Shabbat - Chapter Two

The Rambam uses the expression דחויה, which, as evident from Pesachim 77a and Hilchot Bi'at HaMikdash 4:15, implies that although a prohibition is not enforced, it has not been lifted entirely. In contrast, the term הותרה would imply that no trace of the prohibition remains.

The Kessef Mishneh and other authorities question the implications and the appropriateness of the Rambam's choice of terms. [In a responsum (Vol. 1, 689), the Rashba illustrates the difference between these terms. A person was in need of meat on the Sabbath and there was non-kosher meat available. If the Sabbath laws are דחויה, it would be proper to eat the non-kosher meat. If the Sabbath laws are הותרה, it would be preferable to slaughter a kosher animal on the sick person's behalf. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:14) states that, in such a situation, one should slaughter a kosher animal, implying that the laws are הותרה. (Note, however, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:16 and the Mishnah Berurah 328:39.)]

See the Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayim, Responsa 455, which explains the concept of הותרה as meaning that, with regard to this person, it is as if the laws of the Sabbath were never commanded. (See also Chiddushim UVeurim BaShas, Vol. 3, which explains that although the Rambam stated that a threat to Jewish life overrides the observance of all the mitzvot of the Torah in Hilchot Yesodei Torah, Chapter 5, he emphasizes this concept with regard to the Sabbath laws for the following reason. The other prohibitions are דחויה in the face of a threat to life, while the Sabbath laws are הותרה.

Yoma 85b uses the expression, "Violate one Sabbath on his behalf, so that he will be able to observe many Sabbaths [in the future]." This expression, however, is not halachically exact. Even when one knows that the person will not live to observe many other Sabbaths, as long as he is alive we are obligated to violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf. See Halachah 18.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:10), which cites an opinion that states that we may rely on the evaluation of experienced God-fearing individuals, even if they are not physicians.

Rav Kapach explains that, with this expression, the Rambam implies that we may rely on a local physician and need not seek the advice of a greater expert who lives further away.

See Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 2:8, which gives further details regarding a difference of opinion between physicians.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:13 states that this applies even if there is no danger that the person will die immediately. Since there is a danger that he may die later if the treatment is not administered at this time, the Sabbath laws may be violated.

Note that the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 2:5, specifies that the leniency to extinguish a lamp is granted only when it is impossible to move it - or, alternatively, the sick person - to another place or veil the lamp's light.

There is a question among the Rabbis if this statement is to be interpreted literally or not. As mentioned in the commentary on the previous halachah, there is a difference of opinion if the Sabbath laws are דחויה or הותרה in the face of a danger to life. According to the opinion that they are merely דחויה, an attempt should be made to minimize the violation of the Sabbath laws if doing so does not constitute a threat to the person's life. (See Tzafenat Paneach, Shulchan Aruch HaRav, ibid. and the Mishnah Berurah 328:14.)

Gentiles are not obligated to observe the Sabbath, and thus having them administer the treatment would not involve the violation of a Torah commandment. Nevertheless, they should not be entrusted with the care of the sick for the reason stated by the Rambam.

Since they are below the age of Bar or Bat Mitzvah, according to the Torah itself the observance of the mitzvot is not incumbent upon them, and only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved.

Although women and servants are obligated to observe the Sabbath laws, since in many areas of Torah and mitzvot, their obligations are less than men, having them violate the Sabbath laws in this instance could cause the Sabbath to be regarded flippantly, as explained in the next note.

The Rambam's choice of wording, based on Yoma 84b, has raised several questions among the commentaries. The most literal interpretation is given by the Merkevat HaMishneh, who explains that when people see that the Sabbath laws are violated by the gentiles for Jews or by women or children, they may get the impression that the observance of these laws is not very crucial, and leniencies may be taken on other occasions - even when there is no valid reason. If, however, it is Torah Sages who violate the laws, the common people will realize that it is only the seriousness of the situation that allowed for this leniency.

Among the other interpretations given why the laws should not be violated by women and children, is that this might cause them to violate the Sabbath laws in the future (Kessef Mishneh).

