Gerushin - Chapter Seven

Eretz Yisrael is singled out because Jewish courts frequently held sessions there, and it was feasible to verify the signatures of the witnesses to the get. In contrast, the courts in the Diaspora held sessions less frequently and verifying the signature of witnesses was a far more formidable task. Therefore, different laws apply, as stated in Halachah 5. In the present age, the laws applying to sending gittin in the Diaspora are also followed in Eretz Yisrael. (See Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Even HaEzer 142:1.)

More particularly, according to the Rambam, only one witness is necessary, because the agent himself may serve as the second witness.

If the signatures of the witnesses can be verified, the husband’s protests are ignored. Once the witnesses sign the get, it is considered as if they have testified in court, and the husband’s statements are of no avail.

See the Beit Shmuel 142:5, which quotes a difference of opinion among the commentaries whether or not the Rambam maintains that the husband’s protest causes the get to be considered void. The consequence of this difference of opinion is the status of the children born out of a second marriage. Are they definitely considered to be illegitimate, or is this a point of doubt?

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam considers the get to be unacceptable because the fact that the husband protests the authenticity of the get and the woman is unable to verify the signatures causes us to question the matter. Since the woman was regarded as married, her status cannot be changed until she receives a get that is not of doubtful status.
The Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 141) explains that although we assume that the woman has not been divorced, we do not know this with absolutely certainty. Hence, if she is consecrated by another man after receiving this get, she must be divorced by this second husband. Similarly, there are other authorities who maintain that the status of the divorce is doubtful.

For in this instance there is no way to verify the signature of the witnesses.

I.e., if the woman remarries, she will be committing adultery, and hence, she will be forbidden to remain married to her first husband. Nor will she be permitted to remain married to her second husband. Since they were involved in an adulterous relationship, they are forbidden to marry.

I.e., just as a mother-in-law may not bring a get for her daughter-in-law, a daughter-inlaw may not bring a get for her mother-in-law.

Despite the fact that this woman has been divorced and remarried, we assume that she still harbors bad feelings towards the woman with whom she shared her previous husband and might desire to create difficulties for her.

I.e., a woman who is married to her husband’s brother. If the woman’s husband died without children, her husband’s brother would be obligated to marry her to fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum. Thus, the two women could ultimately become married to the same man.

Although in this instance the mitzvah of yibbum would not apply because the two sisters are forbidden to marry the same man, our Sages did not differentiate when imposing this restriction.

If, however, there is nothing preventing the agent from carrying out his agency, he may not appoint another agent. For we assume that a husband would object to the substitution (Gittin 29a).

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 6, Halachah 4, there are opinions that differ and require the appointment of an agent to be observed by witnesses. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:11) favors the Rambam’s view with regard to the appointment of the agent himself, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:40) follows the other opinions with regard to the agent’s appointment of a second agent. In practice, the present custom is to have the appointment witnessed.

For the husband, and not the previous agent, is the source of empowerment for the final agent.

Generally, the verification of the signature of witnesses on a legal document requires two witnesses. In this instance, however, an exception was made, and the statements of one individual are accepted. The rationale for this exception can be explained as follows: According to Scriptural Law, there is no need for the signatures of the witnesses to a legal document to be verified. This requirement was instituted by our Sages. And in order to prevent a woman from having difficulties in obtaining a divorce, they relaxed that requirement and accepted the statements of the agent (Gittin 3a).

I.e., we do not suspect that the witnesses were gentiles and that the get is void. For it has been customary for Jews living in the Diaspora to adopt gentile names (Tosafot, Gittin 11b). If, however, the probability is small that a Jew would use such a name, e.g., Nickolas or Patrick, there are authorities who are more stringent. See Beit Shmuel 130:30.

Once the statements of the agent are accepted by the court, they are given the same weight as if they had been made by two witnesses. Therefore, the protest of the husband is of no consequence (Gittin 9a). If, however, the husband brings two witnesses who testify that the get is a forgery, their word — and not that of the agent — is accepted (Halachah 9).

Our suspicion is that these women would forge a get to cause the wife to be forbidden to remain married to both husbands, and that the forgery will be easily discovered, because her first husband will protest the legitimacy of the get. When the agent herself must say ‘‘The get was written and signed in my presence,’’ the first husband’s protest will not be accepted, and the woman will be allowed to remain married to her second husband. As such, the forgery will not achieve its desired result.

