Ishut - Chapter Eighteen

Rashi (Gittin 35a) states that as long as the widow does not contemplate remarriage, she is showing honor to her deceased husband, and therefore our Sages ordained that she should receive her subsistence from his estate. However, by demanding payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, she indicates that she is seeking to remarry. From that time onward, her deceased husband’s estate is no longer obligated to support her.
The option whether to continue receiving her subsistence or to demand payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is hers. The heirs cannot compel her to receive the money due her by virtue of her ketubah and cease giving her support (Ketubot 95b; Maggid Mishneh).

The Beit Shmuel 93:13 explains that if the woman asks for payment of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and the heirs refuse to pay her or are unable to do so, she is still entitled to support.

In all these instances, it is considered as if she has already collected the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

In this instance, however, the heirs have the right to pay her the remainder of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and thus prevent her from continuing to collect her subsistence from the estate. If this provision were not granted, every widow would collect all the money due her by virtue of her ketubah except for the final p’rutah, and continue to receive support (Rabbenu Asher, quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 93:10.).

In the present age, this law applies even when the woman has merely become engaged to a new husband (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 93, as quoted by the Rama, Even HaEzer 93:7).

Even if she has not collected the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

Nevertheless, the dwelling becomes the property of the heirs, and they are also entitled to live there. The widow is, however, granted a place of dignity in the household (Maggid Mishneh; Rama, Even HaEzer 94:1).

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that these funds are granted to the widow, but the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 95:5) follows the Rambam’s ruling.

The heirs may, however, fix a price with the physician for the widow’s treatment, and then she becomes responsible for the financial burden (Ketubot 52b; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 79:2).

The rationale is, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 4, that the burial of the woman was granted her in return for the husband’s right to inherit her ketubah. If her heirs can collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, they are required to bury her. If not, since the money for her ketubah remains within the husband’s estate, his heirs are responsible for her burial. Although this is the Rambam’s view, the Ra’avad and Rabbenu Nissim do not accept it. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 89:4) mentions the Rambam’s view and states that it was not accepted by the other authorities.

The same laws apply with regard to her husband during his lifetime, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 4.

These tasks are acts of endearment, appropriate only for a wife to her husband.

Although a husband is granted these rights (Chapter 12, Halachah 3), his heirs are not. The husband is granted the rights to the objects his wife finds so that strife will not arise between them. That rationale is not considered with regard to his heirs (Ketubot 96a).
With regard to the rights to her property: as mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 4, our Sages associated the rights to a woman’s property with her redemption from captivity. Since the heirs are not obligated to redeem her, they are not entitled to this privilege.

The property that a woman brings to her household belongs to her. Her husband has merely the right to derive benefit from it; he is not the owner. With regard to this property, she is treated like any of the other creditors of the estate, and no oath is required of her.

Nichsei tzon barzel is property that the husband has had evaluated, and it is the value of the article for which he obligates himself or his estate. Nevertheless, if the property itself exists, it is given to the woman. If the property has increased in value, however, the husband - and therefore his heirs - are entitled to the increase.

Although the movable property in her husband’s estate is not under lien for her subsistence, it is not taken away from her if she takes possession of it. As the Kessef Mishneh emphasizes, the above applies with regard to the Talmudic era. As stated in the following halachah, it is customary at present to consider movable property as under lien to all a husband’s obligations.
There are some Rishonim who differ with the Rambam and equate the provisions for the widow’s subsistence with the collection of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. (See the following halachah.) The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:20) follows the Rambam’s view.

I.e., a sum that will last far longer than thirty days — the length of time for which the court sells property to provide her with her subsistence — or perhaps more than the worth of the woman’s entire ketubah.

Instead, it must be returned to the heirs. Tosafot (Ketubot 96a) explains the distinction between a woman's taking possession of movable property to collect for her subsistence and the collection of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah as follows. Our Sages ordained that a woman may collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from property that had belonged to her husband and was sold. Therefore, it is likely that the woman will ultimately receive her due. As such, she is required to return the movable property. With regard to her subsistence, however, no such provision was made. Hence, she is given an alternative, to take possession of movable property.

K’nesset HaGedolah explains that, contrary to the standard published texts of the Mishneh Torah, Halachah 12 begins here. This is not a continuation of the previous halachah, because there is a difference with regard to the laws governing movable property between the practices of the Talmudic age and those of the present era.

For if the heirs sell it, the woman has no claim to the proceeds of the sale, nor may she expropriate the property from the purchasers. Similarly, if the heirs destroy the movable property, she has no claim against them. From an ethical perspective, however, the heirs are enjoined not to sell this movable property.

The Chelkat Mechokek 93:36 states that if a specific clause was included in the ketubah regarding this matter, although the widow cannot nullify the sale she has a right to receive her subsistence from its proceeds.

The Rashba states that if a clause was added to the ketubah specifically stating that the woman has the right to collect her subsistence from movable property after her husband’s death, then she is allowed to expropriate the landed property from the purchasers (Maggid Mishneh; Rama, Even HaEzer 93:21).

Our translation is based on manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed texts substitute ‘‘movable property’’ for ‘‘claim for support.’’ Apparently, this version reached the Ra’avad who objects and states — as is the halachah — that the principle applies with regard to landed property as well.

