ox, a guardian was appointed, and then it gored again. (See Or Sameach.)

Rashi (Bava Kama 39a), Rabbenu Asher and the Ra’avad differ and maintain that a guardian is not appointed unless the ox gores three times. Otherwise, the owners are not held liable.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 406) states that the payment is made from the property of the orphans, and not from that of the guardian.

Bava Kama 4:3 uses the expression “A bull from a stadium.” In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam explains “This one sends out his bull and the other sends out his bull. After having trained their animals [to gore], they call to them to attack the other animal to see who will be victorious. This is done with the owner’s consent. This is the habit of many foolish people.”

See Halachah 3. Although previously the guardian was responsible for watching the ox, the change in responsibility is not a change in ownership, and the ox’s status is not changed.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama. 2:4). In neither source does the Rambam mention how often the children must play with the ox. With this ruling, the Rambam rejects an opinion stated in Bava Kama 23b, which states that if three days pass when the ox sees other oxen and does not gore them, the warning is rescinded.

Conversely, an ox that has been classified as mu’ad with regard to animals is not considered to be mu’ad with regard to humans.

Rashi (Bava Kama 37a) explains that on the Sabbath, an ox is not required to work. Hence, it may not feel the yoke of its master as thoroughly and may therefore cause damage. Others cite the Jerusalem Talmud which explains that since people dress differently on the Sabbath, the ox will not be familiar with them, and may gore them because it views them as strangers. This does not apply during the week.

Our translation is based on the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh, which reflects the Rambam’s wording in Halachot 10 and 12. The Rambam is explaining that to be classified as mu’ad for a type of animal, an ox does not have to gore that type of animal three times. The Ra’avad differs and explains that the ox is considered to be mu’ad for all types of animals.

Thus, if it gores an ox on an odd day, its owner will be liable for the full extent of the damages, and if it gores on an even day, he will be liable for only half the damages.

A parallel to this law is found with regard to fixing the pattern of the onset of menstruation. See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 8:6.

I.e., it appears that the shofar blasts prompt the ox to gore.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling, asking why the animal would be considered. to be mu’ad for only this block of three days.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 11.

I.e., with a gate that can withstand an ordinary wind. According to the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 396:1), this halachah is speaking about guarding the animal in an inferior manner as explained in the notes to Chapter 4, Halachah 4. If the animal is guarded in an excellent manner, there is no liability.

According to the Rambam, the owner is not liable for even half the damages. Rabbenu Asher and others differ. According to their view, since he did guard the ox to some degree, he is not liable for the full damages. He is, however, liable for half the damages, for there is no reason why the laws governing him should be more lenient than those governing an ordinary ox. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 396:1.

Note the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama, conclusion of Chapter 4), which states that since this ox frequently gores, it is a mitzvah to slaughter it.

Since the ox is considered to be a tam with regard to one element of goring, the owner is never freed from the obligation to pay the half damages that the owner of an ordinary ox would pay.

Although these principles are stated in the Torah explicitly with regard only to damage done to another animal, Bava Kama 33a explains how an equation to human injury is derived.

For Leviticus 24:19, the source for the laws applying to human injury, states: “When a man will cause a blemish to a colleague.... “Implied is that these laws apply only when the injury is caused by another man.

Hilchot Chovel UMazik 1:1,9.

A human being is not liable in these instances. The rationale is that he is liable for capital punishment for injuring his parents or desecrating the Sabbath. Whenever a person incurs both liability for capital punishment and monetary restitution with the performance of a single deed, he is freed of responsibility for the monetary claim. See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:5,7.

The words “as if it had gored in the public domain” refer to the fact that the owner of an ox that is tam pays for only half the damages. One might draw a comparison to the damage caused by eating or treading, in which instance the owner of the ox is not held liable for damage caused in the public domain, but he is liable for the entire amount of damages caused in the domain of the owner of the produce. To counter this hypothesis, the Rambam emphasizes that with regard to goring, one is liable “as in the public domain,” but not more.