Our Sages accepted the statements of the agent as equivalent to those of two witnesses even when he was not required to have made them (Gittin 6b). Note the comments of the Maggid Mishneh, who questions whether this also applies with regard to questions of monetary law — e.g., the payment of the woman’s marriage contract.

The woman might think that the divorce is effective upon receipt of the get and may remarry, without being aware of the difficulties involved.

More particularly, in this matter the agent can serve in three capacities: a) as the agent to give the get, b) as a witness to verify the signatures of the witnesses, and c) as a judge declaring that the signatures have been verified. This is possible because, as explained above, the verification of the get by witnesses is a requirement of Rabbinic Law. In matters of Scriptural Law, a witness may not serve as a judge. (See also Halachah 19.)

I.e., disqualified by the Rabbis. It is not, however, void according to Scriptural Law (Maggid Mishneh). According to the general principles mentioned by the Rambam (Chapter 10, Halachah 2), if the woman remarries in such an instance, she is not obligated to leave her second husband. The Tur (Even HaEzer 142) quotes opinions that differ and require her to leave her second husband, even if her first husband does not protest. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:1) follows the Rambam’s ruling.

See the notes on Halachah 1.

E.g., two witnesses who testify that the get is a forgery.

In Hilchot Terumah 1:7, the Rambam writes: ‘‘With regard to the islands in the sea, we consider their [status dependent] on an [imaginary] line extended from the Samnum Mountains until the River of Egypt. Those within this line are part of Eretz Yisrael. Those outside this line are part of the Diaspora.’’ The Rambam understands the Samnum Mountains as being located in the southeastern corner of Eretz Yisrael, near Ashkelon. Most of the other commentaries understand this term as referring to the Umenum Mountain range in Northern Lebanon.

In the Talmudic era, Babylonia was a center of Torah study and there would be students traveling from all the cities to and from the central yeshivot in Sura, Neharde’a and Pumbedita. Hence, it was possible to find witnesses to verify the authenticity of the signatures on a get (Gittin 6a).

Regardless of whether the get was given in another place in the Diaspora or in Eretz Yisrael, the signature of the witnesses cannot be easily verified, and hence the agent is required to make these statements.

If the get is given in Eretz Yisrael, the signatures of the witnesses can be verified, and hence the agent is not required to make these statements.

The fundamental element to be observed by the agent is the signature of the get by the witnesses. For as long as the scribe wrote a portion of the get lishmah, for the sake of the man and the woman getting divorced, it is sufficient (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Gittin 2:1).
Note the Yadav Shel Moshe, who questions why the Rambam concerns himself with the issue of lishmah. On the difference of opinion between Rabbah and Ravva regarding the reason for the agent having to say: ‘‘It was written and signed in my presence,’’ the Rambam follows the opinion of Ravva, who states that the problem is not lishmah, but rather the verification of the signatures of the witnesses.

Rashi, Gittin 15a, interprets this as referring to the line that contains the man’s name, the woman’s name and the date. Tosafot interprets it as referring to the first line of the get. The Beit Shmuel 142:28 explains that the Rambam accepts neither of these opinions, but means any given line of the get.

If that were the case, the get would not be written lishmah.

For the confirmation of the get must follow the directives outlined by our Sages in their entirety or rely on the verification of the signatures of the witnesses (Tosafot, Gittin 15b).

Since the decree of our Sages was not fulfilled, the only alternative is to verify the signatures of the witnesses.

I.e., the agent says that the get was written, and one signed in his presence, and he and another person verify the signature of the second witness.

The Tur (Even HaEzer 142) differs with this ruling. He agrees that in contrast to a get brought by one agent, a get brought by two agents may be given to the woman without their saying, ‘‘It was written and signed in our presence.’’ Nevertheless, the Tur maintains that if the husband protests the authenticity of the get, the signatures of the witnesses must be verified. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:18) follows the Rambam’s ruling, while the Rama quotes that of the Tur.

This law applies only when the agents are able to serve as witnesses in court. If, however, they are related to the husband or the wife, or would be disqualified for other reasons, they are required to say, ‘‘It was written and signed in our presence.’’

Rashi (Gittin 16b) appears to imply that both agents must be physically holding the get together. The Rashba differs [and this opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:18)] and states all that is necessary is for the agents to state that they were both appointed by the husband and given the get. The Rashba extends this leniency and states that even if only one agent was appointed by the husband, if another person witnessed his appointment and traveled with him, it is not necessary for the agent to say ‘‘It was written and signed in my presence.’’

