One who was reading a sacred book in scroll form on Shabbat on an elevated, wide threshold and the book rolled from his hand outside and into the public domain, he may roll it back to himself, since one of its ends is still in his hand. However, if he was reading on top the roof, which is a full-fledged private domain, and the book rolled from his hand, as long as the edge of the book did not reach ten handbreadths above the public domain, the book is still in its own area, and he may roll it back to himself. However, once the book has reached within ten handbreadths above the public domain, he is prohibited to roll it back to himself. In that case, he may only turn it over onto the side with writing, so that the writing of the book should face down and should not be exposed and degraded. And we discussed this halakha: Why must he turn it over onto the side with writing, and he is prohibited to bring the book back to himself? Didn’t the book not yet come to rest upon a defined area in the public domain? Even if he brought it back it would not constitute lifting. הָיָה קוֹרֵא בַּסֵּפֶר עַל הָאִיסְקוּפָּה וְנִתְגַּלְגֵּל הַסֵּפֶר מִיָּדוֹ — גּוֹלְלוֹ אֶצְלוֹ. הָיָה קוֹרֵא בְּרֹאשׁ הַגָּג וְנִתְגַּלְגֵּל הַסֵּפֶר מִיָּדוֹ, עַד שֶׁלֹּא הִגִּיעַ לַעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים — גּוֹלְלוֹ אֶצְלוֹ. מִשֶּׁהִגִּיעַ לַעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים — הוֹפְכוֹ עַל הַכְּתָב. וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: אַמַּאי הוֹפְכוֹ עַל הַכְּתָב? הָא לָא נָח!
And Rava said: It is referring to the case of an inclined wall. Because it is inclined, the scroll is resting upon it to some degree. However, that answer is not effective in explaining the case of gathering water. Say that Rava said that the legal status of the slanted wall is different, specifically with regard to a book, as it is wont to come to rest upon an inclined wall. In contrast, is water wont to come to rest upon an inclined wall? It continues flowing. Consequently, the question with regard to water remains. וְאָמַר רָבָא: בְּכוֹתֶל מְשׁוּפָּע. אֵימוֹר דְּאָמַר רָבָא בְּסֵפֶר, דַּעֲבִיד דְּנָיַיח, מַיִם מִי עֲבִידִי דְּנָיְיחִי?!
Rather, Rava said: Here, it is referring to a case where he gathered the rainwater from on top of a hole filled with water. The Gemara asks: If he gathered it from on top of a hole, it is obvious that it is considered like lifting from a significant place. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since the water that comes down from the roof into the hole it is water on top of water and, perhaps, it is not considered placing. Therefore, he taught us that collecting water from on top of a hole filled with water is considered an act of lifting an object from its placement. אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁקָּלַט מֵעַל גַּבֵּי גּוּמָּא. גּוּמָּא פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא מַיִם עַל גַּבֵּי מַיִם לָאו הַנָּחָה הוּא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara comments: And Rava follows his standard line of reasoning, as Rava already said: It is obvious to me that water on top of water, that is its placement, and lifting the water from there is an act of lifting in every sense. It is also obvious that if a nut is floating on top of water, that is not considered its placement, and therefore lifting it from there is not considered an act of lifting. However, Rava raised a dilemma: In a case where a nut is in a vessel, and that vessel is floating on top of water, and one lifted the nut from the vessel, is that considered an act of lifting? The sides of the dilemma are: Do we go according to the nut and the halakha is decided exclusively based on its status, and it is at rest in the vessel? Or perhaps, we go according to the vessel and it is not at rest, as it is moving from place to place on the surface of the water. This dilemma remained unresolved, and therefore let it stand. וְאָזְדָא רָבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: מַיִם עַל גַּבֵּי מַיִם — הַיְינוּ הַנָּחָתָן. אֱגוֹז עַל גַּבֵּי מַיִם — לָאו הַיְינוּ הַנָּחָתוֹ. בָּעֵי רָבָא: אֱגוֹז בִּכְלִי וּכְלִי צָף עַל גַּבֵּי מַיִם, בָּתַר אֱגוֹז אָזְלִינַן — וְהָא נָיַיח, אוֹ דִילְמָא בָּתַר כְּלִי אָזְלִינַן — וְהָא לָא נָיַיח, דְּנָיֵיד. תֵּיקוּ.
A similar dilemma was raised with regard to oil that was floating on top of wine. Oil does not mix with wine. Rather, it floats on top of it in a separate layer. Resolution of this dilemma is dependent on a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis. Is oil considered a discrete entity placed on the wine? Or, perhaps it is considered to be connected to the wine? As we learned in a mishna: Oil that was floating on top of wine and one who immersed himself during the day touched the oil, he disqualified only the oil alone and not the wine, as he only touched the oil and the oil does not render the wine impure. And Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: They both are considered connected to each other, and therefore they are both rendered impure through the same contact. The consideration of whether the oil and the wine are considered connected is the determining factor with regard to the laws of Shabbat as well. שֶׁמֶן שֶׁצָּף עַל גַּבֵּי יַיִן, מַחֲלוֹקֶת רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי וְרַבָּנַן. דִּתְנַן: שֶׁמֶן שֶׁצָּף עַל גַּבֵּי יַיִן וְנָגַע טְבוּל יוֹם בַּשֶּׁמֶן — לֹא פָּסַל אֶלָּא שֶׁמֶן בִּלְבַד. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵיהֶם מְחוּבָּרִים זֶה לָזֶה.