Significantly, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 328:12) explains that the reason the treatment should not be administered by gentiles is the possibility for delay. Accordingly, if there is no delay involved and one can be sure that the same quality of treatment will be given, it is preferable that the treatment be administered by gentiles.

The commentaries explain that the difference between his opinion and that of the Rambam (quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.) depends on the question discussed above: Are the Sabbath laws הותרה or merely דחויה in the face of a danger to life.

[See also Chiddushim UVeurim BaShas, Vol. 3, which states that the Rambam's wording here indicates that he sees the violation of the Sabbath laws in such situations as an expression of reverence and regard for the Sabbath.]

This also is based on the Rambam's interpretation of Yoma, ibid. Others (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:12) understand the phrase גדולי ישראל in that passage as meaning simply "adult males."

The Jerusalem Talmud (Yoma 8:5) states, "A person who [administers treatment] quickly is praiseworthy, and one who raises questions is considered as if he shed blood.

The Rambam is referring to the Sadducees, the Karaites, and others who do not accept the oral tradition.

The Rambam seems to be interpreting the verse as meaning that since these individuals purposefully misinterpret the Torah, God causes their misinterpretations to be cruel and harsh so that they will not live and spread such an approach.

Significantly, the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah state קדח, "piercing pain" (the commentary of Rabbenu Chanan'el on Avodah Zarah 28b), rather than קדחת, "fever."

Avodah Zarah, loc. cit., explains that there is a connection between the eyes and the heart, and such a person is therefore considered to be dangerously ill.

From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:9), it appears that once an eye ailment is nearly healed, we may not violate the Sabbath laws to treat it. See also Hilchot Milah 16.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:3) states that this can also apply to an infection. Disquiet and pain are not, however, considered sufficient cause to violate the Sabbath laws.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) substitutes "teeth" for "lips," and explains that a toothache can also be considered cause to violate the Sabbath laws. The Ramah and subsequent commentaries, however, qualify this statement, explaining which types of toothaches can be treated by Jews and which can be treated only by gentiles. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:3 and Mishneh Berurah 328:8.)

The Maggid Mishneh cites the Ramban as explaining that this applies only when we are unsure if the wound is dangerous or not. In such a situation, we are not required to wait for a physician's assessment and may treat the wound immediately. If, however, we know - or a physician says - that a wound is not dangerous, a Jew may not violate the Sabbath laws to treat it. It may, however, be treated by a gentile. This ruling is also quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:4).

This phrase is based on the Rambam's interpretation of Avodah Zarah 28a and refers to an extremely high fever. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:7) appears to interpret it as referring to a type of malaria that causes fever and chills simultaneously.

From the statements of the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.:5), it would appear that if the sick person himself says that the Sabbath laws should be violated on his behalf, his word should be heeded.

See Yoma 10:4 and the Rambam's commentary on that mishnah.

Either they brought the figs from the public domain or picked them from the tree. Both of these activities involve the performance of labors forbidden on the Sabbath.

This situation refers to an instance where none of the ten know of the others' activities. Alternatively, each one thought that he would be able to bring the fig before the other person (Mishnah Berurah 328:42).

I.e., they need not bring a sin offering, nor do their actions cause them any spiritual blemishes. Indeed, to quote the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:15), "all of them receive a bountiful reward from God" for their actions. 29. If, however, there are two figs on a single stem, it would be preferable to pick them so as not to bring any additional figs (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:16). (See also Halachah 9.)

If, however, there are two figs on a single stem, it would be preferable to pick them so as not to bring any additional figs (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:16). See also Halachah 9.)

The Ramah (Orach Chayim, loc. cit.) emphasizes that if there is any danger of delay or difficulty, the threat to a Jew's life overrides all these considerations.

On Saturday night, however, a healthy person may eat from the remainder. Moreover, there is no need for him to wait the amount of time necessary to cook the food [(כדי שיעשו) Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, 318:2, and commentaries].

The meat need not be salted to remove the blood. Although this is generally done as a preparation for the cooking process, it is necessary only because blood will move from place to place within the meat during cooking. There is no prohibition against eating raw meat even though it has not been salted (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 67:1-2).

