Avodat Kochavim - Chapter Eleven

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 30) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 262) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The fundamental principles of the Jewish faith, which are outlined in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah.

The fundamental principles of the Jewish faith and character traits, which are outlined in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah and Hilchot De’ot.

Note the statements of the Maharik (Shoresh 88), which are quoted by the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 178:1):
The above forbids only those practices followed by the gentiles which encourage licentiousness — e.g., wearing red clothing... — those customs that are described as “the ways of the Amorites,” or those which are throwbacks to pagan rituals. Those practices, however, which are beneficial — e.g., that a doctor should wear a special garb unique to his profession — are permitted.

This coiffure was called kumi in Talmudic times. The commentaries explain that a person who cuts his hair in this fashion violates the prohibition mentioned here even when he does not violate the prohibition against shaving the corners of our heads mentioned in Chapter 12, Halachah 1.

The prohibition against such buildings is explicitly mentioned in the Sifra, Parashat Acharei. The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 178:2) mentions that it is permitted to construct large buildings for the purpose of trade and for use as courts.

The Kessef Mishneh raises a question concerning this, noting that since a variety of different prohibitions are included in this same commandment, it could be considered a שבכללות לאו, a general prohibition whose violation is not punished by lashes (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2-3). The Rambam himself was asked this question, and he replied in a responsum which explains that although a variety of different actions are prohibited by this commandment, they all share a single theme. In contrast, a לאו שבכללות includes prohibitions of a totally different nature.

Since growing a blorit is connected with pagan rites, it is forbidden for a Jew to assist a gentile in growing one.

The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 178) asks: Though the Sages are entitled to advise a person to withhold the performance of a Torah commandment, we do not find that they were granted permission to dispense license to perform an act which transgresses a commandment. He suggests that since, in this instance, the Torah left the definition of the range of the prohibition to the Sages, they did not include a person who holds a government position in its scope, because his intent in adopting such a style of dress is not to resemble the gentiles, but to help the Jewish people.

The Rambam devotes the next thirteen halachot to the discussion of the prohibitions against different forms of divination, astrology, sorcery, and other occult arts. He includes all these prohibitions under the general category of the laws forbidding idol worship because of the conceptual similarity he sees between the two.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 33) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 249) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Our translation is based on the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 179:3. Rashi, in his commentary to Shabbat 67b, the source for this halachah, renders the clause, “slaughter this rooster which crowed in the evening (as opposed to other roosters which crow in the morning).”

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah, loc. cit.) states that as long as one does not specifically state that one is slaughtering the fowl because it crowed in a strange manner, one may slaughter it. Indeed, it is customary to do so.

The Ra’avad objects vigorously to this statement, declaring:
This is a gross error. Doing such a thing is surely permitted. Perhaps he was confused by the statement (Chulin 95b): “Any omen which does not resemble the omens of Eliezer (see Genesis, Chapter 24) and Jonathan (see I Samuel, Chapter 14) is not an omen.”
[The Rambam] interpreted this to mean that [their deeds] were forbidden, but that is not the intent. Rather, our Sages meant [unless an omen is as apparent as that of Eliezer or Jonathan], one should not rely on it. How could he think that righteous men like them would commit such a transgression? Were they alive, they would have him beaten with tongues of fire.
Though some authorities (the Tur, Yoreh De’ah 179; see also Radak, I Samuel, loc. cit.) support the Ra’avad’s view, the Rambam’s opinion is accepted by many of the Rabbis. They, however, seek to justify the actions of Eliezer and Jonathan. Rabbenu Nissim explains that the omens chosen by Eliezer and Jonathan were calculated to serve, not as spiritual indicators of the appropriateness of their acts, but rather as signs that could be used as the basis for a logical conclusion. For example, in Eliezer’s case, Abraham’s household was characterized by kindness and hospitality. Accordingly, a woman who would offer to pour water for a thirsty wayfarer and his camels would surely be a fitting wife for his son.

The punishment is administered, not for specifying that a particular event will serve as an omen, but rather for performing a deed only because of that omen.

