Shabbat - Chapter Thirteen

The Maggid Mishneh draws attention to the fact that there are authorities who hold a person liable if he places an object down on a place in a private domain that is smaller than four handbreadths by four handbreadths. (See the notes on Chapter 14, Halachah 17.)

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1), the Rambam explains the rationale for this law: An object of significant size will not remain at rest if put down in such a small place. Therefore, one is not liable for placing down any objects there.

An object that is positioned on a person, animal, or utensil located in a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths is considered as if it has been placed down on a place that size.

This concept is also explained in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1): The adroitness and dexterity of a human hand makes it fit to hold even very large articles that are placed in it. Therefore, an object placed in a person's hand is considered as if it were placed on the ground on which he was standing.

The Maggid Mishneh cites the Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 1:1) as stating that a person is not liable for placing an object in the hand of another person standing in the public domain unless the latter's hand is held below ten handbreadths high. Nevertheless, as Chapter 12, Halachah 14, appears to indicate, the Rambam does not necessarily make such a distinction.

It must be emphasized that a person's hand is considered as equivalent to a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths in size only when that hand is located in the same domain as he is. When, however, a person is standing in the public domain and his hand is extended into a private domain, an object placed in his hand is not considered to have been put down in the private domain. See Chapter 15, Halachah 1.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 13.

Eruvin 99a questions whether a person would be held liable in such an instance, and leaves the matter unresolved. Therefore, the Rambam rules that a person is not held liable.

Rav David Arameah emphasizes that this halachah is speaking about an instance in which the water is at rest and not flowing.

In contrast, if a person in a similar situation catches rain water in his hand and transfers it, he is not liable, because it is not considered to have come to rest (Shabbat 5a,b).

In this instance as well, since our Sages (Shabbat 5b) do not resolve whether or not a person should be held liable in such an instance, the Rambam exempts him.

The Rambam appears to interpret the passage cited above as emphasizing that an object that floats on water is not considered to be at rest. Hence, the criteria from removing an object from a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths cannot be met. See (Tosafot, Shabbat, loc. cit.), which interprets the passage slightly differently.

Although the matter is the subject of a difference of opinion among our Sages, the majority rule that since oil remains a distinct entity and floats on the water (see Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 8:3), it is not considered to be resting in place.

Chapter 12, Halachah 9.

This is the contents of the first Mishnah of the tractate of Shabbat.

The rationale for this decision is that a person is liable only when he both begins and completes a forbidden labor himself. There is no liability when one person begins a forbidden labor and it is completed by another. Shabbat 93a derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 4:27, "when one performs one...," as implying that "a person who completes its performance, and not one who performs only a portion [of the forbidden labor]." (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:1, and also Chapter 1, Halachah 15.)

One of the principles of Torah law that is applied in several other different contexts (e.g., constructing an eruv or a sukkah) is l'vud - i.e., that an object less than three cubits away from another entity is considered to be connected to it.

And thus, in addition to the removal of the article from its place, he is considered to have performed the hanachah, the placement of the article in its new place (Rashi, Shabbat 92a).

Rashi also emphasizes that although the person is standing in another domain and holding the article in his hand, the fact that his hand is attached to his body does not prevent us from considering the object as having been placed on the ground.

In this context, the commentaries note the contrast to Halachah 14. The Or Sameach explains that the leniency mentioned there applies only when one throws an object, and not when one moves it from domain to domain by hand.

This halachah is also based on the opening mishnah of the tractate of Shabbat. Although the person standing is not liable at all with regard to the Sabbath laws, he transgresses the prohibition (Leviticus 19:14), "Do not place a stumbling block in the path of the blind." See Tosafot, Shabbat 3a, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 347.

There appears to be a slight difference between the Rambam's interpretation of the source for this law, Shabbat 5b, and that of Rashi. Note the commentaries of the Lechem Mishneh and Merkevet HaMishneh.

Unless a person's intent is to rest, his standing is not significant, for it is only circumstance and not conscious decision that causes him to stand still. He is still in the midst of the activity he is performing and has not come to rest. See Halachah 10 and notes.