The Kiryat Melech Rav notes that this explanation is appropriate according to the interpretation of the Tosafot (Chulin 14a). The Rambam (Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 6:12), however, requires even uncooked meat to be salted before one partakes of it. Several different explanations are offered for this difficulty. See Chapter 11, Halachah 5.

For this leniency to be granted, the Ra'avad requires that the sick person have been ill before the commencement of the Sabbath, and his attendants to have thought of slaughtering the animal for him at that time. Otherwise, the animal is considered muktzeh. Although the latter prohibition is waived on behalf of the sick person, it is still enforced as regards the healthy individual.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:2 and Shulchan Aruch Harav ibid 318:5) explain that in this instance, the prohibition of muktzeh does not apply at all.

Slaughtering an animal is a single activity which will provide enough meat for both the sick person and the healthy individual. Allowing the healthy person to eat from the meat will not cause any increase in the violation of the Sabbath laws.

This refers to ailments which, although not threatening to a person's life, are after all serious, and cause him to be confined to bed (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:17) or which cause him to feel weakness throughout his entire body (Ramah, loc. cit.). In contrast, if the person merely feels ill or has a minor ailment in a particular limb, there is a Rabbinic prohibition against taking medication even when the performance of forbidden labors is not involved. (See Chapter 21, Halachah 31.)

As is explained in Chapter 6, the Rabbis forbade a Jew to tell a gentile to perform work on his behalf on the Sabbath. This prohibition is, however, relaxed because of the sick person's condition.

The Hebrew word כוחל refers to the application of powder or eye-paint to the area around the eyes. Although certain Talmudic passages appear to indicate that this was merely a cosmetic practice, in certain instances it had medical value. The leniency to treat the eyes is granted, because, as explained in the notes on Halachah 4, there is a connection between the eyes and the heart.

There is a question regarding activities in which a Rabbinic prohibition must be transgressed. Although asking a gentile to perform a forbidden labor is also prohibited by the Rabbis, some commentaries make a distinction between such a prohibition and a prohibition that involves the performance of an activity.

The wording chosen by the Rambam in this halachah and in Chapter 21, Halachah 31, has left room for speculation concerning his ruling on this question. The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam allows the performance of any activity even when there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved. The Kessef Mishneh differs, and explains that according to the Rambam, any activity forbidden by the Rabbis may not be performed despite the fact that a person is bedridden by illness.

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) does not follow either of the interpretations of the Rambam's view, but instead suggests following the opinion of the Ramban, who permits the performance of any activity forbidden by the Rabbis, provided that it is performed in an abnormal manner. Furthermore, if there is a danger to a specific limb, the Rabbinic prohibitions are waived, and such activities may be performed in the normal manner. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:19 is even more lenient and allows one to perform activities that are forbidden by the Torah itself, provided one performs them in an uncharacteristic manner.

There are times when the cartilage around the heart becomes compressed against the body and it must be lifted up in order to facilitate breathing (Avodah Zarah 29a).

Our translation is based on the description of the techniques of midwifery used in Talmudic and post-Talmudic times. Others translate the term as a woman being bent over with labor pains. Compare to Halachah 13, which mentions the possibility of performing forbidden labors on a woman's behalf from the time "when there is a show of blood." See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 330:3), which mentions both these terms and also refers to the condition when a woman is overcome by labor pains to the point where she must be carried by her friends. Any one of these three conditions constitutes a danger to life for which the Sabbath laws may be broken.

The Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 18:3) states that this leniency applies even when she lives beyond the Sabbath limits (see Chapter 27). Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:9, which state that a mid-wife may be called in the preliminary stages of labor.

She feels more secure knowing that she will be cared for properly in the light than if she were cared for in the dark (Tosafot, Shabbat 128b).

These rulings are based on Shabbat, ibid. In his commentary on that text, the Ramban explains that this principle applies regarding all instances when the Sabbath laws are violated because of a danger to life. If it is possible to reduce the extent to which they are violated, one should do so.

The Maggid Mishneh postulates that the Rambam would not require such stringencies at all times. Were that the case, the Rambam would have stated this principle earlier. Instead, this is a specific ruling applicable with regard to a woman in childbirth. Greater stringency is applied in this instance, because although there is a threat to the woman's life, the probability of a woman's actually dying is very low. (It can be explained that the difference of opinion between the Ramban and the Maggid Mishneh revolves around the question whether the Sabbath laws are דחויה or הותרה in the face of a danger to life, as explained in the notes on Halachot 1 and 2.)