E. g., the ox was covered with filth at the time it fell into the cistern.

E. g., the ox spoiled it with its wastes.

See Chapter 13, Halachah l.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that, as stated in Chapter l, Halachot 8-9, when an ox causes damage in a courtyard belonging jointly to its owner and another person, the owner of the ox is liable for the damage it causes. Why then, asks the Ra’avad, is the owner of the ox not liable in this situation? The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 398:5), however, quotes the Rambam’s ruling.

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 3, Halachot 13-15, the Tur differs with Rambam and maintains that granting the owner of the ox permission to bring his ox into the courtyard is equivalent to accepting responsibility for any damage to it caused by the owner or his property. With regard to damages caused by others, however, the owner of the courtyard is not liable unless he accepts responsibility. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) quotes the Rambam’s wording, while the Ramah follows the perspective of the Tur.

The Maggid Mishneh and Sefer Me’irat Einayim 398:2 state that the owner of the courtyard is generally not liable for the injury another person suffered because of these pits, since he can always claim: “Who gave you permission to enter my property?” Only when the owner gives up ownership of his property or gives others the right to enter is he liable.

This phrase has attracted the attention of the commentaries, for it implies that if the owner of the courtyard knew that the animal had entered his property, he would be liable even when he caused the damage accidentally. From Hilchot Chovel UMazik 1:16, 6:3, however, it appears that he would not be liable in such an instance. See Migdal Oz, Lechem Mishneh.

Note the contrast to Hilchot Geneivah 1:15. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 403:1.

The Tur maintains that the time that is significant is not the time of the animal’s death, but the time when its owner is notified regarding its death. Until that time, the one who caused the damage is responsible for the loss. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 403:2) mentions this view.

And not 120.

I.e., the 100 zuz that the owner of the ox lost, minus 10 zuz, which is the share of the profit given to the person who caused the damage.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 403:2) emphasize that although the person who caused the damage is given a share in the value of the dead ox, this applies only with regard to the loss. If the price of meat rises to the extent that the meat of the ox is worth more than the ox was worth when it was alive, the one who caused the damages is not given a share of the profits.

I.e., the price of cattle increased.

I.e., 50 zuz if the ox was mu’ad. With regard to the larger sum, the matter is considered one of grama, an indirect cause of damage. Therefore, the owner of the ox is not liable (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 404:2).

Tosafot, Bava Kama 10b draws a distinction between this instance and Halachah 8, which states that the increased loss to the carcass is suffered by its owner. The rationale for this distinction is that once the ox died, its owner should have sold it immediately. In this instance, since the ox was still alive, its· owner thought that it would recover and that the loss would be less.

This increase is significant, because the owner of the ox that was damaged can collect the payment (half of the damage) for the damages, only from the body of the ox that caused the damage. Thus, if the damage to an ox was 200 zuz, and the ox that caused the damage was worth only 80 zuz, the fact that its value increased to 100 zuz could affect the amount the owner of the damaged ox receives.

I.e., in the above instance, the payment would be only 80 zuz. The rationale is that the owner of the ox who caused the damage will say: “Did I fatten my ox so that you will take the profit?”
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 404:2) differ and maintain that if the increase in the value of the ox exceeds the cost of fattening it, the cost of fattening it is deducted from its value, and the person whose ox was damaged receives half of the difference.

I.e., in the above instance, the payment would be 100 zuz. The rationale is that since the body of the ox that caused the damage is on lien for the damages, and now that body is worth 100 zuz, the entire amount may be expropriated. Note the Or Sameach, who emphasizes that although the payment is taken from the body of the ox that caused the damages, the lien is not established until the time of the trial. Thus, if the owner of the ox that caused the damage consecrates it, it is consecrated, and the owner of the damaged ox receives no payment at all.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 403) writes that although the responsibility to raise the ox is that of the owner of the cistern, if the owner of the ox becomes aware that his ox fell into the cistern, he must raise it and then bill the owner of the cistern for his costs. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 403:8 quotes this ruling.

It is as if the verse reads “He shall give monetary recompense and the carcass to the owners” (Bava Kama 10b).

Halachah 8.