As mentioned above, according to the interpretation accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, we are not speaking about a second agent, but another person who accompanied the agent.

This is referring to a third individual and not one of the agents.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the statement, ‘‘It was written in my presence,’’ is unnecessary. Since two witnesses testify that they observed the signing of the get, they have verified the signatures of the witnesses. The Rambam mentions this instance only because he is quoting the wording of the Mishnah (Gittin 2:1). And the Mishnah mentions this only as a literary device, so that the wording in its different clauses are parallel.

Even if the two individuals who speak with regard to the signing of the get are not agents, their statements verify the authenticity of the signatures, making it a valid legal document.

This wording implies that if the woman remarried after this divorce, she may remain married to her second husband. Rabbenu Asher and others rule more stringently and maintain that in such a situation, the woman must be divorced by her second husband.

Even after the signatures of the witnesses have been verified, the get should be taken from the woman and returned to her in the presence of witnesses, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 15.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that it is not sufficient for the witness to write these words out. Although a person who cannot speak and who witnessed the death of a woman’s husband is allowed to write out his testimony (Chapter 13, Halachah 28), there is no alternative in that situation. In these circumstances, there is an alternative: to have the signatures of the witnesses verified (Kessef Mishneh).

Gittin 23a states that when an agent is blind, he must be able to recognize the woman by the sound of her voice. It is not sufficient for others to identify her for him. When an agent can see, however, he need not know the woman’s identity and may rely on the statements of others (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 142:11).

Hilchot Edut 9:12 states that a blind person may not serve as a witness and Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:9 states that such a person may not serve as a judge. Hilchot Edut 9:2 states that a woman may not serve in these capacities. Similarly, if the agent is related to the man or the woman, he is incapable of serving as a judge and three witnesses are necessary (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 142:4).

See Halachot 5 and 7 and notes.

It is sufficient for him to appear before two judges, because he can serve as the third judge himself (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 142:9).

As opposed to the situation described in Halachah 4, the agent cannot appoint a second agent himself, because he is required to state in a court of law that the get was written and signed in his presence.

The wording of the Rambam might be understood as implying that the agency is entrusted to the second agent by the court. This, however, is an incorrect inference, for it is the first agent who appoints the subsequent agent. This appointment must, however, be performed in a court to ensure that everything necessary to validate the get is performed. (See Rivash, Responsum 318.)

The Rama (Even HaEzer 142:9) quotes the Rivash as ruling that, if sending a second get would be difficult, it is acceptable for the second agent to bring the get, even though he was not appointed in court, provided he brings a writ of authorization from the first agent.

The reason the appointment of the latter agents must be made in a court is that the signatures of the witnesses have not been verified. By stating that his appointment was made in a court of law, every agent assures the court that the correct process has been followed regarding this get.

If, however, there are no factors preventing the agent from discharging his agency, he may not appoint another agent unless the husband explicitly gave him the authority to do so (Maggid Mishneh).

The Rivash (Responsum 53) differs with this ruling and maintains that if the second agent does not hear the first agent say: ‘‘It was written and signed in my presence,’’ he must be given a writ of appointment. Otherwise, he may not serve in this capacity. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:10) quotes the Rambam’s ruling — and indeed expands upon it, allowing the agent to give the court the authority to appoint any agent they desire. The Rama quotes the ruling of the Rivash.

She must, however, make these statements for the divorce to be effective. Our Sages made this requirement in order not to differentiate between one agency and another (Rashba, commenting on Gittin 24a).

It is likely that a forgery would ultimately be discovered. She would then be forbidden to remain married to her second husband, nor would she be permitted to return to her first husband.
The Maggid Mishneh draws a connection between this halachah and Chapter 12, Halachah 2, which states that the statements of a woman who produces a get are accepted, even though the authenticity of the signatures of the witnesses to the get has not been verified. The Ra’avad in his gloss on Hilchot Avadim 6:7 differs (see also his gloss to Chapter 12, Halachah 2). The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 142:13-14) quotes the opinions of both the Rambam and the Ra’avad. See the Rivash (Responsum 385).

With regard to financial transactions, a person’s statements are not accepted if he has an interest in the matter, unless he substantiates them with proof. Therefore, if a person gives a servant a deed of release that states that he has been freed and has been granted his master’s possessions, his word is accepted with regard to his freedom. With regard to the possessions, however, he is required to substantiate his statements by verifying the authenticity of the witnesses to the deed (Hilchot Avadim 7:2).