Note Sefer HaChasidim, which states that it is preferable that a woman prepare everything necessary for childbirth from the ninth month onward, so that if she gives birth on the Sabbath, only a minimal amount of forbidden labor will have to be performed.

The term "idolatress" is used here to refer to a gentile who actually worships idols. In contrast, the term ger toshav refers to a gentile who accepts the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants. (See Hilchot Melachim 9:1-2 and Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6.)

In Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:2, the Rambam writes that it is forbidden to offer medical treatment to an idolater even for a fee. Accordingly, this halachah extends that principle to include a woman in childbirth. The question is raised, however, concerning the majority of the gentiles in the present age. Although the Rambam considers Christianity as idol worship, many authorities do not. According to the latter opinions, although these gentiles are not idolaters, they have not gone through the formal process of acceptance of the seven laws commanded to Noach and cannot therefore be considered as gerim toshavim.

Many authorities (see the commentary on the Moznaim edition of Hilchot Avodat Kochavim) maintain that it is permitted to treat such people during the week. On the Sabbath, however, one may not perform forbidden labors on their behalf. (See the Mishnah Berurah 330:8, which speaks very critically about physicians who violate the Sabbath laws on behalf of gentiles.) According to these authorities, one would be allowed to treat these gentiles on the Sabbath provided that there was not any forbidden labor involved. Note, however, Rav Kapach, who quotes Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that state "gentile" instead of "idolatress."

According to the generally accepted interpretation of Avodah Zarah 26b, the intent is that the non-Jews will understand that the Sabbath is a sacred day for the Jews. Even when they see that the Sabbath laws are violated for the sake of saving a Jew's life, they will accept the rationalization that the Sabbath laws may be violated only on behalf of an individual who observes the Sabbath.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:2 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:8 mention that if a physician fears that ill-feeling will be generated by his refusal to care for gentiles, he may deliver their babies, provided that he does not perform labors that are forbidden by the Torah itself.

Based on Leviticus 25:35, Avodah Zarah 65a states that the Jews are required to maintain the well-being of such gentiles and, if necessary, the Jews should support the gentiles from their charitable funds.

The Rambam chooses the more lenient of the opinions mentioned in Shabbat 129a, for a woman can begin bleeding well before she gives birth.

Although the Lechem Mishneh states that the counting of the three days should begin from the time the uterus opens, the consensus of halachic opinion is that the three days start from birth. (See the Be'ur Halachah 330.)

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:4 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:12 explain that this refers to activities that a woman's friends will customarily perform on her behalf after she gives birth. A doctor need not be consulted about these matters. Nevertheless, if a doctor says that these activities are unnecessary, they should not be performed.

From the Rambam's wording (and indeed, this is the ruling of Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:5 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:14), it appears that the woman is still considered to be dangerously ill. Hence, unless she protests to the contrary, it is assumed that this treatment is necessary.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav and the Mishnah Berurah, loc. cit., state that the woman's word is accepted even against the opinions of many doctors.

According to the halachic authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:5 and the Mishnah Berurah 330:21), there is one exception. A fire may be kindled for a woman within thirty days after she has given birth. See the notes on the following halachah.

Preferably, the fire should be kindled by a gentile. If, however, there is no gentile available, the fire may be kindled by a Jew (Mishnah Berurah 330:21).

The Maggid Mishneh states that it appears to him that the Rambam (and Shabbat 129b, upon which this halachah is based) is speaking about a woman who gave birth less than a week previously. Although weight is given to this view (see Be'ur Halachah 330), the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 330:6) states that it refers to a woman within a month of childbirth.

The commentaries question whether this refers to a person who is dangerously ill or to a person who is merely seriously ill, but in no danger of dying. According to the latter view, a fire may be kindled on behalf of someone who is dangerously ill.

Sefer HaKovetz states that cutting the umbilical cord involves the violation of a forbidden labor and is permitted only because of the danger involved. Most authorities, however, maintain that only a Rabbinic prohibition is involved.