By using the term "forbidden" rather than "liable," the Rambam emphasizes that the prohibition is Rabbinic in nature. Since this does not represent a departure from one's ordinary conduct, there is the possibility that one will stop, and thus perform an activity for which one is liable. Hence, the Rabbis forbade such conduct (Rashi, Shabbat 153b, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 266:11). Others explain that the Sages issued this prohibition because this leniency might cause the person to carry on a future occasion, or because others might carry after they saw him do so.

Shabbat (loc. cit.) emphasizes that there are two difficulties involved in the person's conduct: a) carrying the object four cubits in the public domain, and b) taking the object from the public domain to his home, a private domain (for most likely, the person stopped at least momentarily before entering).

Since the person began carrying the object before the commencement of the Sabbath, he has not removed the article from its place (akirah) in a forbidden manner. Hence, carrying the object four cubits in the public domain does not constitute a difficulty. In contrast, transferring the object from the public domain into one's home is problematic. Nevertheless, since this transfer is carried out in an abnormal manner, one is not liable.

Shabbat (loc. cit.) mentions this law with regard to a person carrying a package. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:12) questions whether the same leniency applies when a person is carrying a wallet or another small article of that nature. The commentaries explain that since a person does not usually run when carrying a burden, the fact that he runs is a sufficient departure from the norm to remind him that stopping is forbidden. In contrast, since it is not a departure from the norm for a person to run while carrying a wallet, the Rabbis forbade doing so.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:13 and the Mishnah Berurah 266:34 state that in their time, when according to most authorities there is no concept of a public domain, one may follow the lenient view. There is some question, however, if this applies at present.

(See also the notes on Chapter 20, Halachot 6-7. See also the comments of the Mishnah Berurah 266:29, which states that preferably one should have even a package carried by a gentile or an animal, or one should walk with it less than four cubits at a time.)

As mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 15, one is allowed to carry within one's four cubits.

The Rambam uses the past tense, implying that this ruling applies only after the fact, בדעיבד. At the outset, לכתחילה, one is allowed to carry an object less than four cubits at a time only in certain extraordinary situations. (See Chapter 20, Halachah 7, and notes.)

This represents the perspective taken by most commentaries (see Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:5). Rav Kapach, however, cites manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that state מותר, "permitted," rather than פטור, "not liable," implying that there are no restrictions against carrying in this manner.

Only then is he considered to have placed the article down (hanachah). (See Halachah 8.)

The first time he stood, he is not considered to have performed a hanachah. In contrast, when he stood the second time, he is considered to have done so. Hence, he is liable for carrying.

One is liable for moving an article only when there is akirah and hanachah. In this instance, neither of these actions had taken place.

The difference between dragging and rolling and the previous instance appears to be that although the article remains in contact with the ground while being rolled, the entire article is moved from its original place at the same time. In contrast, when one lifts up the pole, one side always remains in its original place.

Rashi (Shabbat 5b) explains that since the person did not perform the akirah with the intent of transferring the article to the public domain, he is not considered to have performed the forbidden labor as a purposeful act. Since it is purposeful activity, מלאכת מחשבת, that the Torah forbade on the Sabbath, he is not liable at all. Although he did perform the transfer and the hanachah intentionally, since he did not have such a thought when performing the akirah, the entire action is considered to have been performed unintentionally.

According to the Rambam, however, the rationale appears to be that since the entire labor was not performed in a forbidden manner, one is not held liable.

I.e., before.

Were the person carrying the object to have stood still, he would have performed a forbidden hanachah, as mentioned in Halachah 8. Although even in such circumstances, neither of the two would have been liable (as stated in Halachah 5), when the article is taken in the manner described by the Rambam, neither is considered to have performed a forbidden hanachah.

There is no prohibition in taking an article off a colleague's back in the public domain, even when the latter is walking. Taking the article from a person in this manner is not considered a continuation of the first transfer of the article, but rather an independent act. (See also the notes on Chapter 20, Halachot 6-7.)

Rashi (Shabbat 102a) states that this refers to a situation where the other person had to leave his original place to catch the article which was thrown. The Sefer HaKovetz and the Merkevet HaMishneh state that according to the Rambam, the thrower is not liable even if the other person who caught the article did not move, for the article did not come to rest in the place intended by the thrower.

Even if the dog's mouth or the opening of the fire is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths (see Halachah 1), the person is liable. The fact that this was the person's intent causes the place the article comes to rest to be considered as significant (Shabbat, loc. cit.).