I.e., the owner of the ox consecrated it to serve as a burned offering or a sin offering, or (if it was blemished) to donate its value to the Temple, but he did not bring it to the Temple as yet.

One can infer that since the ox that is consecrated no longer belongs to a colleague, the laws that follow in the verse do not apply.

See Hilchot Me’ilah, which describes these laws.

For they are all considered to be “consecrated unto God.”

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashini, which describes when a consecrated animal is p1aced into this category.
See Chapter 12, Ha1achah 21, from which it is evident that the 1iab1ity applies on1y when a disqualified animal was a1ready redeemed. If it has not been redeemed, the owner is not liable.

Although it is forbidden to work with, or shear these anima1s, they are still considered the private property of their owners and are thus “an ox belonging to a co11eague.”

Since the meat of a peace offering is eaten by the owners, the anima1 is still considered to be their personal property, despite the fact that it is consecrated. Therefore, payment for the damages can be expropriated from the meat.
See the commentary of the Lechem Mishneh, who questions the apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s ruling here and his ru1ing in Hilchot Geneivah 2:1.

Those that may be eaten outside the Temple Courtyard.

Hilchot Me’ilah 2:1.

Forty loaves of bread are offered together with the thanksgiving offering. These are, however, considered to be a separate entity and are not on 1ien to the person whose property was damaged.

I.e., as befits sacrifices of lesser sanctitv.

I.e., one might think that the person whose property was damaged might be entitled to expropriate the amount of the loss from the body of the ox. Nevertheless, since the ox was acquired by its present owner after the damage took place, he is not held responsible.

Bava Kama 44b derives this concept from the exegesis of Exodus 21:29. If, however, the previous owner retakes possession of the ox, he is liable for the damages even though he declared it ownerless [Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 406:3)]. With regard to the sale of the ox, see Halachah 6. (See also Halachah 8 and notes.)

The Ra’avad differs with the rationale stated by the Rambam, and objects because the gentiles seize animals in lieu of payment for the damage that they cause. The Ra’avad maintains that by speaking of “a colleague’s ox,” the Torah excludes one belonging to a gentile. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 406:1) quote the Rambam’ s ruling.

See Hilchot Melachim 10:12, which states:
[The following rules apply when] there is [a dispute] between a Jew and an idolater: If the Jew will fare better according to their laws, they are judged according to their laws.... If the Jew will fare better according to our laws, they are judged according to Torah law.... It appears to me that this approach is not followed with regard to a resident alien. He is always judged according to their laws.
See also the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 4:3), which echoes and expands upon this principle.

It would appear that the intent of the word mitzvot, meaning “commandments,” is the seven universal laws commanded to Noach and his descendants. One of them is the law obligating societies to set up a system of civil law. See Bava Kama 38a.

For the damages that an ox that is tam causes are collected from its body. Thus, it is as if the ox is on lien for the damages it caused.

This implies that the sale is not nullified. The purchaser may plow with the ox directly after the purchase. Moreover, he cannot return it to the original owner because of the claim against it.

I.e., why the purchaser is at all responsible for the damage the ox caused previously.

Implied is that in essence the person whose property was damaged should be allowed to collect his due from the ox without redeeming it. Our Sages, however, did not allow this, because a person who knew that the ox was consecrated, but did not know that it had gored, might see it being given to the person whose property was damaged and think that an animal that was consecrated can lose its sacred status without being redeemed. Instead, they required that the. person whose property was damaged redeem the ox for a minimal fee and then collect his due from it (Maggid Mishneh).
The Chatam Sofer (Choshen Mishpat, Responsum 165) notes that there appears to be a contradiction between this halachah and Halachah 4. From Halachah 4, it appears that the person can. consecrate the ox and thus totally nullify the lien of the person whose property was damaged. From this halachah, by contrast, it appears that the lien remains.
In resolution, the Chatam Sofer makes a distinction between the sanctification of the value of the ox (as in this halachah), in which instance the lien remains, and the sanctification of the body of the ox (as in Halachah 4), in which instance the lien is nullified.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 407:2) state that if the slaughter causes the value of the ox to depreciate, the owner must reimburse the person whose property was damaged for the loss.

And therefore the recipient of the present may work with the animal.

For the lien on the body of the ox possessed by the person whose property was damaged has now been firmly established. He thus becomes a partner in the ownership of the ox, and the original owner cannot carry out a sale without informing him.

I.e., if the obligation were incumbent on the person whose ox caused the damage himself or on his property, those who had a prior claim would be entitled to take the ox as payment. In this instance, the obligation is associated with the body of the ox itself, and therefore the person whose property was damaged is entitled to the ox for the reason mentioned by the Rambam.

The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 407:4). The Tur and the Ramah differ and state that if the owner of the ox had already designated the ox as payment for a specific debt that existed before the damage took place, that creditor has a right to the ox.

According to Talmudic law, an earlier debt takes precedence over a later one with regard to landed property. With regard to movable property, by contrast, whichever creditor takes control of an asset first is entitled to it.

This explains the fundamental difference between damage caused by a tam and a mu’ad. When a tam causes damage, its own body is on lien for the damage; the damage is not considered to be a debt owed by the owner of the ox. When, in contrast, a mu’ad causes damage, the opposite is true. The person whose property was damaged has no claim to the ox itself; his claim is borne by all the holdings of its owner.

These laws, though applicable to damage caused by an ox that is mu’ad, apply to all other cases of damage for which a person is held responsible.

Bava Kama 7b explains that movable property is considered to be easier to sell after it has been expropriated than landed property. Therefore, it is considered to be “choicer” and should be given priority.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 419:1 writes that the person who caused the damages has the prerogative of giving the person whose property he damaged movable property or landed property, whichever he desires. The Siftei Cohen 419:2 differs and states that according to the Rambam, the Beit Yosef and others, if the person who caused the damages possesses movable property, he must pay in movable property, regardless of whether or not he desires.

The Hebrew term used by the Rambam literally means “bran.”
As long as the person pays for the damage with movable property, the quality of the movable property with which he pays is of no consequence. The Hagahot Maimoniot state that according to the Rambam and Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, even if the person who caused the damage possesses cash, he may pay the person whose property he damaged with movable property of inferior quality.
Although there is debate concerning this concept among the commentaries, it is accepted as binding by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 419:1).

During the lifetime of the person who caused the damage, the choicest property in his holdings is expropriated. After his death, however, the status of the obligation changes, and the property of least value is expropriated (Gittin 48b).
This law applies regardless of the age of the heirs, even if they are past majority (Maggid Mishneh; Siftei Cohen 419:7). See, however, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 419:5.

In his gloss on Hilchot Ishut 16:7, the Maggid Mishneh explains that ·this ruling reflects a difference in the socio-economic status of the Jewish people. Land was commonly owned in the Talmudic period: In contrast, the ownership of land was less common in the era of the geonim. Movable property thus rose in importance, and a creditor would feel secure even when an obligation was supported only by movable property.

Thus, although it is post-Talmudic in origin, it should be adhered to because of its universal acceptance. See, however, Hilchot lshut 16:8.

When an ox that is mu’ad kills a human being, the ox should be executed, and its owner is obligated to pay an atonement fine, as explained in Chapter 10. The Ra’avad explains that if a person admits that either he or his property caused damage, he is obligated for financial payment and for an atonement fine. His ox is not, however, executed because of his statements.

Who are disqualified from serving as witnesses, because they are suspected of pasturing their flocks in fields belonging to other people, for this is equivalent to stealing (Hilchot Edut 10:4).

Who are not acceptable witnesses (Hilchot Edut 9:2,4,7).

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 35:14) writes that although this is the legal standard, it has already become customary to accept witnesses whose testimony would ordinarily be disqualified, if there is no way of finding witnesses who are acceptable. Note, however, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 35:30, which states that the Ramah’s leniency does not apply with regard to damages.

In this as in many other instances, the Rambam emphasizes that circumstantial evidence - no matter how indisputable - is not sufficient. According to Torah law, a claim can be established only through the testimony of witnesses. (See also Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:4; Hilchot Sanhedrin 20:1, 24:1.)