As mentioned above, most authorities maintain that only a Rabbinic prohibition may be waived on behalf of a new-born. Thus, this is interpreted as referring to water that was heated on the Sabbath by a gentile.

מלח is usually rendered as "salt." Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 18:3. (See also Mishnah Berurah 330:24.)

This is useful in straightening the child's limbs.

See Hilchot Milah 2:8. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 331:9) writes that although in Talmudic times, washing a baby at this time was considered as a matter of vital importance, it is no longer common practice. The Ramah (loc. cit.) explains that it is customary to wash the baby before the circumcision with water that was heated on Friday, and to wash him after the circumcision on Saturday night.

There is greater discomfort on the third day after the circumcision, as explained by the commentaries on Genesis 18:1 and 34:25.

At present, the Ramah (loc. cit.) states that if it appears necessary, the baby may be washed with water that was heated before the Sabbath. Needless to say, in all situations, should a doctor state that such a washing is necessary, his advice should be followed.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 330:5) states that it is no longer customary to follow this practice even during the week. We wait a considerable time after the woman loses consciousness, because we are afraid that she did not die, but merely fainted. Hence, by the time we are certain that she has died, we can assume that the fetus is also no longer alive.

Needless to say, at present, when our improved technology makes it possible to monitor the physical functioning of both the mother and the fetus, the physicians should decide on the basis of the information before them. Regardless of the practical application of this ruling today, the principles on which it is based are significant and should be applied in other circumstances.

Note Shulchan Aruch HaRav 330:7, which adds that this ruling is granted despite the fact that the fetus will normally die in such a situation. Although probability (רוב in Hebrew) is a significant factor in halachah, the possibility of saving a life overweighs it.

Generally, a living person can be assumed to continue to live (chezkat chayim) until we are certain that he has died. Although such a presumption cannot be made with regard to this fetus, permission is, nevertheless, granted for the Sabbath laws to be violated on its behalf.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:13) rephrases the concepts stated in this halachah slightly, connecting the praise given a person for being zealous in saving a life with the situation concerning catching fish described afterwards. According to the Shulchan Aruch, this situation teaches us that a person is considered praiseworthy for saving a life on the Sabbath even if he accrues personal benefit through his actions - for example, in the case at hand, in addition to saving a life, the person also receives a catch of fish.

The Rambam adds the term "absolutely" to indicate that it is desirable to spread out and raise one's nets to try to save the child (Lechem Mishneh). Significantly, the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 13:6, states that the person is not held liable even if he intended to catch the fish together with the child.

The Or Sameach writes that he is given "stripes for rebelliousness" (the punishment usually given for the violation of a Rabbinic ordinance), since he intended to perform a forbidden activity. See a parallel ruling, Hilchot Nedarim 12:18.

Significantly, when mentioning this instance in Hilchot Shegagot 2:15, the Rambam states that the person acted בשוגג when catching the fish - i.e., he was unaware that it was the Sabbath or was unaware that it is forbidden to fish on the Sabbath.

This reflects the Rambam's decision regarding a difference of opinion between the Sages in Menachot 64a. One opinion holds the person liable for it considers his intent of primary importance, while the other frees him of liability for it views his actions as most significant.

These instances are cited by Yoma 84b as a continuation of the development of the concept mentioned in the previous halachah, that one may perform an activity to save someone else's life, although in the process of doing so, one derives benefit. The Talmud explains why it is necessary to mention all these different instances.

The Lechem Mishneh notes that the Rambam alters the text of the Talmud slightly to imply that the person breaking down the door did not do so with the intent of using the wood. Rav Kapach differs, noting that, as mentioned in the commentary on the previous halachah, the Rambam absolves the person of liability even when he has an intent to benefit from his actions. (See also the notes of Rabbi Akiva Eiger.)

Yoma, ibid., explains that this leniency is granted even when the fire breaks out in a courtyard other than that in which the person was located. If the fire appears to pose a danger to his life, it may be extinguished.

I.e., a person was seen in the vicinity of the avalanche and we are unsure whether or not he was able to escape or not.

The Maggid Mishneh mentions that this leniency is granted even when there are several doubts involved: Perhaps the person was not trapped under the avalanche. Even if he was trapped, perhaps he is no longer alive and the performance of the labor of clearing will be to no avail.