Here, also, the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that once such an event occurs three times, it is fitting to rely upon it as an omen. Implied is that he considers the debate in the Talmud, not as questioning whether such actions are permitted or forbidden, but whether one should rely on these matters as omens.

The commentaries refer to Chulin 95b, which relates the following episode: Rav Yochanan was contemplating whether to go to Babylon to study under the sage Shmuel. He asked a child to tell him the verse he was studying, and the child replied, quoting I Samuel 28:3, “And Shmuel died”; because of that reply, Rav Yochanan did not make the journey. There are other similar stories in the Talmud. Most commentaries explain that the Sages did not make their decision based on the child’s reply. Instead, they used the reply to reinforce the decisions which they had made previously. Rabbenu Nissim, however, maintains that since, as Bava Batra 12b states, “a shadow of prophecy has been granted to children,” one may use a child’s replies as an omen.

In this context, it is worthy to quote the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 10:3:
Behold, the diviners and sorcerers also predict the future.What differentiates between them and a prophet?
[Though] some of the prophecies made by diviners, sorcerers, and the like materialize, some do not.... Also, it is possible that none of their predictions will come true and they will err completely, as [Isaiah 44:25] states: “He frustrates the omens of impostors and drives diviners mad.”
In contrast, all the words of a prophet come true, as [II Kings 10:10] states: “God’s word will not fall to the ground.”...
The Torah promises that a prophet will relate the truth about those matters for which the soothsayers and diviners give false predictions to the gentiles, so that [the Jews] will not need a sorcerer, a diviner, or the like, as [Deuteronomy 18:10, 14-15] states: “Among you, there shall not be found anyone who passes his son through fire, [a sorcerer, a diviner,....] For these nations... [listen to diviners and sorcerers, God has not given you this lot. God will] appoint a prophet from your midst.”
Though as stated in Halachah 16, the Rambam totally discounts the methods of divination as parallels to prophecy, he does not entirely negate their ability to predict the future. In the Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. II, Chapters 37 and 38, the Rambam discusses this subject at length, explaining that these sorcerers and diviners are people with developed powers of imagination, but little spiritual or intellectual refinement. Their process of divination involves putting themselves into a trance in which they focus their entire attention and mental energy on one aspect of their previous experience.
This particular matter becomes blown up and dominates their entire thought processes to the extent that it appears to them that they have stepped beyond normal human limitations and entered into the spiritual realms. The focusing of their thinking processes in this experience can provide them with insight which they did not possess previously. Since, however, this experience is not being produced by Divine spiritual influence, nor are they intellectually refined, the predictions they make will always be somewhat in error.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 31) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 510) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

This punishment is given to a person who violates a Rabbinic ordinance.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 32) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 511) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Rambam’s statements here [and more explicitly in Sefer HaMitzvot] imply that both the fortuneteller and the one who carries out his directives violate this prohibition. The fortuneteller alone, however, is punished by lashes.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.), the Rambam describes such a person as one who performs tricks with deft hands, and he gives a number of examples: a person who takes a rope, puts it into his cloak, and removes it after it has been “transformed” into a snake; a person who throws rings into the air, and then removes them from a colleague’s mouth. The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 179:17) explains that on the basis of those statements, the acts of contemporary “magicians” would be forbidden.

See the notes on Halachah 15, which attempt to resolve the apparent contradiction between that halachah and the present one.

The Rambam follows the thesis mentioned in the introduction preceding Halachah 4, that none of the occult arts mentioned in these halachot are anything more than figments of human imagination, nor do they have any effect in this world. Other authorities (Rashi, Deuteronomy 18:11, based on Sanhedrin 65b; the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 179:5) interpret this as referring to a snake-charmer — i.e., someone whose chants actually do have an effect.

Punishment is not administered for a transgression unless a deed is committed, and speech is not generally considered to be a deed. Thus, unless the person performs a deed while chanting, he is not liable for lashes.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 35) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 512) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

When it is forbidden to engage in unnecessary conversation (Kessef Mishneh).