The commentaries note the contrast to Halachah 6. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Or Sameach differentiates between throwing an object and moving it by hand.

In his gloss on the Mishneh Torah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger emphasizes that the rope is not considered part of the article itself (in which case the person would be exempted because he did transfer the entire article). (See Chapter 12, Halachah 11.)

Throwing the object into his hands is equivalent to placing it there. If the recipient of the article must move in order to catch it, he is not liable, because the article did not come to rest in the desied place.

Shabbat 5a questions whether these two separate actions, throwing and catching the article, are considered as having been performed in one continuum or not. Since this matter is left unresolved, the Rambam does not hold one liable.

Although Rabbi Akiva maintains that an object that passes through the space above a domain is considered as if it came to rest in that domain, his opinion is not accepted by the majority of the Sages. The halachah follows the majority opinion (Shabbat 11:1).

As mentioned previously, the space within three handbreadths of the ground is considered as l'vud, an extension of the ground.

There are several other opinions among the Rishonim on this issue. Rashi (Shabbat 100a) states that this ruling applies even if the article is being blown by the wind and pauses in its progress in the midst of the air. Since it is less than three handbreadths above the ground, it is considered as being in contact with the ground. Nevertheless, if it does not pause even momentarily in its progress towards the other domain, it is not considered to have come to rest.

Both the Rambam's ruling and that of Rashi are based on the opinion of Ravvah (Shabbat 97a). That Talmudic passage also mentions another opinion, that of Rav Chilkiyah who maintains that, based on the principle of l'vud, the article is considered to have come to rest even though its progress is not halted even momentarily. Rabbenu Chanan'el and the Ramban accept this view.

If, however, the article passes more than three handbreadths above the ground, the person who throws it is not liable even if it comes to rest. As mentioned in Halachah 1, a person is not liable unless the article comes to rest on a surface at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths (Lechem Mishneh).

Note, however, the following halachah.

In his gloss to the Mishneh Torah, Rabbi Akiva Eiger draws attention to Chapter 14, Halachah 17, which appears to indicate that the Rambam does not require an object to be placed down on a surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths in the private domain. From this halachah, however, it would appear that he maintains that such a condition is necessary. Otherwise, there would be no difference whether the article was thrown three handbreadths above the ground or not.

Although Shabbat 97b-98a, the source for this halachah, states this concept with regard to a person who throws an article, the Rambam alters the wording and mentions "a person who carries...." He did not make this change to exclude one who throws an article, but rather to emphasize that a person who carries an article in this manner is also liable.

The commentaries offer several reasons why this emphasis is necessary. Among them: A person who throws an article does not have it in his power to return it. Hence, it is logical to assume that the area in the two public domains can be combined. In contrast, a person carrying an article can change his mind at any time. Therefore, it would have been possible to think that his entrance into the second public domain is an independent act. Hence, it is necessary for the Rambam to mention carrying (Or Sameach).

Alternatively, the Rambam's choice of wording was intended to differentiate between the instance described here, and the circumstances described in Chapter 18, Halachah 24 (Sefer HaKovetz).

E.g., the person was standing two cubits from the end of one public domain. He carried or threw an article over a private domain and it came to rest more than three and a third cubits within a second public domain. Although the article did not travel four cubits in either of the two public domains, when the sum of the space it traveled in both public domains is taken, it exceeds the diagonal of a square of four cubits. Hence, he is liable. See the diagram on the opposite page.

As the Rambam emphasizes in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 11:2), a person is liable only when he passes an article in this fashion, and not when he throws one. The circumstances in which one is liable are derived from the Sanctuary, and in that instance the Levites would pass the boards only; they would not throw them.

The description of this situation is completed in the following halachah.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam states that it would be logical to assume that a person who passes an article from one private domain to another in this manner would also be exempt, as explained in the following note. Nevertheless, since this constituted part of the service of the Levites in the Sanctuary, one is held liable.

Generally, the space more than ten handbreadths above a public domain is considered a makom patur, and one is not held liable for transferring an object through it (Chapter 14, Halachah 7). Nevertheless, since the service of the Levites involved carrying in this manner, one is liable under such circumstances as well.