This communicates a fundamental concept in Torah law: Even a fleeting moment of a Jew's life is precious enough for all possible efforts to be performed to save him even if it is necessary to violate Torah law.

Although we are commanded to show respect for a corpse and not to leave it exposed, we are not allowed to violate the Sabbath laws for such a purpose. (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Yoma 8:5.)

Based on Genesis 7:22, "all that has the breath of the spirit of life," Yoma 88b states that whether a person is breathing or not is the determining factor of whether he is considered alive or not. Significantly, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 329:3 and the Mishnah Berurah 329:11 rule that even if we see that his heart is not beating, he is not considered dead until we are certain that he is not breathing.

The conception of breath as the determinant of life is significant in the present age, when it is possible that a person will continue to breathe despite brain death. The question of whether such a person is considered alive has been raised today within the context of many contemporary medical issues. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Yoreh De'ah, Vol. II, Responsum 174) and other authorities of the present age have ruled that breath is still the fundamental determinant whether or not a person is alive.

This halachah is based on the following principles:

a) As mentioned in Halachah 12, we may not violate the Sabbath laws to save a gentile's life.

b) כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה - "Whenever there is a doubt concerning the identity of objects in a fixed position, we consider the probability as 50%." Since there is at least one Jew in this courtyard, until his body is located, it is considered as if there is a 50% probability that every body found is the Jew. (See also Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 8:11.)

Even if several people departed, the same rule would apply, as long as the entire group did not leave its original place. See the following halachah.

The Rambam's decision depends on Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's text of Yoma 84b. There the Talmud explains that although in general we follow the principle, כל דפריש מרובא פריש - "Whenever an entity separates itself from a group, we assume that it was part of the majority" - in this instance, since the matter involves a possible threat to a Jewish life, this principle is given a slightly different interpretation. Since the group remains in its place, its fixed nature (קביעות) is not disrupted.

It must be emphasized that the Ra'avad, Rashi, and the Ramban have a different approach to the passage in Yoma. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 329:2) follows the opinion quoted by the Rambam.

Again this ruling depends on Rav Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Yoma 84b. Other authorities differ, as mentioned above.

This implies that if a person of unknown origin is found buried under a landslide in a place whose population is primarily gentile, we are not allowed to remove the debris from him. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 15:26.) This is a matter of question on which there is a responsum attributed to the Rambam (although its origins are disputed). (See also Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 4:34, which quotes the Rambam's opinion, and the Ramah, loc. cit., who allows the debris to be removed.)

He should start counting the six days immediately on the day on which he realizes that he has lost touch with the weekly calendar.

Similarly, in his daily prayers, he should recite the prayers of the Sabbath on that day. The recitation of these prayers was instituted so that the person should not lose consciousness of the observance of the Sabbath entirely.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 344:1) states that as long as the person has means, he is not allowed to work at all. Permission to work is granted only when it is a life and death matter. This explains why this halachah is included in this chapter.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) emphasize that although there is a prohibition against walking beyond the Sabbath limits, it is not as serious as the prohibition against forbidden labors. Hence, it is waived in order to allow this person the opportunity to reach a settled area and observe the Sabbath in a proper manner.

If he earns enough on that day to support himself for several days, he must cease work until his means are exhausted (Mishnah Berurah 344:11).

Although these laws surely apply to Jewish communities in Eretz Yisrael, these same laws are also relevant to Jewish communities in the diaspora.

Since their intent is only financial, the Sabbath laws may not be violated for this reason. Note, however, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 329:7 and the Mishnah Berurah 329:17, which state that at present, even when gentiles initially come only for pillage and plunder, since they have no compunctions about killing Jews, particularly if one will defend his property, any gentile raid on a Jewish community is considered a question of life and death warranting the violation of the Sabbath laws.

The rationale is that if a border city is conquered, the enemies will have a vantage point from which to conquer the entire land. This concept has relevance beyond the Sabbath laws. For example, the Lubavitcher Rebbe Shelita has explained that these principles are relevant to the territorial disputes between Jews and gentiles in Eretz Yisrael today. Returning any territory to the Arabs would jeopardize the safety of the entire land.