Rav Kapach offers a unique interpretation of this law. He explains that we are forbidden to call a person to cast spells even in the face of a danger to life. What the Rambam (based on Sanhedrin 101a) is saying is that we may pretend to cast a spell over the snakebite (knowing that it is nonsense) in order to settle the victim’s feelings.

Note Hilchot Teshuvah 3:8, which states that those who deny the Torah do not have a portion in the world to come. Sanhedrin 90a states that a person who whispers an incantation over a wound, then spits, and then recites a verse from the Torah, will not receive a portion in the world to come.

The Siftei Cohen 179:18 explains that the prohibition applies only when one expects the mystic power of the verses alone to heal. If, however, one views God as the source of all cures and recites the verses in order to increase one’s merit, there is no prohibition involved even when a person is already sick. As mentioned in the note below, this opinion is accepted throughout the Jewish community.

Our Sages have elaborated at length on the unique merit of reciting Psalms. In all Jewish communities throughout the world, whenever there is a danger to an individual or to the community, it is customary to gather together to recite Psalms. In certain communities, it is customary to recite a portion of Psalms every day according to a standard division which allows the entire book of Psalms to be completed in a week or in a month. (See “On Saying Tehillim,” Kehot Publications.)

The commentaries cite the practice of reciting Kri’at Shema before retiring as an example of such a practice. (See also Sh’vuot 15b; Hilchot Tefillah 7:2.)

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 38) states that the mediums who try to contact the deceased are the ones who are “in truth dead, even though they eat and are sensitive.”

Punishment is administered only when a deed is committed.

Sefer HaMitzvot (ibid.) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 515) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Chapter 6, Halachot 1 and 2, describe the prohibitions involved with practicing divination with an ov and yid’oni, and relate that these prohibitions are punishable by death. The present halachah mentions two new prohibitions (Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandments 36 and 37; Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvot 513 and 514): to inquire of such mediums.

As mentioned above, punishment is administered for violating a Torah commandment only when a deed is committed, and speech is not considered to be a deed. Accordingly, punishment is not administered for merely inquiring of such a medium. If, however, one commits a deed, it is.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 34) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 511) consider this prohibition to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Our translation follows the Rambam’s opinion (stated openly in the following halachah) that all these occult arts are of no avail and cannot have any effect on reality. Thus, the latter phrase refers to a person who commits a deed performed by sorcerers in an attempt to practice their craft.
It must, however, be noted that the simple interpretation of Sanhedrin 67a is that a person who actually performs a deed through sorcery is executed. One who merely appears to do so is given stripes for rebelliousness.

The commentaries note the apparent contradiction between this halachah and Halachah 9, which states that a person who deludes others into thinking that he has performed a wondrous act is punished by lashes. Among the attempted resolutions of this difficulty are:
a) The person receives two sets of lashes: one for violating the prohibition against divination and one for violating the prohibition against sorcery (Kessef Mishneh).
b) The Rambam is referring to two types of delusion. Thus, in Halachah 9, he speaks of fooling the people into thinking that he “performs wonders,” while in this halachah he does not use such phraseology. The prohibition against divination involves attempting to impress the common people of one’s occult powers in order to exercise one’s authority over them. In contrast, sorcery involves fooling people into believing that one has performed an extraordinary act (Maharik, Responsum 76).

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:1.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:7), the Rambam writes that idol worship and the occult arts were used by the gentiles to impress the common people and allow the pagan priests to exert authority over them.

Nonetheless, as he writes in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 4:7), the Rambam recognized that many “pious and good men of the Torah” shared this perspective.
Note the introduction which precedes Halachah 4 where the Rambam’s views — and those of the Torah authorities who held different perspectives — are explained at length.

See the Rama, Yoreh De’ah 179:1. Note also the Ramban’s commentary to this verse in the Torah where he explains that the verse does not forbid consulting the prophets about the future. On the contrary, it is a mitzvah to consult them even in regard to our personal affairs. In that context, note the Rambam’s comments in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 10:3.