The Merkevet HaMishneh questions the Rambam's use of the word "even," which implies that one is surely liable for passing an article in the manner described above when one passes the article below ten handbreadths. This is problematic: Since logically a person would not be held liable in such an instance, and the obligation stems only from the parallel to the service of the Levites, why is it extended beyond the parameters of their service? Since they would pass the boards more than ten handbreadths above the ground, why is one liable when passing an article at a lower height? (See Tosafot, Shabbat 4a.)

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 12, Halachah 12, during the Jews' journey through the desert they would dismantle, transport, and re-erect the Sanctuary. In this process, the boards for the walls of the sanctuary were carried on four wagons. They would line up in pairs on either side of the Sanctuary. The boards would be lifted from the ground to the front wagon and then passed from one wagon to the other above the space of the public domain. See the accompanying diagram taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.).

Since the wagons were ten handbreadths above the ground, each of them was considered a separate private domain.

The Mishnah (Shabbat 11:2) gives an example of such a situation: Two balconies in a row above the public domain. Note the diagram on the opposite page taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah.

E.g., two balconies on either side of a street (Shabbat, loc. cit.).

The word "even" is used to imply that not only is one free of liability when one throws from one balcony to another, even when an article is passed by hand in this fashion, one is exempt.

The reason for this exemption is that the Levites would pass the boards from wagon to wagon along the length of the public domain, but not across it. As mentioned above, logically one would not necessarily infer that a person should be held liable for transferring an article in this manner. Nevertheless, since we find that the Levites would transfer the boards in this manner, one is held liable. This applies, however, only when one transfers an article in the same manner as they would transfer the boards.

I.e., forgot that it was the Sabbath or forgot that it was forbidden to transfer articles in this manner on the Sabbath. Hence, the person is considered as having performed the act בשוגג, "inadvertently."

Seemingly, this law is dependent on the situation described in the previous two halachot. A person desired to pass an object (fruit) from one courtyard (a private domain) to another courtyard, which was separated from the first by the public domain. Nevertheless, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 348:2 states that it also applies when taking the article into the other courtyard would not make one liable for a sin offering - e.g., when they are positioned on opposite sides of the public domain.

Rav Moshe Cohen and the Maggid Mishneh maintain that this law applies only when the person's hand is held less than ten handbreadths above the public domain. If, however, the person extends his hand higher then ten handbreadths from the ground, he is allowed to return it, since it is being held in a makom patur. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 348:1) accepts this interpretation.

I.e., the conclusion of the Sabbath. The Rashba in his notes on Shabbat 3a states that this restriction applies only when a person extended his hand to transfer the article before the commencement of the Sabbath. If he extended his hand outward after the commencement of the Sabbath, he is allowed to return it, lest he drop the article into the public domain, and in doing so perform a forbidden labor.

(According to the Rambam, he would not be liable in such an instance. Even if he dropped the article, it would not have been placed down in the place he originally intended. Hence, he would be exempt, as stated in Halachah 15.)

Although the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions the Rashba's view, it rules according to the Rambam. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 348:1 quotes solely the Rambam's view. The Mishnah Berurah 348:8, however, mentions authorities who accept the Rashba's opinion.

The question is based on the concept expressed in Halachah 15: A person is liable for transferring an article only when it comes to rest in the place where he intended it to when he removed it from its original place.

Accordingly, it is considered as if this was implicit in his original intent.

Rashi and Tosafot differ with the Rambam in their interpretation of the source for this halachah, Shabbat 97b. According to their perspective, the thrower is liable only when it makes no difference to him where the article lands. If his intent was for it to travel eight cubits, he is not liable.

See the Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim 254), which explains the theoretical difference between this view and the Rambam's ruling.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 11:3), the Rambam explains that the person is not liable because he did not intend to throw the article beyond the permitted distance.

The Rashba offers a different explanation of this Mishnah, that the article came to rest momentarily within four cubits and then rolled beyond that distance. Since the Rambam does not mention the object coming to rest at all in this clause, he does not follow this interpretation.

The Rambam would surely agree that one is not liable in the situation described by the Rashba. It is a matter of question, however, whether the Rashba would agree that the person is not liable in the situation described by the Rambam.

Since the object came to rest, albeit momentarily, it is considered as if his intent were completed.

Because there is no forbidden hanachah.