War must be waged against them because it is possible that their intent is to kill. Hence, we follow the principle that the Sabbath laws may be violated even where there is merely a question of a threat to life.

I.e., an obligation. See Hilchot Rotzeach UShemirat HaNefesh 1:14, which describes the mitzvah (Leviticus 19:16): "Do not stand by idly while your neighbor's life is in danger."

It is told that in the Maccabean revolt, the Greeks once attacked the Jews on the Sabbath. The people, unaware of this law, refused to take up arms in defense and thousands died. Afterwards, the Rabbis publicized this ruling.

Eruvin 45a relates that originally it was forbidden for the people to return with their weapons, and they would leave them in a home within the city's wall. Once the enemy forces saw that the Jews were returning unarmed and attacked them. More Jews were killed in the confused scramble for their weapons than by the enemy attack. After this event, the Sages allowed those who come to assist a besieged city to return with their weapons.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger states that this applies only when one knows that there are Jews on the ship. If we do not have such information, it would appear that we should assume that the passengers of the ship are gentiles and should not endeavor to save their lives.

Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:1 states that it is a mitzvah to cry out to God for assistance in the event of any distressing situation that affects a Jewish community. On the Sabbath, however, it is only proper to make such requests when there is an immediate threat to human life. Just as such requests are made on behalf of a community, they should also be made on behalf of a single individual whose life is threatened (Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:6, Hilchot Shabbat 30:12).

Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:1 states that, as part of the mitzvah of entreating God's mercy, trumpets should be sounded. Nevertheless, trumpets should be not be sounded for this purpose on the Sabbath, since sounding the trumpets violates a Rabbinic prohibition (Hilchot Shofar 2:7). Here, however, the intent in sounding the trumpets is to alert the Jews in the surrounding area and to summon them. The prohibition is waived for this purpose. (See Hilchot Ta'aniot 1:6.)

Just as one may violate the Sabbath laws to save a Jew's life, one may violate the Sabbath laws to save a Jew who is being forced to adopt a gentile way of life (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 306:29 and the Mishnah Berurah 306:57).

See Ta'anit 22b.

In Chapter 30, Halachah 13, the Rambam states that this requirement was instituted "so that the soldiers' minds will be settled and they will not be overly preoccupied on the Sabbath." Although the war will require violation of the Sabbath laws, efforts should be made to minimize the tension and anxiety experienced by the soldiers to the greatest degree possible.

See Hilchot Melachim 6:11 which states that we can lay siege to gentile cities "on the Sabbath." The Kessef Mishneh notes the contradiction and suggests amending the text of Hilchot Melachim in light of our halachah. The Lechem Mishneh, however, explains that this clause of our halachah speaks of a milchemet reshut, a war which we are not obligated to wage, while Hilchot Melachim speaks of a milchemet mitzvah, a war which we are obligated to wage.

Hilchot Melachim describes a voluntary war, a milchemet reshut, as a war fought "to expand the borders of Israel or magnify [the king's] greatness and reputation." In contrast, a war that is obligatory in nature, a milchemet mitzvah, refers to "the war against the seven nations [who occupied Eretz Yisrael], the war against Amalek, and [a war] fought to assist Israel against an enemy which attacks her."

Sifre on Deuteronomy (loc. cit.), Shabbat 19a.

According to the Kessef Mishneh's (Hilchot Melachim 6:11), this refers to the leniency of waging war on the Sabbath. The restriction of laying siege to a city three days before the Sabbath, in contrast, applies only with regard to voluntary wars. In an obligatory war, we may lay siege to a city even on the Sabbath itself.

Rav Kapach notes that the citation of a historical event as proof of a law is extremely out of character for the Rambam in the Mishneh Torah. He explains that the Rambam's statements are directed against statements of Rav Sa'adiah Gaon, who writes that Jericho did not fall on the Sabbath.

It is possible to explain the Rambam's statements from another perspective. Joshua was instructed concerning the conquest of Jericho by Divine command. Indeed, according to human reason, there was no reason why Jericho should have been conquered on the Sabbath. Hence, the fact that God delivered such a command is a clear directive that one may begin a milchemet mitzvah on the Sabbath.