I.e., her husband died childless, and he had a brother who is commanded to marry his widow.

This time period is granted in order to determine whether the woman had conceived with her husband before he died. If three months pass without pregnancy becoming noticeable, we can assume that a child was not conceived.

Until she gives birth or miscarries, she is not entitled to remarry, lest she become bound by the obligation of yibbum. Since it is because of her husband that she may not remarry, his estate is required to provide for her (Rashi, Yevamot 41b).

The Maggid Mishneh states that the latter two clauses — that the yavam became sick or that he lived overseas — apply also only if the yavam had previously appeared in court. If, however, he has never appeared in court, he is not under any obligation.
The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 160:1) follows the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, who states that the yavam is obligated to support her in the latter instances only when he consented to marry her. If he desired to perform chalitzah, he is under no obligation to her.

There is no need for her to take an oath that the yavam had not given her property. Since they have not established a relationship, there is no basis for such suspicions (Ketubot 107b).

Who should not perform the mitzvah of yibbum until he attains majority.

Since he is forbidden to marry her, he is not required to support her. Nor is she entitled to support from her husband’s estate. Yevamot 41b says that it is as if she is penalized from heaven.

The Rambam is referring to statements made by a dying man with regard to the allocation of his property. If these statements are observed by witnesses, they are binding. This practice, referred to as a matnat sh’chiv me’ra (the oral will of a dying man) is described in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:2).

I.e., since it is possible that the woman will suffer a loss, she has the right to protest. If, however, she remained silent, we assume that she accepted her husband’s decision.

The reference is to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who ruled this way in a responsum. His opinion is favored also by the Ra’avad, the Ramban, the Rashba and Rabbenu Asher. Ketubot 105a states that the woman should take an oath ‘‘at the end and not at the beginning.’’ They explain that this refers to a woman whose husband has died. The woman should take the oath when she comes to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, and not when she comes asking for support. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:19) appears to favor this view, and the Rama states that it should be followed.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 16.

Rav Yosef Migash.

They interpret Ketubot (loc. cit.) to be referring to a woman whose husband traveled overseas. She should not take an oath at the outset — i.e., when she comes to collect her subsistence — but rather at the end, if her husband comes and requires this of her. See Chapter 12, Halachah 21.
The dissenting authorities refute this interpretation, explaining that it is far more reasonable to require an oath of a woman when her husband is alive than after his death, for after his death it is very likely that the woman will soon take an oath to collect her ketubah.

In contrast to the sale of property so that the woman can collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Chapter 17, Halachah 13), in this instance the sale need not be publicized. The rationale is that the woman needs the money for her subsistence immediately and should not be required to wait.

Rabbenu Chanan’el and the Ramban differ with the Rambam on this point. Although their opinion is also mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:25), it appears that the Rambam’s opinion is favored.

In this manner, a large amount of property is sold. If a smaller amount were sold, the parcel of land would be too small to fetch a proper price.

I.e., the purchaser gives the widow only enough money to support herself for thirty days at a time. The rationale is that if she remarries or seeks to collect her ketubah, she is no longer entitled to receive support for her subsistence. Since there is the possibility that this will happen at any given time, she is given support for only a limited period of time. In the event that she remarries, the remainder of the money left from the sale is given to the heirs (Rashi, Ketubot 97a).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this is simply proper advice for the woman. For she
can sell all the land necessary to provide her with the money due her by virtue of her
ketubah at one time, while to collect her subsistence she must sell the land in small parcels.
If she chooses, however, she may take the latter alternative.

Since the heirs are orphans, the court is obligated to look after their interests. Therefore, it is obligated to ensure that the woman’s earnings are given to them.

In all these cases, the widow is no longer entitled to receive support from her deceased husband’s estate, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 18.

In this instance, since the probability is that the woman would not have been given a document recording her ketubah, the fact that she does not have such a document in her possession is not considered detrimental to her position.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 31.

See Hilchot Gerushin 12:1.

Since her status is questionable, she is not entitled to support. For this is granted only to a man’s wife and not to his divorcee.

Since divorce is dependent on the husband’s initiative, as long as a woman’s status is in question — and for that reason she may not marry another person — he is required to continue to support her (Rashi, Ketubot 97b).

Ketubot 96a mentions two years and three years, stating that the difference is between a rich widow (who can afford to wait) and a poor one; alternatively, between a brash widow (who is not embarrassed to appear in court) and a modest one (who will hesitate before coming). The Rambam does not mention the second opinion at all (although generally, when the Talmud mentions two opinions, he rules according to the second opinion), nor does the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 93:14). Rabbenu Asher and the Chelkat Mechokek 93:26, however, do mention the latter opinion.

The Rashba maintains that if, however, the woman took property as security, or if she borrowed money to be repaid with the money she will receive for her support, she is still entitled to receive the money retroactively. This opinion is cited by the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.).

As long as she has not remarried, the property of her husband’s estate is considered under lien to her and in her possession. Hence, she is given this privilege.

For once she remarries, the property is considered to be in the possession of the heirs. Hence, they are given this privilege.

The same law applies if the widow demanded payment of the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, but did not demand payment for the additional amount.

See Halachah 1