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Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Elai said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who was standing in the private domain or the public domain laden with food and drinks on Shabbat, and his intention was to carry them to another corner of the same domain, if once he began walking he changed his mind and exited that domain, and he enters and exits from domain to domain, even if he does so all day long, he is exempt by Torah law for carrying out on Shabbat until he stands still. Moving the object is not considered carrying out, since he did not intend from the outset to move himself in order to carry out. Therefore, only after he stands still can it be considered a bona fide placement, and only when he subsequently moves and walks would he incur liability. אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעַאי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָיָה טָעוּן אוֹכְלִים וּמַשְׁקִין, וְנִכְנָס וְיוֹצֵא כׇּל הַיּוֹם כּוּלּוֹ — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲמוֹד.
Abaye added and said: And that is specifically if he stopped to rest; then it is considered placement. However, if he stopped to adjust his burden, it is not considered placement. The Gemara comments: From where did Abaye arrive at this conclusion? From that which the Master said with regard to the laws of carrying in the public domain: Although, by Torah law, one who transfers an object four cubits in the public domain is liable, if while transferring the object he stopped to rest within four cubits, he is exempt. By stopping to rest, he performed an act of placement in the middle of the transfer. As a result, he did not carry the object four complete cubits. However, if he stopped to adjust the burden on his shoulders, he is liable, as stopping in order to adjust his burden is not considered an act of placement. It is considered an action required to facilitate the continued carrying of that burden. On the other hand, after he walked beyond four cubits, if he stopped to rest, he thereby performed an act of placement and completed the prohibited labor, and he is liable; if he stopped to adjust the burden on his shoulders, he is exempt. From this halakha, Abaye learned that only when one stops to rest is it considered an act of placement in terms of the prohibited labor of carrying on Shabbat. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: וְהוּא שֶׁעָמַד לָפוּשׁ. מִמַּאי — מִדְּאָמַר מָר תּוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת עָמַד לָפוּשׁ — פָּטוּר, לְכַתֵּף — חַיָּיב. חוּץ לְאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, עָמַד לָפוּשׁ — חַיָּיב. לְכַתֵּף — פָּטוּר.
With regard to the essence of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s halakha about entering and exiting all day long, the Gemara asks: What principle is he teaching us with this halakha? Is it to teach that one is exempt from bringing a sin-offering for performing the prohibited labor of carrying out on Shabbat when the lifting of the object from its place from the first moment was not for that purpose of carrying out, but for another purpose? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan already say it once? As Rav Safra said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who transfers objects from corner to corner in a private domain, and, while carrying them, he changed his mind about them and took them out to the public domain, he is exempt because the lifting at the first moment was not for that purpose of carrying out to another domain. Why, then, was it necessary to repeat the same halakha? The Gemara answers: They are different amora’im who transmitted this matter. One Sage said it in this language and one Sage said it in that language. They chose different halakhot to relate the principle that Rabbi Yoḥanan stated a single time. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? — שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה עֲקִירָה מִשָּׁעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה לְכָךְ? הָא אַמְרַהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן חֲדָא זִימְנָא! דְּאָמַר רַב סָפְרָא אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמַּעֲבִיר חֲפָצִים מִזָּוִית לְזָוִית, וְנִמְלַךְ עֲלֵיהֶן וְהוֹצִיאָן — פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה עֲקִירָה מִשָּׁעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה לְכָךְ. אָמוֹרָאֵי נִינְהוּ, מָר אָמַר לַהּ בְּהַאי לִישָּׁנָא, וּמָר אָמַר לַהּ בְּהַאי לִישָּׁנָא.
Since the issue of interruptions in the performance of the prohibited labor of carrying out was mentioned above, the Gemara proceeds to discuss a more complex related issue. The Sages taught in a baraita: One who carries an object out from a store, which is a private domain, to a plaza [pelatia], which is a public domain, by way of a colonnade [setav], which is situated between the store and the public domain and whose legal status is that of a karmelit, is liable, as he carried out from the private domain to the public domain. And ben Azzai deems him exempt. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲנוּת לִפְלַטְיָא דֶּרֶךְ סְטָיו — חַיָּיב. וּבֶן עַזַּאי פּוֹטֵר.
The Gemara clarifies the opinions. Granted, the opinion of ben Azzai makes sense, as he holds that walking is considered like standing. In other words, with each step, he is considered as if he came to a complete stop. Therefore, as he walked through the colonnade, which is neither a public domain nor a private domain, he came to rest there. Consequently, he did not carry from a private domain to a public domain; he carried into and out of a karmelit. However, the Rabbis, although they hold that walking is not considered like standing, their opinion is difficult. Where do we find a comparable case where one is liable? There is no direct transfer from domain to domain. The transfer is via a domain where there is no Torah prohibition. Where do we find that the Torah deemed one who carried out in that manner liable? בִּשְׁלָמָא בֶּן עַזַּאי, קָסָבַר מְהַלֵּךְ כְּעוֹמֵד דָּמֵי. אֶלָּא רַבָּנַן, נְהִי נָמֵי דְּקָסָבְרִי מְהַלֵּךְ לָאו כְּעוֹמֵד דָּמֵי, הֵיכָא אַשְׁכַּחְנָא כְּהַאי גַּוְונָא דְּחַיָּיב?
Rav Safra said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That is not an exceptional case, אָמַר רַב סָפְרָא אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: