Torah Reading for Mishpatim

i.e., the right ear. Or perhaps it only means the left ear, which is a relatively lighter punishment? Scripture therefore states the word אֹזֶן here and אֹזֶן in another place to make an analogy based on similar words (גְזֵרָה שָׁוָה); it says here, “His master must pierce his earlobe (אָזְנוֹ),” and it says regarding the metzora: “the antihelix of the right ear (אֹזֶן) of the person being purified” 8 – just as over there אֹזֶן refers to the right ear, so, too, here אָזְנוֹ refers to the right ear.

And why was the ear seen fit to be pierced out of all limbs of the body? Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai said: This ear that heard at Mount Sinai: “You must not steal,” 9 and went ahead and stole – it must be pierced; and if the bondman is one who sold himself out of poverty: The ear that heard at Mount Sinai: “For the Israelites are servants to Me,” 10 and went ahead and acquired for itself another master – it must be pierced.

Rabbi Shimon expounded this verse in a way that sheds light on the surrounding context like a fine ornament enhances its surroundings: Why were the door and doorpost singled out for this purpose out of all objects in the house? The Holy One, blessed be He, said, “The door and doorpost that were witnesses in Egypt when I passed over the lintel and the two doorposts of the Israelite houses and freed them from slavery, and I said: ‘For the Israelites are servants to Me – meaning that they are My servants’ and not servants to other servants, yet this person went ahead and acquired for himself another master – let his ear be pierced in their presence.”

i.e., like Canaanite bondmen, who go free with the loss of a tooth or an eye. This girl, however, does not go free due to the loss of a tooth or an eye, but works for six years, or until the Jubilee year, or until she shows signs of puberty – whichever is first brings her freedom first – and her master gives her the value of her eye or her tooth as compensation.

Or perhaps the verse means that she does not go free as Hebrew bondmen do – i.e., after six years or at the Jubilee year? Scripture therefore states elsewhere: “If your brother, a Hebrew man, is indentured to you, or a Hebrew woman.” 13 It thus compares a Hebrew woman to a Hebrew man with regard to all stages when he leaves service: Just as a Hebrew man leaves service after six years or at the Jubilee year, so, too, a Hebrew woman leaves service after six years or at the Jubilee year. What then is the meaning of: “she may not leave as bondservants do”? That she does not go free due to damage to tips of limbs as Canaanite bondmen do. I might think that the Hebrew bondman leaves service due to damage to any of his tips of limbs – Scripture therefore states: “a Hebrew man or a Hebrew woman,” comparing a Hebrew bondman to a Hebrew bondwoman: Just as a Hebrew bondwoman does not leave service due to damage to tips of limbs, so, too, does a bondman not leave service due to damage to tips of limbs.

Why was this verse said? Since it says elsewhere: וְאִישׁ כִּי יַכֶּה כָּל נֶפֶשׁ אָדָם מוֹת יוּמָת “If a man strikes any human being, he must be put to death,” 15 I would have understood it to mean even if he struck him with a non-fatal blow. Scripture therefore states here: “He who strikes a man so that he dies,” implying that he is not liable for the death penalty until he strikes him with a fatal blow. And if it had just said: “He who strikes a man,” and not said: “If a man strikes…,” I would have said that he is not liable for the death penalty unless he strikes a man. From where do I know that he is liable even if he strikes a woman or a child? Scripture therefore states: “If a man strikes any human being” – even a child or even a woman.

Furthermore, if it had just said: “He who strikes a man,” I might have understood that even a minor who struck and killed a person is liable for the death penalty. Scripture therefore states: “And if a man strikes” – but not a child who strikes. And also, the verse “If a man strikes any human being” implies even if the victim is a non-viable fetus. Scripture therefore states: “He who strikes a man,” that he is not liable for the death penalty unless he strikes a viable child who is fit to become a man.

צָדָה denotes lying in wait, and similarly it says: “yet you lie in wait (צֹדֶה) for my soul in order to take it.” 16 It is impossible to say that צָדָה is related to הַצָּד צַיִד “who trapped game,” 17 for the letter ה does not appear in the verb for trapping animals, and its noun form is צַיִד, whereas the noun form of the verb צָדָה is צְדִיָּה and its present participle is צוֹדֶה, while the present participle of צַיִד is צָד. I therefore say that its meaning is as Onkelos translates it: וּדְלָא כְמַן לֵהּ “but one who did not lie in wait for him.”

Menachem ben Saruk, however, did list it in the same entry as הַצָּד צַיִד, but I do not agree with him. But if indeed it were to be listed under a class of צד, we would list it under the same class as: “you will be carried (lit.) on the side (עַל צַד) of nations,” 18 “I will shoot to the side (צִדָּה),” 19 and “and he will speak words of blasphemy toward (לְצַד) the Most High,” 20 and thus here, too, אֲשֶׁר לֹא צָדָה means: “he did not turn aside (לֹא צִדֵּד) to discover some position (צַד) for him to die” – but even this explanation raises doubt. In any case, צָדָה denotes lying in wait.

is a wound that draws blood, i.e., he wounded his flesh; “navredure” in Old French. The degree of payment, however, all depends on what kind of wound it is: If it caused depreciation in the victim’s market value, the assailant pays compensation of the damage; and if the victim is confined to bed, he pays him for his loss of work, medical costs, embarrassment, and pain.

Now, this part of the verse is apparently superfluous, but in Chapter HaChovel 10 our rabbis explained it as teaching us that the assailant is liable to pay for the victim’s pain even where he must already pay him compensation for the damage – for although he gives him the value of his hand, we do not exempt him from paying for his pain by saying that since he “acquired” his hand, he may cut it off in any way he wishes; rather, we say: he ought to have cut it off through a drug by which the victim would not suffer so much pain, but this assailant instead cut it off with an iron instrument and caused him pain.

The verse is speaking of where the two animals were equal in value: if one work-bull worth 200 zuz killed another work-bull worth 200 zuz, then whether the carcass of the dead animal is worth much or little, when one party takes half the value of the living animal and half that of the dead one, and the other likewise takes half the value of the living animal and half that of the dead one, the result is that each one suffers the loss of half the damage caused by the death of the animal. We thus learn that a tam (first-offender) pays for half the damage it causes, for from our case where the two bulls were equal in value you may infer that the same applies where they were not equal in value, that the law of the tam is to pay for half the damage it causes, no less and no more. Or perhaps Scripture is speaking even of where the two bulls were not equal in value when alive, that then too they should divide the value of both animals? This cannot be, for if you say so, sometimes the damaging party will end up with a great profit, if the carcass can be sold to non-Jews for a much greater sum than the value of the attacking bull – and it is untenable that Scripture say that the damaging party should profit! Or sometimes it would happen that the damaged party receives much more in compensation than the value of the entire damage, if half the value of the attacking bull is more than the entire value of the attacked bull – and if you say that this is so, it will be that the law of a tam (first-offender) is sometimes more stringent than that of a mu’ad (repeat-offender)! You must therefore agree that Scripture is speaking specifically of where the two bulls were equal in value, and it teaches you that a tam pays for half the damage, and from the case where they were equal in value you may infer what to do in a case where they were not equal in value, that regarding one who is to be paid half the damage done to his animal, we evaluate for him the carcass, and that which the animal has depreciated as a result of its death, he takes half of the depreciation together with the carcass and goes his way.

And why did the verse use this form of expression and not say simply: “he must pay for half of it”? It is in order to teach us that a tam pays for what it damages only up to its own value, and if it gored and then died, the damaged party takes only the carcass of the attacking bull, and if its value does not reach half the damage done to his animal, he loses out; similarly, if a bull worth a maneh gored a bull worth 500 zuz, the damaged party receives only the value of the attacking bull, for the action of a tam does not carry responsibility to make its owner liable to pay from his own best property.

Scripture thus teaches you that when someone claims that an entrusted item was stolen from him and it was discovered that he stole it himself, he must pay double.

And when does this apply? Only when he first swore that it was stolen from him and afterward witnesses came saying that he stole it himself; for so our rabbis 3 expounded the verse: “the owner of the house must approach the judges,” 4 that this “approaching” is for the purpose of swearing. You say it is for swearing, but perhaps it is simply for judgment, in which case once he has come to court and denied liability by saying it was stolen from him, even without taking an oath to that effect, he is liable immediately to pay double if witnesses come and testify that it is really in his possession. To this I answer: The consignee’s claim regarding “laying a hand” (שְׁלִיחוּת יָד) is mentioned here, 5 and similarly “laying a hand” is mentioned below: 6 “an oath to God must take place between the two of them, that the consignee did not lay a hand on his fellow man’s property.” Just as over there Scripture explicitly mentions an oath, so, too, here, this verse refers to an oath.

is the equivalent of וְהָמַמְתִּי – “And I will sow confusion,” and its Aramaic translation is וַאֲשַׁגֵּשׁ. Similarly, any word whose verb form’s last root letter is repeated, when in the form פָּעַלְתִּי (first person singular past tense), there are cases where the repeated letter is dropped and the remaining letter takes a dagesh and is vocalized with a melopum (cholam), such as וְהַמֹּתִי “and I will sow confusion,” from the same root as in וְהָמַם גִּלְגַּל עֶגְלָתוֹ “and his wagon wheel will roar”; 1 וְסַבּוֹתִי “and I turned,” 2 from the same root as in וְסָבַב בֵּית אֵל “and he would make his rounds to Bethel”; 3 דַּלֹּתִי “I was poor,” 4 from the same root as in דָּלְלוּ וְחָרְבוּ “diminished and dried up”; 5 עַל כַּפַּיִם חַקֹּתִיךְ “I have engraved you on My hands,” 6 from the same root as in חִקְקֵי לֵב “(lit.) engravings of the heart”; 7 אֶת מִי רַצּוֹתִי “whom did I oppress,” 8 from the same root as in רִצַּץ עָזַב דַּלִּים “he oppressed and abandoned the poor.” 9

But one who translates וְהַמֹּתִי as וְאֶקְטַל “and I will kill” is mistaken, for if it were of the same root as מִיתָה “death,” its ה would not be vocalized with a patach, nor would its מ take a dagesh and be vocalized with a melopum (cholam). Rather it would be written וְהֵמַתִּי, as in וְהֵמַתָּה אֶת הָעָם הַזֶּה “if You kill this nation,” 10 with the ת taking a dagesh because it is instead of two ת’s – one is a root letter, because no form of the root מות appears without a ת, and the other is part of the suffix along with the י, as in אָמַרְתִּי, חָטָאתִי, and עָשִׂיתִי. Similarly in וְנָתַתִּי, the second ת takes a dagesh because it is instead of two ת’s, for the word ought to have been written with three ת’s – two as part of the root, as in בְּיוֹם תֵּת ה׳ “on the day that God gave over,” 11 and מַתַּת אֱלֹהִים הִיא “it is a gift of God,” 12 and the third as part of the suffix.